Fw: [NDS] (very long) nagarjuna/jaspers

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- tmurphy (AT) aloha (DOT) net

NondualitySalon

Sunday, August 05, 2001 7:27 AM

[NDS] (very long) nagarjuna/jaspers

read for nagarjuna, and then jaspersthe following is from Karl

Jaspers, "Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides,Plotinus, Lao-tzu,

Nagarjuna," (from "The Great Philosphers: The OriginalThinkers, Vol

II") pp115-132:NAGARJUNA Roughly from the first to the eighth

century A.D. a philosophy based onlogical operations grew up in

India, both among the Hindus (the Nyayaschool) and among the sects of

Mahayana Buddhism. The most famous of theBuddhist thinkers were

Nagarjuna (roughly second century A.D.), Asanga,Vasubandhu, Dignaga,

Dharmakirti (seventh century). The literature has comedown to us not

in its original form but in later works, which became thefundamental

texts of philosophical Buddhism, especially in China. In this world

of dialectical logic as the conscious expression of a wayof life, the

Shunyavadin, the sect to which Nagarjuna belonged, drew themost

radical conclusions from the assumptions common to all Buddhist

sects.All is empty, they taught. Things have only a momentary,

phantom existencewithout permanent substance. Consequently true

knowledge lies in Emptiness.I acquire it by detachment, that is, by a

thinking that is free from signsand signification, stirred by no

inclination or goal. This doctrine iscalled the "diamond-splitting

Perfection of Wisdom"; it also calls itselfthe middle way

(*madhyamika*) between the two theses that life is and thatlife is

not: emptiness (*shunya vada*) has neither being nor nonbeing.Perfect

Wisdom lies in perfect freedom from conflict. We gain an idea of

this philosophy from two books, *Prajnaparamita* and*Nagarjuna*. They

have been translated from Chinese and Tibetan; theSanskrit originals

have been lost. Along with these works we must alsoconsider a few

passages in the *Sutra of the Forty-two Chapters*. We cangain little

idea of Nagarjuna as an individual. We know him only as

arepresentative of this extreme possibility of transcending

metaphysics bymeans of metaphysics.I. THE OPERATIONS OF THOUGHT1. *A

fundamental concept* in this thinking is *dharma*. All existence

is*dharma*. *Dharma* is thing, attribute, state; it is content

andconsciousness of content; it is subject and object, order,

creation, law,and doctrine. The underlying conception is 'that the

content of the world isnot an established order or form, but a

process of ordering and form-giving,and that every order must make

way for another order, every form for anotherform' (Oldenberg).

Although each *dharma* is independent, the dharmas arelisted, some

seventy-five of them, to form a system of categories. Dharmahas as

many meanings as our Occidental "Being." The word cannot

hetranslated, because its meanings are all-embracing.2. *The goal* of

this thinking is stated to be "*nonattachment*" to the*dharmas*. By

not accepting them, not apprehending them, by breaking freefrom them,

I attain Perfect Wisdom. Consequently the Enlightened One(Bodhisattva)

will stand outside appearance, outside sensation, outsideconcepts,

outside forms, and outside consciousness" (Pr. 37). Children and

common men cling to the *dharmas*. Though the *dharmas* arenot real,

they form images of them. After imagining them, men cling to nameand

form. Not so the Enlightened One: in learning, a Bodhisattva does

notlearn any harm. "To him the *dharmas* are present in a different

way." Detachment requires a last step, I might suppose that at

least thedoctrine exists, that this one *dharma* has being, that the

Buddha existed,that the Bodhisattva who attains Perfection of Wisdom

exists. Are they notreality? No, this too is empty. "I do not see

that *dharma* Bodhisattva, nora *dharma* called Perfect Wisdom"

(35-53). Perfection of Wisdom cannot beperceived, is not present as

an existing thing. For we cannot speak ofappearance in the face of

that which is nonperception of appearance, norspeak of consciousness

where there is no awareness of sensation, concept,form. This is the

fundamental and radical idea: to detach myself from allthings and

then from detachment; to cling to nothing.3. *The instrument* of this

thinking is the dialectic as it had beendeveloped by Indian loglc.

Such dialectic alone enables me to understand andachieve complete

detachment. It breaks down every concept, undermining itsapplication

to an object. These operations, in which Nagarjuna wasparticularly

ingenious, became in their turn a kind of doctrine. Let uscarry out a

few of them: a) *All designations are meaningless*: When I speak, I

suppose that thesigns (*nimitta*) I employ "signify" things. If for

example I wish to speakof becoming and perishing, I first devise

different signs. But designationand differentiation lead us into

error. Designation and thing designatedcannot be one nor can they be

different. For if they were one the word wouldburn when we said fire.

If they were different, there could be nodesignation without a thing

designated, and conversely no thing designatedwithout a designation;

hence they cannot be different. Thus designation andthing designated

are neither the same nor different; thus in my discoursethey are

nothing at all. But if the designation is said to be a mirrorimage,

as a mere image it is again false. Thus what is thought

anddifferentiated under a false designation cannot truly exist.

Since designation and thing designated can be neither one nor

different,distinctions between things designated - such as coming and

going, becomingand perishing - are also untenable. To live by signs is

to live in illusion,far from Perfect Wisdom. But every man lives by

signs when he lives in therealm of appearance - whether he assumes

that "appearance is a sign," orthat "appearance is empty," when he

lives in the assumption "I live" or "Iam conscious." With the

resources of language there is no escape from speech

throughsignification (signs). Every sentence ensnares me anew in what

I was tryingto escape from. b) *To judge by the evidence, everything

is and at the same time is not*:A11 statements can be proved or

refuted by reference to evidence. As aninstance: "Perishing" is

untenable, for in the world things are seen to beimperishable, for

example: the rice exists today because it has alwaysexisted. Since it

is present, there is no "perishing.Becoming" is alsountenable: in

the world all things are seen to be "unproduced." And in thesame

vein: Destruction is not, for the rice plant sprouts from the

seed.Since becoming is perceived, there is no destruction. On the

other wayaround: There is no eternity, because eternal things do not

occur in theworld: at sprouting time the rice seed is not seen. Thus

one thing afteranother is demonstrated by evidence: things are not

one, they are notdifferent; there is no coming, there is no going,

etc. This notion is based on the fact that all categories can be

foundsomewhere in the world. Instead of asking where certain

categories apply andwhere they do not apply, the author shows that

they are always applicable incertain respects; then he goes on to

endow them with absolute validity, andonce they are taken as

absolutely valid, he easily disproves them. c) *How being and

nonbeing are refuted*: Being is, nothing is not. Thisposition as well

as the contention that nothing exists, is rejected byNagarjuna. He

takes the following steps, each time setting up a thesis andrefuting

it to make way for a new thesis which is refuted in turn. 1):

*Things exist independently*. No, for to exist independently means

tohave come into being without causes and conditions. All things owe

theirexistence to causes and conditions. Consequently, nothing

existsindependently, everything exists through something else. 2):

*If there is no independent existence, then at least there

isotherness*. No, for if there is no independent existence, what

would be thesource of otherness? It is an error to call the

independent existence ofanother thing otherness. If there is no

independent being, there is also nootherness. 3): *Even without

independent being and otherness, there must be things*.This is

impossible. For what being can there be without being-as-such

andbeing-different? Consequently: Only where there are being-as-such

andbeing-different, is being attained. 4): *Then there is

nonbeing*. Not at all. For without being there can beno nonbeing.

What people call nonbeing is only the otherness of a being. Thecore

of the idea is the demonstration that both being and nonbeing

areequally impossible. If there were being-as-such (independent

being), its nonbeing would notbe. Never can something that is in

itself become other. If there reallyexists something that is in

itself, otherness is not possible. But if thereis no being-as-such,

in relation to what can there be otherness or nonbeing?It follows

that both being and nonbeing are untenable. Thus the follower

ofPerfect Wisdom must take neither being nor nonbeing as his

foundation, hemust assert neither that the world is eternal nor that

it is perishable. Those who see being-as-such and being-otherwise,

being and nonbeing, havefailed to understand the teachings of the

Buddha. When the Buddha refutesbeing, men infer falsely that he

asserts nonbeing. When the Buddha refutesnonbeing, it is falsely

inferred that he asserts being. Actually, he refutedthem both, and

both views must be abandoned. d): The technique of refutation

consists in methodically demonstratingthat every possible statement

can and must be refuted: "The Sankhyas assumethat cause and effect

are one; thus, to refute them, assert: they are notone. The

Vaisesikas assume that cause and effect are different; thus torefute

them, assert: they are not different." This method crystallized

into a typical formula, which consisted inconsidering four

possibilities one at a time and in rejecting them all: 1.Something

is. 2. It is not. 3. It both is and is not. 4. It neither is noris

not. Thus every possibility of a final valid statement is excluded.

The consequence is that everything can be formulated negatively

andpositively. The Buddha taught one thing and the opposite as well.

Not onlyis the opposition between true and false transcended but also

the oppositeof this opposition. In the end no definite statement is

possible. The fourstatements are repeated and rejected in connection

with each *dharma*. Forexample: There is an end; there is no end;

there is and is not an end; theend neither is nor is not. Or: After

Nirvana the Buddha exists; he does notexist; he exists and does not

exist; he neither exists nor does not exist. e): *What is refuted*:

The operation is constantly repeated, but thecontent varies - modes of

thought, opinions, statements, in short, thecategories of Indian

philosophy, are refuted in turn. Just as the nature ofa flame depends

on the kind of fuel consumed, so the operation of refutationdepends on

what is refuted. Many of these categories are familiar to us,others

are not; but it must not be forgotten that translation obscures

thespecifically Indian coloration of such concepts as being and

nonbeing,becoming and perishing, causality, time, matter, self,

etc.*Summary of the Doctrine* a) There are two truths: the veiled

worldly truth and the highest truth.According to the veiled truth,

all the *dharmas* have a cause. According tothe highest truth, they

are perceived to be without cause. But the highesttruth cannot be

obtained independently of the veiled truth. And Nirvana isnot

obtained without the highest truth. Thus the Buddha's doctrine

isdependent on two truths, or in other words, the true can be

attained onlythrough the false. But this path can be traveled only

with the help ofenlightenment, which comes to me from the highest

truth. Thanks to thisenlightenment, I cease, even in my thinking of

the inherently empty*dharmas*, to accept the illusion of the world;

even while I think the*dharmas* and participate in them, I cease to

cling to them. b) Thus the one is conceived in terms of two truths.

But this conceptionleads to two opposed views: all things do and do

not possess independentbeing. If things exist independently and as

such, they are without cause andcondition, then there is no cause and

no effect, no action and no agent, nobecoming and no perishing. If

things are held to be nonexistent, all becomesphantasm. Nagarjuna

rejects both these views in favor of "Emptiness." Thingsdo not exist

eternally in themselves, but at the same time they are notnothing.

They are midway between being and nonbeing, but they are empty.There

is no *dharma* that has come into being independently, hence

all*dharmas* are empty. Nagarjuna calls this the doctrine of

"conditioned becoming." For him itis an expression of the deepest

truth. But in formulating it, he iscompelled to employ terms that are

inadequate from the standpoint of his ownmethod, as when he sums up

the doctrine: "Without becoming, also withoutperishing, not eternal,

also not cut-off, not one, also not differentiated,without coming,

also without going - who can thus teach conditionedbecoming, the

quiet extinction of development: before him I bow my head." This

view of the emptiness of things in "conditioned becoming" saves

thereality of the conquest of suffering, the reality of the way. For

if therewere independent being, there would be no coming-into-being

and nopassing-away. What exists through itself, cannot come into

being and willendure forever. Thus if there is independent being,

nothing further can beattained, nothing more can be done, because

everything already exists. Ifthere were independent being, living

creatures would be free of diversity.There would be no suffering. But

if things are empty, there is becoming andperishing, action and

accomplishment. To contest the emptiness of things isto contest their

actuality in the world. Suffering is a reality preciselybecause it

does not exist in itself and is not eternal. c) This has an amazing

consequence, which is clearly formulated: Ifnothing authentically is,

must we not infer the nonexistence of the Buddha,of the doctrine, of

knowledge, of ritual practice, of the congregation, ofmonks, of the

Sages who have attained the goal? The answer is that they doexist in

emptiness, which is neither being nor nonbeing. Because there

isemptiness, the Buddha exists. If things were not empty, if there

were nobecoming, no perishing, and no suffering, there would be no

Buddha; norwould there be his doctrine of suffering, the negation of

suffering, and theway to the negation of suffering. If suffering

existed independently, itcould not be destroyed. If the way existed

in itself, it would not bepossible to travel it, for eternal being

precludes motion and development.If we postulate independent being,

there is nothing more to be achieved.Hence the Buddha, his teaching,

and what is achieved by his teaching are allin emptiness. Only when a

man sees all the *dharmas* as conditioned becomingin emptiness, can he

see the doctrine of the Buddha, the Four Noble Truths,and transcend

suffering. Those who take the Buddha's doctrine of unsubstantiality

as an argumentagainst that same doctrine, have not understood it.

Their argument ceases toapply if all thought, representation, and

being are seen in emptiness. Those who accept emptiness accept

everything, the worldly and thetranscendent. To those who do not

accept emptiness, nothing is acceptable. Those who differentiate

the four views of the logical schema move inveiled truth. They are

beset by many kinds of representations. They stillcling to the

alternative: "If this is true, the other is false." But forthose in

whom the eye of Perfect Wisdom has opened, the four views disappear.

The spiritual eye of those who suppose that they see the Buddha

throughdevelopments such as: being-nonbeing, eternal-not eternal,

body-spirit,etc., has been injured by these developments. They no

more see the Buddhathan a man born blind sees the sun. But those who

see conditioned becoming,see suffering, its coming-into-being and the

manner of its annihilation,that is, they see the way, just as a man

endowed with eyes is enabled by theshining of a light to see the

appearances of things.II. THE MEANING OF THE DOCTRINE1.

*Teachability*: Insofar as this method of refuting every assertion

ofbeing or nonbeing is represented as universally valid, we have

before us adoctrine. As such it has been called negativism or

nihilism. But this is notcorrect. For what this doctrine seeks is an

authentic truth which cannotitself becomedoctrine: Hence, all its

operations end in paradoxical statements thatcancel each other out

and so point to something else: "The Buddha says: Mydoctrine is to

think the thought that is unthinkable, to practise the deedthat is

not-doing, to speak the speech that is inexpressible, and to

betrained in the discipline that is beyond discipline" (*The Sutra of

theForty-two Chapters*, 18). Actually, the doctrine was set forth as

a doctrine, both orally and inwriting, and was also reflected in

exercises and in ethical practice. "ABodhisattva must above all hear

this Perfection of Wisdom, take it up, bearit in mind, recite, study,

spread, demonstrate, explain and write it" (Pr.36-38). But this is

only the first stage. Hearing the doctrine, the monk whois not yet at

the goal "follows his trust" (Pr. 38). He is not yet in thetruth. The

truth is not arrived at by any knowable, logically determinedcontent,

but "awakens suddenly to unexcelled perfect enlightenment" (Pr. 41).

This process of hearing and learning until the truth itself is kindled

isa process of thought which seizes upon the whole man. The operations

as suchleave nothing in place, they confuse the mind and make it

dizzy.Accordingly: "If, hearing these thoughts, he is not alarmed and

does nottake fright .... if in the presence of such a doctrine he does

not sink downin terror, if the backbone of his mind is not broken . .

.. then this manshould be instructed in the Perfection of Wisdom" (Pr.

35, 77). Reading the texts, we see that the doctrine consists in

practice, inconstant repetition, and that this repetition with

variations creates a moodof its own which is in keeping with the

content of the doctrine. The logicalelement itself is seldom clearly

and systematically developed. The dialectictakes the form of mere

lists. This is perhaps appropriate to the mode ofthought. For this

negative logic prepares the way, not for a positiveinsight developed

in logical terms, but for a silence filled from anothersource. Here

all reasoning annuls itself. This is illustrated by a number of

anecdotes (related after Hackmann).Bodhidharma asked his disciples

why they did not express their experience.All the answers are

correct, but each in succession comes closer to theauthentic truth.

The first disciple says that the experience is unrelated tospoken

words, though associated with them in instruction. The second:

Theexperience is like a paradise, but vanishes immediately and

therefore cannotbe expressed. The third: Since all existing things

have only an illusoryexistence, the content of his experience, once

framed in words, would bemere illusion and emptiness. The fourth,

instead of answering, steps beforethe master in an attitude of

veneration, and keeps silence. The last hasgiven the truest answer

and becomes the patriarch's successor. - Or:Bodhidharma speaks with

the Emperor Liang Wu Ti. The Emperor says: I havenever ceased to

build temples, to commission the writing of sacred books, togive new

monks permission to enter monasteries. What is my merit ? - None

atall. All this is only the shadow that follows the object and is

without truebeing. - The Emperor: What then is true merit? - To be

surrounded byemptiness and stillness, immersed in thought. Such merit

cannot be gained byworldly means. - The Emperor: What is the most

important of the holydoctrines? - In a world that is utterly empty,

nothing can be called holy. -The Emperor: Who is it who confronts me

thus? - I do not know. But now the question arises: Not finding,

not perceiving, not seeing aPerfection of Wisdom, what Perfection of

Wisdom should I teach? Answer:Practice in such a way that in

exercising you do not pride yourself on theidea of illumination. This

thought is pure, for it is in fact nonthought.But because this thought

of Perfect Wisdom is nonthought, is it thereforenonexistent? The

answer: In a nonthought there is neither being nornonbeing; hence it

is impossible to ask whether the thought that isnonthought exists

(Pr. 35).2. *The purpose of the operations*: This thinking demands

that we shouldnever hold fast to a position but free ourselves from

all assertions, thatwe should not rely on any *dharma*, neither on

sound nor tangible things northoughts nor representations, that we

should shatter all explanations, for"what is explained is precisely

not explained" (Pr. 149). Consequently, weshould admit no alternative

thinking, no decision between opposites, but letall differentiations

cancel themselves out. There is no limit, no ultimatepoint of rest,

but only, through the failure of thought, a transcending ofthought

into a more-than-thought, into the Perfection of Wisdom. Theemptiness

that is arrived at by compelling thought will awaken the

infinitemeaning of the unthinkable. Thus thinking becomes a

perpetual overturning of thoughts. Everystatement as such is absurd.

All statement is self-negating. But thisself-negation can kindle the

truth. The authentic truth can become manifestonly by negating itself

in statement. Thus the way leads through a truthwhich when thought is

no truth, to the truth which is manifested in ceasingto be thought.

This authentic truth is a thinking that lives by thecombustion of

provisional truth. But what is this nonthought attained by thought,

this liberation from allliberations? The answer: Apprehending that

which cannot be apprehended, itis itself not apprehended, for it can

no longer be apprehended by signs (Pr.38). When he has arrived at

that point, the Bodhisattva "stands fast in thesense of not-standing"

(Pr. 48); "he will not stand somewhere; in PerfectWisdom he will stand

in the mode of not-standing." The teacher of this doctrine

contradicts himself whenever he speaks, andsuch self-contradiction

becomes a deliberate method. Questioned from thestandpoint of any

*dharma* whatsoever, he can always find a way out. Becausehe is

independent of all the *dharmas* he does not, in speaking, come

intocontradiction with the essence of his doctrine, although he does

contradictall statements, even his own. Consequently, every false

statement isjustified, because statement as such is always false.

This thinking may be interpreted as follows: Through thinking man

hasbecome fettered to the thought content, the *dharmas*; this is the

reasonfor our fall into the suffering of existence. Through the same

thinking, butin the opposite direction, the thought content is

dissolved. Fettered bythought, we employ the weapons of thought to

destroy its fetters and sopenetrate to the freedom of nonthought.

Nagarjuna strives to think the unthinkable and to say the ineffable.

Heknows this and tries to unsay what he has said. Consequently he

moves inself-negating operations of thought. The obvious logical

flaws in the textsare only in part mistakes that can be corrected;

for the rest, they arelogically necessary, resulting from an attempt

to do the impossible -namely, to express absolute truth. In

Nagarjuna's thinking we may find a formal analogy on the one hand

tothe dialectics of the second part of Plato's Parmenides, and on the

otherhand to modern symbolic logic (Wittgenstein). Symbolic logic

might beemployed as a means of systematically correcting the mistakes

which, in theIndian texts as in the far more highly developed thinking

of Plato'sParmenides, are so disturbing to modern Occidentals. Only

occasionally doesthe logical operation effected in the Indian texts

break through the mistsin full clarity. But on the other hand, these

Indian philosophers, as wellas Plato, raise the question: What is the

meaning of these purely logicalendeavors? Only in Wittgenstein do I

find an inkling of what it might meanto carry thought, by pure

thought free from error, to the limit where itshatters. Amid the

clarity which is possible today, but which as mereclarity remains an

empty pastime, the depth that is discernible in theIndian texts for

all their cloudiness might well become a spur toself-reflection.3.

*The uses of logic*: To the analytic mind which thinks in terms

ofalternatives, such concepts as motion, time, the One are

unthinkable. In theWestern world the search for logical operations

with which these problems,always under specific assumptions, can in

some measure be mastered, hasopened up magnificent fields of finite

knowledge, in which even theinfinite, in certain forms or under

certain aspects, has become aninstrument of finite thinking. In

India the barest beginnings were made toward the consideration

ofthese problems. These beginnings served an entirely different

purpose fromthe solution of specific problems (a purpose which might,

in view of thesubtle logical insights of recent centuries, be revived

in a sense whichtoday cannot be foreseen). Operations which shatter

all definite statements, so that everythingdissolves into otherness,

opposition, contradiction, so that alldeterminations vanish and no

position stands fast, must ultimately leadeither to nothingness or to

an intimation of authentic being, even if it canno longer be called

being. Or to put it in another way: The end is either aplayful

concern with "problems" or a state of mind which in such methodsfinds

a means of understanding and actualizing the self, an attitude

ofperfect superiority to the world, of perfect detachment from all

things andfrom one's own existence, and hence of perfect superiority

to oneself. In Asia the visible embodiment of this way of thinking

may be a monasticlife of meditation enhanced by practice, or it may

take the form of ritesand cults, magic and gestures. But the

dialectic of the philosophers servedneither the one nor the other.

Within these embodiments, its aim wasnegative: the rejection of all

metaphysics as a knowledge of another,objective being distinct from

myself (as in the Hindu system); and positive:the acquisition of

Perfect Wisdom which may be termed nonthought, becausethrough thought

it has become more-than-thought.4. *Against metaphysics*: Nagarjuna

rejects all metaphysical thinking. Herejects the creation of the

world, whether by a God (Isvara) or by*purusha*, whether by time or

by itself. He opposes attachment to all fixedconcepts - of

attributes, being as such, atoms, etc.; he opposes the viewthat

everything will be destroyed and the view that everything is

eternal;he rejects the notion of the self. The metaphysics he has

rejected is replaced by this logical thinking.Buddha's fundamental

attitude, the rejection of ontological questions infavor of salvation

and the truth necessary for this salvation, is carried toits logical

conclusion. The earlier ontological speculation becomes

aclarification through movements of thought which cancel each other

out. Over a period of centuries Indian philosophy had elaborated a

rich logic.But this logic had been intended for public discussion and

worldly science.Even in later centuries certain Tibetan sects looked

upon logic as a worldlydiscipline (Stcherbatsky). But here logic

became a means of union withauthentic being, not through ontological

knowledge but through a processwhich consists in the self-combustion

of thought itself. This thinking can only destroy metaphysical

ideas, it cannot producethem. It finds no home, either in the world

or in a cogitated realm oftranscendence. Metaphysical speculation is

extinct, mythical thinking hasbecome meaningless. But as long as the

world endures, metaphysics and mythremain; they are the fuel which

must forever be consumed anew. Stcherbatsky contrasts the Buddhist

antimetaphysical philosophy with themetaphysical philosophy of the

Vedanta. Both deny the reality of the world.But though the Buddhist

denies the reality of the world of appearance, heremains within it,

because beyond it begins a realm that is inaccessible toour insight.

The Vedantist on the other hand denies the reality of the worldof

appearance only in order to establish the true being of Brahman.

TheBuddhist says: Knowledge is undivided; only to our deluded eye

does itpresent itself in the cleavage of subject and object. The

Vedantist says,however: The whole world is a simple substance that

never ceases; thedivision of consciousness into subject and object is

mere illusion.5. *The state of Perfect Wisdom*: It is called freedom

from conflict. Thethinking which, forever in conflict, negates every

statement, is directedtoward the place where all conflict ceases,

where "dwells" the unconflicting(Pr. 36, 54). The seeker after wisdom

is bidden to "dwell in theunconflicting." What kind of state is this?

It is described: when the work is done and the task carried out,

theburden is cast off; that is the goal. Thoughts are made free,

mastery overall thought is gained in the detached knowledge which

masters itself. Thefetters of existence have vanished, impurities

fall away, freedom fromtorment is achieved (Pr. 34). Through

passion and the deception of signs, all the dharmas bring

aboutsuffering. Once the emptiness of suffering is perceived, it is

overcome. Nowman has achieved a state free both from illusion and

from torment. In thisperfect peace the emptiness of the *dharmas*

does not cease to exist, but Iam no longer touched by them, they have

lost their terrors, their poison,their power. In emptiness I gain

awareness of that to which signs such asbirth and death no longer

apply, of something motionless, for which allcoming and going have

lost their meaning. This attitude is not what is ordinarily known

as skepticism. For theoperations of thought which lead beyond the

antinomy of true and false, thatis, beyond thought, also carry it

beyond dogmatism and skepticism. To callit negativism is to fail to

see that here the no as well as the yes hasvanished. To call it

nihilism is to forget that the alternative betweenbeing and

nothingness has been dismissed. How in Perfect Wisdom "being" is

experienced as the emptiness of theworld is illustrated in images. To

the Bodhisattva all things are like anecho, he does not think them, he

does not see them, he does not know them(Pr. 75). He lives in the

world as in the "emptiness of a city of ghosts"(Nag. 27). The

"illusory nature" of things, the fact that they at once areand are

not (and are adequately conceived in none of the four views),

iscompared with the materializations (regarded as real in India) of a

magician(Pr. 46): a magician at a crossroads conjures up a large crowd

of people andmakes them disappear again; so is the world. No one has

been killed ordestroyed by the magician; so without destroying them,

the Bodhisattva makesmultitudes of beings disappear. The

Bodhisattva knows, sees, and believes all things by virtue of

aconcept which is contained neither in the concept of a thing

(*dharma*) norof a non-thing (*adharma*). The right attitude would be

achieved by one whocould fully explain lines like the following: "The

stars, darkness, a light,an illusion, dew, a bubble, a dream, a

streak of lightning, a cloud" (Pr. 157). In keeping with this

attitude worldly values are disparaged. The Buddhais quoted as

saying: "In my eyes the dignity of a king or prince is no morethan a

grain of dust in the sun; in my eyes a treasure of gold and jewels

isno more than clay and shards . . . in my eyes the thousand systems

of thecosmos are no more than the fruit of the myrobalan . . . in my

eyes theritual objects (of Buddhism) are no more than a heap of

worthless treasures. . . in my eyes the path of the Buddhas is no

more than the sight of aflower . . . in my eyes Nirvana is no more

than a waking from sleep by dayor night . . . in my eyes the error

and truth (of the various schools) is nomore than the game of the six

dragons" (Hackmann). Are we entitled to say that the possessor of

such wisdom sees nothingbut a vast unutterable nothingness? That he

is submerged in the shorelessocean of the undifferentiated? We must

hesitate. The thinker whose aim isredemption from the fetters of the

*dharmas* is beyond our understanding andour judgment. "His way, like

that of the birds in the air, is hard tofollow" (Dhammapada 92). But

it is certain that in perversions of theoriginal thought futility and

meaninglessness soon make their appearance.6. *The perversions*: The

attitude of superiority to world and self in theemptiness of Perfect

Wisdom becomes ambiguous: Sovereign "emptiness" is open to every

fulfillment, hence never fulfilledin life and never at an end. One

who takes this attitude looks upon lifefrom a distance, countenances

fulfillment but never succumbs to it, acceptsit but is never moved.

Present, he is always beyond; in satisfaction heexperiences boundless

dissatisfaction, which receives only the reflectedradiance of the

realm against which all finite strivings shatter. Thus inthe temporal

world such an attitude, although sustained by quietness in thesource,

is open, that is, mobile, active, concerned, but all actions

areconsidered by a standard which destroys their reality. But this

emptinesscan be perverted. This occurs when all existence vanishes in

the quiet ofnothingness. Then my own existence shrivels in time,

because all fulfillmentis rejected in favor of an abstract

fulfillment of being-notbeing, ofemptiness, of quiet as such. When

the fuel of veiled truth is no longerpresent, the combustion process

leading to the unfathomable depths ofNirvana can no longer take

place. Along with the fuel, with the reality ofexistence, the

language of understanding vanishes; the consequence is a fallinto the

incommunicable. This possibility of perversion is seen in Western

terms. Thephilosophical texts of Nagarjuna describe the perversion of

Perfect Wisdomin a manner consonant with his own thinking. Since

everything that is saidfrom the standpoint of Perfect Wisdom is open

to misunderstanding, it isimmediately misused. Consequently, the

liberation of men in the course ofgenerations is not an advance;

rather, misunderstanding leads to ruin. On the whole the prognosis

is unfavorable. "After Buddha's Nirvana,after five hundred years in a

*dharma* that is mere imitation, after theminds of men have gradually

grown dull, they no longer recognize Buddha'smeaning and cling only to

words and written characters" (Nag. II, 2). Howdoes this come about?

They hear and speak of absolute emptiness but do notunderstand its

source. They express such skeptical thoughts as: If all isempty, how

can we distinguish the consequences of good and evil? They canask

such questions only from a worldly point of view, because for

theworldly there is no difference between worldly truth and absolute

truth. Inother words, what was intended speculatively they understand

as purposiveknowledge. In objectivizing thought, they lose the meaning

of the doctrineof emptiness, because, in their attachment to mere

logical propositions,they draw conclusions that have nothing to do

with emptiness. They fail tounderstand that to include the Buddha,

the doctrine, the congregation inemptiness, is not to deny them but

to consider them as *dharma* and as suchto bring them into a state of

suspension. Such a state of suspension ispossible only if we refrain

from absolutizing any representation, idea, orproposition. This is to

travel the true path, in *dharma*, toward thedisappearance of

suffering in Perfect Wisdom. Thus to look upon all thingsas without

absolute being is the profoundest elucidation of world and self.But

they lose this light by their attachment to the word of the

doctrine.Ceasing to take the doctrine as a sign, an indicator, and

looking upon it asan object of knowledge, they lose the thought.

Concern with the profound doctrine is salutary, but also dangerous.

Whenit is not properly understood, it kills. For if emptiness is

seenimperfectly, it leads those of little understanding not only into

error butinto destruction, just as poisonous snakes, if improperly

handled, and magicand conjuring if improperly executed, lead to

destruction (Nag. I, 151). What emptiness ultimately came to mean

in popular Buddhism is shown by aChinese book of wisdom written in

the twelfth century: He who has understoodthe emptiness of corporeal

things ceases to set any store by opinions; hewill refrain from all

activity and sit still without a thought (Hackmann).7. *The original

consciousness of the Encompassing*: This strange thinkingdoes not

have an object, knowledge of which is gained through reasons

andfacts. Its presupposition is not a thesis but the Encompassing,

which ismanifested through figures of thought and metaphors. All

ideas are immersedin an atmosphere without which they would wither

away. They throw light onthe presupposed attitude of the thinker,

which without this thinking hewould be unable to maintain. The

fundamental view is seemingly gained by logical thought. Theintention

is to destroy logic with logic and so demonstrate that thinking

isitself illusion; to prove that nothing can be proved, that nothing

can beasserted, and that nothingness can also not be asserted. With

all this, logical necessities are discovered, which have validity

assuch. But they are no more than a rational game, concerning which

it must beasked: Why play it? In the Asian form of this thinking,

we see a surface picture whichmisleads us as to the origin: in

discussion, whatever another may assert isdenied. There is a

triumphant consciousness of destruction, against whichnothing can

stand up. By the same endlessly repeated tricks, everything thatis

said is shown to be untenable. Behind these playful abuses lies the

truemeaning, namely, that all statements concerning being and

nonbeing must betranscended in the unconflicting. The

self-destruction of all thought mustfree us for something else. This

something else can be fulfilled byexperience in the higher meditative

techniques of Yoga. But it is alsoaccessible in normal consciousness.

Where emptiness is actualized, thingsare suspended between being and

nonbeing; then they point to something whichis inexpressible but

experienced with full certainty. This Encompassing cannot be

described as an empirical psychologicalstate, but it can be

adumbrated. Schayer attempts to give an idea of it byindicating the

senses in which certain words were originally employed."Shunyata"

(emptiness) is employed as a stage of meditation (in the PaliCanon):

"And now let him catch sight of an empty village, and let everyhouse

he enters be forsaken, deserted, and empty; and let every dish

hetouches be empty and without content." Here man's sensibility is

likened toan empty village; this emptiness does not signify a denial

of being, butindifference, insipidity, imperviousness.."Animitta"

("without definitesuchness, signlessness") means in the Pali Canon:

nonattachment to theattributes of perceived things; it does not mean

a denial of theirexistence, but a mode of practical behavior, in

which the monk, like avigilant gatekeeper, bars access to the sensory

stimuli streaming in on himfrom without. "Maya" (magic) means

comparison of the world to a phantasm, asan expression of the

arbitrariness and futility of being, not as a denial ofits reality.

Here it should not be forgotten that the Indians looked uponimages,

echoes, and dreams as realities. Existence is not denied; what

isdenied is its authenticity.8. *Survey of the Buddhist sects and the

ultimate meaning of all doctrines*:The Shunyavadins are one sect among

many. What is common to all is theBuddhist striving for redemption,

the knowledge of suffering and of theinsignificance of the world's

reality. On this common ground, reflection onthe possibility of

knowing reality had resulted in numerous opinions. The outside

world is real and can be known directly through perception(the

Sarvastivadins); it is not perceived by the senses but its

existencecan be inferred through perceptions (the Sautrantikas); only

consciousnessis certain and the source of this certainty is

consciousness itself; onlythe inner world is real, the difference

between subject and object has noreal existence (the Yogacaras);

neither outside nor inner world can berecognized as real, independent

being; there is no difference betweensubjective and objective reality

(the Shunyavadins, to which Nagarjunabelonged). In this schema of

"epistemological" standpoints we can recognize theWestern schema of

idealism and realism, rationalism and empiricism,positivism and

nihilism, especially in reference to the question of thereality of

the outside world. But such comparisons apply only to therational

byproducts of the philosophical operations effected by the

Indianthinkers. Obviously, the essential cannot be appropriately

expressed interms of a formulable doctrine. This would be possible if

the instrument ofsalvation were a definite knowledge. But since all

knowledge in the sense ofpositively formulable contents signifies

"attachment," the way of salvationis to be sought rather in the

shattering of all knowledge, all possibilityof knowledge, and all

opinions. The emptiness of all worldly reality becomes the positive

being of thesource, whence man fell into the coming-and-going, the

evil and suffering ofthe world, and to which he must return. All

thinking and all being-thoughtpertain to the fall. The aim of true

thinking is a return from the unfoldingof thought to nonthinking.

What happened through the unfolding of thoughtcan be undone by better

thought in the dissolution of thought. The finalstep is to perceive

the untruth of all signs and hence of language. Once itis understood

that a word is a mere sign without real meaning, the worddisappears,

and that is deliverance. Consciousness, which created sufferingby

shaping emptiness into the many worlds, is carried back to its

source. But in the world there still remain doctrine, language,

the teaching ofthe way of salvation, the disintegration of thought by

the same thought thatbrought about the fall by thought. Consequently,

despite all the insight aphilosopher could gain into his own thinking

by the self-annulment ofthinking, he could not help taking a position

- unless the need for silencewere taken seriously and all discourse,

all listening, all communicationceased. And so Nagarjuna's position,

his doctrine of "conditioned becoming,"became a fixed formula for

emptiness. The sense of this doctrine of "conditioned becoming" is

that sinceeverything at once is and is not, everything is

conditional. Because heknows this, the Bodhisattva becomes master of

all thoughts, enslaved tonone. Moving among finite thoughts, he

hovers over them, and in this stateof suspension he includes himself

and his own existence. I myself and mythinking are the condition of

all things and of the phantasm which is theexistence of this world.

This world of the *dharmas* and the self as wellare conditioned. The

process of conditioned becoming produces a world inwhich we think

ourselves at home and at the same time suffer without hope

ofsurcease. But we see through this whole world of conditioned

becoming,including the formulated doctrine, and that is salvation.

The illusionrecedes and that of which it is impossible to speak lies

open before us. Thedoctrine is the ferryboat that will carry us

across the river of existence.Once we have reached the other shore,

the boat is superfluous. Since thedoctrine belongs to the illusory

stream of worldly existence, to take italong with us on the other

side would be as foolish as to carry the boat onour shoulders as we

leave the shore to enter the new country. The Sageabandons it to the

stream which lies behind him. The doctrine is useful inhelping us to

escape, but there is nothing to be gained by holding it

fast.*Historical Comparisons*When we compare different forms of

thought, analogies merely accentuate thedifferences in historical

content.A. *Dialectic*: Dialectic is the movement of thought through

opposition andcontradiction, but this can mean very different things:

it may lead by wayof contradictions to limits, at which it discloses

the abyss but also anopen horizon; the situation at the limit becomes

a goal and a demand. - Itmay lead to closed circles, in which

contradictions are transcended in asynthesis; all the stages of the

thought process are integrated into aliving totality. - It may be

conceived and carried out as a reality, inwhich negation as such

yields a positive result by the negation of thenegation; the new is

expected to be born automatically from negative thoughtand action.

None of these possibilities is essential in the dialectic of

theBuddhists. Here dialectic becomes a means of rising above thought

to theunthinkable, which, measured by thinking, is neither being nor

nothingness,but both in equal degree, though even in such statements

it remains beyondour grasp. Sometimes Nietzsche seems to approach

this method. He, too, prevents usfrom coming to rest in any position.

He flings us into a whirl ofoppositions, and at same time negates

every statement he makes by itsopposite. In this way he has created

in the modern world a spiritualsituation which he himself brought

about in the belief that the best way toovercome nihilism was to

carry it to its ultimate consequences. ButNietzsche, who without

systematically elaborating this dialectic set out toemploy it as an

instrument for the complete liberation of mankind, conceivedof this

liberation as a step not into an unthinkable otherness, but

ratherinto a worldly reality, the full and unconditional possession

of which hethought he was making possible. When Nietzsche said:

Nothing is true,everything is permissible, he aspired to open men's

minds, not to atranscendence which he denied, but to the earth and

the ascent of man in hisown earthly world, through himself and beyond

himself - beyond good and evil. Like the Buddhists, Nietzsche tried

to break down all the categories.There is, he said, no unity, no

causality, no substance, no subject, etc.All these are useful

fictions, perhaps indispensable to life. Of all things,says

Nagarjuna, none exists in itself, no thought or object of thought

istrue, all are conditioned. Both agree that there is no being;

everything ismere interpretation. But in this form of thought that is

common to them, intheir negative operations, they pursue very

different aims. To determine thetrue nature of these aims is for us a

never-ending task. In Nagarjuna andthe Buddhists the stated aim is

Nirvana and the will to salvation; inNietzsche it is the will to

power and the will to engender a superman.B. *The structure of being,

the categories*: The Buddhists have theirso-called formula of

causality (the circle of the fundamental categories ofbeing). The

Yogacaras speak in particular of the primordial consciousness,the

germinal consciousness, whose unfolding brings with it the illusion

ofthe world. The development of this idea shows the nature and form

of a worldthat does not truly exist, the structure of all

appearances. This Indianconception has been likened to Western

idealism. And indeed, Kant conceivesthe whole world as appearance,

its forms defined by the categories ofconsciousness as such. All

knowable objects are produced, not as to theirbeing but as to their

forms, by the subject. So-called transcendentalidealism created a

systematic schema of this reality that unfolds in thought. But the

analogy at once discloses a difference. The Indians devised

thisstructure in order to divest scientific knowledge of its truth,

for it isdream and illusion. Kant conceived and developed his similar

structure inorder to justify scientific knowledge within the limits of

possibleexperience. For him the world is appearance, but not illusion.

The idealistswho followed Kant did not conceive these categorial

structures as limited toappearance, but as the eternal truth itself,

as God's thoughts. Neither viewbears any kinship to Buddhist

thinking. For the German idealists justifyknowledge of the world and

activity in the world, while the Buddhists on thecontrary stand for

abandonment of the world, for renunciation of scientificknowledge,

which they look upon as unrewarding because fundamentally false;they

reject action in shaping the world, which is not only futile but

holdsus in a state of captivity.e. *Emptiness and openness*:

Emptiness permits of the greatest openness, thegreatest willingness

to accept the things of the world as a starting pointfrom which to

make the great leap. Indifference toward all worldly thingsalso

leaves every possibility open. Hence the tolerance of Buddhism

towardother religions, modes of life, views of the world. The

Buddhist lives withall these as expressions of a lower, worldly

truth, each equallysatisfactory as a point of departure toward higher

things. This unrestrictedopenness attracts men. Buddhism won Asia;

though repressed here and there,it never resorted to violence, never

forced dogmas on anyone. Buddhism hadno religious wars, no

inquisition, and never engaged in the secular politicsof an organized

church. Western reason presents an analogy to this Buddhist mode of

thought,which is as infinitely open as emptiness. Both listen, both

respect theopinions of others. But the difference is this: the

Buddhist Sage goesthrough the world like a duck; he no longer gets

wet. He has transcended theworld by dropping it. He seeks fulfillment

in an unthinkable unworld. ForWestern man, however, reason finds its

fulfillment, not in any absolute, butin the historicity of the world

itself, which he gathers into his ownExistenz. Only in historical

realization, becoming identical with it, doeshe find his ground; he

knows that this is the source of his freedom and ofhis relation to

transcendence.D. *Detachment*: Detachment from the world and myself,

the inner liberationthat I achieve by dissociating myself from

everything that happens to me inthe world and everything I myself do,

think, and am, is a form which wasembodied in very different ways.

The Bhagavad Gita praises the warrior who remains indifferent and

aloofdespite his impetuous heroism, who plays the game

conscientiously and actsenergetically, while regarding all activity

as vain. - In Epicurus thefundamental attitude is: I have passions,

but they do not have me. - In St.Paul, I act and live in the world as

though I were not there. - Nietzscheregards detachment from oneself as

the hallmark of the aristocratic soul. Despite this analogy in the

form of detachment, the fundamental attitudeof the Buddhists and of

Nagarjuna is an entirely different one: the accentis on the

impersonal; as the world becomes a matter of indifference, theself is

extinguished. The detachment has its source not in a "myself," butin a

transcendent reality which is not a self. In all Western forms of

detachment from the world, the essential issought in something that

is present in the world: in the empty freedom of apunctual self, or

in a self which in historical immersion, inself-identification, takes

upon itself the burden of being-given-to-oneselfbut nevertheless

illumines itself infinitely and achieves self-detachment

inreflection. Considered from the standpoint of Asian thought,

these forms ofdetachment will always be imperfect, for they all

preserve a bond with theworld. From the Western standpoint, however,

the Asian form will always seemto be an escape from the world into

the inaccessible and incommunicable. Your use of is

subject to