'Akshara' etc. in the BhG

[Guest guest]

I would like, if I may, to take a slightly different angle on this topic

and discuss it not on the basis of Ramanuja's Gitabhashya, but on the text

of the Bhagavadgita itself.

 

Like the Svetasvatara Upanishad, the BhG upholds the doctrine of three

ontological categories (tattvatraya). In 7.4-5, we find that Krishna has

two 'natures' (prakriti), the higher comprising the living beings (jiva),

the lower comprising the material elements. In the 13th chapter, matter is

termed prakriti while the self is designated as purusha, and God is a

'higher purusha' and the 'supreme self' (paramatman). Finally, in 15.16-18

the doctrine is presented in its most explicit form, with all three

categories designated as 'beings' (purusha) -- namely, kshara-purusha,

akshara-purusha, and purushottama.

 

Viewing the BhG as an internally consistent whole, it seems clear that:

1. (apara)-prakriti = kshara-purusha = matter or the material aspect of

living beings;

2. para-prakriti = (akshara)-purusha = the living being in itself, i.e.,

the self;

3. paramatman = purushottama = God as the supreme being and self of all.

 

In 15.16-18, the akshara or 'indestructible' being is defined as kutastha

'aloft' or 'immovable'. The same epithet appears in 12.3 along with

akshara, anirdesya 'undefinable', avyakta 'unmanifest', sarvatraga

'omnipresent', acintya 'inconceivable', acala 'immovable', and dhruva

'permanent'. Compare this list to 2.24-25, which is undisputably a

description of the self: nitya 'eternal', sarvagata 'omnipresent', sthanu

'permanent', acala 'immovable', sanatana 'ancient', avyakta 'unmanifest',

acintya 'inconceivable', avikarya 'unchangeable'.

>From these obvious similarities, it seems clear to me that BhG 2.24-25,

12.3, and 15.16 refer to one and the same entity, namely, the individual

self. The answer to the question of what scripture refers to the individual

self as 'akshara' is therefore: the BhG itself. It also definitely refers

to this self as omnipresent, however one cares to interpret that statement.

(Incidentally, BhG 4.35 also states that the jnanin will see 'all beings'

or 'all creation' first within himself, and then in God.)

 

Finally, if one takes the words 'jiva' and 'atman' as synonymous, as

Ramanuja generally does, there is no mystery about 'upasana of the jiva',

since meditation on the self is a common enough theme in the scriptures.

Ramanuja himself explains (in his Vedantadipa?) that meditation on God as

the self of the jiva, or on the jiva as the body of God, are both

acceptable since they ultimately contain the same elements. Only if 'jiva'

is construed as a less than real entity does this pose a problem.

 

Ramanujadasa:

Martin Gansten

[Guest guest]

Dear Sri Krishna Kashyap, Sri Martin and others,

 

My intention was to find out if there was enough reason *within* Sri Ramanuja's

system for 'jIva' to be 'axara'; which your replies have answered. Whether the

BG supports it or not is a contentious issue discussing which, I guess, will

lead to dialectic over the basic philosophical axioms; and which perhaps will

spoil the weather of this list. Since my original question was answered, I shall

leave this thread here with some counterpoins and await your detailed analysis

and Sri Chari's book.

 

It is surprising to find that the 15.16's axara purusha is made out to be the

Jiva, when the Uttama purusha himself states in no uncertain terms that 'ksharaH

sarvANi bhUtAni'. It is not possible to make this phrase 'sarvANi bhUtAni' out

to the material/matter of this world, for, in many other instances in the Gita

itself, this phrase is used to denote sentient beings (for example in 18.61,

'sarvANi bhUtAni' should refer to the sentient beings as the words 'hriddeshe'

and 'bhrAmayan' are inapplicable for insentient matter). Also, that Jiva is not

imperishable per se cannot be a justification to classify it as 'axara', for one

even prakriti does not have 'svarUpa' destruction (there are 2 other reasons

atleast).

Similarity of adjectives does not prove much; the same set of adjectives can

refer to multiple entities.

 

That the 6 chapters refer to Jivopasana is quite new (atleast to me). IMHO, it

looks more like how Jiva should do his upAsana rather than how Jiva should be

upAsanA'ed (which is the subject of 12.01 according to Sri Ramanuja). The

phrases quoted such as 'macchitta', 'matparaH', support such a view only. Also

notable is that while stressing about the importance of Karma-sanga-tyAga, jnAna

et al, i.e., the behavior of sthitaprajna, the relation of such acts with Lord

is also mentioned (eshhaa braahmii sthiti.. mayi sarvANi karmANi and others).

Thus, there is only a mention of how jiva himself should conduct itself; that

too in relation with Lord. There is no mention of how Jiva should worship

himself.

Honestly I don't still understand what this jIvopAsana is. If it constitutes the

meditation as mentioned in 6.29, the very next verse makes it clear who this

'Atma' is. Despite that how can one construe Atma as the Jiva? Moreover, what is

there in the Jiva to be meditated upon? All qualities such as 'achchedyatva',

'avyaktatva' etc are all because of the Lord (See 9.04 for example). Secondly,

where is it mentioned that meditation on these qualities as possessed by the

Jiva bestow moxa? That 'I' principle is more readily available is no good

reason; there are things more easily available.

 

I refer you to BNK Sharma's review, published in BNKS' English Translation of

Madhva's Gita Bhashya, of Prof.Robert(Roger?) Minor's article on Gita. It

summarizes better than the book by Dr.S.K.Bhavani.

 

That Upasana of Lakshmi is a foreign concept to Gita can be concluded only if it

is forgotten that she is equated to chitprakriti (of Madhvacharya's system). The

two prakritis mentioned in 7.4 and 7.5 are jaDa and chit prakriti (9.10 refers

to a prakriti as if it is a sentient being), according to Sri Madhvacharya. This

is unlike Sri Ramanuja, who interprets 'prakriti' as 'nature'. IMO, this

interpretation that talks of Lord as having two svabhAvas, lower and higher, not

only corrupts His homogeneity but also makes the next verse vague: If everything

fits in or is His nature, what is the big deal in claiming that there is nothing

higher to Him, whatsoever? Moreover, in statements involving prakriti, it is

clear that the Lord is talking of an entity different from Him and inferior to

Him (mayAdhyaksheNa). The word 'me' in 7.4-5 meaning 'mine' can simply imply

that both these prakritis belong to Him just like when I say 'this is my pen',

the pen belongs to me.

 

Your comments on the Advaita's interpretation are from a perspective outside the

advaita system. Whether BG supports advaita or not is a different issue.

 

My reference to Prabhupaada's "BG as it is" (and not to other works in Chaitanya

sampradaya) was in response to your comments on his deviation from Madhva.

Regarding the interpretation of 'Atma', even Shankaracharya says that this word

refers to Paramatma in his BSB on 3.1.1. Moreover, it is not difficult to derive

such an interpretation given the context (For example, look at 6.29 and 6.30).

IMO, the resemblances b/w his and Sri Madhva's bhAShya is, to a large extent,

coincidental (Also, Prabhupada's interpretation never seems to be aware of Sri

Madhva's Gita Tatparya). Whether he has played his 'role' well or not, how he

should be judged etc is irrelevant, isn't it?

 

Regards,

Krishna

[Guest guest]

Dear Krishna,

>It is surprising to find that the 15.16's axara purusha is made out to be

the Jiva,

>when the Uttama purusha himself states in no uncertain terms that 'ksharaH

>sarvANi bhUtAni'. It is not possible to make this phrase 'sarvANi bhUtAni'

out

>to the material/matter of this world, for, in many other instances in the

Gita itself,

>this phrase is used to denote sentient beings

 

As you yourself point out, 'similarity of adjectives does not prove much'.

The fundamental meaning of 'bhuta' is that which has come into being or

been created; and this may refer to sentient as well as insentient

entities. The BhG in at least one place (7.6) defines 'bhuta' as a

combination of the two (etadyonini bhutani...). In 15.16-18, the word is

certainly used to denote either 'creatures' in the empirical sense (i.e.,

bodies) or material elements (mahabhuta), as it would go absolutely against

the grain of the text -- and, indeed, of all vedantic texts -- to describe

the self as destructible (kshara). Matter, as you rightly point out, is not

really destructible either; but it forms are, in contrast to the self.

 

On the other hand, while a single adjective may be used to refer to

different entities, a long list of identical or near-identical attributes

narrows the scope considerably. 'The dark one' may refer to any number of

persons; 'the dark, four-armed, yellow-robed, discus-holding,

serpent-resting one' not so... The epithets in 2.24-25 and 12.3 are surely

too similar to leave an unprejudiced mind in doubt of their common

referent. To describe the self as akshara, and as the object of meditation,

is more in keeping with the tenor of the BhG than reading references to Sri

and her worship into the text (where they are never mentioned).

 

Ramanuja Dasa,

MG

[Guest guest]

Dear Sri Krishna K,

 

It will take some time for me to reply to this due to work load. I think a

real dialectic dialog is useful atleast to me to appreciate sri

Madhvacharya's views well. However, as you mentioned, it may not be

appropriate for this list.

 

I like Mani varadarajan to let me know if we can take this discussion within

a short email list out side bhakti-list or get into dialectics right within

this list.

 

Krishna

 

 

Krishna K [kadirik]

Thursday, April 04, 2002 3:04 AM

bhakti-list

RE: 'Akshara' etc. in the BhG

 

 

Dear Sri Krishna Kashyap, Sri Martin and others,

 

********* details deleted

[Guest guest]

Dear Sri Martin,

 

I have tried replying to your comments; IMHO, any further comments will get to

dialectic over 'sharIri-sharIra' bhAva and related concepts, which I don't know

well. Since the moderator is yet to show his approval or otherwise, I shall post

this with the promise that further communication will be off the list.

 

 

Martin Gansten [Martin.Gansten]

Wednesday, April 03, 2002 2:31 PM

> Dear Krishna,

> As you yourself point out, 'similarity of adjectives does not prove much'.

> The fundamental meaning of 'bhuta' is that which has come into being or

> been created; and this may refer to sentient as well as insentient

> entities. The BhG in at least one place (7.6) defines 'bhuta' as a

> combination of the two (etadyonini bhutani...).

 

The referrent (etad) is the second prakriti, who is said to be yonIni of

'sarvANi bhUtAni'; note the change of numbers; 'etad' is singular, 'jIvabhUtaM'

is singular; while 'sarvANi bhUtAni' isn't. Moreover, isn't it against plain

experience that the Jiva cannot be the referrent in 'yayA idaM dhAryate jagat'

(by which this world is held) ?

 

In what other places in Gita is 'sarvANi bhUtAni' (or similar phrase) used to

refer to insentient matter?

 

****

In 15.16-18, the word is certainly used to denote either 'creatures' in the

empirical sense (i.e., > bodies) or material elements (mahabhuta), as it would

go absolutely against > the grain of the text -- and, indeed, of all vedantic

texts -- to describe > the self as destructible (kshara). Matter, as you rightly

point out, is not

> really destructible either; but it forms are, in contrast to the self.

>

*****

Just as the tone of 'destruction' is reduced by saying that it is not matter

itself, 'forms of matter' that are destructible, one can easily that the bodies

that the Jivas take are destructible. In any case, the Jiva's linga deha is not

destroyed till moxa. Since Jivas always have some body or the other, prior to

moxa, and whose bodies are destructible, they can be called 'kshara'.

This would go more 'with' the grain of BG and Vedanta because the multiplicity

matches ('ksharaH sarvANi bhUtAni') unlike the singular used for axara.

 

***********

> On the other hand, while a single adjective may be used to refer to

> different entities, a long list of identical or near-identical attributes >

narrows the scope considerably. 'The dark one' may refer to any number of >

persons; 'the dark, four-armed, yellow-robed, discus-holding, > serpent-resting

one' not so... The epithets in 2.24-25 and 12.3 are surely > too similar to

leave an unprejudiced mind in doubt of their common

***********

IMO, an unprejudiced mind would reason it out like this:

 

Till one comes to 15.16, the adjectives 'avyakta', 'achChedya', 'axara' et al

are known as applicable to the Jiva and the Lord. Then, the Lord calls

'kUTastha' as 'axara'. Definitely, paramatma is not this kUTastha. Either it has

to be a jIva or a new entity. Now, depending on what 'kshara' can mean, either

it will be a jIva or a new entity.

 

The Lord says that 'kshara' = 'sarvANi bhUtAni'. It cannot mean 'Matter' because

(1) the context is regarding 'purushau' (about the two kinds of purusha). By no

means can matter be called as purusha.

(2) Generally and in Vedanta, this phrase means "Beings" (unless the context

demands otherwise).

(3) Had this phrase meant 'matter', many verses in Gita would not make sense,

where the referrent of this phrase, have some area called 'hriddeshe' and is

subject to delusion.

Thus, this phrase means 'all beings' only. This implies that 'axara' mentioned

must be an entity, different from Jiva and Uttama purusha.

 

********

> referent. To describe the self as akshara, and as the object of

> meditation,

> is more in keeping with the tenor of the BhG than reading references to Sri

> and her worship into the text (where they are never mentioned).

********

Which verse unambiguously indicates that the Jiva should be meditated upon? Hope

the difference between 'meditation on the Jiva' and 'sAdhana of jIva' is

maintained. Pls answer these questions (ref my earlier mail).

 

The tenor of Gita can be decided only after the purport is understood well. As

mentioned earlier, 7.5 is a proof that the Sritattva is one of the subjects of

Gita. And such verses where 'prakriti' is referred as if it is a sentient being

(vis-a-vis where it is referred as insentient also: 13th chapter, 14.3-5)

support it.

 

Another point to note is that 7.21 and 9.23 clarify that worship of other

devatas is grades less than the worship of the Lord. Despite that, Arjuna's

wanting to know which of Paramatma upAsana and X-upAsana would be redundant if X

is any other jIva like the devatas; unless such is corroborated in the shrutis;

hence the references to shrutis which speak of obtaining moxa on Lakshmi's

upAsana. Sri Madhvacharya makes a point here, but this is not the place to

discuss that :-)

 

I found your mail on the site; it didn't reach my inbox. Is this an

old problem with ?

 

Regards,

Krishna

[Guest guest]

Dear Krishna,

>The referrent (etad) is the second prakriti, who is said to be yonIni

>of 'sarvANi bhUtAni'; note the change of numbers; 'etad' is singular

 

This is not correct. Etadyoni- is an adjective compound (bahuvrihi-samasa),

as is seen from the change of gender (yoni- is feminine, -yonIni is neuter

plural). Etad- is the stem form used in all compounds irrespective of

number, just as 'tad-guruH' could mean tasya guruH, tayor guruH, or teSAM

guruH depending on the context. The number, therefore, must be decided from

the context.

 

To make etad- in BhG 7.6 to refer only to the para-prakriti, you have to

disregard the context to a degree which I would consider as seriously

violating the text (though perhaps not to the extent of the famous ChU

gloss 'atat tvam asi'!). But enough said. Many meanings can be read into a

text (eisegesis), and arguments fabricated to support them, if one is not

content to approach the text on its own terms. If you wish to believe that

the BhG labels the self 'destructible' (kshara) and introduces Sri as a

separate tattva under the designation 'purusha' (!), I will not waste my

time or yours trying to persuade you otherwise.

 

For any listeners-in, however, I would like to note as a final comment that

the BhG repeatedly makes a difference between the 'self in itself' as

experienced by the jnanin and 'all creatures' (bhuta), stating explicitly

that the jnanin sees latter in the former (cf. 4.35, 6.29). That's all from

me on this thread, at least for now.

 

Ramanuja Dasa,

MG

[Guest guest]

Moderator's note: Dear Members, please continue to discuss this

issue. What I request you to avoid is a blow-by-blow debate.

Instead, it is better if the issues are phrased as broad

questions and answers about the flow of thought in the Gita

and of Sri Ramanuja's commentary. This will allow everyone to

follow the discussion.

 

Thanks,

Mani

[Guest guest]

bhakti-list, Martin Gansten <Martin.Gansten@t...> wrote:

 

I didn't intend to reply on this thread, but a look at Sri Ramanuja's commentary

on 15.16 seemed relevant here; hence the response.

> This is not correct. Etadyoni- is an adjective compound (bahuvrihi-samasa),

....

> guruH depending on the context. The number, therefore, must be decided from

> the context.

 

Thanks for the above correction. However the point re multiplicity still

remains. That 'jIvabhUtAM' is in singular is still answered. One has two ways of

replying; that the referrent is either (i) the collective or (ii) the abstract

entity 'jIva'. If the former, it is against one's experience that the collective

of Jivas is the referrent of 'yayA idam dhAryate jagat' (by that which the world

is held); if the latter, it is never the case that an abstract entity *supports*

concrete stuff.

Another point, not yet answered, is that if everything is the Lord svabhAva,

what's the point in the Lord claiming Himself to be superior to everything else

in the next verse?

> To make etad- in BhG 7.6 to refer only to the para-prakriti, you have to

> disregard the context to a degree

 

The context in this case is very 'open': anything can be made out of it when the

Lord is saying that not many people know *this* knowledge. Each can easily

accuse the other of 'violating the text'.

> which I would consider as seriously violating the text (though perhaps

> not to the extent of the famous ChU

> gloss 'atat tvam asi'!). But enough said. Many meanings can be read into a

> text (eisegesis), and arguments fabricated to support them, if one is not

> content to approach the text on its own terms. If you wish to believe that

> the BhG labels the self 'destructible' (kshara) and introduces Sri as a

> separate tattva under the designation 'purusha' (!), I will not waste my

> time or yours trying to persuade you otherwise.

 

It is well accepted that scriptures contradict themselves on the face of it

(Why, Yudhishthira accepts that in MBh!); that's why each Acharya has given his

way of interpretation. It is not possible to get to 'gati sAmAnyAt' (unity of

purport of scriptures) without resolving such conflicts. For example, can you

accept whatever is mentioned on the face of it in the nAsadIya sUkta? or in

'asadvA idamagra AsIt; tato vai sadajAyata' (Taittariya Up).

Specific to the Chandogya statement, it is perhaps forgotten that the compound

can be split eitherway. Sri Madhva gives his reasons including contextual ones

as to why the split should be done as 'atat' (Also, refer to Sri Vyasatirtha's

Nyayamrita on this). Btw, I have read that He has even explained the vulgate

reading also. Also refer to his commentators on this.

 

Two points need clarification:

a. Regarding 'ksharaH sarvANi bhUtAni' of 15.16, as noted earlier, anything

existing, be it either matter or jiva, cannot have svarUpa destruction (2.16).

Obviously the sense of 'destruction' has to be toned down. You prefer to

classify 'matter' as kshara. I have given reasons in my earlier mails why that

cannot be and hence classify the jIvas as kshara, whose contact with matter is

destructible (in terms of body loss).

 

b. Regarding Lakshmi being classified as purusha need not be puzzling. All

through the Gita, the word purusha is used. (A simple search should yeild many

occurences). In most of the cases, it obviously means 'Being'; otherwise the

Lord should be accused of being unfavorable to women! Also, Lakshmi is said to

be more powerful than any puruSha other than the Lord (ambhraNi/devI sUkta),

hence classifying her as 'purushha' is not a problem.

 

I looked up Sri Ramanuja's commentary on 15.16. Regarding point (a), what he

says is different from this: "kshara-purusha = matter or the material aspect of

living beings;". According to him : ksharaH cha axara eva cha iti dvau imau

puruShau loke prathitau | tatra xara shabda nirdiShTaH puruSho

jIvashabdAbhilipanIya brahmAdistambhaparyantaxaraNasvabhAva *achitsamsR^iShTa

sarvabhUtAni...." and "axarashabda nirdiShTaH... muktAtmA", all beings who are

yet to be liberated are classified as kshara and all muktas are axara. Thus it

is clear that he too sees problems with calling 'matter as kshara', instead

classifies 'beings with material contact, which is destructible' as kshara.

With this intepretation of axara as mukta jIva, the questions would be: (a)

Where is mukta-jIvopAsana mentioned? (b) why the singular despite the multiple

mentioned for 'ksharaH'? esp when amukta jIvas don't become one on mukti ©

whether mukta or amukta jIvas are mentioned for upAsana, 7.20 and 9.23 clearly

put 'upAsana of any other jIva' on a scale lower than that of Paramatma. In that

light, isn't Arjuna's question in 12.01 redundant?

 

For the arguments made by me so far re how Sri's upAsana can be a subject in

12.01 (see 14.3-5), I think a response better than 'Arguments fabricated to

support', which looks like a tacit acceptance of lack of answers, is possible. I

await Sri Krishna Kashyap's mail.

 

Regards,

Krishna

 

[ In this thread, please focus on Sri Ramanuja's interpretation and not

a defense or attack of Sri Madhva's position. The latter is beyond

the scope of this email list. Often Sri Madhva's arguments rely

on nuances and ingenious usage of grammar, often lending unusual

meanings to very familiar and straightforward words. Debating such

involved interpretation is too difficult to do over email.

Thanks. -- Moderator ]

[Guest guest]

I didn't intend to write any more on this either, but on consideration, a

few clarifications may be in place.

 

First, I should like to say a word or two of where I'm coming from. As you

can tell by my name, I am not (like most active members of this list) an

'ethnic' Sri Vaishnava, though Hindu thought in general has occupied my

mind for more than twenty years. Having taken pancasamskara from Sri

Rangapriya Swami of Bangalore a few years ago, I am now a Sri Vaishnava by

initiation and practice; but I was a Sanskritist and an historian of

religion first, and maintain a (secular) scholar's perspective in certain

ways.

 

One instance of this perspective is the scholarly [hyper]sensitivity to

eisegesis, that is, reading things *into* a text rather than *out of* it

(exegesis). Now, to some degree all theologians (of whatever religion)

always do this: it is in the nature of a systematic theology. But when

eisegesis is carried beyond a certain point, so that the general tenor of

the reading begins to differ significantly from that of the text itself, I

cannot help feeling that the text is being violated.

 

In general, I find that Ramanuja's eisegesis, particularly of the BhG,

takes the form of exaggeration: overstating a tendency which is already in

the text. (For instance: the BhG clearly advocates karmayoga over

jnanayoga. Ramanuja overstates this case to the point where jnanayoga is

said to be possible only for disincarnate beings!) With some other acaryas,

I find that the tendency is often to argue *against* the tenor of the text,

with 'ingenious usage of grammar', as pointed out by our Moderator.

 

Having said this, I would like to comment on the following two related

questions:

>If the former, it is against one's experience

>that the collective of Jivas is the referrent of 'yayA idam dhAryate jagat'

>(by that which the world is held); if the latter, it is never the case that

>an abstract entity *supports* concrete stuff.

>Another point, not yet answered, is that if everything is the Lord

>svabhAva, what's the point in the Lord claiming Himself to be superior to

>everything else in the next verse?

 

On Ramanuja's view, the world is in fact dependent on the individual self,

which in turn is dependent on God; therefore everything ultimately depends

on God, making Him superior to everything else. One may in fact turn the

tables and say: if the self and the world are *not* materially dependent on

God, but eternally and absolutely separate categories, then what is the

point in claiming His superiority?

 

The relevant points are most clearly brought out in Vedarthasamgraha 17:

'The individual self has brahman for its own self, for the self is a

modification of brahman because it constitutes his body, as appears from

another sruti: ..."whose body is the self", etc. The non-conscious entities

in the generic structures of a god, a man etc. are modifications of this

same individual self -- which is a modification of brahman himself --

because they constitute the self's body.' A few paragraphs later, in VAS

22, Ramanuja adds: 'The demonstration that all is an effect of brahman

furnishes proof that that all has reality of itself in so far as it has

brahman for its self, and not otherwise.' (Slightly edited version of van

Buitenen's translation.)

 

Finally, regarding the meaning of kshara in BhG 15.16, I would like to

clarify that my preferred option all along has been to understand 'sarvani

bhutani' in the light of 7.6: 'all creatures' in the sense of a combination

of body and soul. I see no conflict between this and Ramanuja's gloss

ksharana-svabhava-acit-samsrishta-sarva-bhutani; in fact, the meaning seems

to me identical. As for meditation on the self, sruti and smriti are full

to overflowing of vakyas supporting it; but as I anticipate that you would

construe 'self' (atman) in every case to refer to paramatman, I will not

bother to cite any.

 

Ramanuja Dasa,

MG

[Guest guest]

bhakti-list, "Krishna K" <kadirik@i...> wrote:

> With this intepretation of axara as mukta jIva, the questions would

be: (a) Where is mukta-jIvopAsana mentioned? (b) why the singular

despite the multiple mentioned for 'ksharaH'? esp when amukta jIvas

don't become one on mukti © whether mukta or amukta jIvas are

mentioned for upAsana, 7.20 and 9.23 clearly put 'upAsana of any

other jIva' on a scale lower than that of Paramatma. In that light,

isn't Arjuna's question in 12.01 redundant?

>

 

Dear Krishna,

 

Let me preface this email by a warning that my knowledge of

sanskrit is at the kindergarden level. In verse 12.1, the reference

is to two classes of devotees (a) yE satatayuktAh bhaktAh tvAm

paryupAsate, that is those who meditate on you, and (b) Ye

aksharam avyaktam (paryupAsate), that is those who meditate on

the akshara.

 

My first impulse is to differentiate the sense of "paryupAsate"

mean in the two cases. In the first case, it would mean loving

meditation on nArAyaNA, and in the second case, it would merely

have the sense of meditation on a tattva, in this case the true

nature of the akshara or the jIva. (Thus the question of propitiating

a being other than nArAyaNA does not arise in the second case,

because the question of propitiating itself does not arise.) My

understanding is that the "upAsana" could be used in both these

senses. I leave it to you and others to comment on whether this

reading is technically acceptable.

 

The other solution proposed, if I understand Mani correctly, is

that the phrase "Ye aksharam avyaktam (paryupAsate)" refers to

the meditation on nArAyaNA as akshara in order to realize oneself

as akshara. Thought this was worth recalling.

 

-Kasturi

[Guest guest]

Martin Gansten writes:

> In general, I find that Ramanuja's eisegesis, particularly of

> the BhG, takes the form of exaggeration: overstating a tendency

> which is already in the text. (For instance: the BhG clearly

> advocates karmayoga over jnanayoga. Ramanuja overstates this

> case to the point where jnanayoga is said to be possible only

> for disincarnate beings!)

 

Martin,

 

While I agree with your overall observation, can you point out

where Ramanuja says this about jnAna-yoga? As I have understood

the bhAshya, Ramanuja only says that success in jnAna-yoga is

difficult and only possible for a very advanced aspirant, but it

is nonetheless possible.

 

My take on Ramanuja's Gitabhashya is that I find it to be

the most careful reading of the text. Ramanuja always takes

into account the context and comments appropriately (e.g., the

many different usages of the word 'brahman' in the Gita).

I also think his interpretation rings psychologically true

in terms of the process of yoga.

 

Yes, there are a few places where I have to admit that I would be

hard pressed to convince an impartial observer that Ramanuja's

interpretation is not without difficulty (e.g., the different

meditations on the ParamAtman outlined for the three different

aspirants in Chapter 8). At the same time, as you say, in each

situation the tendency toward these interpretations is there in the

text and it certainly would be hasty to conclude that Ramanuja is

wrong.

 

As my friend Krishna Kalale/Kashyap once remarked, of the

three classical commentators s on the Gita, Sankaracharya

is the boldest (reading monistic Advaita in an avowedly

theistic text), Ramanuja's is closest to the intention of the

original, and Madhva's is the most theistic (reading references

to the ParamAtman wherever the jIva is actually intended,

i.e., the first six chapters).

 

aDiyEn rAmAnuja dAsan,

Mani

[Guest guest]

>While I agree with your overall observation, can you point out

>where Ramanuja says this about jnAna-yoga? As I have understood

>the bhAshya, Ramanuja only says that success in jnAna-yoga is

>difficult and only possible for a very advanced aspirant, but it

>is nonetheless possible.

 

You are quite right that this is the overall tenor of Ramanuja's teaching;

the argument about jnanayoga not being for embodied (prakriti-samsrishta)

beings is an extreme example. I brought it up only to illustrate a point.

It occurs in Ramanuja's bhashya on BhG 3.35.

 

Ramanuja Dasa,

MG

[Guest guest]

Dear Martin,

You wrote :-

*******************************************************

>While I agree with your overall observation, can you

point out

>where Ramanuja says this about jnAna-yoga? As I have

understood

>the bhAshya, Ramanuja only says that success in

jnAna-yoga is

>difficult and only possible for a very advanced

aspirant, but it

>is nonetheless possible.

 

You are quite right that this is the overall tenor of

Ramanuja's

teaching;

the argument about jnanayoga not being for embodied

(prakriti-samsrishta)

beings is an extreme example. I brought it up only to

illustrate a

point.

It occurs in Ramanuja's bhashya on BhG 3.35.

 

Ramanuja Dasa,

MG

*******************************************************

 

The slokha of BhG 3.35 according to Gita Bhashya of

Acharya Ramanuja :-

 

sreyan sva-dharmo vigunah

para-dharmat svanusthitat

sva-dharme nidhanam sreyah

para-dharmo bhayavahah

 

This slokha only means that persons qualified for

karmayoga and who are not advanced to the sankya stage

(even though they do have a theoretical knowledge of

the self and body which is a pre-requisite even for

starting karmayoga)are safe and will not be doing harm

to themselves if they follow karma yoga itself because

their inherent nature i.e the prakriti guna

combinations with which they are associated at that

time is suitable for karmayoga and obviously if they

try to imitate a sankya yogi(whose intellect easily

goes to his self than to the thoughts of his

body),they

will be inviting spiritual downfall rather than

spiritual advancement.

 

The above can be understood from the context of slokha

33 and 34 of the same chapter.

 

Also the 3rd chapter begins with the confusion of

Arjuna about the means to be adopted i.e whether karma

or sankya(gnana) yoga.He even shifts the source of his

confusion to Sri Krishna.Sri Krishna in turn starts to

explain that there are two paths leading to self

realization i.e karma and sankya,the later being an

advanced stage of the former in the true sense and not

all embodied beings i.e souls attached to sense

objects

through senses are immediatley qualified to practise

sankya even though it is close to their true nature.

 

Having understood all this right from the beginning of

 

3rd chapter related to an embodied being at different

levels of embodiment i.e prakriti guna combinations,to

say that 35th slokha talks of gnana or sankya yoga as

a means adopted by an "disincarnate being" and not an

embodied soul is "illogical from the context of the

chapter" and Acharya Ramanuja has never given such a

meaning.Please refer Gita Bhashya of Ramanuja by M.A.

Sampatkumaran or the one published by Ramakrishna

mission.

 

Dear Martin,I liked your explainations for the term

akshara,kutastha etc. signifying the soul in its true

state according to Sri.Ramanuja's school of thought.

 

I hope the above explaination clarifies your doubt.Any

errors above are mine.Please feel free to write to me

your comments about the same.

 

Sri Krishnaarpanamasthu

Suresh B.N.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Tax Center - online filing with TurboTax

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[Guest guest]

Dear Suresh,

 

Thank you for your comments. If I understand them correctly, you object to

the interpretation of prakriti-samsrishta ('united with [material] nature')

as 'embodied'. In this you may of course be correct -- the expression is

not absolutely unambiguous -- but I would direct your attention to

Ramanuja's gloss on BhG 15.16, where he uses a very similar phrase:

jiva-shabda-abhilapaniya-brahma-adi-stamba-paryanta-ksharana-svabhava-*acit-

samsrishta*-sarva-bhutani 'all creatures, denoted by the term jiva [and]

united with insentient [matter], the nature of which is to perish, from

Brahma to a clump of grass'. Here 'embodied' seems to translate acit- (or

prakriti-) samsrishta very well. There is also some justification for this

interpretation in 3.8 (text as well as commentary), where inactivity --

associated with jnanayoga -- is said to be incompatible with the

maintenance of the body.

 

Robert Lester, in his 'Ramanuja on the Yoga', has also understood the word

in the same sense.

 

Ramanuja Dasa,

MG

[Guest guest]

>

>Martin Gansten [Martin.Gansten]

>Wednesday, April 10, 2002 8:32 PM

>

>I didn't intend to write any more on this either, but on

>consideration, a few clarifications may be in place.

 

Ditto. Actually more questions. But first a simple question to Mani.

 

***** Mani2 wrote:

While the akshara-upAsaka meditates principally on the jIva having God as its

innermost self, the jnAni meditates principally on God having the jIva as His

attribute. (The first is brahma-SarIraka-jIvAtma upAsana, the second is

svAtma-viSishTa-brahma upAsana). As Martin has pointed out, Sri Ramanuja

mentions that the distinction between these two aspirants is only in the initial

stage ("mukha-bhedena" -- see Vedanta Saara).

****

 

If the differences in upAsana is only in initial stages and only nominal

(mukha-bhedena), why does the Lord qualify the axara-upAsana as 'klesho

adhikataraH'?

>always do this: it is in the nature of a systematic theology. But when

>eisegesis is carried beyond a certain point, so that the

>general tenor of the reading begins to differ significantly from that of the

>text itself, I >cannot help feeling that the text is being violated.

 

I have been told something similar about Shankaracharya's BSB too; that his

Adhyasa bhAShya is an unnecessary preface and is against the tenor of the

Sutras. But for a starter (Why, even for others) the tenor cannot be decided

unless the purport is fixed. Now, the fact that there are commentaries from

people of respectable stature itself suggests that the purport cannot be fixed

by the prima facie or dictionary meanings; it is clear that prima facie meaning

is simply inconsistent. Also, the systems propounded by each Acharya have a

bearing on their interpretation.

IMO, an interpretation should be evaluated on more important factors:

concurrence with experience, how 'early in the game' would one resort to human

limitations/inconceivability of something, the logical strength, whether a line

of interpretation agrees/disagrees with some other mainstream text, the method

of analysis etc. Since dictionary meanings anyway cannot give the deeper

meaning, a statistical standard such as 'who deviates the most or least' is

simply pointless(IMO).

 

**** I wrote:

>>If the former, it is against one's experience that the collective of Jivas is

the referrent of 'yayA idam dhAryate jagat'

>>(by that which the world is held); if the latter, it is never the case that an

abstract entity *supports* concrete stuff.

>>Another point, not yet answered, is that if everything is the Lord svabhAva,

what's the point in the Lord claiming Himself >>to be superior to everything

else in the next verse?

 

***** You wrote:

>On Ramanuja's view, the world is in fact dependent on the individual self,

which in turn is dependent on God; therefore everything >ultimately depends >on

God, making Him superior to everything else. One may in >fact turn the >tables

and say: if the self and the world are *not* materially >dependent on >God, but

eternally and absolutely separate categories, then what is the >point in

claiming His superiority?

******

If you notice you have just come on the other side of the table, paritally: 'me'

in 7.4 is interpreted by Madhva and his sub-commentators as 'madadhInA'.

Ramanuja interprets it as 'madIyA'; Shankara says the same, but interprets

'prakriti' as nature (he gives a quote to this effect). Since you mentioned this

quote in your earlier mails as giving Lord's two 'natures', I would assume that

to be the tradition. With that, the question remains: If both prakriti and the

Jivas form a part of Lord's nature, basically when everything we know and see is

covered as a part of His nature (which I presume is not different from Him),

what's the point in saying that He is greater than [everything else = nothing in

this case]?

 

Would you say that since pot is materially *dependent* on clay, clay is

*superior* to pot? Ofcourse there is no question of superiority at all since

they are the same stuff *essentially*.

Also, regarding "the world is in fact dependent on the individual self": Isn't

this plain against facts of experience? Or is that one will realize this after

liberation? That is also not agreeable because from what Ramanuja says in his

commentary on 2.10, he clearly says that the soul is fundamentally different

from matter (which I think all Vedantins accept). How can a [clay's

modification] be essentially different from clay itself? It is in these cases

that one feels that notoreity in 'ingenious usage of grammer' is much more

benign than that in changing the facts of experience.

 

**** You wrote

>to overflowing of vakyas supporting it; but as I anticipate

>that you would

>construe 'self' (atman) in every case to refer to paramatman,

>I will not

>bother to cite any.

****

 

As you have well anticipated, shrutis and smritis are overflowing with vakyAs

supporting meditation of self, only if the word 'Atman' is construed as jIva in

every case. To the best of my guess, each Acharya has interpreted it based on

different factors, and has not interpreted it in the same way always, though

favoring a particular meaning. Instead of correcting your anticipation, I'd like

to know how the following shruti vAkyAs are interpreted:

 

1. The Yajnavalkya's statements in Br.Up: na vA are patyuH kAmAya patiH priyo

bhavati...

2. The Katha Upanishad statement: na ayamAtmA pravachanena labhyo.. yamevaishha

vR^iNute tena labhyaH tasyaiSha AtmA vivR^iNute tanUM svAM

3. The Mundaka Upanishad definition of Atma: yasmin dyauH pR^ithivI

chAntarikshamotaM...tamevaikaM jAnatha AtmAnam anyAvaacho

vimuJNchatha amR^itasyaiSha setuH.

4. The Mandukya Up. on Atma. Can one's 'Atma' be construed as having 19 heads in

both waking and sleeping state? Is one's Atma: eSha sarveshvaraH eSha sarvaGYa

eSho.antaryAmi eSha yoniH sarvasya prabhavaapyayau hi bhuutaanaam.h?

 

In each of the above, it does not make sense to interpret 'AtmA' as 'Jiva'.

In the first one, where Yajnvalkya is saying that a husband does not become

beloved just by the wife's desire, but by Atma's desire. Does it make any sense

to construe Atma as the jIva (of wife/husband)? Similarly in the second one. In

the third one, note that 'AtmA' is referred as 'amR^itasyaiSha setuH' (the

bridge to moksha!). The fourth is self-explanatory.

 

Also, the very fact there is a separate BrahmasUtra for this: 1.3.1, that too in

the samanvaya adhyAya should indicate what the word Atma should mean, primarily

and in most of the scriptural statements; that the rUDhyArtha is not possible to

render shAstraa's 'gati sAmAnya'.

 

Btw, I would be thankful if one can give the sanskrit text of SriBhAshya on BS

1.3.1.

 

Regards,

Krishna

[Guest guest]

Dear Martin,

 

Iam not objecting to your understanding of

'prakriti-samsrishta' as 'embodied'.What iam objecting

is to the usage of the term "Dis-incarnate" instead of

"embodied" in BhG 3.35 in the source which you quote

from.If "Dis-incarnate" and "embodied" are understood

as same i.e to mean "embodied" then there is no

problem,otherwise it will mean that sankya yoga cannot

be practised by an embodied being i.e soul or purusha

identified to its embodiment due to its karma and can

only be practised by an "Dis-incarnate being" i.e a

purusha free from all this,if thats what you mean by

the term?.

What Archarya Ramanuja says is that "sankya yoga is

difficult to practise by an embodied soul even though

it is qualified to practise the same" because it is

"still vulnerable to Rajo guna" even at this stage.

This concept is made clear in the last few slokhas of

3rd chapter by Sri Krishna to Arjuna when arjuna asks

sri krishna about the reason why even persons advanced

to the stage of sankya fall from their positions.

 

This however does not mean that sankya yoga "can never

be practised by an embodied soul" and the conclusion

that only "Dis-incarnate or avatara purusas" can

practise it will damage the context of the chapter and

also limit the powers of the jiva only as suitable to

karma yoga,when in fact it goes beyond sankya yoga

into Bhakti yoga to be ultimatley similar to Lord

himself(of course by his grace) as the lord himself

mentions at many places for example in chapter 4,10 th

slokha.

vita-raga-bhaya-krodha

man-maya mam upasritah

bahavo jnana-tapasa

puta mad-bhavam agatah

 

 

Hope it is clear.Please write your comments about the

same.Any errors above are mine.

 

Sri Krishnaarpanamasthu

Suresh B.N.

 

--- Martin Gansten <Martin.Gansten wrote:

> Dear Suresh,

>

> Thank you for your lengthy mail. If I understand you

> correctly, you object

> to my understanding of 'prakriti-samsrishta' as

> 'embodied'. You may of

> course be correct -- the word in itself means only

> 'united with [material]

> nature -- but I am not alone in this understanding

> (cf. Lester, 'Ramanuja

> on the Yoga'). You will note, also, that in his

> bhashya to BhG 15.15,

> Ramanuja makes use of a near-identical phrase, in

> the compound

>

jiva-shabda-abhilapaniya-brahma-adi-stamba-paryanta-ksharana-svabhava-acit-s

> amsrishta-sarva-bhutani 'all creatures united with

> insentient [matter, and]

> denoted by the term jiva, from Brahma to a clump of

> grass'. This certainly

> sound as though acit- or prakriti-samsrishta should

> be taken in the sense

> of embodiment.

>

> Regards,

> MG

>

 

 

 

 

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[Guest guest]

> Iam not objecting to your understanding of

>'prakriti-samsrishta' as 'embodied'.What iam objecting

>is to the usage of the term "Dis-incarnate" instead of

>"embodied" in BhG 3.35 in the source which you quote

>from.

 

If you accept that prakriti-samsrishta means 'embodied', then surely it

follows that since jnanayoga is (according to Ramanuja's commentary on the

verse in question) not the svadharma of embodied beings, it can only be the

svadharma of those *not* embodied, i.e., discarnate.

 

As I said before, no further comments from me on this topic.

 

Ramanuja Dasa,

MG

[Guest guest]

Pardon me for the long delay in replying, but

Krishna Kadiri brought some points up which merit

a response:

 

bhakti-list, "Krishna K" <kadirik@i...> wrote:

> ***** Mani2 wrote:

> While the akshara-upAsaka meditates principally on the jIva having

God as its innermost self, the jnAni meditates principally on God

having the jIva as His attribute. (The first is brahma-SarIraka-

jIvAtma upAsana, the second is svAtma-viSishTa-brahma upAsana). As

Martin has pointed out, Sri Ramanuja mentions that the distinction

between these two aspirants is only in the initial stage ("mukha-

bhedena" -- see Vedanta Saara).

> ****

>

> If the differences in upAsana is only in initial stages and only

nominal (mukha-bhedena), why does the Lord qualify the axara-upAsana

as 'klesho adhikataraH'?

 

The nominality of the difference is in the nature of

the ultimate goal, and it is in this context that

Sri Ramanuja has made this comment. The akshara-upAsana

is no doubt an inferior meditation, compared to the

direct brahma-upAsana. But the akshara-upAsaka will

ultimately and inevitably continue to brahma-upAsana

in the end and attain Brahman.

 

The akshara-upAsaka must meditate on the abstract

nature of the individual self and on its similarity

with the ultimate Self in respect of its consisting

solely of knowledge and bliss in its essence (jnAna-

Anandaika-svarUpatva). This is naturally difficult

for someone who is embodied and who continues to

confuse the body with the self. For this reason

the attainment of this goal is slower than for the

brahma-upAsaka who thirsts and meditates on the Lord

and the Lord alone. This why Krishna declares that

for embodied beings (dehavadbhiH) akshara-upAsana

is more difficult, i.e., takes a longer time to reach

fruition.

 

> 'me' in 7.4 is interpreted by Madhva and his sub-commentators

as 'madadhInA'. Ramanuja interprets it as 'madIyA';

 

Note: madIya here means 'belonging to Me'.

 

With regards,

Mani