advaita-siddhi 18 - Objections by opponent

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In this part, we will study the objections raised by the

opponent against the definition of mithyAtva as beingsublated by

GYAna.

 

advaita-siddhi text

--------------------

GYAnanivartyatvaM vA mithyAtvam.h |

nanu - uttaraGYAnanivartye pUrvaGYAne ativyAptiH,

mudgarapAtAdinivartye cha ghaTAdAv-avyAptiH,

GYAnatvena GYAnanivartyatva-vivaxAyAmapyayaM doShaH, adhiShThAna-

sAXAtkAratvena nivartye shuktirajatAdau cha GYAnatvena

GYAnanivartyatva-abhAvAt.h sAdhyavikalatA, GYAnatvavyApya-

dharmeNa GYAnanivartyatva-vivaxAyAM GYAnatvavyApyena smR^iti-

tvena GYAnanivartye saMskAre ativyAptiH -

 

Translation

-----------

 

Definition: Alternatively, unreality is the property of being

sublated by knowledge or cognition.

Objection by oppponent: This definition of mithyAtva, ie.

GYAnanivartyatvaM vA mithyAtvam, is too wide (ativyApti) in the

case of a cognition's being sublated by a subsequent cognition.

And in the case of a pot's being destroyed by stroke of a hammer,

the definition would be too narrow (avyApti). If the intention is

that unreality consists in being sublated by cognition as cognition,

(GYAnatvena GYAnanivartyatva)

even then there is the same defect, ie. of being too narrow.

Further, in the case of the illusion of silver in nacre, the

sublation of the illusory silver is due to the direct realization

of the substratum, ie. the nacre, (adhiShThAna-sAxAtkAra), and

there is no sublation due to cognition as cognition, which leads

to the defect of sAdhyavikalatA, ie. the definition is defective.

If the definition means that unreality is what is sublated by a

property concomitant with the property of being a cognition

(GYAnatva-vyApya-dharma), in the case of a memory (smR^iti) that

sublates a mental impression (saMskAra), the definition is too

wide.

 

As BrahmAnanda's GauDabrahmAnandI clarifies, this third definition

is based on the shruti itself.

 

'vidvAnnAmarUpAdvimukta' ityAdishrutyarthe vivadamAnaM prati

sAdhyAntaramAha - GYAnanivartyatvaM veti |

 

A different sAdhya (thing to be proved, ie definition) is (now)

stated, as per the interpretation of the shruti "The knower of

Brahman is free from names and forms."

 

Let us now examine the objection of the opponent point bypoint.

 

1) Definition is too wide

-------------------------

First of all, he says that the definition has the defect of

being too wide (ativyApti). How? In the case of a cognition

being replaced by a subsequent cognition, the first cognition

though "out of focus" right now is certainly not false. Suppose,

I see the sun rising in the East and next I see a cow. At that

moment when I am cognizing the cow, the cognition of the sun is

in the background or out of focus, so to speak, being displaced

by the cognition of the cow. Does it mean my cognition of the sun

is false. No. The definition is too wide because it seems to apply

to this case where a cognition is displaced or sublated in some

sense by a subsequent cognition.

 

2) Definition is too narrow

-----------------------------

Next, the opponent says that in the case of a pot being destroyed

by stroke of a hammer, thereby driving the pot into nonexistence,

the definition is too narrow. The advaitin claims that things such

as a pot are sublated by GYAna alone. Clearly, the opponent says,

the pot is not existent any more after being destroyed. So it should

be sublated. But what destroys or sublates the pot is not GYAna, but

something as simple as the stroke of a hammer! Actually, I

suspect that the dvaitin seems to be making fun of the advaitin

here - "You cannot make things such as a pot vanish by means

of what you call GYAna. If you want to make the pot vanish,

why don't you smash it with a hammer!"

 

Suppose a definition of a characteristic, say M, can be

expressed logically as M(X) <-> GN(X), which means X has

characteristic M if and only if X has characteristic GN.

Now, if we can find some Y such that Y has GN but not M,

then the definition is too wide and suffers from the defect

termed in nyAya as "ativyApti". In the case of a cognition C

which is sublated by another subsequent cognition, C', C has

the characteristic GN, GYAnanivartyatva, but not M, mithyAtva.

The definition here is too wide.

 

On the other hand, if we can find a Y such that Y has characteristic

M but not GN, then the definition is too narrow, a defect called

"avyApti". In the case of a pot, P, it is destroyed by a

stroke of a hammer and thereby has characteristic M, mithyAtva,

but not characteristic GN. It is not destroyed by any GYAna.

So the definition is too narrow in this case.

 

3) What if GYAnanivartyatva means GYAnatvena GYananivartyatva

-----------------------------

The opponent now seems to anticipate a move by the advaitin

to silence the charge of ativyApti. Suppose the advaitin

says "By GYAnanivartyatva, we really mean that the cognition

(GYAna) that sublates what is mithyA has to be considered

as a cognition acting as a cognition, not anything else."

 

BrahmAnanda clarifies this "anticipated position" of

the advaitin in the language of navya-nyAya:

 

GYAnatvena GYananivartyatveti | GYAnatva-avachchhinna-

kAraNatApratiyogika-kAryatAvan-nAsha-pratiyogitvetyarthaH |

 

By "GYAnatvena GYAnanivartyatva" is meant the characteristic

of being the counterpositive (pratiyogin) of the destruction

which has an effect-ness, where the effect-ness is related

to a cause-ness delimited (determined) by cognition-ness.

 

The gist is that what determines the cause of destruction

of something unreal is the GYAna acting as a GYAna, ie. the

characteristic GYAnatva.

 

Now, suppose the anticipated position holds that cognition

of the nature of a vR^itti (a mental modification) is a quality

(dharma) of the mind (manas). The VedAnta-paribhAShA

says: "vR^itti-rUpa-GYAnasya manordharmatve cha" and cites

shruti as support for this position. Even in the nyAya system,

cognition is said to be a property (guNa) of the self.

(GYAnAdhikaraNam-AtmA - tarkasaMgraha of annaMbhaTTa). If cognition

is a quality of the mind (or self), any cognition that displaces a

previous cognition does so not in its capacity as a cognition but

in its capacity as a quality of the mind. So what happens

in this case is that one quality of the mind sublates another

quality of the self. Therefore, the definition of mithyAtva

is free from the defect of being too wide, simply because

the example of one cognition's being sublated by a subsequent

one is no longer relevant.

 

4) The charge of avyApti still holds

----

The opponent now says that although the advaitin has freed his

definition from this defect of being too wide, the other defect

of being too narrow still applies. The GYAnatvena GYAnanivartya-

tva clarification still does nothing to remove the defect in

the case of the stroke of the hammer which destroys the pot.

 

5) The definition is flawed

---------------------------

Further, there is another problem with the "GYAnatvena

GYAnanivartyatva" definition. In the case of the illusion

of silver in nacre (shukti-rajata), the cause of the destruction

of the illusion is not just any cognition of nacre, rather it

is the cognition of that nacre which is the substratum of the

illusory silver. While a person mistakes a rope for a snake

in the dark, it is not sufficient to end his illusion by

holding some other rope in front of him! What does end the

illusion is his perceiving the rope which he mistook for

a snake. In such cases of illusion, the destruction of the

illusion is not by a cognition acting in its capacity as a

cognition. However, the illusory thing is admitted to be

mithyA. So even though mithyAtva is present, GYAnanivartyatva

is absent in the illusory thing. This gives rise to the defect

of sAdhya-vikalatA, ie. the definition is defective because

we see that mithyAtva is really not defined as GYAnanivartyatva

but as "adhiShThAna-sAxAtkAratva", which makes the advaitin's

attempt to prove the GYAnanivartyatva version futile!

 

6) What if a sub-class of GYAna is intended

-----------

The opponent now anticipates another move by the advaitin.

What if GYAnanivartyatva is taken to mean "GYAnatvavyApya-

dharmeNa GYAnanivartyatva", ie. what is illusory is sublated

by a sub-class of GYAna, not just GYAna in general. To understand

this definition, remember that GYanatva is a property. A property,

say P, that is concomitant with GYAnatva, say G, is a property

such that whenever P is present, G is also present. In other words,

P implies G. The property P is said to be GYAnatva-vyApya or

"pervaded by GYAnatva." So the anticipated position is that

what is illusory (mithyA) is sublated by a cognition of thetype P.

 

7) Still the definition is too wide

-------

 

There is still a problem with the definition, says the opponent.

Consider smR^iti or memory which is a sub-class of GYAna, ie.

a specific kind of GYAna. The tarkasaMgraha of annaMbhaTTa

defines smR^iti as "saMskAramAtrajanyaM GYAnaM smR^itiH", memory

or recollection is cognition caused by reminiscent impression

alone. So it is clear that recollections are a sub-class or

a specific kind of cognition. The opponent, however, contends

that whenever a recollection occurs, the corresponding

reminiscent impression (saMskAra) that caused it gets

destroyed. In this case, the saMskAra, though destroyed by the

smR^iti is not considered false. So, once again, we have a

case where the definition of mithyAtva is too wide.

 

This last objection by the opponent is quite shaky at the

outset. First of all, even the naiyAyikas are divided regarding

whether the saMskAra gets destroyed by the smR^iti that it gives

rise to. The older nyAya-vaisheShika school holds that the

saMskAra gets destroyed by the smR^iti but logicians of the

newer navya-nyAya school tend to side with the advaitins in

rejecting this theory. The VedAnta-paribhAShA says: na hi smR^iteH

saMskAranAshakatva niyamaH, smR^itidhArA-darshanAt.h -

there is no rule that recollection destroys saMskAra because

a flow of recollection is observed. Therefore, the very premise

of the objection is questionable.

 

But still, the opponent might persist in challenging the advaita

position that smR^iti does not destroy saMskAra. As we shall

see, MadhusUdana's reply makes the last objection irrelevant

even if this advaita position regarding smR^iti is notadmitted.

 

MadhusUdana begins his reply thus (as usual):

 

iti chenna |

 

If this is what you contend, we say no (your objections are not

justified).

 

Anand