Parisi&Watson/critical realism

[Guest guest]

At 09:57 AM 11/25/99 -0600, Parisi & Watson wrote:

>

>I read through you Web page and found it very interesting. But could you

>expand a bit on this point in explicitly Advaitic terms? I'm especially

>interested in how intellectual analysis can be used to undermine the

>dominant Western 'critical' realism, which you have described in the past:

>we never perceive the thing in itself, but only an impression the thing

>makes on our sensory apparatus, which then gives rise to a representation of

>the thing 'inside.'

 

Excellent question! Let me tackle it in Western and then advaitic terms.

 

How can intellectual analysis undermine critical realism?

 

Western analysis:

=================

Critical realism, like you say, holds that our cognition is never directly

of the Thing itself, but of characteristics of the thing. These

characteristics are identical to the actual character or *existence* of the

thing. Critical realism was an attempt to steer a via media between

realism and idealism. On one hand, realism had the problem that is

couldn't account for menatl acts on one side somehow representing

non-mental objects. An unbridgeable gap. Also, if everything mental

corresponds to some non-mental reality, then what about hobgoblins and pink

elephants? On the other hand, idealism was seen as having the weakness of

calling things like cars and bridges some kind of psychic occurrences.

 

So critical realism comes in to say that since we really do want to say we

know something (and not have skepticism forced on us), then our sense data,

which are in us, represent the world, which is out there. There are

several problems:

 

Problem 1 - relativity of perception. Visual example. Sometimes the sense

data occur under different colored light, so the orange looks redder this

minute, yellower the next minute. Are these all characters of the real?

If not, then which ones are, which ones aren't?

 

Problem 2 - metaphysical problem. Where do we get evidence to support the

claim:

 

(CR) My sense data are characteristics of the Thing.

 

Claim (CR) depends on a "view from nowhere," according to which, we somehow

know enough about the Thing to know that these sense data are its

characteristics. There is nothing that could serve as evidence for (CR).

 

Problem 3 - the status of the characteristics. (i) Are they mental events?

(ii) Are they part of the world? (iii) Are they both? If (i), then

critical realism is suffers the same faults as idealism. If (ii), then

critical realism suffers the same faults as realism, for then how are these

characteristics themselves known? (iii) Then critical realism suffers from

both weaknesses (and both strengths as well) :-)

 

Advaita analysis:

=================

(This is my understanding from the Chinmaya Mission teachings)

Critical realism corresponds most closely to another "via media," the

Advaitic creation theory of drishti srishti (simultaneous or sudden

creation). I believe that David Godman, Ramana's librarian, calls this

vada something like "creation by perception." Brahman filters down through

the koshas, the intellect, mind, and senses, goes out and actually makes

the world, and is there perceived then brought back to mind and is

cognized, then to the intellect where it is categorized, analyzed, etc. It

is a realist philosophy because the objects in the world are actually

there, are actually created by the Self in conjuntion with the apparatus of

the intellect/mind/body. But the world's existence is totally dependent

upon and inseparable from Brahman at all times.

 

The criticism of the drishti-srishti vada is not given to every student at

all times. When the student is ready, the drishti-srishti vada is sublated

by a higher teaching. Drishti-srishti vada is a via media between the

srishti-drishti vada (staged creation of the elements, *not* dependent on

perception), and ajata-vada (non-creation). Ajata-vada, as taught in

Gudapada's Mandukya-karika, is taught as a "higher" vada. But it is not

easy to understand, and can be scary to the students, as it does not give

them much to "grab onto."

 

Perhaps other members can refine this understanding of the vadas. Robert,

does this help?

 

Regards,

 

--Greg

[Guest guest]

>Greg Goode <goode

>

>How can intellectual analysis undermine critical realism?

>

>Western analysis:

>=================

>Critical realism, like you say, holds that our cognition is never directly

>of the Thing itself, but of characteristics of the thing. These

>characteristics are identical to the actual character or *existence* of the

 

It is not necessary to claim that the characteristics are identical to the

thing in itself. There is ample evidence that sense perception is largely

concocted, or we might even say trumped up, on the fly. But the survival

value of sense perception indicates that it does give us at least some

credible hints about what is really out there.

>thing. Critical realism was an attempt to steer a via media between

>realism and idealism. On one hand, realism had the problem that is

>couldn't account for menatl acts on one side somehow representing

>non-mental objects. An unbridgeable gap. Also, if everything mental

>corresponds to some non-mental reality, then what about hobgoblins and pink

>elephants? On the other hand, idealism was seen as having the weakness of

>calling things like cars and bridges some kind of psychic occurrences.

 

It would be naive to claim that all mental states or occurences correspond

to something outside, for exactly the reasons that you state. But that

doesn't exclude sense perception from bearing some resemblence to objects

outside us. It's not all or nothing.

>So critical realism comes in to say that since we really do want to say we

>know something (and not have skepticism forced on us), then our sense data,

>which are in us, represent the world, which is out there. There are

>several problems:

>

>Problem 1 - relativity of perception. Visual example. Sometimes the sense

>data occur under different colored light, so the orange looks redder this

>minute, yellower the next minute. Are these all characters of the real?

>If not, then which ones are, which ones aren't?

 

 

This is a non-problem. It is easily dispensed with by admitting that sense

perception is conditional, error prone, and generally faulty, while still

stipulating that it does still give us some valuable, useful information. I

would say that both sides of the equation can be supported by evidence

beyond a reasonable doubt.

>Problem 2 - metaphysical problem. Where do we get evidence to support the

>claim:

>

> (CR) My sense data are characteristics of the Thing.

>

>Claim (CR) depends on a "view from nowhere," according to which, we somehow

>know enough about the Thing to know that these sense data are its

>characteristics. There is nothing that could serve as evidence for (CR).

 

 

There is no necessity to bring the 'Ding-an-sich' into it explicitly. It's

more a matter of convincing circumstantial evidence based on correlating

various testable, repeatable observations. When our sense perceptions enable

us to survive and to manipulate the world to our advantage, then the claim

that they represent something beyond our own minds becomes very convincing,

even though in absolute terms we have nothing with which to compare it, as

you say. But life calls us to be more pragmatists than absolute

epistemologists.

>Problem 3 - the status of the characteristics. (i) Are they mental events?

> (ii) Are they part of the world? (iii) Are they both? If (i), then

>critical realism is suffers the same faults as idealism. If (ii), then

>critical realism suffers the same faults as realism, for then how are these

>characteristics themselves known? (iii) Then critical realism suffers from

>both weaknesses (and both strengths as well) :-)

 

 

I would go with (iii). The physiology of perception clearly indicates that

perception is not 'direct' in the sense that we tend normally to believe,

and this fact is also reinforced by the notorious errors and distortions to

which perception is prone, as you say. But if my perceptions can be grossly

garbled by ingesting LSD, then clearly they are more 'mental' than

'outside.' And yet am not I and my nervous system also part of the world?

Can my perceptions not be studied empirically, at least up to a point and in

an indirect manner? The world, ourselves, our 'truth,' and our perceptions

are all very sloppy, conditional, and subject to faults of all kinds, as

evidenced by the fact that we know about the physiology of perception only

by means of - perception. But to be too bothered by this sort of circular,

circumstantial reasoning means to give up knowing anything at all, or even

living.

>Advaita analysis:

>=================

>(This is my understanding from the Chinmaya Mission teachings)

>Critical realism corresponds most closely to another "via media," the

>Advaitic creation theory of drishti srishti (simultaneous or sudden

>creation). I believe that David Godman, Ramana's librarian, calls this

>vada something like "creation by perception." Brahman filters down through

>the koshas, the intellect, mind, and senses, goes out and actually makes

>the world, and is there perceived then brought back to mind and is

>cognized, then to the intellect where it is categorized, analyzed, etc. It

>is a realist philosophy because the objects in the world are actually

>there, are actually created by the Self in conjuntion with the apparatus of

>the intellect/mind/body. But the world's existence is totally dependent

>upon and inseparable from Brahman at all times.

>

>The criticism of the drishti-srishti vada is not given to every student at

>all times. When the student is ready, the drishti-srishti vada is sublated

>by a higher teaching. Drishti-srishti vada is a via media between the

>srishti-drishti vada (staged creation of the elements, *not* dependent on

>perception), and ajata-vada (non-creation). Ajata-vada, as taught in

>Gudapada's Mandukya-karika, is taught as a "higher" vada. But it is not

>easy to understand, and can be scary to the students, as it does not give

>them much to "grab onto."

>

>Perhaps other members can refine this understanding of the vadas. Robert,

>does this help?

 

 

I think I'm losing a lot from an explanation peppered with Sanskrit terms

with which I'm not at all familiar. But at least it's good to see a clear

dividing line drawn between Advaita and subjective idealism.

 

Robert.

[Guest guest]

Robert,

 

What you articulate is what we might call critical realism "lite," and I

think most reflective and educated people operate according to a version

like this. Why "lite"? Well, because of this - you don't seem to be

pushing any of its points too hard, you are basically saying that it makes

conventional sense, and that it has predictive and survival value, right?

You aren't putting as much weight on it as the philosophers do, both its

critics and its adherents. They discuss whether this or another

metaphysical theory is really how things are. They go into lots of

details, spin out implications, talk about the Ding-an-Sich, etc. It

doesn't seem that you are saying all that. My points below were about a

heavy (not lite) position, about whether it is the best way to account for

perception... As a conventional view of the way knowledge and perception

operate, I think most well educated, reflective adults probably hold to

something like this lite version of critical realism. There are quite

plausible alternatives, however. And leaving the question of "realization"

out of it, I must say I've never come across any writer or speaker on

non-dualism who treats any kind of realism seriously, as a theory that

really describes how things inherently are. Have you? In advaita vedanta,

a realist creation theory is taught, but then a "higher" theory is taught

later on, which is not a realist theory.

 

 

Greg:

>>Critical realism, like you say, holds that our cognition is never directly

>>of the Thing itself, but of characteristics of the thing. These

>>characteristics are identical to the actual character or *existence* of the

 

Robert:

>It is not necessary to claim that the characteristics are identical to the

>thing in itself. There is ample evidence that sense perception is largely

>concocted, or we might even say trumped up, on the fly. But the survival

>value of sense perception indicates that it does give us at least some

>credible hints about what is really out there.

 

That there is survival value in paying attention to sensory evidence

doesn't establish that there is anything out there. As David Hume argued,

regularity is sufficient. The fact that there are regularities between

certain kinds of observations and certain behaviors and outcomes is enough.

Regularities that establish correlations between paying attention to some

kinds of evidence and longer life, and other regularities between

disregarding evidence and a shorter life. Nothing need be claimed or

thought about what's out there or in here.

 

Greg:

>>Problem 2 - metaphysical problem. Where do we get evidence to support the

>>claim:

>>

>> (CR) My sense data are characteristics of the Thing.

>>There is nothing that could serve as evidence for (CR).

 

 

Robert:

>There is no necessity to bring the 'Ding-an-sich' into it explicitly.

 

I'd say that (CR) characterizes critical realism, and without explicit

mention of the Thing, it becomes the lite version.

 

Robert:

> It's more a matter of convincing circumstantial evidence based on

correlating

>various testable, repeatable observations. When our sense perceptions enable

>us to survive and to manipulate the world to our advantage, then the claim

>that they represent something beyond our own minds becomes very convincing,

>even though in absolute terms we have nothing with which to compare it, as

>you say. But life calls us to be more pragmatists than absolute

>epistemologists.

 

Partly agree, partly disagree. I agree that representationalism is

convincing. Why else would most reflective people hold to something like

it? I disagree about the pragmatic view. It is not necessary at all to

hold anything resembling (CR) in order to get along in the world. Our

manipulation of the world is interpreted by the nonrepresentationalist as

just another set of regularities. Actions and results need be nothing

other than observed data, in a wide sense (where even *intentions*

preceding the actions are observed). The body, as the acting and

manipulating apparatus, is itself part of the observed network, reducible

to emotional and sense data.

 

.....

Greg's advaita analysis...

.....

 

Robert:

>I think I'm losing a lot from an explanation peppered with Sanskrit terms

>with which I'm not at all familiar. But at least it's good to see a clear

>dividing line drawn between Advaita and subjective idealism.

 

Sorry, I thought you'd asked for advaita's take on the issue...

 

--Greg

[Guest guest]

>Greg Goode <goode

<snip>

>>I think I'm losing a lot from an explanation peppered with Sanskrit terms

>>with which I'm not at all familiar. But at least it's good to see a clear

>>dividing line drawn between Advaita and subjective idealism.

>

>Sorry, I thought you'd asked for advaita's take on the issue...

 

 

Yes, but I think I would either need the Sanskrit terms paraphrased out, or

else defined. I have read in Ramana Maharshi that students were initially

taught something more traditionally objective and historical about the

creation of the world, but that later it was supplanted by some sort of

theory of instantaneous creation. Maybe that's the sort of thing you're

alluding to. But I found his version of it also very unclear, at least in

translation.

 

As to the lite version of critical realism, I agree with you, but I think it

results from a shift from the traditional mode of philosophizing to a more

'scientific' orientation (I hate the term, but what can I do?). Over the

millennia philosophy has been about the search for 'Truth,' in the most

absolute and unconditional sense, and where this goal could not be attained,

the deficit was often covered by complex doctrines, the arbitrariness of

which was disguised only by their obscurity. Science, on the other hand, is

much more focused on an operational standard of successful prediction, and

nothing is ever final or absolute. The best we ever have is our latest and

most advanced understanding, which can always be overturned by new evidence

requiring a new interpretation. This provisional way of thinking carries

much less baggage, and so is more adaptable to the truth as it gradually

unfolds itself to us.

 

The main thing I was reaching for in my original question was whether an

almost Western style critique of realism could lead directly into Advaita,

as a sort of bridge from West to East. I know that rational thought can

never establish or comprehend nonduality, but I wondered if it could at

least have a destructive role in clearing away some of the underbrush by

denying and refuting some of the underpinnings of what has become the

default, unspoken Western scientific metaphysics. Sorry if I didn't make the

point of my question clear.

 

Robert.

 

PS: It probably also seems ungracious of me to ask a question and then pick

apart the answer, but I don't know any other way to get clear on what is

being said.

 

Robert.

[Guest guest]

>"Parisi & Watson" <niche

>

>I have read in Ramana Maharshi that students were initially

>taught something more traditionally objective and historical about the

>creation of the world, but that later it was supplanted by some sort of

>theory of instantaneous creation.

 

As I understand it, the Maharshi tended to work the other way around - he

would start with the "highest" creation teaching, then proceed to "lower"

ones if the person couldn't (wouldn't) accept that. Neither of the theories

you mentioned above are the "true" or "highest" teaching of Advaita Vedanta,

however - that would be the teaching that there is no creation in the first

place, therefore we don't have to come up with some theory to account for

it. (Our Western "realistic" ideas about the world correspond to the

"lowest" teaching in Vedanta, which would only be given out to the really

slow students :-)

>.... Science, on the other hand, is

>much more focused on an operational standard of successful prediction, and

>nothing is ever final or absolute. The best we ever have is our latest and

>most advanced understanding, which can always be overturned by new evidence

>requiring a new interpretation. This provisional way of thinking carries

>much less baggage, and so is more adaptable to the truth as it gradually

>unfolds itself to us.

 

What you describe is the true scientific attitude, and it would be wonderful

if most scientists really held to those high principles. I'm afraid, though,

that much of what passes for science these days is really just scientism - a

dogma of materialistic reductionism without an iota of evidence to back it

up.

 

Warren

[Guest guest]

At 09:03 AM 11/28/99 -0600, Parisi & Watson wrote:

>>>I think I'm losing a lot from an explanation peppered with Sanskrit terms

>>>with which I'm not at all familiar. But at least it's good to see a clear

>>>dividing line drawn between Advaita and subjective idealism.

>>

>>Sorry, I thought you'd asked for advaita's take on the issue...

>

>

>Yes, but I think I would either need the Sanskrit terms paraphrased out, or

>else defined. I have read in Ramana Maharshi that students were initially

>taught something more traditionally objective and historical about the

>creation of the world, but that later it was supplanted by some sort of

>theory of instantaneous creation. Maybe that's the sort of thing you're

>alluding to. But I found his version of it also very unclear, at least in

>translation.

 

I see that Warren has written on Ramana's teachings. Let me try to quickly

paraphrase in English these advaitic teachings on creation. It goes in 3

levels:

 

1. srishti-drishti vada - staged creation theory, or cretaion through

emanation. According to this theory, creation happens like this:

Consciousness emanates out of itself the 5 elements (ether, air, fire,

water, earth) in subtle form, then in grosser form, till the mind, body and

world are created. The purpose of this creation theory is to account for

the creation of the world while simultaneously showing that it is part and

parcel of Consciousness.

 

2. drishti-srishti vada - instantaneous creation theory, or creation

through perception/cognition. According to this theory, Consciousness

flows down through the subconscious storehouse, intellect, mind and senses,

goes out and creates the observed object, then instantaneously apphrehends

the object. Once the object is apprehended, the information about the

object flows back up through the senses, mind, and intellect, and residue

is stored in the subconscious storehouse (that's where our tendencies,

proclivities and memories are retained).

 

3. ajata-vada - non-creation theory. According to this theory, all

"things" are nothing other than appearances or arisings in Consciousness.

A car or toothache isn't something objectively existing, but rather an

appearance, like the snake and the rope example. These appearances are

also called arisings, and they are all causeless and spontaneous. There is

some logic applied to establish that cause and effect cannot be the

mechanism whereby arisings arise. Belief in cause and effect is a subtle

attachment to (or attribution of) a greater reality of the cause, than of

the effect.

 

Normally in orthodox Shankaracharyan advaita vedanta, the student's earlier

lessons from the texts are interpreted in terms of the first theory. Then

later, the second theory, then later the third.

>The main thing I was reaching for in my original question was whether an

>almost Western style critique of realism could lead directly into Advaita,

>as a sort of bridge from West to East. I know that rational thought can

>never establish or comprehend nonduality, but I wondered if it could at

>least have a destructive role in clearing away some of the underbrush by

>denying and refuting some of the underpinnings of what has become the

>default, unspoken Western scientific metaphysics. Sorry if I didn't make the

>point of my question clear.

 

I see now! I think these arguments *can* have a cleansing, freeing effect,

which can dissolve the tenacity of intellectual theories. It worked that

way for me, personally. That's how the particular philosophers on that

Western Philosophy page were chosen. I was always interested in

philosophy. Way before I'd ever heard of Advaita Vedanta or had any

interest in spiritual topics, I happened to read Brand Blanshard in the

1970's. Blanshard is a masterful philosophical writer, and his gentle and

insightful arguments rid me of my strong tendency to rely and think in

terms of essences of objects (the essential table, above and beyond the

forms, colors, textures, shapes, etc.). Blanshard also critiques other

metaphysical views, including critical realism! Reading George Berkeley in

the 1980's rid me of the tendency to think of a physical world "out there,"

composed of actual, real, externally existing attributes, characteristics,

or substances. There are other, less drastic examples, but these

substantialist, realist ways of thinking just never, ever came back.

 

So when I started studying eastern philosophy, it was a very natural segue.

Much of the groundwork had already been done.

 

Regards,

 

--Greg