Spinoza and the upanishads (part 1)

[Guest guest]

namaste.

 

In the recent postings, Patrick Kenny brought up the philosophy

of Spinoza and the strong determinism and asked how that is

viewed in vedanta. In our Library, there is a book titled

"Spinoza and the upanishads" and I thought I should summarize

that book here, which may be relevant in this context.

 

Dr. M.S. Modak, former Registrar of Nagpur University and a former

student of R.D. Ranade wrote his Ph.D. thesis in 1928 for the

University of London on the topic "Spinoza and the upanishads:

a comparative study". Nagpur Vidyapeeth Mudranalaya of Nagpur,

India, published this thesis as a monograph with the same title.

In the following paragraphs, I will try to present a brief summary

of this monograph. I hope I will be able to bring out the essence

of the book. Any errors in this summarization are mine and I hope

I will be excused for those errors.

 

Undertaking a comparative study of Spinoza and vedanta is not to say

that the argumentative development of the two systems of thought are

identical. An immense gap of more than 2000 years separates the two

systems. Their social and cultural environments are wide apart from

each other. There is little to suggest that Spinoza was under any

direct influence of the ancient Hindu thought. Nevertheless there

are many similarities. Spinoza is compared to an Indian R^iShi.

Monier Williams writes "The Hindus were Spinozites more than two

thousand years before the existence of Spinoza".

 

Modak goes into a detailed discussion of the difficulties comparing

Spinoza and upanishads, the obscurity of upanishadic information

and the wealth of information available on Spinoza. Then the monograph

goes into taking specific topics and discussing how they were treated.

 

 

Ultimate Reality

 

The upanishads say the Self, Brahman, Atman as the ultimate reality.

God is a necessary intermediate step in the process of our visualizing

ultimate reality. Upanishadic manner of approach is psychological.

By an analysis of the phenomenon of consciousness, the upanishads

saw the ultimate reality transcending the wake-up, dream and deep-

sleep consciousness. This fundamental idea of the unity of

Consciousness is achieved not so much by explicit reason as by

intuition.

 

For Spinoza, the approach is theo-logical. The infinite idea dei

i.e. the infinite idea of God is the primary reality. This conception

of the infinite idea of God was arrived at by reflective cognition which

establishes a sort of unity and continuity in all our thinking without

which no theory of knowledge is possible.

 

In determining the criterion of truth, Spinoza and the upanishadic

thinkers argue in a strikingly similar way. The upanishads start with

self as the highest ground of certitude, for though everything else

can be doubted, the doubter could not doubt himself. Spinoza says

(with regard to sceptics who doubt the infinite idea of God) "If they

affirm or doubt anything, they know not that they affirm or doubt it:

they say that they know nothing, and say that they are ignorant of

the fact that they know nothing; nor do they say this with certainty,

for they fear to confess that they exist as long as they know nothing,

to such an extent that they ought to remain silent, lest perchance

they might suppose something which has the saviour of truth." Truth

to Spinoza is its own certainty.

 

Also in upanishads, Self which is truth, is self-evident. No effort

is needed for knowing the Self. It is needed only to remove the

error of identifying the Self with the not-Self. According to shri

Shankara, the process of knowing is not so much a creation as a

discovery. This discovery will be imperfect if there is any taint

clinging to the instrument of the mind.

 

Are the sayings dogmatic?

 

When the upanishads assert that the Self is the highest ground of

certitude, and truth is its own criterion, they are laying down a

doctrine which is transcendental and is not dogmatic. The existence

of the Self is not inferred by any syllogistic process, but felt and

recognized as a metaphysical fact. It is transcendental because it

is pure Self-Consciousness which is beyond all limitations. It

transcends our empirical knowledge. Intellectual knowledge will be

insufficient to attain It. It is, however, not dogmatic since the

upanishadic sages do not asseret it as a dogma, but speak of It as

intuitionally perceived. The conviction that the Self could be

attained by man is a common strong theme throughout all the upanishads

and it is reasonable to infer, therefore, that the upanishadic sayings

are the spiritual experiences of these sages and are not dogmatic

uterances.

 

Spinoza also asserts that there is no external test for truth and

that we must be content in the last resort with the clear and

persistent witness of consciousness. The same question as before

confronts us here also. Others consider Spinoza's doctrine is not

necessarily transcendental or dogmatic. Spinoza would admit nothing

supernatural in his system of thought. For Spinoza, intellect is a

sufficient guide to the knowledge of reality. His intuition is not

something extra-intellectual, but it is 'thoughtfulness matured to

inspirations'. The infinite idea of God can be conceived

intellectually. At that stage, intellect becomes intuition. The

latter is not something different from the former.

 

The transcendental element in the conception of the Self is quite

explicit in the upanishads. The Self cannot be reached by mere

intellect. It could be grasped by intuition alone. That is not

to say that intuition is opposed to intellect or reason. It is

supersensuous and super-intellectual in its character.

 

Strong determinism

 

Strong determinism is inherent in Spinoza's philosophy. It is

because the ultimate reality is God. However, in vedanta, the

ultimate reality is not God, but the SELF. Thus in vedanta,

the strong determinism and free-will have a lower order of

truth and in the ultimate reality, there is neither free-will

nor strong determinism.

 

(to be continued)

 

Regards

Gummuluru Murthy

--------------------------------

[Guest guest]

Dear Gummuluru,

 

Thank you for taking up this topic. (I do remember that you mentioned

it previously but I was afraid that you might have given up on the

idea.) I am very interested to see where this takes you so rather than

engage you in discussion now I would like just like to flag a few

points that might make for interesting discussions later. But first

let me make it clear that my attitude to Spinoza is by no means

uncritical: I do not regard his writings as 'inerrant' in the way that

fundamentalist Christians and, dare I say, certain Advaitins regard

their scriptures. In particular I find that Spinoza's account of God

is incomplete for despite his constant talk of the love of God it is

not clear a priori how his geometrically perfect God is lovable. I was

led to study the Gita in order to find a way of putting a human face

on Spinoza's God or, if you like, to understand how the yoga of

devotion is possible in the absence of a personal God. I am quite

confident that had Spinoza known of the litterature about the Supreme

Self (and especially the Gita rather than the Upanishads) he would

have been quite happy to use the word atman instead of God (and God

knows it would have saved him an awful lot of trouble with theologians

Christians and Jewish --- as you probably know Christians have always

condemned Spinoza as an atheist). So the first point I would question

is this distinction:

> However, in vedanta, the

> ultimate reality is not God, but the SELF

 

A second topic that might be discussed concerns the similarities and

differences between Spinoza's 'intuitive knowledge of God' and

unmediated mystical knowledge of the self. These two certainly seem to

be very similar in their effects, but a distinguishing feature of

Spinoza is his unwavering insistence on reason or rationality (so that

intuitive knowledge is just a higher type of rationality, one which

mathematicians rely on heavily).

 

As for this statement:

> Thus in vedanta,

> the strong determinism and free-will have a lower order of

> truth and in the ultimate reality, there is neither free-will

> nor strong determinism.

>

 

another consequence of Spinoza's rationalism is that he would not

accept the distinction between absolute and relative levels of truth,

although he does frequently insist that each thing can be viewed in

two ways, namely as 'belonging to a particular time and place' or as

'being in God and following from the necessity of the divine nature'.

Seen in the latter way, individual beings are 'modes of substance

[God]' so that God alone acts (but Spinoza would insist that he acts

according to deterministic necessity).

 

I'm looking forward to the next installment.

 

Regards,

 

Patrick

[Guest guest]

namaste Patrick,

 

Part 2 of Spinoza and the upanishads will appear shortly.

 

The objective of this series of posts is to see where the upanishads

and Spinoza differ and where they agree as seen by someone who has

done thorough research on this topic. As for me, I am simply

summarizing Dr. Modak's analysis. I do not know if I can engage

you in a discussion of Spinoza as I do not know much about Spinoza's

work. I feel much more comfortable discussing the upanishads than

Spinoza. But I am willing to understand more about Spinoza's work

if someone discusses his work much more fully in the context of

advaita.

 

Regards

Gummuluru Murthy

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