Our Fundamental Error - Part 7 of 11

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Answers to these Objections and Showing the possibility for adhyaasa: -

 

1. "The object must be directly perceivable." This is not strictly true. It

is certainly the case that the object must be known. It is not possible to

make a mistake about something about which we know nothing at all but it is

not necessary that the object be immediately in front of us. This first

condition should be restated as 'the object must be a known, existent

entity'. Now, there is no problem since the aatman is known even though it

cannot be seen (we know that we exist).

2. "The object should be incompletely known." This is equivalent to saying

that we should have partial, but not complete ignorance about the object.

This is precisely the case with the aatman. We know that we exist (sat) and

are conscious (chit) but we do not know that we are bliss (aananda). We have

partial knowledge. Thus there is no valid objection.

3. "There must be a similarity between the object and its superimposition."

The counter-argument here is that this is a general rule and that exceptions

are possible. E.g. it is a general rule that the intelligent cause or

creator is different from the material cause just as a potter is different

from the clay from which he makes his pots. However there are exceptions

such as the spider and its web. Here the material for the web comes from the

spider's own body. Similarly a dreamer creates her dream from the thoughts

and memories in her own mind. Shankara argues that this is such an exception

to the general rule and that it is not necessary for similarity to exist.

 

This argument on its own may seem a bit feeble. Shankara says that we know

of cases where adhyaasa takes place when there is no similarity and gives an

example to support his claim. We know that the sky is really colourless but

that nevertheless we see it as blue. We might also claim that it is

polluted. But these are superimpositions by us of 'blue' or 'polluted' upon

a sky which is without colour or form. This error takes place without there

being any similarity between 'sky' and 'blue' or between 'sky' and

'pollution'. (As written, this argument carries little conviction . It is

slightly better if 'air' or 'space' is understood rather than 'sky' - the

Sanskrit word 'aakaasha' can mean either sky or space.)

"We must have had prior experience of that which is superimposed." Shankara

agrees that, in the rope-snake analogy, we must have had prior experience of

a snake but says that it does not have to be a real snake; experience of a

false snake would have left a suitable impression, too (e.g. we might have

seen the snake in a movie). Another analogy encountered in the scriptures is

seeing a ghost instead of a post and we all accept that we do not have to

have seen a real ghost for this since we mostly do not believe such a thing

exists. It is sufficient to have read about them. Similarly, in the case of

aatmaa-anaatmaa, we project an unreal anaatmaa. And where did we encounter

the unreal anaatmaa before? In a previous adhyaasa, says Shankara! This

leads to an infinite regress, of course, and Shankara claims that 'we never

talk about the beginning of adhyaasa' - it is beginningless! Therefore (he

says), there is no real anaatmaa and it is not necessary for there to be a

real one for adhyaasa to occur. ….end Part 7

 

Dennis