Brahmasuutra-3b

[Guest guest]

Miguel Angel Carrasco:

> >But my difficulty was not really here. What I don't

> >understand is how is it that adhyaasa can even

> >exist. If a jiiva is nothing but Brahman (like a

> >gold ring is nothing but gold) then it is Brahman

> >who makes the mistake in the statement "I am only

> >a body-mind".

> >"Who else but Brahman could it be? There is no one

> >else. And it is no use saying it is not Brahman but

> >the jiiva who makes the mistake, because the jiiva

> >is nothing but Brahman.

 

Sadananda:

 

<snip>

> Remember the story of Mr. Jones and the rat -Mr Jones

who thought he is a

> rat goes to a doctor and after many sessions gets

convinced that he is a

> man and not a rat. But he comes back running to the

doctor gasping for his

> breath saying that I know I am man and not a rat, but

I am afraid that that

> cat in the street may not know that I am a man and

not a rat! - Mr jones

> understood - conceptually that he is a man not a rat-

but fatually he has

> not yet realized that he is man and not a rat! This

is our problem - when

> we ask Jiiva is Brahman, then how come he has

adhhyaasa. The teaching is

> to the one who thinks he is jiiva - just like the

doctor-sessions are for

> Mr. Jones who thinks he is a rat. Mr. Jones was or

is never a rat and

> always a man. So to whom the adhyaasa belongs? Only

to notional ratty

> Jones!

 

Dear Sadananda,

 

I don't quite see that you have solved the difficulty I

posed.

To use the analogy you made, just imagine that Mr Jones

is the only being there is. There is absolutely nothing

else, only Mr Jones. And he believes he is a rat. That

is adhyaasa, a mistake: he is superimposing something

(the idea of a rat) on his real nature (the nature of a

man). How is this possible? Because poor Mr Jones is

not infallible. He can make mistakes. But what if he

were infallible? Then we would have to say that his

belief of being a rat is not a mistake, but just a

dream. Once he wakes up he'll see that belief not as a

mistake but as what it was, a dream.

 

Now let's replace the elements in the analogy. Instead

of poor Mr Jones (remember, in our analogy he is the

only being there is) we have Brahman (the only being

there is). And instead of the belief "I am a rat" we

have "I am only a body-mind". Is that a mistake? That

depends on whether Brahman is infallible or not, and on

whether IT is the only being there is. Of course

Brahman is the One without a second, and, having no

limitations, IT can only be infallible. So the belief

"I am only a body-mind" is not a mistake but a dream.

 

You said: "So to whom the adhyaasa belongs? Only to

notional ratty Jones!"

Replacing the elements in the analogy, you would have

to say : "...only to notional humanly Brahman". As

there is nothing but Brahman, if there is any belief it

must be Brahman's belief. If someone says "I am only a

body-mind" it can only be Brahman who says that,

because there is no one else.

 

As I said, it is useless to reply that it is not

Brahman but the jiva who says that. The jiva is nothing

but Brahman. A=B. If the jiva says that, it is Brahman

who says that. Whatever is done is done by Brahman.

There is no one else. So either Brahman is not

infallible (and then we can call that belief adhyaasa),

or it is infallible, and then we cannot call it

adhyaasa, because Brahman can make no mistakes. The

first is impossible, Brahman can make no mistakes. So

we are left with the second alternative: that belief is

not a mistake. What then? A dream.

 

Miguel Angel

[Guest guest]

Fascinating! I have just a few problems with the latest Shankara counters to

that pesky puurvapakshi.

 

As regards saadR^isyam: -

 

Firstly, the example of a general rule ‘the pot maker is different from the

clay’ and exceptions ‘dreamer and dream world or spider and web’. Since the

dream world is unreal, is it meaningful to talk of a material cause? The

material of the web comes from an organ in the body of the spider but the

spider is not that organ. Presumably the organ could be surgically removed

and the spider could continue to function (though perhaps not catch much in

the way of food!). Thus in the first case there is no material cause so

that the intelligent and material causes are still different. In the second

case, they are also different. Therefore they still follow the general rule.

Reference to this as an example of general vs exception does not seem very

strong.

 

Secondly, the example of blue sky. Isn’t this in the general category of

things ‘in themselves’ not being as we perceive them? (i.e. Kant’s noumenal

vs phenomenal) We can NEVER perceive things in themselves. You also say

‘When we say it is a blue sky, we are superimposing blueness upon the

colourless sky.’ But we are not, are we? It is a characteristic of the air

itself, is it not, refracting longer wavelength red light and allowing the

blue to pass through to reach our eyes. i.e. there is not really an adhyaasa

at all. We see blue because that is REALLY the wavelength of the light that

is reaching us. (I know that the ‘blueness’ is something that our brain

supplies in its conversion of the perception into sensible neural impulses

but that was not the point of the objection presumably, since Shankara could

not have known anything about this.)

 

A couple of paragraphs later, you state that ‘In the rope-snake case,

<saadR^isyam> is applicable but in the case of the blue sky or aatma-anaatma

adhyaasa it is not applicable. This does not seem to have been demonstrated.

Even had the example of blue sky etc. been a valid proof that errors can

take place without similarity, it has not been shown that aatma-anaatma is a

case analagous to blue sky rather than to rope-snake.

 

As regards samskaaraH: -

 

I liked the argument about previous experience of a false snake being

equally acceptable. Very clever! I got a bit lost, however, when it came to

the objection ‘how did the first unreal anaatma experience occur?’. ‘We don’

t talk about it’ didn’t seem to answer the objection. Was I missing

something here?

 

Namaste,

 

Dennis

[Guest guest]

Dennis - you are doing a real surgical operation on the notes - Very well.

I enjoy it myself, whether I can answer to your satisfaction based on my

understanding or not, it is worth to raise the issues. Others who are more

learned in the list can address the issues too.

>Fascinating! I have just a few problems with the latest Shankara counters

>to

>that pesky puurvapakshi.

>

>As regards saadR^isyam: -

>

>Firstly, the example of a general rule Œthe pot maker is different >from

>the

>clay‚ and exceptions Œdreamer and dream world or spider and web‚. Since the

>dream world is unreal, is it meaningful to talk of a material cause? The

>material of the web comes from an organ in the body of the spider but the

>spider is not that organ. Presumably the organ could be surgically removed

>and the spider could continue to function (though perhaps not catch much in

>the way of food!). Thus in the first case there is no material cause so

>that the intelligent and material causes are still different. In the second

>case, they are also different. Therefore they still follow the general

>rule.

>Reference to this as an example of general vs exception does not seem very

>strong.

 

Dennis you have to separate explanation or theory versus observation.

Observations are facts as you see and record and explanations are based on

the analysis of the observations and the explanations as outlined in notes

II, vary and get sophisticated as the finer and finer details of the

observed facts keep coming. That is the nature of all objective sciences -

There is no final explanation and the scientists survive on that hope! At

the outset - the spider is the intelligent cause or least a chaitanya vastu

who is creating the web. The mater to crate the web is not out side the

spider but comes from it. Now one can separate these two causes - the

nimitta and upaadaana by going into spider and exmaine carefully its

stuulashariira and suukshma sariira and attribute matter to the matter and

intelligence to the subtle suukshma shariira - but those are details that go

beyond the intended example - The fact remains for an philosophical observer

not a zoologist that both intelligent cause and material cause is the same

spider. From the philosophical approach both upaadaana kaaraNa and nimitta

kaaraNa are one and the same. By the by this example is given in the

scripture itself.

 

The purpose of the example may not have any relation to adhyaasa per sec but

only shows that there are few exceptions from very generally accepted rules

and these happen to be very important

examples.

>Secondly, the example of blue sky. Isn‚t this in the general category of

>things Œin themselves‚ not being as we perceive them? (i.e. Kant‚s noumenal

>vs phenomenal) We can NEVER perceive things in themselves. You also say

>ŒWhen we say it is a blue sky, we are superimposing blueness upon the

>colourless sky.‚ But we are not, are we? It is a characteristic of the air

>itself, is it not, refracting longer wavelength red light and allowing the

>blue to pass through to reach our eyes. i.e. there is not really an

>adhyaasa

>at all. We see blue because that is REALLY the wavelength of the light that

>is reaching us. (I know that the Œblueness‚ is something that our brain

>supplies in its conversion of the perception into sensible neural impulses

>but that was not the point of the objection presumably, since Shankara

>could

>not have known anything about this.)

 

Dennis, again you are going into explanation of why sky is blue - what you

have given is explanation of why adhyaasa occurs. The example is not meant

for how specific adhyaasa occurs. Blue sky or curved space are the

observations involving errors even though there is no saadR^isyam interms of

sky and blueness. This is independent of whatever is the cause for the

blueness. - air, wavelengths, etc., etc., They only provide a rational

explanation for why that adhyaasa occurs. But is there a saadR^isyam

interms of air, wavelengths and the sky? - Sky is unique by itself and there

is nothing else like that to compare - it is one without a second. There is

no space where space is not. More important is the subtlest of all the

elements and closest to aatma, which is subtler. In fact it is the first in

the series of creation - etasmaat aatmaana akaashaH sambhuutaH, akaashaat

vaayuH .... etc. In that sense example is rightly chosen since it is closest

to aatma in its subtlety and there is nothing like it. aatma is being even

more subtle there is nothing else to compare with it to have saadR^isyam -

Hence Shankara chooses a beautiful example to illustrate the point that

saadR^isyam is not compulsory requirement for adhyaasa. Even if Shankara

did not know the correct explanation of how adhyaasa occurs resulting in a

blue sky, but does that really matter? - what matters is that there is a sky

which looks blue even though it is not blue. And that is the adhyaasa -

superimposing a particular feature which does not belong to the sky.

Imposing a color to the colorless sky is it not erroneous knowledge? -

There ends the utility of the example since Shankara has achieved what he

wants to achieve - gave an example that saadR^isyam is not a compulsory

requirement and adhyaasa can occur without having saadR^isyam.

>A couple of paragraphs later, you state that ŒIn the rope-snake case,

><saadR^isyam> is applicable but in the case of the blue sky or

>aatma-anaatma

>adhyaasa it is not applicable. This does not seem to have been

>demonstrated.

>Even had the example of blue sky etc. been a valid proof that errors can

>take place without similarity, it has not been shown that aatma-anaatma is

>a

>case analagous to blue sky rather than to rope-snake.

 

In a way you are right. What Shankara has knocked down in the process is

that the requirement of saadR^isyam is not universal and there are

exceptions to the rule of saadR^isyam. That much he has established, and

then argues that aatma-anaatma adhyaasa also falls into that category of

exceptions. The reason it falls which I could have added is that aatma,

like the sky is one without a second, which of course is the point of the

puurvapakshi - Where he says there is no saadR^isyam since it is only one

and there is nothing like aatma. But one can use the same argument for it

to come under the exceptions since similar to the sky which is only one,

there is nothing similar to aatma which is also one without a second. In

that sense sky is the most appropriate example to bring in the lack of

universal applicability of saadR^isyam for adhyaasa.

>As regards samskaaraH: -

>

>I liked the argument about previous experience of a false snake being

>equally acceptable. Very clever! I got a bit lost, however, when it came to

>the objection Œhow did the first unreal anaatma experience occur?‚. ŒWe

>don‚

>t talk about it‚ didn‚t seem to answer the objection. Was I missing

>something here?

 

For a false snake one can give an example of seeing the snake in the movie

etc and for a ghost in picture in a book etc. But false anaatma

superimposition for adhyaasa experience of previous false anaatma causes the

samskaara. Now the question then arises what was the cause for the previous

experience of false anaatma. Shankara says experience of previous to

previous anaatma the samskaara of which results the previous anaatma. This

is like a chain interdependent each to previous experiences of anaatma.

Then question arises how did the first experience of anaatma arose, since it

is the first there is nothing before that. Only answer is the ignorance is

anaadi or beginningless - it is like chicken and egg situation - for every

chicken, egg is the cause and for every egg previous chicken, and that

previous chicken, previous to previous egg is the cause - Now if you ask how

did the first chicken or egg came into picture - one can say it is

beginningless - in the sense we cannot intelligently talk about it any

further. Shankara calls it as 'anirvachaniiyam' - inexplicable.

 

Actual problem is the rationality falls apart since the rational intellect

which is asking or seeking the answer itself is the problem - it is

inquiring into its own source - For that one has to go beyond the intellect

or transcend the intellect - hence logic fails in inquiring aatma - it comes

under the categories which is beyond laukika anumaana - Hence the problem.

This is where scriptures comes to our rescue hence shabda as pramaaNa become

essential that relates to aatma. This Shankara himself takes up in the next

notes.

 

Hari OM!

Sadananda

>Namaste,

>

>Dennis

>

 

K. Sadananda

Code 6323

Naval Research Laboratory

Washington D.C. 20375

Voice (202)767-2117

Fax:(202)767-2623

 

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[Guest guest]

Dear Sadananda,

 

I have been following with great interest your Notes.

There is only one point I don't quite understand.

You say that "I am a jiiva is the basic adhyaasa"

(error).

In this supposedly-wrong statement, there are three

elements:

1) I, the subject that identifies itself with the

jiiva;

2) the object of the false identification, the

jiivahood; and

3) the "am", the equation between the two.

 

I see quite clearly that element 2 (jiivahood) is the

adyaasa part, which should be replaced by Brahman,

giving place to the corrected statement "I am Brahman",

in which then there would be no adyaasa.

What I don't yet see is element 1) (the subject of

adyaasa).

When I say "I am a jiiva", who is that I? Who makes the

mistake? Who is in error?

 

Obviously the subject of adyaasa must be either the

jiiva or Brahman. Which?

 

It can't be the jiiva, because then we wouldn't have an

adyaasa but a tautology: "I, the jiiva, am a jiiva".

There can't be error in any statement of the kind A=A.

 

So the subject of adyaasa must be Brahman: "I (Brahman)

am a jiiva". This is confirmed by the fact that the

correct statement is "I am Brahman", where I=Brahman,

and also by the fact that there is nothing but Brahman.

But the statement "I (Brahman) am a jiiva" is

equivalent to "I, who am Brahman, do not know that I am

Brahman, and think that I am a jiiva". Is this the

case? If so, how is it possible that Brahman doesn't

know Itself and falls prey to adyaasa? Isn't Brahman

unchangeable? An error indicates a change: before and

after the mistake. How can this happen to Brahman?

 

Miguel Angel

[Guest guest]

>"Miguel Angel Carrasco" <macf12

>Dear Sadananda,

>

>I have been following with great interest your Notes.

>There is only one point I don't quite understand.

>You say that "I am a jiiva is the basic adhyaasa"

>(error).

>In this supposedly-wrong statement, there are three

>elements:

>1) I, the subject that identifies itself with the

>jiiva;

>2) the object of the false identification, the

>jiivahood; and

>3) the "am", the equation between the two.

>

>I see quite clearly that element 2 (jiivahood) is the

>adyaasa part, which should be replaced by Brahman,

>giving place to the corrected statement "I am Brahman",

>in which then there would be no adyaasa.

>What I don't yet see is element 1) (the subject of

>adyaasa).

>When I say "I am a jiiva", who is that I? Who makes the

>mistake? Who is in error?

>

In the statement 'I am jiiva', 'I am' is the translation for 'aham' - But

even as it may - 'I am' involves both I which stand for consciousness and

'am' stands for existence. Both are not adhyaasa - since 'I am' remains

before and after the knowledge - 'I am a jiiva' will become after correct

understanding 'I am Brahman'- Hence I am remains as it is. That is why it is

called satya amsha or real part. The false part is the particular feature

that is ' jiiva' which later will be understood as 'I am Brahman' or ' aham

brahmaasmi'. Here there is no error in the 'I am' part - only error in the

'jiiva' hood.

 

Please read the text again. The error is only in the visheshha amsha, which

is jiiva, not in the I am. Remember the biblical statement 'I am that I am'

that remains as such.

>Obviously the subject of adhyaasa must be either the

>jiiva or Brahman. Which?

>

>It can't be the jiiva, because then we wouldn't have an

>adyaasa but a tautology: "I, the jiiva, am a jiiva".

>There can't be error in any statement of the kind A=A.

>

>So the subject of adyaasa must be Brahman: "I (Brahman)

>am a jiiva". This is confirmed by the fact that the

>correct statement is "I am Brahman", where I=Brahman,

>and also by the fact that there is nothing but Brahman.

>But the statement "I (Brahman) am a jiiva" is

>equivalent to "I, who am Brahman, do not know that I am

>Brahman, and think that I am a jiiva". Is this the

>case?

 

In the statement "I am ......" the I am involves both sat and chit parts -

Everybody knows that they exist and they are conscious beings. We do not

need scripture to teach that. In fact, only because we are existent and

conscious beings, the scripture is able to tell us something that we are

searching for. What we are all searching for is Amanda or happiness.

Happiness involves limitlessness and that is Brahman - scripture is telling

us what we are searching for what we already are. But we take ourselves that

we are limited - limited space -wise, object-wise, time-wise etc.

 

If so, how is it possible that Brahman doesn't

>know Itself and falls prey to adyaasa? Isn't Brahman

>unchangeable? An error indicates a change: before and

>after the mistake. How can this happen to Brahman?

 

Yes nothing will happen to Brahman- just like nothing happens to gold - yet

bangle and ring and necklace which are just names and forms think they are

just the forms and forget that they are the gold that pervades all the

ornaments. The adhyaasa is with the gold in the ring and necklace that

think that they are only the names and forms and hence limited by the names

and forms. Ring thinks it has a date of birth and date of death and limited

in space and time etc and is different from

bangle etc. From the gold point there is just one gold - pervading all

ornaments. Hence gold does not have any misunderstanding nor it is

undergoing any transformation when it exists in the form of ring or bangle

etc. Only ring forgetting that it is gold, by identifying itself with the

upaadhiis or names and forms think that I am only a ring etc. Hence

adhyaasa or error does not belong to Brahman but belongs individuals - who

think they are individuals and not sat chit and aananda. Just as the rope

remains as a rope before and after the error, Brahman remains as Brahman

before the error, during the error and after the error is removed. Hence

even the ignorance and the adhyaasa also comes under the category of maya.

When ring understands that it is noting but gold and gold alone, is

misunderstanding goes away. It now knows that it was gold all the time,

before it became ring, even when it is ring and even when ring is destroyed

to become something else. But just because ring has realized, the bangle has

not. It may still remain thinking that it is a bangle and not gold. Hence

Ring has to come as a teacher and teach the bangle - tat twam asi - you are

that. The self in you is the self in all - the gold in you and in me in the

wide world is the same gold - we are nothing but pure gold without any names

and forms. Gold pervades all ornaments yet gold is not the ornaments which

are just names and forms. How that happens - actually there is nothing that

is happening from the gold point. All it can say that it is my glory that I

can exist in all forms and names yet I am beyond all forms and names. Hence

from Gold point there is no adhyaasa and no maya. The problem is only form

the point of ring or jiiva which or who think that he is only a jiiva

identifying with a name and form. I think if you read again with this

understanding the notes may become clear. If not let us discuss somemore.

 

Hari Om!

sadananda

 

 

>Miguel Angel

>

>

>

 

 

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[Guest guest]

> I see quite clearly that element 2 (jiivahood) is the

> adyaasa part, which should be replaced by Brahman,

> giving place to the corrected statement "I am Brahman",

> in which then there would be no adyaasa.

 

In discussing the Advaita concept of adhyaasa, it would be useful to

be clear about the following -

 

1. what is meant by jiiva-hood ?

2. what is meant by Brahman?

 

Let us begin at the outermost extent, the body. In the sentence, "I

am fat", an attribute of the physical body (fatness) is superimposed

on the "I", and an attribute of "I"-ness is superimposed on the

physical body. The fat person can go on a diet and become thin, which

shows that fatness and thinness are not intrinsic to the "I". The

person can die, and then there is only the body, there is no more "I"

associated with it. To cremate or bury a corpse is a funeral. To burn

or bury a person alive is a crime. Therefore, the superimposition is

mutual (itaretara), not just one way.

 

Nevertheless, we see that people make these kinds of statements (I am

fat/thin, born/dying, happy/unhappy) all the time, attributing

qualities to "I", that do not intrinsically belong to that "I". This

is adhyaasa, plain and simple. Who is it that is doing the adhyaasa?

The question is quite meaningless as such, because adhyaasa is done

by everybody. Asking the question is as fruitless as trying to search

for an entity called "darkness" by lighting a lamp. When we ask, "Who

am I?" AtmavicAra starts, and the adhyaasa begins to disappear.

 

In the statement "I am jiiva is an adhyaasa", the word jiiva is

shorthand for "suffering, in bondage (saMsAra), unhappy, hating

things that hurt my body and mind, loving things that give pleasure

to my body and mind." This "saMsAritva" is not an intrinsic

characteristic of the real "I" and therefore it is an adhyaasa. Who

is doing this adhyaasa? The jiiva itself. Clearly, it is paradoxical,

but the idea is not to "explain" the paradox, or to assert that the

paradox is impossible. The idea is to find a way out of it. The jiiva

identifying with the mind, body and world feels that it suffers from

bondage, and is in saMsAra. The jiiva has to investigate itself and

find out that it is really Brahman, free from error, change etc.

 

In all discussion about Brahman, the direction of enquiry should be

from the many to the one. One should not get distracted in an enquiry

directed the other way round. This is covered in the third and fourth

chapters of the brahmasUtras. Hope this clarifies things from the

brahmasUtra perspective.

 

Vidyasankar

[Guest guest]

>"Vidyasankar Sundaresan" <vsundaresan

>In all discussion about Brahman, the direction of enquiry should be

>from the many to the one. One should not get distracted in an enquiry

>directed the other way round. This is covered in the third and fourth

>chapters of the brahmasUtras. Hope this clarifies things from the

>brahmasUtra perspective.

 

 

The comments are well taken. In one of the discussions in our class when we

were discussing that I am not the body, nor the mind nor the intellect etc -

suddenly someone asked - who then realizes if I am not all that. Brahman

does not need realization; and body, mind and intellect come under jadam and

do not need realization either. I had to leave the question saying that the

one who is asking the question is the one who will be realizing - leaving

him to think who is asking the question. You are right one has to be clear

in term the meaning of the terms jiiva-hood and Brahman status. Hopefully

these become clear as we go long with the inquiry of Brahman.

Hari OM!

sadananda

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[Guest guest]

Hi!

Is it not that the Atman is the one asking the question, being tied to this

body, mind, and

intellect and associated with it? When the answer becomes clear to the Atman

that it itself is

Brahman the associated material and mental states are known to it as temporary

and limited

phases caused by maya.

Does this make sense?

-- Vis

 

Kuntimaddi Sadananda wrote:

>

> >"Vidyasankar Sundaresan" <vsundaresan

>

> >In all discussion about Brahman, the direction of enquiry should be

> >from the many to the one. One should not get distracted in an enquiry

> >directed the other way round. This is covered in the third and fourth

> >chapters of the brahmasUtras. Hope this clarifies things from the

> >brahmasUtra perspective.

>

> The comments are well taken. In one of the discussions in our class when we

> were discussing that I am not the body, nor the mind nor the intellect etc -

> suddenly someone asked - who then realizes if I am not all that. Brahman

> does not need realization; and body, mind and intellect come under jadam and

> do not need realization either. I had to leave the question saying that the

> one who is asking the question is the one who will be realizing - leaving

> him to think who is asking the question. You are right one has to be clear

> in term the meaning of the terms jiiva-hood and Brahman status. Hopefully

> these become clear as we go long with the inquiry of Brahman.

> Hari OM!

> sadananda

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[Guest guest]

>"R. Viswanathan" <RVis

Tue, 12 Sep 2000 20:04:17 -0700

>

>Hi!

>Is it not that the Atman is the one asking the question, being tied to this

>body, mind, and

>intellect and associated with it? When the answer becomes clear to the

>Atman that it itself is

>Brahman the associated material and mental states are known to it as

>temporary and limited

>phases caused by maya.

>Does this make sense?

>-- Vis

 

Yes Vis. Atma has one leg in Brahman and one leg in the matter - that is

what it meant by satya-asatya mithuniikaraNam - mixing up of the real and

unreal parts in terms of adhyaasa. Identified with the matter and taking

the limitations of the equipments, upaadhiis, it inquires into the nature of

the Brahman. When both legs are landed in Brahman or the real aspect of

aatma, there is no more adhyaasa, since no more mixing up of real and unreal

parts. There is neither a questioner nor the question - everything

dissolves in the awakening of the knowledge that ' aham brahmaasmi' I am

that infinite oneness. Many has become one. One is already shifting the leg

towards Brahman, as Vidya pointed out, when the inquiry of Brahman starts.

Hence the attention should be shifted to the step forward than to the step

backward that is to the ONE rather than to many.

 

It is interesting, when I was first exposed to Adviata I had lot of

questions. Gurudev, Swami Chinmayanandaji, was patiently answering all the

questions, except one - 'How did all this started? - How did the first

vaasana got initiated or the cycle of birth and death? - When I forced the

issue, he looked at me very seriously and told that that is a very good

question and asked me to take a paper and write it down. After I finished

writing, he asked me to fold the paper and keep it in my pocket. I did that

with all that seriousness. He said, "Good. Now when you go and meet Brahman

face to face, ask that question to him directly". Then seeing my pathetic

face, he explained. The questions and the questioner are the part of the

problem - the very intellect that is seeking the answer itself is born out

of ignorance. When you shift your attention to Brahman, you shift your

attention from the very intellect - in that realization, there is neither a

questioner nor the question - the very intellect that is seeking the answers

dissolves - your identification with the equipments ceases. You are one

indivisible Brahman. Bhagavaan Dattatreya puts this beautifully in

Avadhuuta Geeta:

"aham dhyaata param dhyeyam akhanDam khanDate katham|'

How can you divide, I am the meditator and this has to be meditated upon,

when everything that remains is one indivisible.

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

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[Guest guest]

Miguel Angel Carrasco :

<skip>

> >When I say "I am a jiiva", who is that I? Who makes

> >the mistake? Who is in error?

> >Obviously the subject of adhyaasa must be either the

> >jiiva or Brahman. Which?

 

Sadananda:

<skip>

> Yes nothing will happen to Brahman- just like nothing

happens to gold - yet

> bangle and ring and necklace which are just names and

forms think they are

> just the forms and forget that they are the gold that

pervades all the

> ornaments. The adhyaasa is with the gold in the ring

and necklace that

> think that they are only the names and forms and

hence limited by the names

> and forms. Ring thinks it has a date of birth and

date of death and limited

> in space and time etc and is different from bangle

etc.

 

--------

Yes, I see what you mean. The error lies not in the

gold but in the individual gold ring. But in what does

the mistake consist? Obviously not in the statement "I

am a gold ring", which is true. A gold ring *is* a gold

ring. Also there is no mistake if the ring were to say

"I am a ring". This is also true, and no mistake: a

gold ring *is* a ring. So where is the mistake? I think

there could only be error if the gold ring were to say

"I am a copper ring", here the adhyaasa part is

"copper", not "ring".

 

In the same way, if the jiiva says "I am a jiiva", here

there is no mistake, at least formally. It is a

tautology: A=A. A jiiva *is* a jiiva.

Where is then the mistake? I think it all comes down

to what we understand under "jiiva". If by "jiiva" we

understand "only a body-mind organism" then yes, I

agree, there is a mistake, because something is missing

in the definition: Consciousness. Whereas if we define

"jiiva" as "Consciousness in a body-mind organism" then

there is no mistake in saying "I am a jiiva".

 

But my difficulty was not really here. What I don't

understand is how is it that adhyaasa can even exist.

If a jiiva is nothing but Brahman (like a gold ring is

nothing but gold) then it is Brahman who makes the

mistake in the statement "I am only body-mind". Who

else but Brahman could it be? There is no one else. And

it is no use saying it is not Brahman but the jiiva who

makes the mistake, because the jiiva is nothing but

Brahman. The jiiva is not an entity independent from

Brahman. The jiiva *is* Brahman (that's why I can say

"I am Brahman").

 

So the question is again: How can Brahman fall prey to

adhyaasa?

 

Miguel Angel

[Guest guest]

Hi!

Is it not that the Atman is the one asking the question, being tied to this

body, mind,

and

intellect and associated with it? When the answer becomes clear to the Atman

that it

itself is

Brahman the associated material and mental states are known to it as temporary

and limited

phases caused by maya.

Does this make sense?

-- Vis

 

Geo> It seems that the question is born from Maya herself. Atman is the

drop of the ocean, it knows no separation from the one-movement - so it

would not ask the question. (Reference to the question bellow)

 

"The comments are well taken. In one of the discussions in our class when we

were discussing that I am not the body, nor the mind nor the intellect etc -

suddenly someone asked - who then realizes if I am not all that."

[Guest guest]

> agree, there is a mistake, because something is missing

> in the definition: Consciousness. Whereas if we define

> "jiiva" as "Consciousness in a body-mind organism" then

> there is no mistake in saying "I am a jiiva".

 

where does this consciousness go on death? and where does it

come from at birth? embodiedness is a temporary phenomenon, no?

>

> But my difficulty was not really here. What I don't

> understand is how is it that adhyaasa can even exist.

 

that is the trouble with adhyaasa!!

>

> So the question is again: How can Brahman fall prey to

> adhyaasa?

 

Actually, it doesn't. Not only is jiiva really Brahman,

*everything* is Brahman. It is as if the partless is divided

into parts, and then the different parts identify with one

another, without realizing that it is all only "as if". To

say that Brahman is doing this for play (k.rii.daa) is one

answer. That it is all liilaa is another answer. That it is

intentional on the part of Brahman is yet another answer,

but if you think about it, none are really answers. Play,

sport, intention - all these presume differentiation and

adhyaasa. Part of the process of realization is understanding

that adhyaasa is quite illogical and therefore to not do it

any more!

 

Best wishes,

Vidyasankar

[Guest guest]

 

Miguel Angel Carrasco [macf12]

 

So the question is again: How can Brahman fall prey to

adhyaasa?

 

Miguel Angel

 

[Madhava Replies:]

 

namastE!

 

He never did!

 

Brahman did not fall prey to adhyaasa. Just like a dreamer never fall prey

to a lion which is trying to eat him away in the dream! Now, who will be

able to tell the dreamer that he is just dreaming? Nobody, unless somebody

forcedly wake him up, or he wakes up by himself. We can understand this

"somebody" who is forcedly waking him up to make him realize is ---- Adi

Shankara ---- he is trying to make the dreamer realize that he is *just*

dreaming, through the means of Adhyasa Bhashya.

 

There is nothing wrong in the Gold Ring thinking that *it* is the ring. But

there is a chance that it will melt down one day! As long as the ring

remains in a cozy locker of any bank vault, the ring is okay... But the

moment the ring lands in a robber's hand, it may worry that he may melt it

down. Ring can think that it is Ring, there is nothing wrong in it, but

Ring thinking that it is going to *permanently* remain in the form of *Ring*

is wrong! The form that is assumed is not the real form.

 

Same is the case with us. We are very happy in our own homes. Our own jobs

are very comfortable. We are better than most of the people, at least we

can eat, drink and wear comfortable dresses, stay in comfortable places.

But how long is this *comfort* going to last? Thinking that "I am

comfortable" is also another adhayasa :-)

 

 

Yours,

Madhava

[Guest guest]

>--------

>Yes, I see what you mean. The error lies not in the

>gold but in the individual gold ring. But in what does

>the mistake consist? Obviously not in the statement "I

>am a gold ring", which is true. A gold ring *is* a gold

>ring. Also there is no mistake if the ring were to say

>"I am a ring". This is also true, and no mistake: a

>gold ring *is* a ring. So where is the mistake? I think

>there could only be error if the gold ring were to say

>"I am a copper ring", here the adhyaasa part is

>"copper", not "ring".

 

Sorry I somehow missed this post - during my travels and on and off of

internets.

 

The mistake is - when the golden ring say "I am only a ring" which is just

the name and form of the gold. If I gold in the ring form if it has that

undestanding then there is no problem - I am gold and I can exist in this

ring form or any other form - forms are my glory but Gold and gold alone.

If it forgets that it is gold and assumes that it is ring alone and the

limitation of the ring becomes its limitations. That is the effect of

superimposed error. I am mortal, I am limited and I am unhappy since I

cannot stand these limitations. Seeing a bangle it will start feeling

joulous thinking that bangle has bette life than her - All these because of

forgetting that it is gold and gold all the time whether in ring form or

bangle form or any other form.

 

I am on way to travel - if this is not clear we can discuss further.

 

I cannot open this e-mail account one can reach me through my hotmail

account - k_sadananda

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

 

 

 

 

>In the same way, if the jiiva says "I am a jiiva", here

>there is no mistake, at least formally. It is a

>tautology: A=A. A jiiva *is* a jiiva.

>Where is then the mistake? I think it all comes down

>to what we understand under "jiiva". If by "jiiva" we

>understand "only a body-mind organism" then yes, I

>agree, there is a mistake, because something is missing

>in the definition: Consciousness. Whereas if we define

>"jiiva" as "Consciousness in a body-mind organism" then

>there is no mistake in saying "I am a jiiva".

>

>But my difficulty was not really here. What I don't

>understand is how is it that adhyaasa can even exist.

>If a jiiva is nothing but Brahman (like a gold ring is

>nothing but gold) then it is Brahman who makes the

>mistake in the statement "I am only body-mind". Who

>else but Brahman could it be? There is no one else. And

>it is no use saying it is not Brahman but the jiiva who

>makes the mistake, because the jiiva is nothing but

>Brahman. The jiiva is not an entity independent from

>Brahman. The jiiva *is* Brahman (that's why I can say

>"I am Brahman").

>

>So the question is again: How can Brahman fall prey to

>adhyaasa?

>

>Miguel Angel

>

>

>

>Discussion of Sankara's Advaita Vedanta Philosophy of nonseparablity of

>Atman and Brahman.

>Searchable List Archives are available at:

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K. Sadananda

Code 6323

Naval Research Laboratory

Washington D.C. 20375

Voice (202)767-2117

Fax:(202)767-2623

[Guest guest]

For some reason I missed your mail again. it gets burried somewhere in the

list and when I am purging the list, I find yours that I did not respond. -

Sorry about that.

>-->

>

>Miguel Angel Carrasco :

><skip>

>> >When I say "I am a jiiva", who is that I? Who makes

>> >the mistake? Who is in error?

>> >Obviously the subject of adhyaasa must be either the

>> >jiiva or Brahman. Which?

>

>Sadananda:

><skip>

>> Yes nothing will happen to Brahman- just like nothing

>happens to gold - yet

>> bangle and ring and necklace which are just names and

>forms think they are

>> just the forms and forget that they are the gold that

>pervades all the

>> ornaments. The adhyaasa is with the gold in the ring

>and necklace that

>> think that they are only the names and forms and

>hence limited by the names

>> and forms. Ring thinks it has a date of birth and

>date of death and limited

>> in space and time etc and is different from bangle

>etc.

>

>--------

>Yes, I see what you mean. The error lies not in the

>gold but in the individual gold ring. But in what does

>the mistake consist? Obviously not in the statement "I

>am a gold ring", which is true. A gold ring *is* a gold

>ring. Also there is no mistake if the ring were to say

>"I am a ring". This is also true, and no mistake: a

>gold ring *is* a ring. So where is the mistake? I think

>there could only be error if the gold ring were to say

>"I am a copper ring", here the adhyaasa part is

>"copper", not "ring".

 

It is not just that I am ring - but the knowledge is only I am only a ring.

Ring is not an entity by it self -or it is only a temporal entity, it is

just the name for a form with utility. But in and through the ring it is

Au or gold. One (gold) is indendent and the other(ring) is dependent. I

cannot have ring separate from gold where as gold can exist without being a

ring. When the gold thinks it is only a ring - only the properties of the

ring, it assumes and not that of the gold. It is what we call it as

golden ring - the golden has become an adjuctive and ring has become a noun

that posses the attribute the adjective. In fact it is the otherway

around. It is in and through the gold and it should call itself as ' I am

ringly gold' - may sound funny but that is the fact like your A=A that

fact. If it says, I am ringly gold, the intrinsic properties of Gold are

retained along with temporal superficial propeties associated with ring

such as ID, OD etc are superimposed. Hence Krishna says - they are all in

me, but I am not in them - in the sense that ring, bangle etc are of gold

but names and forms being superficial and not real, where real is defined

as that is which is eternal and non-negatable. Date of birth, date of

death, the modificaitions etc belong to ring and not to gold which was

gold, is gold and will be gold. No changes in the intrinsic properties of

Au, the changes in the superficial or temporal propeties.

 

 

>In the same way, if the jiiva says "I am a jiiva", here

>there is no mistake, at least formally. It is a

>tautology: A=A. A jiiva *is* a jiiva.

>Where is then the mistake? I think it all comes down

>to what we understand under "jiiva". If by "jiiva" we

>understand "only a body-mind organism" then yes, I

>agree, there is a mistake, because something is missing

>in the definition: Consciousness. Whereas if we define

>"jiiva" as "Consciousness in a body-mind organism" then

>there is no mistake in saying "I am a jiiva".

 

Partical true. Consciousness is not in the body, the body is in the

consciousness. This is because consciousness cannot have a boundary. If

there is a boundary, then consciousness is inside and not outside. Then

the question arises that what is outside and how do you know that there is

outside. Only way to answer that question is - I am conscious of the

existence of outside - then only I can say there is out side. This implies

that, that outside is in my consciouness so that I am conscious of that

outside. There cannot be anything outside the consciousness or

consciousness has to be infinite - so is the existence. If you think

deeply, you will realize that when I am conscious entity, there is no

error, When I say I am existant entity there is no problem. ( in the

statement -I am - both are included) The problem comes only when I say I

am limited entity. that it is the error - I am jiiva who is limited since

body that I am conscious off is limited, mind and intellect that I am

conscious off are limited. But I who is consciouness and existence is not

limited.

Because of these superimposed limitations of the body, mind and intellect,

jiivahood arises with the notions that he is limited. Any limitation is a

problem and all the suffering in life is due to that notion of limitation.

 

In the equation, if you read the adhyaasa part again, what is missing is

not the consciousness or existence but the completeness or brahmatvam or

unlimited nature of mine which is same as happiness - State of happiness is

limitlessness. and that is brahmatvam. Hence 'aham brahma asmi' is the

teaching - I am the totality is the teaching, because the error is centered

on the notion of limitation and that is jiivahood.

 

I think the above aspect has to be clear in terms of where the error is.

>But my difficulty was not really here. What I don't

>understand is how is it that adhyaasa can even exist.

>If a jiiva is nothing but Brahman (like a gold ring is

>nothing but gold) then it is Brahman who makes the

>mistake in the statement "I am only body-mind".

 

The problem I see is right there, if you stop and think. What I think you

are doing is jumping from one state to the other. - Read your sentence

again - if a jiiva is nothing but Brahman -Please stop right there and

think.

 

Jiiva is nothing but Brahman is the knowledge. If that is known the problem

is already solved. If that is known your question does not arise any

more. See the intellectual understanding that Jiiva is Brahman is

different from full realization that Jiiva is indeed brahman - It is an

understanding as a fact not as an understanding as a thought.

 

"Who

>else but Brahman could it be? There is no one else. And

>it is no use saying it is not Brahman but the jiiva who

>makes the mistake, because the jiiva is nothing but

>Brahman.

 

The one who is saying is the one who is asking me the question! If jiiva

is nothing but Brahman and If Brahman alone is there - who is there to ask

and who is there to answer? It is one without a second. The major

confusion is getting the two reference states mixed up. As long I feel I

am an individual who thinks and questions, there is no knowledge of I am

Brahman - conceptually yes but fatually not. When the factual knowledge

occurs then there is no adhyaasa nor jiiva nor creation not anything even

to ask. The question and questioner are dissolved in totality that I am.

Read your questions again with this understanding.

 

 

The jiiva is not an entity independent from

>Brahman. The jiiva *is* Brahman (that's why I can say

>"I am Brahman").

>

>So the question is again: How can Brahman fall prey to

>adhyaasa?

 

You are absolutely right - Brahman cannot and will not. Hence even adhyaasa

is also adhyaasa but it is only real as long as there is notion of jiiva.

Hence from Brahman point there is no adhyaasa. From Jiiva point there is

adhyaasa since the sat chit and ananda entity feels unhappy due to

superimposed limitations. We all know happiness does not come from objects

or happiness is not an object, yet we crave for objects thinking that that

will bring happiness to us - This is universal experience of all jiiva-s.

Why is that? We know it but we fall for it - that is due to adhyaasa.

Understanding that I am Brahman has to become fatual and not just

conceptual. There lies most of our problems. The reason is the pressure

of habitual thinking - or vaasana-s to be more technical.

 

Remember the story of Mr. Jones and the rat -Mr Jones who thought he is a

rat goes to a doctor and after many sessions gets convinced that he is a

man and not a rat. But he comes back running to the doctor gasping for his

breath saying that I know I am man and not a rat, but I am afraid that that

cat in the street may not know that I am a man and not a rat! - Mr jones

understood - conceptually that he is a man not a rat- but fatually he has

not yet realized that he is man and not a rat! This is our problem - when

we ask Jiiva is Brahman, then how come he has adhhyaasa. The teaching is

to the one who thinks he is jiiva - just like the doctor-sessions are for

Mr. Jones who thinks he is a rat. Mr. Jones was or is never a rat and

always a man. So to whom the adhyaasa belongs? Only to notional ratty

Jones!

 

>

>Miguel Angel

>

 

K. Sadananda

Code 6323

Naval Research Laboratory

Washington D.C. 20375

Voice (202)767-2117

Fax:(202)767-2623

[Guest guest]

Miguel Angel - before we discuss further - I discovered why I am missing

your mails. Your computer is putting the data 1 Jan 1966 and my e-mail

sorter which sorts on the basis of the date buries some where in the mail

list than the along with the new incoming mails. This is different type of

adhyaasa!

>Dear Sadananda,

>

>I don't quite see that you have solved the difficulty I

>posed.

>To use the analogy you made, just imagine that Mr Jones

>is the only being there is. There is absolutely nothing

>else, only Mr Jones. And he believes he is a rat. That

>is adhyaasa, a mistake: he is superimposing something

>(the idea of a rat) on his real nature (the nature of a

>man). How is this possible? Because poor Mr Jones is

>not infallible. He can make mistakes. But what if he

>were infallible? Then we would have to say that his

>belief of being a rat is not a mistake, but just a

>dream. Once he wakes up he'll see that belief not as a

>mistake but as what it was, a dream.

>

>Now let's replace the elements in the analogy. Instead

>of poor Mr Jones (remember, in our analogy he is the

>only being there is) we have Brahman (the only being

>there is). And instead of the belief "I am a rat" we

>have "I am only a body-mind". Is that a mistake? That

>depends on whether Brahman is infallible or not, and on

>whether IT is the only being there is. Of course

>Brahman is the One without a second, and, having no

>limitations, IT can only be infallible. So the belief

>"I am only a body-mind" is not a mistake but a dream.

>

>You said: "So to whom the adhyaasa belongs? Only to

>notional ratty Jones!"

>Replacing the elements in the analogy, you would have

>to say : "...only to notional humanly Brahman". As

>there is nothing but Brahman, if there is any belief it

>must be Brahman's belief. If someone says "I am only a

>body-mind" it can only be Brahman who says that,

>because there is no one else.

 

 

 

If I can paraphrase your question, you are asking the fundamental question

- how did Brahman become jiiva - I tried to answer from each reference -

>From Brahman reference there is no jiiva and no creation - He is one without

a second. Examples we use to illustrate are worldly example and are limited

by that very reason. Yet one can see the same truth. Amidst of variety of

gold ornaments, from Gold point, it is just pure gold and there is nothing

other than gold, the apparent plurality is only apparent and not real. From

Brahman point there is no adhyaasa. No words can express anything about

Brahman since words by their very nature are limited and description of that

infinite state through words are trying to see the sun using a torch light.

>From Jiiva point, jiiva thinks he sees differences - differences between

jiiva-s, differences between the worldly (inert) objects, and differences

between jiiva-s and the worldly objects. What Vedanta teaches is these

difference are superficial and due to adhyaasa. The substratum is one and

the same unchanging and eternal - existence-consciousness-limitlessness -

that is the Brahman and you are that.

 

You question boils down to how did Jiiva hood started or ignorance that is

the root cause for adhyaasa started when there is nothing other than

Brahman. - This question was answered in the notes by Shankara in response

to objections of a puurvapakshi. In a nut shell -there are two aspects

related to the ignorance, which is the root cause of adhyaasa. 1. it is

beginningless or anaadi and 2. it is unexplainable or inexplicable, in

Sanskrit anirvachaniiyam. Let me explain this by way of example.

1. Creation is a cycle - and hence time bound. Shree Vidyasankar Sundaresan

emphasized this aspect in his responses. In a cycle there is no beginning

or end. Only way to get out of this cyclic process is to transcend the very

time concept that involves cause-effect relationship. This happens in the

realization of I am Brahman - since you transcend both space and time which

are mental projections - hence transcend cause and effect relationship. See

your question pertains to cause and effect - in Brahman there is no cause

and effect which are time bound, on the other hand jiiva is caught in the

realm of cause-and effect - how did this happen? -You are looking for a

cause again. Now before you look for an answer, you need to look at the one

who is asking the question - question and questioner are both invalid since

question is in the realm of cause-effect and the answer lies beyond the

cause-effect. Hence Shankara says it is anirvachaniiyam or inexplicable.

Before you look for a answer, Vedanta asks us first to investigate the

validity of the questioner. Vedanta says the question is invalid since

questioner himself is invalid. To appreciate the Vedanta answer, it asks us

inquire into who is the questioner?

2. The second way of looking at it is that your question is in the realm of

intellect. It is the intellect that is seeking the cause-effect

relationship and that is the role of the intellect. But the intellect

itself is the product of the avidya or ignorance - It is like using a

flashlight, I want to see the batteries that is the cause for the light.

Assuming it is not a see-through flashlight, and there is no other light, I

cannot use the light from the flashlight to see the very cause for that

light. If I open the flashlight to see the batteries, there is no more light

from the torchlight and I cannot see the batteries any more - just an

example to illustrate the point. The very intellect, which is beaming

because it is enlivened by the consciousness, cannot be used to investigate

the very consciousness the source of its light. Scriptures use somewhat

self-contradictory words to uplift the intellect to go beyond the

cause-effect relation like for example, it is smaller than the smallest yet

bigger than the biggest. I am in all of them, yet I am different from all

of them. The body is in me, the mind is in me, the intellect in me, the

world is in me, yet I am not the body, mind, intellect or the world - If one

reads these scriptural statements without proper teacher, he will think this

is rattling of a child with self-contradictory meaningless words. The

religious teachers are facing a fundamental problem - that which is

inexplicable or anirvachaniiyam they are forced to explain using words -

They come up ingenious methods using words to go beyond the words, using

intellect to go beyond the intellect.

 

In the final analysis, adhyaasa exists only at the level of jiiva and not at

Brahman level. Brahman being infinite and beyond cause-effect and jiiva

being finite and in the real of cause-effect, we cannot jump from one to the

other using intellect which itself is the product of cause-effect.

(intellect is a sequence of thoughts - gap between two thoughts is the time

and space). How do you go from one state to the other- you cannot -since

going etc are within the realm of time. Hence it is an inquiry that reveals

who you already are - It is not gaining something, going somewhere but being

what you already are. For that only the inquiry into who you are or what is

Brahman is required - that is what Brahmasuutra emphasizes.

>

>As I said, it is useless to reply that it is not

>Brahman but the jiva who says that. The jiva is nothing

>but Brahman. A=B. If the jiva says that, it is Brahman

>who says that. Whatever is done is done by Brahman.

>There is no one else. So either Brahman is not

>infallible (and then we can call that belief adhyaasa),

>or it is infallible, and then we cannot call it

>adhyaasa, because Brahman can make no mistakes. The

>first is impossible, Brahman can make no mistakes. So

>we are left with the second alternative: that belief is

>not a mistake. What then? A dream.

 

A dream analysis a good one and that is what MaanDukya Upanishhad teaches.

Before we bring into the dream analysis, please examine my response, if

there are still questions, let us discuss.

 

Thanks for lively discussions.

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

 

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