correct vs. apaurushEya

[Guest guest]

Dear friends,

 

I had the impression that visistAdvaita philisophy (and vedAnta in general)

seem to rest, among other things, on two premises:

 

1. The veda is apaurushEya (un-authored and beginningless), and

2. The veda is correct.

 

But it appears to me that the first premise is redundant. For is it not

possible that there exists a similar body (say un-veda) which is also

apaurushEya (un-authored and beginningless) but completely incorrect? So the

fact that something is apaurushEya says nothing about its correctness.

 

On the other hand the second premise, that the veda is correct, is

in itself sufficient justification for it to serve as pramANa. So only

the second premise is needed to develop the philisophy.

 

Please note:

 

a. I have not argued that the veda is not apaurushEya, but only that this

premise is not strictly necessary.

 

b. I have not said that such a thing as the un-veda exists, but only that

its existence cannot be denied a-priori.

 

c. My main question is whether my impression is incorrect. That is, is

there some important tenet of visistAdvaita for which the first

premise is necessary and the second is not sufficient.

 

d. In a debate between a vedAntin and a non-vedAntin, the first might

say `Look, veda is more authoritative than your scripture because veda is

apaurushEya'. I don't think such an arguement has any power when

the non-vedAntin is anyway not going to accept the veda as authority.

 

e. I have a good reason for trying to make this arguement and I'm not

being flippant. Also no offence is meant. Please tolerate these views

as coming from one who basically believes in visistAdvaita but is

trying to undertsand it.

 

krishNArpaNam

Kasturi

[Guest guest]

Kasturi Varadarajan writes:

> On the other hand the second premise, that the veda is correct, is

> in itself sufficient justification for it to serve as pramANa. So only

> the second premise is needed to develop the philisophy.

 

Kasturi,

 

You are only partially correct. The apaurusheyatva

of the Vedas is necessary for because it is the *only* way of

having a final authority about an eternal reality. In other

words, think about how you would answer this question:

 

Of what nature is Eternal, Absolute Reality?

 

If we derive our answer based on an authored text, well, how

do we know that the author himself is perfect?

 

Take for example the case of Pancaratra Agama, believed to

be authored by a perfect being (God). How do we know that it

actually is authored by a perfect being, and therefore it is

authoritative?

 

If we say, "I have faith that the author (God) is perfect.

Pancaratra is authored by him so it is perfect."

 

Well, then why do you believe in the perfectness of this

author? Why not also in Mohammed, Lao-Tzu, Confucius, or

Moses?

 

If the reply is that one's faith simply rests in

one's idea of who is God, then Vedanta is cast into the same

lot as all the world's major religions -- basing faith

on subjective reasons in a prophet or one's idea of God.

Anyone who sets himself up as God can therefore claim

to be an author of Truth.

 

This is insuffcient for the orthodox Vedantin, because

he or she knows that chances are that authors are imperfect.

How do we know that the supposed prophet or Deity is not

under the sway of the three gunas? Furthermore, how would

we demonstrate in a more objective manner the nature of

reality, without relying on authored and therefore

possibly incorrect information?

 

The only alternative is that we have to get these answers

from another source. Visual observation and inference

are inadequate, because these questions deal with issues

that are supra-sensory and non-material. So we have to

have access to a trustworthy source other than these.

This source must be unauthored, for otherwise we are left

with the same dilemma, i.e., that of knowing whether *this*

author is perfect, resulting in infinite regress.

 

Now, it so happens that the Vedas have a history of being

considered unauthored, *and* they have a history of being

considered trustworthy, truthful texts (Apta-vAkya). For,

as you say, if something is unauthored but not trustworthy,

it is useless.

 

As a corollary to this argument, consider the following

question: can we know that Reality is eternal without

relying on a non-eternal source?

 

If the Vedas are non-eternal, how can we trust them

when they have not been around to truly be "witness"

to the eternity of Reality?

 

One may argue, "Well, God is our authority for the

eternity of Reality. Since God is eternal, he is

the eternal 'witness' to his eternity." This places

us back in the personality, faith-based camp. How

do we know that this person claiming to be God is

not lying about his eternity?

 

Or, if it is argued that "God authored the Vedas,

and the Vedas tell us that He is eternal," what

we end up with is a logical see-saw. We believe

in the eternity of God because the Vedas declare

it. But we believe in the Vedas because the

eternal (and therefore perfect) God authored them.

 

So this is not a valid alternative.

 

What this means is that we have to accept two axioms:

(a) The Vedas are unauthored, and therefore eternal

(b) The Vedas are trustworthy

 

No matter what, both axioms are necessary. We need

the Vedas to be eternal *and* a trustworthy for them

to be true authorities on Reality.

 

The beauty of this principle is that this makes Vedantins

in a significant way far more objective and non-emotional

in religious inquiry. The only two axioms that need to

be accepted in the process of inquiry are the above two.

One need not even accept on faith that Narayana is God --

in fact, one *should* not accept on faith that Narayana

is God. This tenet is derived wholly from the Vedas,

studied in the appropriate manner.

 

Hope this explains to a certain extent,

ramanuja dasan,

Mani

[Guest guest]

On Fri, 31 Mar 2000, Kasturi Varadarajan wrote:

> I had the impression that visistAdvaita philisophy (and vedAnta in

> general) seem to rest, among other things, on two premises:

>

> 1. The veda is apaurushEya (un-authored and beginningless), and

> 2. The veda is correct.

>

> But it appears to me that the first premise is redundant. For is it

> not possible that there exists a similar body (say un-veda) which is

> also apaurushEya (un-authored and beginningless) but completely

> incorrect? So the fact that something is apaurushEya says nothing

> about its correctness.

 

This is a very thought-provoking post, and I thank you for it. A few

thoughts (bearing in mind that a) I am more of a personally Maadhwa than a

Srivaishnavin and b) that my knowledge of Sri Ramanuja's philosophy is

very limited, being based almost entirely on secondhand works such as the

Yatindramatadipika of Srinivasadasa):

 

* It would seem impossible for an apaurusheya text to be any

less than flawless from the viewpoint of Vishishtadvaita,

since nescience would be a result of the material universe

(which would include the concept of time), and anything

beginningless would be created outside of the nescient

physical universe.

* Newton's Laws are correct within a certain context, but

incorrect in others (e.g., see Einstein's relativity

theory). It follows that to say that a text is flawless

(which an apaurusheya text would have to be) would imply

that it is not only correct within a limited context,

but utterly inerrant in every sense.

 

 

 

Peace,

 

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