Action, reaction, response and free-will

[Guest guest]

Dear Sadananda,

 

Thank you for taking up the question I put to Jaishankar. Unfortunately, I'm

afraid your reply has not clarified the situation. It seems that you have

not addressed the key issue. Also, I beg to disagree with the points that

you have made.

>

> Dennis you have raised very important issue. In a way what you say

> is true. But I am sure you agree with me that there is difference in

> an impulsive response in contrast to deliberate well thought out

> response. True, in both the thought process is involved. At the same

> time there is a lot of difference in the quality of action.

>

> Impulsive response is called a reaction since it reflects more the

> instinctive response fully colored by ones intensive likes and

> dislikes. That makes it as reaction to the input where the play of

> the rational intellect is low while the contribution from ones

> feelings is high. It is an emotional response rather than

> intellectual response. That is when ones anger, lust and other

> passions takes over ones actions. People loose the discriminative

> faculty and act or I should say react and later when the

> discriminative faculty is available regret that they should not have

> done that. This is where as Krishna puts it - krodha, anger, leads

> to sammoha, delusion, where there there is lack of discrimination and

> sammoha leads to memory loss, smR^iti bhramsha, where one forgets

> that one is dealing with his own mother or father or child and act

> irrationally - That is when the man goes down fall - praNasyati.

> When one knows what is the right thing do if one uses the

> intellectual reasoning but acts impulsively what one feels like doing

> - That divergence between the emotional values and intellectual

> values is termed 'sin'. Yoga integrates these two faculties. There

> is less and less of reaction and more and more of action for a yogi.

>

 

This seems to be making it all very complicated. I saw it as relatively

strightforward and simple. There are three types of action - action for

oneself or selfish action; action for others or unselfish action; action in

response to a need with no thought of oneself or the other. Most people

indulge in the first two (though rather more prefer the first!). Some

practise the third. Students of the giitaa try to practise the third! The

enlightened man only (?) practises the third since, for him, there is no

small self or any 'other'. The first results in paapa; the second puNya.

Only the third type does not result in any karmaphala.

 

What I would term 'reaction' is when there is an automatic, habitual

response to a situation, without any real awareness and without the

involvement of buddhi. i.e. re-action; action again, in the same way as it

always happens. (Since the jnaana still has praarabdha karma, is it not

possible that he could still act in this way?)

 

However, the main point, differing from what you seem to be saying, is that

*any* action that involves thinking (manas) is necessarily incurring some

element of habit. As soon as thinking begins, the action can no longer be a

simple response to the need. This is when selfish considerations arise -

desire, anger etc. Buddhi operates in stillness and clarity without any of

the confusion introduced by manas. Accordingly, when you say "But I am sure

you agree with me that there is difference in an impulsive response in

contrast to deliberate well thought out response", the answer would have to

be that, yes, I do agree, but not in the way that you seem to imply. If

buddhi is operating, the impulsive response could actually be the 'correct'

one, generating no sanskaara. The second one cannot fall into this class

since 'well thought out' very much implies the involvement of manas.

 

> As you said when one goes step by step thinking process, in the very

> sequence of steps, one gets detached and analyzing the problems on

> its merit rather than clouded by emotions. That is one becomes more

> and more objective in his approach.

 

I don't think I did say this! Certainly I did not mean to imply that, if

that was the impression. Discounting the sort of analysis done by Sankara in

the BSB, I think that most of us tend to lose any possibility of detached

action once we start thinking too deeply about something. We get involved in

'what ifs' and 'if only I had' etc. i.e. more and more selfish content.

 

With respect, the remainder of your post seemed to further complicate the

issue so I will leave the above for your cosideration and comment rather

than addressing further aspects.

 

That then brings us to the main issue of my post, which concerned the

question of free will or not in any of this. You do not seem to have

commented on this. My contention was that all seem not to involve free will.

 

In the case of the selfish action, this is driven by habit, i.e. what I want

or do not want. This is dictated by past (or imagined) likes and dislikes.

This is a cause and effect relationship and does not involve free will.

 

With unselfish action, there is still a desired outcome, this time for a

perceived 'other' rather than for oneself. An idea in mind acts as cause for

an effect-action. In both this and the above case, there may be many

intermediate mental steps. But if each step is logically driven from the

previous (based on acquired conditioning of what is logical), then there is

no free will involved.

 

With actions that are a simple response to a need, without the intervention

of manas, there are no thoughts involved. However, if this is the case, that

the action is a direct response to the need (cause and effect) then, again,

there is no free will.

 

Is there a fallacy in this anlysis?

 

Namaste,

 

Dennis

[Guest guest]

advaitin , Shree Dennis Waite" wrote:

------------------

Case 1:

------------------

> In the case of the selfish action, this is driven by habit, i.e.

what I want

> or do not want. This is dictated by past (or imagined) likes and

dislikes.

> This is a cause and effect relationship and does not involve free

will.

>

------------------

Case 2:

------------------

> With unselfish action, there is still a desired outcome, this time

for a

> perceived 'other' rather than for oneself. An idea in mind acts as

cause for

> an effect-action. In both this and the above case, there may be many

> intermediate mental steps. But if each step is logically driven

from the

> previous (based on acquired conditioning of what is logical), then

there is

> no free will involved.

>

------------------

Case 3:

------------------

> With actions that are a simple response to a need, without the

intervention

> of manas, there are no thoughts involved. However, if this is the

case, that

> the action is a direct response to the need (cause and effect)

then, again,

> there is no free will.

>

> Is there a fallacy in this anlysis?

---

 

Dear Shree Dennis,

I have divided the last portion of the post into 3parts as above.

 

Here is my understanding, not necessarily right or wrong, but a

viewpoint.

Case1 is really same as case2, opposite sides of the same coin. Case3

is neither selfish nor unselfish, but falls under involuntary

actions, some examples being pumping of the heart.

 

All the above 3 cases seem to fall into category-3. Yes, there is no

free-will in all of them as was stated.

 

What we are missing in all the 3cases is the element of 'desire' that

is the determining factor. Gita 3:36 onwards.

 

Arjuna said:

 

3.36 Now then, O scion of the Vrsni dynasty (Krsna), impelled by

what does this man commit sin even against his wish, being

constrained by force, as it were?

 

The Blessed Lord said:

 

3.37 This desire, this anger, born of the quality of rajas, is a

great devourer, a great sinner. Know this to be the enemy here.

 

3.38 As fire is enveloped by smoke, as a mirror by dirt, and as a

foetus remains enclosed in the womb, so in this shrouded by that.

 

3.40 The organs, mind, and the intellect are said to be its abode.

This one diversely deludes the embodied being by veiling Knowledge

with the help of these.

 

3.39 O son of Kunti, Knowledge is covered by this constant enemy of

the wise in the form of desire, which is an insatiable fire.

 

 

3.41 Therefore, O scion of the Bharata dynasty, after first

controlling the organs, renounce this one [A variant reading is,

'prajahi hi-enam, completely renounce this one'.-Tr.] which is sinful

and a destroyer of learning and wisdom.

 

3.42 They say that the organs are superior (to the gross body); the

mind is superior to the organs; but the intellect is superior to the

mind. However, the one who is superior to the intellect is He.

 

 

3.43 [The Ast, introdcues this verse with, 'Tatah kim, what follows

from that?'-Tr.] Understanding the Self thus

[understanding....thus:that desires can be conquered through the

knowledge of the Self.] as superior to the intellect, and completely

establishing (the Self) is spiritual absorption with the (help of)

the mind, O mighty-armed one, vanquish the enemy in the form of

desire, which is difficult to subdue.

 

With Kindest Regards,

Raghava

[Guest guest]

advaitin , raghavakaluri wrote:

> advaitin , Shree Dennis Waite" wrote:

 

Namaste,

 

As this subject surfaces periodically, and a previous link

appears to have gone unattended, here is a dialogue that would be of

interest to the readers:

 

The Riddle of Fate and Free-Will Solved:

(A dialogue between His Holiness Shri Chandrashekhara Bharati

Mahaswami and a Disciple): [His Holiness was the Sringeri Mathadhipati

1912-1954.]

 

H.H. : I hope you are pursuing your studies in the Vedanta as usual?

D. : Though not regularly, I do make some occasional study.

H.H. : In the course of your studies, you may have come across many

doubts.

D. : Yes, one doubt repeatedly comes up to my mind.

H.H. : What is it?

D. : It is the problem of the eternal conflict between fate and

free-will.

What are their respective provinces and how can the conflict be

avoided?

H.H. : If presented in the way you have done it, the problem would

baffle

even the highest of thinkers.

D. : What is wrong with my presentation? I only stated the problem

and

did not even explain how I find it to be a difficult one.

H.H. : Your difficulty arises in the very statement of the problem.

D. : How?

H.H. : A conflict arises only if there are two things. There can be no

conflict if there is only one thing.

D. : But here there are two things, fate and free-will.

H.H. : Exacly. It is this assumption of yours that is responsible for

your

problem.

D. : It is not my assumption at all. How can I ignore the fact that

the

two things exist as independent factors, whether I grant their

existence or not?

H.H. : That is where you are wrong again.

D. : How?

H.H. : As a follower of our Sanatana Dharma, you must know that fate

is

nothing extraneous to yourself, but only the sum total of the

results of your past actions.

As God is but the dispenser of the fruits of actions, fate,

representing those fruits, is not his creation but only yours.

Fre-will is what you exercise when you act now.

D. : Still I do not see how they are not two distinct things.

H.H. : Have it this way. Fate is past karma; free-will is present

karma.

Both are really one, that is, karma, though they may differ in

the

matter of time. There can be no conflict when they are really

one.

D. : But the difference in time is a vital difference which we

cannot

possibly overlook.

H.H. : I do not want you to overlook it, but only to study it more

deeply.

The present is before you and, by the exercise of free-will,

you can

attempt to shape it.

The past is past and is therefore beyond your vision and is

rightly called adrishta, the unseen. You cannot reasonably

attempt

to find out the relative strength of two things unless both of

them

are before you. But, by our very definition, free-will, the

present

karma, alone is before you and fate, the past karma, is

invisible.

Even if you see two wrestlers right in front of you, you

cannot

decide about their relative strength. For, one may have

weight, the

other agility; one muscles and the other tenacity; one the

benefit of

practice and the other coolness of judgment and so on. We can

go on

building arguments on arguments to conclude that a particular

wrestler will be the winner.

But experience shows that each of these qualifications

may fail

at any time or may prove to be a disqualification. The only

practical

method of determining their relative strength will be to make

them

wrestle.

While this is so, how do you expect to find by means of

arguments a solution to the problem of the relative value of

fate

and free-will when the former by its very nature is unseen!

D. : Is there no way then of solving this problem?

H.H. : There is this way. The wrestlers must fight with each other

and prove

which of them is the stronger.

D. : In other words, the problem of conflict will get solved only

at the

end of the conflict. But at that time the problem will have

ceased to

have any practical significance.

H.H. : Not only so, it will cease to exist.

D. : That is, before the conflict begins, the problem is incapable

of

solution; and, after the conflict ends, it is no longer

necessary to

find a solution.

H.H. : Just so. In either case, it is profitless to embark on the

enquiry

as to the relative stregth of fate and free-will.

 

A Guide

 

D. : Does Yor Holiness then mean to say that we must resign

ourselves to

fate?

H.H. : Certainly not. On the other hand, you must devote yourself to

free-

will.

D. : How can that be?

H.H. : Fate, as I told you, is the resultant of the past exercise of

your

free-will. By exercising your free-will in the past, you

brought on

the resultant fate.

By exercising your free-will in the present, I want you to

wipe

out your past record if it hurts you, or to add to it if you

find it

enjoyable.

I any case. whether for acquiring more happiness or for

reducing

misery. you have to exercise your free-will in the present.

D. : But the exercise of free-will however well-directed, very often

fails to secure the desired result, as fate steps in and

nullifies

the action of free-will.

H.H. : You are again ignoring our definition of fate. It is not an

extraneous and a new thing which steps in to nullify your free-

will.

On the other hand, it is already in yourself.

D. : It may be so, but its existence is felt only when it comes into

conflict with free-will. How can we possibly wipe out the past

record when we do not know nor have the means of knowing what

it is?

H.H. : Except to a very few highly advanced souls, the past certainly

remains unknown. But even our ignorance of it is very often an

advantage to us.

For, if we happen to know all the results we have

accumulated

by our actions in this and our past lives, we will be so much

shocked as to give up in despair any attempt to overcome or

mitigate

them. Even in this life, forgetfulnes is a boon which the

merciful

God has been pleased to bestow on us, so that we may not be

burdened

at any moment with a recollection of all that has happened in

the

past.

Similarly, the divine spark in us is ever bright with

hope and

makes it possible for us to confidently exercise our free-

will. It

is not for us to belittle the significance of these two boons--

forgetfulness of the past and hope for the future.

D. : Our ignorance of the past may be useful in not deterring the

exercise

of the free-will, and hope may stimulate that exercise. All the

same, it cannot be denied that fate very often does present a

formidable obstacle in the way of such exercise.

H.H. : It is not quite correct to say that fate places obstacles in

the way

of free-will. On the other hand, by seeming to oppose our

efforts,

it tells us what is the extent of free-will that is necessary

now to

bear fruit.

Ordinarily for the purpose of securing a single benefit, a

particular activity is prescribed; but we do not know how

intensively or how repeatedly that activity has to be pursued

or

pesisted in.

If we do not succed at the very first attempt, we can

easily

deduce that in the past we have exercised our free-will just

in the

opposite direction, that the resultant of that past activity

has

first to be eliminated and that our present effort must be

proportionate to that past activity.

Thus, the obstacle which fate seems to offer is just the

gauge

by which we have to guide our present activities.

H.H. : The obstacle is seen only after the exercise of our free-will;

how

can that help us to guide our activities at the start?

H.H. : It need not guide us at the start. At the start, you must not

be

obsessed at all with the idea that there will be any obstacle

in

your way.

Start with boundless hope and with the rpesumption that

there

is nothing in the way of your exercising the free-will.

If you do not succeed, tell yourself then that there has

been

in the past a counter-influence brought on by yourself by

exercising

your free-will in the other direction and, therefore, you must

now

exercise your free-will with re-doubled vogor and persistence

to

achieve your object.

Tell yourself that, inasmuch as the seeming obstacle is

of your

own making, it is certainly within your competence to

overcome it.

If you do not succeed even after this renewed effort,

there can

be absolutely no justification for despair, for fate being but

a

creature of your free-will can never be stronger than your

free-will.

Your failure only means that your present exercise of

free-will

is not sufficient to counteract the result of the past

exercise of

it.

In other words, there is no question of a relative

proportion

between fate and free-will as distinct factors in life. The

relative

proportion is only as between the intensity of our past action

and

the intensity of our present action.

D. : But even so, the relative intensity can be realised only at

the end

of our present effort in a particular direction.

H.H. : It is always so in the case of everything which is adrishta or

unseen. Take, for example, a nail driven into a wooden pillar.

When

you see it for the first time, you actually see, say, an inch

of it

projecting out of the pillar. The rest of it has gone into the

wood

and you cannot now see what exact length of the nail is

imbedded in

the wood. That length, therefore, is unseen or adrishta, so

far as

you are concerned. Beautifully varnished as the pillar is, you

do

not know what is the composition of the wood in which the nail

is

driven. That also is unseen or adrishta.

Now, suppose you want to pull that nail out, can you

tell me

how many pulls will be necessary and how powerful each pull

has to

be?

D. : How can I? The number and the intensity of the pulls will

depend

upon the length which has gone into the wood.

H.H. : Certainly so. And the length which has gone into the wood is

not

arbitrary, but depended upon the number of strokes which drove

it in

and the intensity of each of such strokes and the resistance

which

the wood offered to them.

D. : It is so.

H.H. : The number and intensity of the pulls needed to take out the

nail

depend therefore upon the number and intensity of the strokes

which

drove it in.

D. : Yes.

H.H. : But the strokes that drove in the nail are now unseen and

unseeable.

They relate to the past and are adrishta.

D. : Yes.

H.H. : Do we stop from pulling out the nail simply because we happen

to be

ignorant of the length of the nail in the wood or of the

number and

intensity of the strokes which drove it in? Or, do we persist

in

pulling it out by increasing our effort?

D. : Certainly, as practical men we adopt the latter course.

H.H. : Adopt the same course in every effort of yours. Exert yourself

as

much as you can. Your will must succeed in the end.

 

Function of Shastras:

 

D. : But there certainly are many things which are impossible to

attain

even after the utmost exertion.

H.H. : There you are mistaken. There is nothing which is really

unattainable. A thing, however, may be unattainable to us at

the

particular stage at which we are, or with the qualifications

that we

possess.

The attainability or otherwise of a particular thing is

thus

not an absolute characteristic of that thing but is relative

and

proportionate to our capacity to attain it.

D. : The success or failure of an effort can be known definitely

only at

the end. How are we then to know beforehand whether with our

present capacity we may or may not exert ourselves to attain a

particular object, and whether it is the right kind of

exertion for

the attainment of that object?

H.H. : Your question is certainly a pertinent one. The whole aim of

our

Dharma Shastras is to give a detailed answer to your question.

Religion does not fetter man's free-will. It leaves him

quite

free to act, but tells him at the same time what is good for

him and

what is not.

The resposibility is entirely and solely his. He cannot escape

it by

blaming fate, for fate is of his own making, nor by blaming

God, for

he is but the dispenser of fruits in accordance with the

merits of

actions. You are the master of your own destiny. It is for you

to

make it, to better it or to mar it. This is your privilege.

This is

your responsibility.

D. : I quite realise this. But often it so happens that I am not

really

master of myself. I know, for instance, quite well that a

particular

act is wrong; at the same time, I feel impelled to do it.

Similarly,

I know that another act is right; at the same time, however, I

feel

powerless to do it. It seems that there is some power which is

able

to control or defy my free-will. So long as that power is

potent,

how can I be called the master of my own destiny? Whatis that

power

but fate?

H.H. : You are evidently confusing together two distinct things. Fate

is a

thing quite different from the other one which you call a

power.

Suppose you handle an instrument for the first time. You will

do it

very clumsily and with great effort.

The next time, however, you use it, you will do so less

clumsily and with less effort. With repeated uses, you will

have

learnt to use it easily and without any effort. That is, the

facility

and ease with which you use a particular thing increase with the

number of times you use it.

The first time a man steals, he does so with great

effort and

much fear; the next time both his effort and fear are much

less. As

opportunities increase, stealing will become a normal habit

with him

and will require no effort at all. This habit will generate in

him a

tendency to steal even when there is no necessity to steal. It

is

this tendency which goes by the name vasana. The power which

makes

you act as if against your will is only the vasana which itself

is of

your own making. This is not fate.

The punishment or reward, in the shape of pain or

pleasure,

which is the inevitable consequence of an act, good or bad, is

alone

the province of fate or destiny.

The vasana which the doing of an act leaves behind in

the mind

in the shape of a taste, a greater facility or a greater

tendency for

doing the same act once again, is quite a different thing. It

may be

that the punishment or the reward of the past act is, in

ordinary

circumstances, unavoidable, if there is no counter-effort; but

the

vasana can be easily handled if only we exercise our free-will

correctly.

D. : But the number of vasanas or tendencies that rule our hearts

are

endless. How can we possibly control them?

H.H. : The essential nature of a vasana is to seek expression in

outward

acts. This characteristic is common to all vasanas, good and

bad.

The stream of vasanas, the vasana sarit, as it is called, has

two

currents, the good and the bad.

If you try to dam up the entire stream, there mey be

danger.

The Shastras, therefore, do not ask you to attempt that. On the

other hand, they ask you to submit yourself to be led by the

good

vasana current and to resist being led away by the bad vasana

current.

When you know that a particular vasana is rising up in

your

mind, you cannot possibly say that you are at its mercy. You

have

your wits about you and the responsibility of deciding whether

you

will encourage it or not is entirely yours.

The Shastras ennciate in detail what vasanas are good

and

have to be encouraged and what vasanas are bad and have to be

overcome.

When, by dint of practice, you have made all your

vasanas

good and practically eliminated the charge of any bad vasanas

leading you astray, the Shastras take upon themselves the

function

of teaching you how to free your free-will even from the need

of

being led by good vasanas.

You will gradually be led on to a stage when your free-

will

be entirely free from any sort of coloring due to any vasanas.

At that stage, your mind will be pure as crystal and all

motive for particular action will cease to be. Freedom from the

results of particular actions is an inevitable consequence.

Both

fate and vasana disappear. There is freedom for ever more and

that

freedom is called Moksha.

____________________

______

 

.. shrii shaN^karaarpaNamastu ..

____________________

______

[Guest guest]

Dear Raghava,

 

Apologies - I do not follow the relevance your comments here. You say "What

we are missing in all the 3 cases is the element of 'desire' that is the

determining factor". But this was not so. My statement under Case 2 was

"With unselfish action, there is still a desired outcome, this time for a

perceived 'other' rather than for oneself." What I was saying is that Case 1

is driven by selfish desire, Case 2 by unselfish desire. Case 3 on the other

hand involves no desire but it is not at all like 'pumping of the heart' as

you suggest. That example relates to the automatic functioning of the body -

we cannot choose *not* to operate the heart. Case 3 is representative of the

behaviour of the elightened one who responds purely to what is front of her,

without any taint of desire or wish for a specific result.

 

Regards,

 

Dennis

 

Dear Sunder,

 

You say "and a previous link appears to have gone unattended". Not true! I

downloaded this at the time and read it with great interest. (As an aside, I

would like to take this opportunity to thank you for the many excellent

links that you have posted. I did wonder whether you have a home page of

these so that we might all benefit at any time from the very considerable

research that you must have done to discover them all.)

 

However, what prompted me to ask the question was the article from Swami

Dayanada that was posted. Here, he very clearly alludes to man's ability to

exercise free will in his actions and I was specifically endeavouring to

establish how what he was saying could be backed up. I have read his

commentaries on the Gita and was very impressed by the clarity of his

presentation and did not recall finding any grounds for disagreement with

what he said. Accordingly I was surprised that this article was by the same

author.

 

As far as the dialogue with His Holiness Shri Chandrashekhara Bharati

Mahaswami is concerned, though it is now some time since I read it, it would

quite probably answer my questions were I concerned about a conflict between

the ideas of fate and free will. But I am not. I am satisfied that the

concept of free will is untenable. (I did write 'happy' initially but this

is not strictly true!) As I recall, the article assumed an obvious

difference between fate and free will but it did not provide any convincing

argument to show that the latter did actually exist. I would argue that any

'choice' to work in the 'opposite direction to that dictated by fate' is no

choice at all but irrevocably driven by past and current thoughts and

events. This is, I suppose, tantamount to saying that the so-called free

will is also fate; that there is only fate, no matter how much we delude

ourselves to the contrary.

 

Regards,

 

Dennis

[Guest guest]

Dear Dennis,

 

We have three aspects here - (a) free-will (b) fate © Knowledge of

the Brahman

 

Arjuna(Free-will) on his own accord, was confused and dropped his

pursuits because he had no direction. Backed up by Krishna(Knowledge

of the Brahman), he saw clearly his own role(free-will).

 

We are bound in this creation and we have to act at all times, as

Gita says. Herein lies the synchronisation of free-will with God's

will so that we may act.

 

As Krishna says, Nara and Narayana both are needed.

 

As far as fate, yes, this is all mental creation and is within Maya.

 

With Love,

Raghava

[Guest guest]

Dear Dennis,

 

You surely bowled me over or knocked me out or whatever!!

 

Thank you for your kind words. Actually the new meta-search-engines

do such a good job for me that I feel reluctant to add another web

page of links! [updating dead links is a horrendous task!!]

[Metacrawler, Google, and Copernic2000 are my favorites]. I do

contribute links to others' web pages, esp. Sanskrit Documents Site.

Should the need arise, I may spend some time putting them together.

 

To me, Free Will exists to the same degree as the Sense of Doership

of Action. To the extent that Doership and Ego are 'Real', Free Will

exists. To the degree they are absent or 'Unreal'["anaha.nvaadi,

niraha~Nkaara, nirmama," etc. in Gita's words] the question does not

arise.

 

Regards,

 

sunder

 

 

advaitin , "Dennis Waite" <dwaite@d...> wrote:

>

> Dear Sunder,

>

> You say "and a previous link appears to have gone unattended". Not

true! I

> downloaded this at the time and read it with great interest.

> research that you must have done to discover them all.)

>

> However, what prompted me to ask the question was the article from

Swami

> Dayanada that was posted. Here, he very clearly alludes to man's

ability to

> exercise free will in his actions and I was specifically

endeavouring to

> establish how what he was saying could be backed up. I have read his

> commentaries on the Gita and was very impressed by the clarity of

his

> presentation and did not recall finding any grounds for

disagreement with

> what he said. Accordingly I was surprised that this article was by

the same

> author.

>

> As far as the dialogue with His Holiness Shri Chandrashekhara

Bharati

> Mahaswami is concerned, though it is now some time since I read it,

it would

> quite probably answer my questions were I concerned about a

conflict between

> the ideas of fate and free will. But I am not. I am satisfied that

the

> concept of free will is untenable. (I did write 'happy' initially

but this

> is not strictly true!) As I recall, the article assumed an obvious

> difference between fate and free will but it did not provide any

convincing

> argument to show that the latter did actually exist. I would argue

that any

> 'choice' to work in the 'opposite direction to that dictated by

fate' is no

> choice at all but irrevocably driven by past and current thoughts

and

> events. This is, I suppose, tantamount to saying that the so-called

free

> will is also fate; that there is only fate, no matter how much we

delude

> ourselves to the contrary.

>

> Regards,

>

> Dennis

[Guest guest]

Dear Raghava and Sunder,

 

Your last message (Raghava) concludes: -

 

"As far as fate, yes, this is all mental creation and is within Maya."

 

and Sunder also makes a similar comment: -

 

"To the extent that <free will and ego> are absent or

'Unreal'["anaha.nvaadi,

niraha~Nkaara, nirmama," etc. in Gita's words] the question does not

arise."

 

I am quite happy with this.

 

Sunder also says "To the extent that Doership and Ego are 'Real', Free Will

exists."

 

I would want to modify this to say "To the extent that they are 'real', we

*believe* that free will exists". Actually, I don't see why we cannot accept

that free will does not exist even within vyaavahaara. There is no doubt

that the illusion exists but can anyone demonstrate logically that it is

actually (i.e. within the laws of vyaavahaara) taking place?

 

Raghava goes on to say: -

> We have three aspects here - (a) free-will (b) fate © Knowledge of

> the Brahman

>

> Arjuna(Free-will) on his own accord, was confused and dropped his

> pursuits because he had no direction. Backed up by Krishna(Knowledge

> of the Brahman), he saw clearly his own role(free-will).

>

 

No question but that Arjuna is confused and does not know what to do. But

this is the logical consequence of all of the events that have taken place

and of his thoughts and ideas about those events. All perfectly logical and

the resultant conclusion of a series of cause-effect relationships - no free

will involved. Krishna then points out that he has no choice but to act

(inaction is still action). He is a kshatriya and his svadharma is to right

the wrongs committed by the Kauravas etc. The net effect of all of this

marvellous philosophy is to convince him that he has to act. All cause and

effect. Where is the free will in all of this?

 

Regards,

 

Dennis

[Guest guest]

Dear Dennis,

 

We have ended up with two possibilities here:

 

1) Everything is a series of cause-effect relationships - no free

will involved.

2) Free-will exists for each life form. The purpose of free-will is

to synchornize with God's will and eventually realize that there is

only God's will.

>The net effect of all of this marvellous philosophy is to convince

him that he has to act.

 

As I see, I would also humbly like to point out that this is just a

by-product. The purpose of this marvellous philosophy is to render

Atma-Jnana to Arjuna.

 

With Love and Wishing the forum all the best for a happy and

prosperous new year,

Raghava

[Guest guest]

Harih Aum Dennisji:

 

I agree with your assessment in an earlier post that "The so-called ‘free

will; is also fate." At the same time, using a parallel logic, we will be

able to see that ‘fate' is not independent of ‘free will.' As Jivas, we have

limitations to resolve this puzzle on the origin of ‘fate' and ‘free-will.'

Because of this difficulty, we continue our inconclusive debates on the

interaction between ‘fate' and ‘free will.' Problems such as the ‘chicken and

egg' (also seed and tree) are unresolvable by human intellect. The fundamental

knowledge of ‘fate' or ‘free will' is ‘Anaadi - without a beginning.' The

existence of either or chicken or egg become necessary for the development of

logical concepts and theories that relate chicken and egg. Similarly, the

existence of either ‘fate' or ‘free will' become essential to describe human

action and liberation. In conclusion, at the vyaavahaara level, we have to

accept that at least one of ‘fate' or ‘free will' existed. Acceptance of the

existence of either of ‘fate' and ‘free will' will be sufficient to develop

the relationship and the 'theory of karma; within a consistent logical

framework that everyone can understand.

 

Warmest regards,

 

Ram Chandran

[Guest guest]

advaitin , "Dennis Waite" <dwaite@d...> wrote:

> Dear Raghava and Sunder,

>

>

> Sunder also says "To the extent that Doership and Ego are 'Real',

Free Will

> exists."

>

> I would want to modify this to say "To the extent that they

are 'real', we

> *believe* that free will exists". Actually, I don't see why we

cannot accept

> that free will does not exist even within vyaavahaara. There is no

doubt

> that the illusion exists but can anyone demonstrate logically that

it is

> actually (i.e. within the laws of vyaavahaara) taking place?

 

Namaste,

 

That is why Gita states [17:3]:

 

.....shraddhaamayaH ayaM purushhaH yaH yat shraddhaH saH eva saH ..

 

A person is made up of faith; as one's faith, thus is the person.

 

The experience of vyavahaara AS illusion takes effort

[saadhanaa], unlike the analogies usually mentioned. In both cases,

though, WHY it occurs transcends logic, so the question of

demonstrating such a phenomenon logically is a lost cause!

 

Regards,

 

sunder

[Guest guest]

Dear Ram,

 

I would be very reluctant to accept the idea of anaadi with respect to this

problem. It seems to me that this is the ultimate 'get-out clause' when it

comes to philosophical discussions in advaita. (I am not altogether happy

with Shankara's use of this regarding anaadi adhyaasa.)

 

If we accept that fate and free-will are the same thing, there is no

question of a 'chicken and egg' situation and no need to resort to infinite

regress. As I said, I see no reason to suppose that there are two different

things here. If we act and this coincides with a feeling of having 'made a

decision', we call it free will. If there is no concurrent feeling, we call

it fate. But the 'feeling of having made a decision' is just as much a

result of earlier thoughts as was the act itself. (In fact, if we beileve

Libet's experiments, the feeling occurs after the act has been initiated

anyway.)

 

Best wishes,

 

Dennis

[Guest guest]

Dear Dennis:

 

When we don't want to admit our limitations, our problem will remain

for ever! Even if we admit that 'fate and free-will' are the same, the

problem will not disappear - instead of two small problems, we end up

with one BIG problem. There is no way to resolve the 'puzzle' of

'fate' and/or 'free-will' at the vyavahara (relative) level and this

is the contention of Sankara. All problems will disappear at the

Paramarthika (absolute) level and the questions will submerge with the

Brahman! We will have no more analysis of 'cause' and 'effect' because

there will be neither cause nor effect!

 

This is a good time to repeat the famous quoatation of St. Augustine:

'Faith is to believe what we don't see, and the reward is to see what

we believe!' I believe that there will be no logical solution fully

satisfactory to the puzzle that we try to resolve.

 

warmest regards,

 

Ram Chandran

 

advaitin , "Dennis Waite" <dwaite@d...> wrote:

> Dear Ram,

>

> I would be very reluctant to accept the idea of anaadi with respect

to this

> problem. It seems to me that this is the ultimate 'get-out clause'

when it

> comes to philosophical discussions in advaita. (I am not altogether

happy

> with Shankara's use of this regarding anaadi adhyaasa.)

>

> If we accept that fate and free-will are the same thing, there is no

> question of a 'chicken and egg' situation and no need to resort to

infinite

> regress. As I said, I see no reason to suppose that there are two

different

> things here. If we act and this coincides with a feeling of having

'made a

> decision', we call it free will. If there is no concurrent feeling,

we call

> it fate. But the 'feeling of having made a decision' is just as much

a

> result of earlier thoughts as was the act itself. (In fact, if we

beileve

> Libet's experiments, the feeling occurs after the act has been

initiated

> anyway.)

>

> Best wishes,

>

> Dennis

[Guest guest]

advaitin , "Dennis Waite" <dwaite@d...> wrote:

> If we accept that fate and free-will are the same thing, there is no

> question of a 'chicken and egg' situation and no need to resort to

infinite

> regress. As I said, I see no reason to suppose that there are two

different

> things here. If we act and this coincides with a feeling of having

'made a

> decision', we call it free will. If there is no concurrent feeling,

we call

> it fate. But the 'feeling of having made a decision' is just as much

a

> result of earlier thoughts as was the act itself. (In fact, if we

beileve

> Libet's experiments, the feeling occurs after the act has been

initiated

> anyway.)

 

Dear Dennis,

 

I think that Nietzsche's 'formula for greatness in a human being'

might interest you. He calls it _amor fati_, love of fate, and from

memory it goes as follows (see _Ecce Homo_ for the exact quote):

 

That one wants nothing to be different,

not forwards, not backwards,

not in all eternity. Nor merely to accept what

is, still less idealize it --- all idealism is mendaciousness

in the face of what is necessary --- but to _love_ it.

 

It can be argued that the question of how to achieve this is

Nietzsche's principal philosophical concern. For instance he saw his

revival of the Stoics' idea of eternal recurrence as serving precisely

this purpose: he maintained that nothing less than _amor fati_ could

withstand the idea that everything that happens has already happened

in the past and will happen again in the future, infinitely often in

both directions.

 

However I think it's clear that in the last analysis Nietzsche didn't

really have much of a clue about how to achieve this goal. My guess is

that he got the idea from Spinoza who actually *does* seem to have

gotten to the bottom of this conundrum.

 

Regards,

 

Patrick

[Guest guest]

Dear Ram,

 

I really do apologise for pursuing this - I'm afraid other members may be

starting to feel I am becoming tedious! But you are still referring to there

being a 'puzzle' to solve. I'm afraid I do not see what the problem is that

needs resolution. I agree that all (perceived) problems will disappear at

the paramaarthika level and into this I would put such problems as the

begininglessness of maayaa etc. But no one has yet explained to me what the

problem is here. I was hoping by my initial post to persuade someone to try

to convince me that there was such a thing as free will. Why do you think

there is 'one BIG problem'? What is it?

 

Best wishes,

 

Dennis

>When we don't want to admit our limitations, our problem will remain

>for ever! Even if we admit that 'fate and free-will' are the same, the

>problem will not disappear - instead of two small problems, we end up

>with one BIG problem. There is no way to resolve the 'puzzle' of

>'fate' and/or 'free-will' at the vyavahara (relative) level and this

>is the contention of Sankara. All problems will disappear at the

>Paramarthika (absolute) level and the questions will submerge with the

>Brahman! We will have no more analysis of 'cause' and 'effect' because

>there will be neither cause nor effect!

[Guest guest]

Dear Dennis:

 

I agree that all problems are only in appearance and they will

disappear at the paramarthika level. At the vyavahara level, we are

faced with notions which include, 'fate,' 'free-will,' 'action,'

'reaction,' 'desire,' etc., etc. All these notions are our own

creations (in appearance) to resolve our questions (thoughts). A

number of notions and associated frameworks (notions with a logical

structure)have been created to explain relationships that bring

consistency to human life experiences (cause and effect). All such

notions (definitions) are not permanant and are subject to change by

time, person and environment.

 

Notions are useful ladders to resolve our questions and problems from

time to time. As we spritually grow, we do discard notions which

become unacceptable to our beliefs and paths. We do not want to hang

on to those notions for ever because at some stage they are likely to

become barriers instead of stepping stones. According to Vedanta at

the Paramarthika level we are free from all notions because the

questions, answers, the questioners and answerers get united

into the Brahman.

 

No logical resolution of a problem is feasible until we can determine

the origin and/or the end. All we can do is to 'speculate' and that is

exactly what we are doing! Since both of us only speculate, the

question: who is right and who is right can never be resolved!

 

warmest regards,

 

Ram Chandran

[Guest guest]

Dear Ramachandran,

 

I like your ladder analogy.Ladder is a means to the top.One does not leave the

ladder until one reaches the top.One should not cling on to the ladder once one

reaches the destination (top.)

 

Lord Sri Krishna says;

 

One who is endowed with scriptural erudition culminating in realization of

ME,understanding that all this is nothing but maya,should renounce even jnanam

unto Me.

 

Regards

 

Ananda Sagar

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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