Bhagawad Gita - Ch2. Verses 11 [Adi Shankara]

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[Commentary by Adi Shankara]

 

16.0 What happens to one who endures cold, heat etc? Listen:

 

16. The unreal comes not into being, the real never lapses into

non-being. The truth about both these has been perceived by the seers of

Reality.

 

16.1 The unreal i.e. that which has no being, such as cold and heat as

well as their cause, has no true existence. Effected states like cold and

heat are observed to be unreal in themselves when tested by means of valid

cognition. They are only inconstant transofrmations. Take, as an example,

effected entities like pot. When scrutinised, they are not seen apart from

clay and the like, their material causes. Therefore, as effects they are

unreal. In the same way, all transformations, not being cognizable apart

from their causes, are unreal. Unreal are effects like pots, for they are

unknown before their origination and after their destruction. The same

holds good for things like clay, the causes of pots and the like, for these

causes too are not known apart from their causes.

 

Objection: If the totality of causes and effects be unreal there arises teh

contingency of an absolute vacuum.

 

Answer: No; throughout the sphere of cognitive experience we have to deal

with two cognitions:

(1) the cognition of the real, and (2) the cognition of the unreal. That

alone is real whose cognition is not mutable, and that is unreal whose

cognition proves mutable. Thus, the distinction between the real and the

unreal rests on cognitions. Throughout the sphere of experience, the two

cognitions with an identical subsrtratum is available to one and all. Note

that this case is different in nature from the cognition of a "blue lotus".

Right examples are "the pot is", "the cloth is", "the elephant is" and so on

throughout the whole sphere of cognitive experience. Of these two

cognitions, the one whose content is pot and the like, is mutable. And so

it is demonstrated. Not so the cognition of reality or sat. Therefore,

being mutable the objects of cognitions of pot and the like are unreal; not

so, the object of the cognition of the "real", it being immutable.

 

16.2 Objection: When the pot perishes, and the cognition of the pot

proves mutable, the cognition of the real, sat, too proves mutable.

 

Answer: No, the cognition of the real is still available in regard to other

objects like the cloth. The cognition of the real has, as its content, only

the adjective.

 

Objection: Like the cognition of the real, that of the pot is also

available in regard to another existent pot.

 

Answer: No; it is not available in regard to the cloth.

 

Objection: The cognition of the real, too, does not occur in regard to the

pot that has perished.

 

Answer: No; your remark sounds plausible only because the substantive is

absent. The cognition of the real, whose content is the adjective sat, will

not have that as its referent; for, an adjective without a substantive is

illogical. the non-occurrence of the cognition of the real, then, is not

due to the absence of the real.

 

16.3 Objection: Dependence on the same substratum of both the cognitions is

illogical, since the substantives like the pot are, in truth, not there at

all.

 

Answer: No; in fact one observes that the cognitions of light and so forth

expressed in the proposition, 'there is water', refer to an identical

substratum, though one of the two component elements, water, is not there at

all. Therefore, on the one hand, unreal and caused entities like the body

and dual entities like heat and cold do not come into being; on the other

hand, a real entity like the Self never lapses into non-being. For, as we

observed, it is everywhere present. Thus has the unshakable truth about the

Self and the non-Self-the real and the unreal-namely, that the real is ever

real and the the unreal ever unreal, been perceived by the seers of Reality.

 

16.4 Tat in the word tattva is the name of the 'all', and the all is

Brahman. Those who habitually perceive it are the seers of Reality. by

them has the above truth has been received. Relying on this perception of

the seers of Reality, you must endure grief and delusion. Giving up both

grief and delusion and frimly holding that uncertain dualities like cold adn

heat are unreal transformations or effects taht, like a mirage, illusorily

appear, you should endure them. This is the idea.

 

17.0 What then is that which is eternally real? Listen:

 

17. On the contrary, know that to be impossible by which all this is

pervaded. None can destroy that which is immutable.

 

17.1 What does not habitually perish is the imperishable. Tu, on the

contrary, distinguishes It from the unreal. Know that. What ? Brahman or

Sat, i.e. Being, by which the whole world, together with the sky, is

pervaded, juas as pots and thelike are pervaded by the sky. Destruction is

non-perception or non-being. The immutable is that which neither increases

nor decreases.

 

17.2 Thsi Brahman known as sat does not change Its own nature, i.e. does

nto forfeit it; for, It is partless, unlike the body etc. Neither in

respect of Its properties does It change; for, It has no property. For

example, Devadatta decays through loss of his wealth; but Brahman does not.

Therefore, none can bring about the destruction of the immutable Brahman.

None, not even God, may destroy the Self. Indeed the Self is Brahman and

any transitive activity of the Self (the Self acting on Itself) is

inconceivable.

 

18.0 Again, what is that which, being unreal, has but an inconstant

existence? It is thus set forth:

 

18. These bodies that perish are said to pertain to the eternal Self that

is embodied-the eternal Self that is imperishable and indeterminable.

Therefore, fight, O scion of the Bharatas!

 

18.1 The perishables are things, which have an end or anta. For

instance, the idea of reality, associated with things like a mirage, snaps

when tested by means of right cognition.

This is its end. Likewise, these bodies of the eternal and indeterminable

Self are as perishable as the bodies seen in a dream or projected by a

magincian. Men of discrimination affirm this truth. The expressions

'eternal' and 'imperishable' (nityasya, anasinah) are not tautologous;

for, eternity, and perishability are fo two types. For instance, a body

reduced to ashes and no longer perceptible, is said to have perished. It is

also said to have perished when, though existent, it has undergone a great

transformation due to diseases, etc. The two expressions nityasya and

anasinah rule out both these forms of destruction as regards the Self.

Otherwise, the eternity of the Self may be held to be similar to that of

objects like the earth. To exclude thsi possibility the text says, "of the

eternal" and "of the imperishable".

 

18.2 "Of the indeterminable" means "of that which is not measurable by

the means of right cognition like perception and so forth."

Objection: The Self is measured or determined by Revelation, and, earlier,

by perception and so forth.

Answer: No; for the Self is self-established. Indeed it is only when the

knower, the Self, is given, that there arises the search for the right means

of cognition on the part of the seeker after knowledge. Without knowing the

Self earlier as "such and such am I", none attempts to secure determinate

knowledge of the object of knowledge. To none at all is the Self altogether

unknown. The final means of right cognition, the sastra or scripture,

acquires validity as regards the Self by setting aside the non-attributes of

the Self superimposed on It, and not by revealing what was altogether

unknown. Thus the sruti declares: "That which is immediately present is

Brahman, the Self in all" (Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 3.4.1)

 

18.3 Since the Self is thus eternal and immutable, you must fight, and

not withdraw from battle-this is the sense. Here fighting is not enjoined

as a duty. For, Arjuna has already himself to fight. But he remains

immobilised due to grief and delusion. Therefore, the Lord removes the

impediment in his path to the performance of his duty. Hence, the term

"fight" is only a restatement of a given position and not an original

injunction.