Guest guest Posted October 11, 2002 Report Share Posted October 11, 2002 (1) breath control (pranayama) (2) sensory inhibition (pratyahara) (3) meditation (dhyana) (4) concentration (dharana) (5) examination (tarka) (6) ecstasy (samadhi) what is tarka the 5-th leg of yoga? "(Jayaratha) says that tarka is what is in harmony with sruti, in otherwords, in accord to what is revealed by the seer. Further, in this context, tarka is seen as being the shortest route to higher consciousness; since it reveals what to accept and reject, and linked by some with the saktipata (descent of grace) and suddhavidya (wisdom). The above shows that in some forms of early Yoga, tarka formed a repository of knowledge accumulated by seers that became very useful to certain groups if the lineage of seers should ever come to end." -------- I think tarka means a systematic form of understanding,logic and/or argument, to prove or disprove something, which when applied to your quote makes sense. M ------ All paths go somewhere. No path goes nowhere. Paths, places, sights, perceptions, and indeed all experiences arise from and exist in and subside back into the Space of Awareness. Like waves rising are not different than the ocean, all things arising from Awareness are of the nature of Awareness. Awareness does not come and go but is always Present. It is Home. Home is where the Heart Is. Jnanis know the Heart to be the Finality of Eternal Being. A true devotee relishes in the Truth of Self-Knowledge, spontaneously arising from within into It Self. from: a. ------ Tantric Argument: The Transfiguration of Philosophical Discourse in the Pratyabhijna System of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta by Lawrence, David Introduction The Enlightenment dichotomy between the detached, universally intelligible and cogent discourse of science and philosophy on the one hand and the devout, reasonless, emotional or mystical discourse of religion on the other has greatly influenced Western understandings of Indian and other non-Western philosophies. Wilhelm Halbfass has observed that Indian philosophy was excluded until recently from most Western histories of philosophy because of its religious nature (i.e.,its common purpose of facilitating the pursuit of salvation) as well as its situation outside the European historical development of Greek thought. The former has been viewed to contradict a "twofold concept of freedom" definitive of philosophy: 1.a freedom from practical interests--from soteriological motives and from ordinary utilitarian interests; i.e., a "purely theoretical" attitude in which knowledge is sought for its own sake. 2.a freedom from the grip of dogma, from myth, and from religious and other traditions; i.e., the freedom to criticize, to think rationally, and to think for oneself.[1] This criterion has operated equally in the exclusion from serious consideration of other non-Western philosophies. Though for some time abjured by most scholars of non-Western philosophies, the religion-philosophy dichotomy has continued to have an insidious influence in a polarization between religious-historicist and philosophical research methodologies.[2] The historicist approach ostensibly overcomes the dichotomy by interpreting in terms of holistic cultural contexts, usually reducing philosophy to the broadly religious categories of world view and ritual-ethical practice. This unification is achieved, however, at the expense of the rationalist project of philosophy--philosophy reduced to religion as myth or ritual is no longer seen as "philosophy."[3] On the other hand, a lot of the best philosophical work on non-Western philosophies has tended to abstract discussions of problems of language, epistemology, and ontology from their functions within religious systems in comparing them to analogous discussions in the West.[4] I believe that the modern philosophy-religion dichotomy may be better overcome by a historically sensitive revision of the project of philosophical rationalism than by a relativist or postmodern destruction of philosophy. Looking back, before the prejudices of the Enlightenment, a more synergistic conception of the relation of philosophical rationality to religion is found in our own paradigmatic Greek philosophies. As Pierre Hadot has shown, most of these were conceived as systems of "spiritual exercises," in that they aimed at the conversion (epistropheand metanoia) of the student to a redemptive understanding of self and universe.[5] Throughout the long history of Christian philosophy and natural theology, there have been attempts to use reason to determine religious truths independently of the assumptions of the Christian revelation, as an instrument of religious conversion, or under rubrics such as "faith seeking understanding."[6] In the still-developing pluralism of the contemporary academy, there has been a steady increase of efforts to create dialogue between Western and non-Western, between religious and nonreligious philosophies--frankly attempting the mediation of religious claims.[7] This essay will examine the strong synergism between a "hard-headed" concern with philosophical justification and intelligibility on the one hand and soteriology on the other, in the Pratyabhijna works of the tenth- and eleventh-century Kashmiri thinkers Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta. [8] Building on the initiative of Utpala's teacher Somananda, these two thinkers created a new, philosophical instrument of conversion for the Trika tradition of monistic Saivism, to which I have given the name "tantric argument." Though the method of this essay is exegetical, I hope it can contribute to constructive philosophical as well as historical understandings of the relation of philosophy and religion.[9] ----------- The Saivas develop the Advaita Vedantin concept of self-luminosity (svaprakasatva) to explain how Siva always already has a nondual realization of Himself.[26] Putting their convoluted discussions of this concept in a more linear fashion, the thinkers deny that (1) any cognizer (pramatr) (2) by any means (pramana) could have (3) any cognition (prama, pramiti) or proof (siddhi)--ofwhich the object (prameya)is the Supreme Lord. Like Advaita, they explain the operation of the sastra negatively as only removing the ignorance of this self-luminosity. [27] The following explanation by Abhinavagupta brings together this point with the other negation of methodology in terms of divine omnipotence; it is the Lord who both creates and removes His self-concealment: Nothing new is accomplished. Nor is what is really not shining [aprakasamana] illuminated [prakasyate]. [Rather] the supposition [abhimanana] that what is shining is not shining is removed. For liberation, which is the attainment of the state of the Supreme Lord, is nothing but the removal of that [false supposition]. *****The cycle of suffering in rebirth [samsara] is nothing but the nonremoval of that. Both of these [conditions of liberation and rebirth] are in essence only supposition. And both are manifested by the Blessed One. [28] whole article at http://pears2.lib.ohio-state.edu/FULLTEXT/JR-PHIL/lawrence.htm karta: rebirth is within a life span: the birth of the myriads of *selves*.. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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