Dreams as explained by discussion on pramAnas

[Guest guest]

Dear Bhagavatas,

 

Note: Key Reference: Sri. S.M.S. Chari*s book *Advaita and Vis*istAdvaita: A

Study Based on VedAnta Desika*s S*atadUsanI.*

 

The issue of dreams is dealt with in the broader discussion of pramAnas-valid

sources of acquiring knowledge. The content of dreams are objects of senses, or

verbal testimony (note verbal testimony is imbibed through sense organs), or

inferential knowledge (note that inferential knowledge produces new knowledge

but makes use of premises based on perception and or verbal testimony.) Because

perception is the substratum of verbal testimony and inferential knowledge, the

main discussion revolves around nature and content of perception.

 

The question to be addressed is whether an illusory object can produce a real

effect?

 

Advaitic claim: An illusory object can produce a real effect.

 

The Advaitins make use of analogies to support this claim. The Advaitin*s goal

is to establish this claim, so that he can conclude that, although scripture is

illusory, it can produce a real effect.

 

1.Rope-snake, is an illusory (something that appears to be present but is really

not) object but it generates a real effect, fear.

 

2. Objects experienced in dreams are not real yet they produce effects that are

real.

 

Vis*istAdvaitic Claim: Only a real object can produce a real effect.

 

The rationale for the claim is as follows. It is cognition that produces the

effect; the content of cognition is real; therefore a real object causes a real

effect.

 

The Advaitin may object as follows:

 

The catalyst for the cognition is an illusory object; therefore an illusory

object is the ultimate cause of the real effect.

 

Vis*istAdvaitic Counter Argument beautifully formulated, by the quintessential

profound idealist (KavitArkika Simham) Sri. Vedanta Desika:

 

Objects by themselves are not capable of being catalysts; it is direct sense

contact that gives rise to cognition (direct sense contact either at the time of

cognition or at some earlier point in time.) Thus, it is not the object that is

the cause of a real effect, but rather the cognition triggered by direct sense

contact (contact either at the time of cognition or at some earlier point in

time.) The object of cognition is real, so a real object leads to a real cause.

 

For example: when one sees a rope snake,

 

1.the thought of a snake arises;

2. the snake is a real object; knowledge about the snake was obtained at some

prior point in time when direct sense contact took place;

3. it is the cognition of the snake that produces fear and not the rope that

appears to be a snake.

 

To summarize, only real objects can lead to real effects. The objects of dreams

are the objects of cognition. The objects of dreams are real even though they

are not physically present during a dream. Thus, dreams involve real objects

leading to real effects.

 

ramanuja dasan,

Venkat

[Guest guest]

Dear Sri Venkat,

I was away from my mails for the past 3 days. So please bear with me this

delay.

Please don't misunderstand that I am talking for/against a school of

philosophy in this mail. Basically I am trying to resolve my doubts.

 

I agree that without cognition, fear won't arise. This is because if the

person seeing the rope didn't have the cognition, he won't get the illusion of

snake in the first place. For example a child won't experience fear upon seeing

rope-snake.

What I feel is cognition plays only a role of a medium of understanding in an

experience and not a role of a cause because without cognition there is no talk

about experience itself. It's only a medium and it should be there. And it's

true that there is no cognition without external objects (real and unreal). The

question here is about the external objects that give rise to this cognition and

not about the cognition itself which happens internal to a being. I hope I am

clear here.

You said that "cognition is real and hence only real objects can cause real

experience". This is a partial statement.

I feel here you are generalising by using the term "real objects" which in

this case means only cognition which is internal. But how does this go to prove

that illusory objects can't give rise to cognition ? Cognition can't arise by

itself. There has to be a rope-snake to cause cognition of false-snake to arise.

So I feel by dealing with the rope-snake case, you only proved that cognition

causes real experience. That cognition is real needed no discussion. The

question remains as to whether unreal external objects can give rise to

cognition. If answer is yes, then "unreal objects can give rise to cognition and

hence real experience".

 

In summary, cognition is only internal medium of understanding in an

experience and without that there is no talk about experience itself. So

describing that as the cause will limit the scope of the discussion and will not

answer the actual question. The "rope-snake" case is a question about external

objects. So the problem is whether an unreal external object can give rise to

cognition and hence real experience or not.

 

Looking forward to your clarification on above notes.

 

Members, please don't misunderstand that I am explicitly talking for any

school of thoughts or against any default authorities of this list. This is

purely self-educative.

 

Thanks and regards,

adiyEn,

chandrasekaran.

[Guest guest]

Dear Bhagavtas/Sri. Venkatraman,

 

Sri. Venkatraman Wrote:

> What I feel is cognition plays only a role of a medium of understanding

in an experience and not a role of a cause because without cognition

there is no talk about experience itself. It's only a medium and it should be

there.

 

Response:

 

Objects by themselves are not capable of being catalysts; it is direct

sense contact that gives rise to cognition (direct sense contact either at

the time of cognition or at some earlier point in time.) Thus, it is not the

object that is the cause of a real effect, but rather the cognition triggered

by direct sense contact (contact either at the time of cognition or at some

earlier point in time.)

 

KEY POINT: There is no question of talking about effect independent of

cognition. For example, suppose one shuts off all his sense organs;

some time after that, an object is placed before that individual. Can the

object act as a catalyst? No!

> You said that "cognition is real and hence only real objects can cause

real experience". This is a partial statement. I feel here you are

generalising by using the term "real objects" which in this case means

only cognition which is internal.

 

Response:

 

Please note, we are discussing a topic that belongs in a metaphysical

paradigm. Your are using notions belonging to a empiricist/logical

positivist paradigm. One cannot provide an empirical proof in matters that

are beyond the realm of senses. Only proof by inference is available.

(In fact strictly speaking all proofs are proofs by inference. That is a

whole different matter however.) It is very important to keep in mind the

paradigm in which one is discussing matters or else the discussion will

go nowhere. It is fine to disagree, but the disagreement must be framed

within the paradigm in which the discussion is taking place.

>The question remains as to whether unreal external objects can give

rise to cognition. If answer is yes, then "unreal objects can give rise to

cognition and hence real experience".

 

Response:

 

When one is confronted with a rope-snake, either a rope-snake

cognition, which is different from a real snake cognition, arises, or a

rope-snake cognition, which is the same as a real-snake cognition,

arises. In either case, it is a real object that leads to a real effect. That

is, if the rope-snake cognition differs from a real snake cognition then it

cannot be considered illusory.

 

Ramanuja dasan,

Venkat