MANASOLLASA - III

[Guest guest]

Ishwara, who is eternal, does not become a `doer' just by the

activity of the means of Kriya. Nor does he become a `knower' by the

activity of the means of knowledge. He is verily self-resplendent.

The idea is that one who is a knower or doer by virtue of external

means, is subject to change. What is subject to change cannot be

eternal. Then, how does Ishwara exercise his Kriya Shakti and Jnana

Shakti? It is by his mere presence, like a magnet or a king, whose

presence is enough for others to do their duties.

According to Advaita Vedanta, Ishwara is Abhinna-Nimitta-

Upaadaana-Kaarana i.e. He is both the efficient cause and the

material cause of this world. Secondly, creation is a projection out

of Himself by his power of Maya. Thirdly, the whole process of

creation, sustenance and destruction is just an illusionary exercise.

Thus it becomes clear that Ishwara is the unchanging eternal Reality.

It is a well known universally accepted principle that while

discussing about things beyond the reach of the senses, one should

proceed from the seen to the unseen, from the known to the unknown.

The of quoted example for the Nimitta Kaarana is the potter. The

potter has to exert himself to produce the pot. This exertion

involves the use of his limbs. That means, he is a Saririn (embodied

being) with limbs or parts. Anything that is embodied or comprising

of parts gets destroyed one day. If Ishwara is accepted as only the

Nimitta Kaarana, He has perforce to be admitted as an embodied being

subjected to change, decay and death. This however is against all

scriptural statements. Also, there is no example in this world by

which we can illustrate that a thing can be changeable and yet

eternal. Hence, the views of the Sankhyas and Vaisesikas cannot be

accepted.

If Ishwara possessed Gunas like Buddhi etc. eternally, then,

being endowed with an eternal desire, He would have to engage Himself

in the act of creation of this world, eternally. Then, since the

inclination towards action will not cease, the bondage of

transmigration also will not cease. Therefore this creation of the

world by Ishwara is only a phenomenon of Maya.

Existence and revelation have passed on from the eternal

Ishwara into these objects, which are similar to unreality,

insentient and transient. This passing on (Sankrama) is not like the

passing on of heat from the fire to the iron ball. In that case,

reality will have to be conceded for the free iron ball, which is

against Advaita. It is more like the borrowed reality of the snake in

the rope or silver in nacre, wherein the snake or silver do not exist

apart from the substratum, which alone is real. The existence of

these objects is the existence of the Atman alone and not anything

apart from it. Similarly, their revelation is not different from the

revelation of the atman.

The various kinds of perception as also their objects are

connected together in the ego-sense like the groups of pearls on the

string. When the light of the Atman is reflected in the mind, it is

called Ahamkara or ego-sense. This itself is the Jiva, the individual

soul. The various kinds of knowledge that arise out of perceiving

various objects of the senses coalesce in this ego-sense. The

existence of those objects (Sattaa) and knowledge about them

(Sphurana) are perceived only through thus ego-sense, which again is

only a reflection of the Sphurana of the Atman. Previously, existence

itself had been denied to the objects of the world. Here, granting an

empirical existence for them, their unity I the Atman-consciousness

is being shown.

This world appears to all as verily non-different from light.

The waves, bubbles etc., do not have an existence of their own,

separate from water. Neither the waves nor the bubbles have any

independent existence apart from water. Similarly, all the objects of

this world, which derive their Sattaa and Sphurana from the Atman,

are Atman alone in reality.

That knowledge which enters into an object producing the

awareness `I know (this object)', later on, rests on the inner Self

as `This was known by me'. This proves that Sphurana or revelation is

a quality of the Atman and not of the outside object. The effects

like jar etc. rest upon their material causes like clay etc. Since

this world is non-different from light or consciousness, it has to

rest on the supreme Lord.

Just as a mirror becomes dirty by the dust on it, knowledge

also gets covered by ignorance. Hence, the beings are deluded by

that. If the non-dual principle is the Reality, then, how is it that

the living beings cannot comprehend it? The dirt on the mirror covers

it, making it incapable of reflecting things. Similarly, Ajnana or

ignorance which is begginningless (Anaadi) and indescribable

(Anivrchaneeya) covers the Jnana of the beings. Consequently, they

perceive the world of duality, develop desires, involve themselves in

action, get deluded and suffer. Just as it is the `great sky' that

appears as the `pot sky' due to the limiting adjunct of the pot, in

the same way, the difference between the Jivatman and Paramatman has

been wrought by the limiting adjunct of the body. So, it is the body

that is the root of all troubles! Once the spirit that pervades it,

but which really transcends it, is realized, identity with Paramatman

is established. We shall further see the process of achieving this.

The identity between the Jiva and Paramatman is exhibited by

sentences such as, `That thou art' – Tat Tvam Asi. Normally Tat

refers to a distant object and Tvam to a person nearby. Brahman as

Ishwara, who is the creator of this apparently infinite world

naturally appears to be `there', at a great distance whereas a person

with whom we are talking is `here', near at hand. Hence, the supreme

Brahman who is the cause of the world is stated as the meaning of the

word Tat (that). On the other hand, the Jiva who is limited by the

body etc., is named by the word Tvam (thou). One who is seen

in `that' place, time and condition is said to be `that person'.

Similarly, one who is seen in `this' place, time and condition is

said to be `this person'. Consider a simple example to illustrate the

method recognize the identity between Jiva and Brahman. If the person

Devadutta whom we saw yesterday evening in the market comes to our

house this morning, perhaps in a different dress, we still recognize

him immediately as `This is Devadutta'. In doing so, the two times,

the two places and the two dresses are brushed aside and only the

person himself has been taken into consideration. Similarly, while

interpreting the sentence of identity of Jivatman and Paramatman

viz., Tat tvam Asi (That thou art), the qualities of the two that

appear directly (for eg., being inside the body, being outside;

little knowledge and omniscience; little power and infinite power

etc. ) should be given up as incidental, and take the person himself

who is the Atman\Brahman, the pure consciousness.

In the sentence tat tvam asi, the relation between the

words `Tat' (that) and `tvam' (thou) is one called Samaanaadhikarana.

Adhikarana means `substratum' and `Samaana' means `same'. So, the

word means, `having the same substratum'. When we say, `this is a

blue lotus', blueness and lotusness inhere in the same substratum,

the flower called the blue lotus. The idea here is that both the

words tat and tvam have the same substratum, which is pure Chaitanya

or consciousness. Meanings may differ, but the thought remains the

same. Also, the relation between the meanings of these two words (tat

and tvam) is that of a Visheshana and Visheshya. Visheshana is a

quality. Visheshya is that which is qualified. `Blue' is the

Visheshana. `Lotus' is the Visheshya. Similarly, the Jiva, being the

meaning of `tvam', is the Visheshana. Ishwara, the meaning of `tat',

is the Visheshya. This great sentence `that thou art', teaches

identity through Lakshya and Lakshana. Lakshana is an implication.

Lakshya is what is implied. When a red horse is running, if we

say, `Oh! Red is running', the word red implies the red horse. `Red'

is the Lakshana and the horse is the Lakshya.

The meaning of a sentence is of three types: Vaachyaartha,

Vyangyaartha and Lakshyaartha. Vaachyaartha is the direct meaning as

in the sentence, `Bring the cow'. Vyangyaartha is the suggested

meaning as in, `Hari is with conch and discus'. The word `Hari' has

several meanings such as lion, monkey, Lord Vishnu etc. To show that

it is Vishnu that is meant here, the words conch and discus are used.

This fixes the meaning of Hari. In Lakshyaartha, t is the implied

meaning that is important, rather than the direct. Consider `The

Kalinga is a hero'. Though actually the word Kalinga means a country,

here it means a citizen of that country.

The Lakshana or implication by which the Lakshyaartha is

derived is of three types: Jahad-Lakshana, that in which the direct

meaning is completely given up in favor of the implied one. Consider

the example, `The cowherd village is in the Ganges'. Since a village

cannot exist in a river, it implies that it is `on the bank' of the

river Ganga. Here the direct meaning has been completely given up

(jahad = giving up). Next comes Ajahad-Lakshana, that in which the

direct meaning is not given up, but something in addition is implied.

For instance, `White is running'. Since the color white cannot run,

it is the white horse or rabbit that is implied. Here, `white' is not

given up (ajahad = not giving up), but `horse' is added. The last is

the Jahad-ajahad-Lakshana, also called Bhaaga Lakshana and Bhaaga

tyaaga Lakshana, in which a part of the direct meaning is given up,

but another part is retained. The ofquoted example is, `This is that

Devadutta' which we have already seen. In the sentence tat Tvam Asi,

both Jahad and Ajahad Lakshanas do not hold good. This sentence,

which is a Mahavakya (the great sentence) is to be interpreted by

means of Bhaaga Lakshana.

When words coined due to different causes point towards the

same object, then, the relationship of these words is one of

Samanadhikarana. Just as the `pot sky' is neither a modification nor

a part of the sky, similarly the sentence says that the Jivatman-

because of the entry (of Paramatman) into the forms created by His

own Maya, as the Jivatman- is neither a part nor a modification of

Paramatman. This Paramatman is known through the Veda and logic, as

being without parts and modifications. In the Madhyadina recension of

Brihadaranyaka Upanishad (2.1.20) there is this statement: `all these

arise out of the atman'. The Gita says, ` In this world of beings, it

is My own eternal part that has become the Jiva (15.7)'. Hence the

doubt arises whether the Jivatman is a modification (Vikara) or a

part (Amsha) of Paramatman. This is confronted by illustrating the

above `pot sky' example. If Ishwara consisted of parts or limbs, or

were subjected to modifications, He too would be destructible. One

who is Himself destructible cannot be the ultimate cause or creator.

Thus by logic, we have to concede that He is indeed without parts and

modifications. The following Vedic mantras clearly show that He, who

is in this body as Jivatman, is really Ishwara or Paramatman. `Having

created it, It entered the very same (Taittareya Upanishad

2.6)', `Having entered (it) in the form of Jivatman (Chandogya

Upanishad 6.3.2)', `That this (person) has entered here, right up to

the tips of the (finger) nails (Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 1.4.7)'. The

following Sruti statements clearly show that the Supreme Self is

without parts, beyond modifications and the cause of all causes. ` (I

take refuge in Him who is) without parts, beyond all activity,

peaceful, without defects and stains (Sve. Upanishad 6.19)`, ` (The

wise see the Original Cause of all beings as) eternal, all-pervading,

inherent in all, extremely subtle, indestructible – (Mundaka

Upanishad 1.1.6)', `He is the cause, the Lord of the master of all

senses; there is none who has generated Him, nor one who is His

master – (Sve Upanishad 6.9)'.

The sentence `tat tvam asi' is also not verily devoted to

praise as in, `You are Indra'. One who is not Indra (the king of

gods) may be praised as if he is Indra. Like that, is the Jivatman

being praised as if he is Brahman? No; because in the beginning of

that teaching it is stated, `My dear, in the beginning of creation,

the eternal Truth, one without a second, alone existed (Chandogya

Upanishad 6.2.1)'. At the end again, it is said, `All this has Sat as

its self (Chandogya Upanishad 5.8.7)'. Thus it is obvious that the

whole topic centers round the Supreme Self.

Nor does this sentence advocate similarity as in, `The boy is

like fire'. Nor does it prove a cause and effect relationship as

between clay and pot. To prove similarity between two objects, there

must be something in common either with regard to physical features

or qualities or action. Since Paramatman ahs none of these things,

such a comparison is not at all possible. The Sweta Upanishad

says, `There is no image of that (4.19)'. Since Paramatman is

limbless, cause and effect relation is also impossible.

It is also not a sentence that teaches the relationship

between the species and the individual as instanced by `This is a

defective cow'. Each of the individual cows has the common

characteristics of the species in it. Like that, if Ishwara is the

species and Jiva is the individual, then Ishwara will have to be

considered as an unconsciousness lifeless entity like the `cowness'.

Similarly, this great sentence also does not imply a quality-

qualified relation as in, `Blue lotus'. That is, if Jiva qualifies

Ishwara, He will become a bound soul. On the other hand, if the

Ishwara qualifies the Jiva, the latter will be ever free, thereby

nullifying the need for all the scriptures, which are preaching the

way to liberation.