NOTES ON BRAHMASUUTRA-3B

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Notes on Brahmasuutra-IIIB

 

 

sadaashiva samaarambhaam shankaraachaarya madhyamam|

asmadaachaarya paryantaam vande guruparamparaam||

 

I prostrate to the lineage of teachers starting from Lord Shiva who is ever

auspicious and with Bhagavaan Shankara in the middle and all the way up to

my own teacher.

 

vaastalya ruupam triguNairatiitam

aananda saandram amalairnidhaanam|

shree chinamayaananda guro praNiitam

sadaa bhajeham tava paada pankajam||

 

Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond the three

guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source of purity who is

the best among the teachers, Shree Chinmayaananda, to his lotus feet I

(sada) always prostrate.

-

 

Adhyaasa Bhaashhyam (continued)

 

(Note: Due to feed back I received so far, I am cutting down the length of

the postings. Hence the adhyaasa part will be discussed in more than three

parts. This may give more time for readers to think and discuss. If you have

not voiced your opinion so far it is time to do that).

 

In the last notes we stopped with puurvapakshi's claims that aatma-anaatma

adhyaasa is not possible even though rope-shake adhyaasa is possible. For

adhyaasa involving 'satyaanR^ita mithuniikaraNam', mixing up of real and

unreal entities, four conditions need to be satisfied, simultaneously. All

the four conditions are satisfied for the rope-snake case but none are

fulfilled for the aatma-anaatma case. They are pratyaksha vishayatvam,

aJNaatatvam, saadR^ishyam and samskaaram. (The reader is referred back to

Notes IIIa for details). Since none of the four conditions are satisfied,

aatma-anaatma adhyaasa is not possible, and the concept of adhyaasa is

wrong. Since adhyaasa is the foundation for Adviata Vedanta, the whole

philosophy is on shaky grounds. This is the objector's contention.

 

3.9 Adhyaasa shankaa samaadhaanam and sambhaavana

(Response to the objections and showing the possibility for adhyaasa)

 

Of the six topics of adhyaasa stated above (see section 3-6), we have

covered two topics, adhyaasa lakshNa and adhyaasa shankaa. The next too

topics of adhyaasa; shankhaa samaadhaanam and adhyaasa sambhaavana are very

similar. Hence they will be discussed together in the following.

 

Shankaraachaarya has to address the objections with regard to each of the

four conditions stated by puurvapakshi or the objector.

 

The first condition is that the thing that is mistaken should be 'pratyaksha

vishaya' - should be an object perceived in front. For that Shankara's

answer is that the condition to be fulfilled is not exactly the same as

stated by the puurvapakshi, or the objector. The first condition needs to

be modified slightly since it was presented incorrectly by puurvapakshi.

For a mistake to take place an object must be evident, or it should be a

known object since an unknown object cannot be mistaken. I cannot make a

mistake about 'gaagaabuubuu', since I donot know what that 'gaagaabuubuu'

is. Hence it should be a known object or an evident object, but need not be

an object in front, as puurvapakshi claims. There is no need for an object

to be in front for it to be mistaken. It is sufficient if it is a known

object. From the point of aatma, it is not an object in front, but still as

the subject aatma is evident enough for one to commit the mistake. Hence

the first condition should be restated as that it should be evident and not

pratyaksha vishaya, as the puurvapakshi claims. It should be an evident

'vishaya' and need not be 'pratyaksha vishaya' and aatma fulfils the

modified requirement. Therefore the first condition should be restated as

'prakaashhamaanatvam', or a known existent entity and not 'pratyaksha

vishayatvam'. Then the modified first condition is fulfilled both in the

case of rope-snake and in the case of aatma-anaatma. Hence adhyaasa is

possible.

 

The second condition is aJNaatatvam - that is it should be not known - that

rope is not known - Rope is partially known as an object present but it is

not fully known as a rope. Existence of a rope as an object is known, but

the 'ropeness' of the existing object is unknown. Partial ignorance is the

second requirement - it is 'aamshhika aJNaatatvum' that is partial ignorance

and not 'puurNa aJNaatatvam', complete ignorance. We claim in the case of

aatma also it is partially known and partially unknown, and therefore the

second condition is completely fulfilled. The aatma is partially known as

'aham asmi', that is 'I exist'. Whenever a person says 'I am' - the sat

(am) and chit (I) of aatma is evident but not fully known as 'aham brahma

asmi' or 'aham aanandaH asmi', I am the totality or I am bliss. Thus sat

and chit are known but anantatvam, my infinite nature is not known; 'aham

aanandaH', I am bliss, is not known. What is the proof for this? -

Everybody's bio-data speaks for itself in proof of this. Everyone

introduces himself as ' I am this or that' etc., where 'I am', the subject

corresponding to sat and chit, and 'this and that' being an object with a

limited qualification - apuurNatva - proving that one is ignorant of

oneself. Because of the existence of this self-ignorance only Upanishads

are coming to our rescue to teach us our true nature. In Chaandogya

Upanishad there is a statement, 'aatmavit shokam tarati' - 'the knower of

the self crosses the sorrow' - From these it is very clear that a samsaarii,

who is always engulfed in sorrow, does not have self-knowledge. Hence

self-ignorance is there. This is everybody's personal experience. Hence

the second condition that there should be partial knowledge and partial

aJNaatatvam is fulfilled. That is the requirement of AMshhika aJNaatatvam,

partial ignorance is fulfilled.

 

Third condition is 'saadR^isyam', similarity, should be there between the

'adhishhTaanam' that is the rope and the superimposed snake. For this

objection, the advaitin's answer is that the similarity is a general

condition, which always need not be fulfilled for adhyaasa to occur. There

are exceptions to this condition. For example, the general rule is the

creator, intelligent cause (nimitta kaaraNa) is different from the material

for creation (upaadaana kaaraNa). That is the pot maker (nimitta kaaraNa)

is different from the clay (upaadaana kaaraNa). But there are exceptions to

this general rule - for example a dreamer creating his dream world, a spider

creating its web, ultimately the Iswara creating this world. Similarly

'saadR^isyam' or similarity is a general condition but it is not an

invariable necessity or compulsory condition. And adhyaasa is possible

without having 'saadR^isyam' or similarity. aatma-anaatma adhyaasa comes

under this category of exceptions. Hence the third rule is not applicable

here.

 

Why saadR^isyam is not a compulsory requirement? Because we do have cases

where error or adhyaasa takes place without any similarity or saadR^isyam.

Shankaraachaarya gives an example - 'aprathyakshetiH aakaashhe baalaaH

talamalinataadi adhyasyanti' - To illustrate this take the example of the

blue sky or blue space - the blue sky, is it an error or knowledge? We know

that the sky is niruupam or without any color or form. When we say it is a

blue sky, we are superimposing blueness upon the colorless sky. Not only

the blueness but the sky seems to look like a vessel turned upside down (due

to horizons) - the concavity of the space (talatvam) and its niilatvam

(blueness) and also malinatvam (space pollution) are all falsely

superimposed on space. When such an error or adhyaasa takes place what kind

of saadR^isyam or similarity one can attribute between aakaasha or space and

the superimposed blueness or pollution or concavity? In fact aakaasha is

never similar to anything else - there is beautiful statement to this effect

in RaamaayaNa.

 

gaganam gaganaakaaram saagaram saagaropamam|

raama raavaNayor yuddham raama raavaNa yoriva||

 

There are no other similar things to compare, for space other than with the

space, ocean other than with the ocean and similarly the Raama-RaavaNa war

other than with Raama-RaavaNa war.

 

Therefore aakaasha is not similar to anything and therefore no saadR^isyam'

is possible. However aakaasha adhyaasa is every body's experience. Thus

adhyaasa seems to take place even with out having a similar object and

therefore the third condition saadR^isyam is not compulsory. In the

rope-snake case, it is applicable but in the case of blue sky or

aatma-anaatma adhyaasa it is not applicable. Hence the third condition for

aatma-anaatma case is invalid.

 

The forth condition of the puurvapakshi is related to the mixing up of satya

and asatya or anR^ita vishaya. Such a mixing up is possible as in the case

of rope-snake case if one has prior experience of real snake before. That

is prior samskaara of the real snake exists in the mind for one to project

it on the rope in front. Thus a false snake is possible due to experience

of a real snake before. Such samskaara is not possible for aatma-anaatma

case since there is no real anaatma for one to have that experience or

samskaara. This is the objection of the puurvapakshi. This objection is

answered by advaitin as follows. Samskaara is required and it comes from

previous experience and up to this part, it is acceptable. But we differ

from objector's statement that the previous experience of a real snake is

required for adhyaasa to take place. Previous experience of a snake is

required all right, but it need not have to be a real snake. One can have a

previous experience of a false snake and that experience of false snake or

samskaara can create an impression, which can produce another false snake.

For example if I have never seen a real snake but experienced a false snake

in a movie (if it is real snake, no body will remain in the theater) which

created samskaara for me to project a snake on the rope, and I experience

the fears associated with seeing a snake. People project ghost on a post

without having seen a real ghost in their life. Concept of a ghost in book

is sufficient to create a samskaara for adhyaasa to take place.

 

Similarly the adhyaasa in the case of aatma-anaatma is possible by the

previous samskaara of unreal anaatma. How did this previous experience or

samskaara of unreal anaatma occur? That again is due to adhyaasa involving

previous to previous unreal anaatma. And for the previous to previous

adhyaasa there is previous to previous to previous unreal anaatma. This can

go on. Then how did the very first unreal anaatma experience occur?

Shankaraachaarya says - 'naisargitoyam lokaH vyavahaaraH' - it is anaadi

adhyaasa. We never talk about the beginning of adhyaasa. It is naisargitaH

(uncreated or beginning-less or anaadi) - puurva puurva adhyaasaH, uttara

uttara adhyaasasya kaaraNam (previous previous adhyaasa is responsible for

the following and the following adhyaasa). anaadi avidyaa vaasanaya - the

beginning-less ignorance based samskaara. Therefore real anaatma is not

there and is not required for adhyaasa to take palace. Previous experience

of unreal anaatma is there which is the cause for adhyaasa.

 

Hence all the four conditions are effectively fulfilled. The first

condition is fulfilled in a modified form - prakaashhamaanatvam instead

pratyaksha vishayatvam that is it should be evident rather than directly

perceivable in front. The second condition aJNaatatvam is fulfilled since

aatma is indeed partially known and partially unknown. The third condition

is not compulsory and the fourth condition is also fulfilled since

samskaara is there not of real anaatma but of unreal anaatma, which is

sufficient to produce adhyaasa. Therefore aatma-anaatma adhyaasa is

possible.

 

This forms the first answer to puurvapakshi. This answer is only a

provisional or temporary answer. This is a defensive argument. This above

answer is applicable to both objectors that belong to aastika and naastika

camps. The answer is given using the same laukika anumaana that

puurvapakshi used in his objections. Thus Shankara first shows using the

same language of the objector that it is not adhyaasa that is wrong but his

objections against adhyaasa are based on wrong postulates. In the process he

provides the correct postulates too and shows that adhyaasa is possible.

 

Since the objectors are mostly aastika-s a more complete answer is provided

in the next post.

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

 

 

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