The existence of objects

June 17, 2001

Dear Greg

Thanks for you answer.

You said:

"if it were truly said that "X doesn't exist," this would have to be about

an X. That's the rub! The ironic conclusion arises that X has to exist for

it not to exist!"

I don't see why. Let's take for example the statement "Martians do not

exist". Do you mean to say that it is necessary that Martians do exist in

order to be able to deny their existence? Clearly this is not the case.

Otherwise we would never be in a position to deny anything, because,

according to your argument, the very denying implies their existence.

But later you said: "there can be no separate teacups to serve as the object

of thought... "

Here you are denying the existence of separate objects. Doesn't the very

denying implies their existence?

"If one demanded an origin or origin-explanation, it would be all objects

arising from consciousness. If one required a somewhat staged explanation,

then it could be said that external objects arise from thoughts and

perceptions, which arise from consciousness. But this easily collapses into

the previous explanation."

I concur with you on this. It is commonly believed that our inner

representations (ie our thoughts about objects) are a sort of mental copies

of external entities. But, there being no separate objects, all

representations are not copies but original creations, that is, images

without an external model.

The question is: why is it that the images that arise "here" forming this

cluster that bears the name "Miguel" are so similar to the images arising

"there" forming the cluster "Greg". If they are original creations, why do

they look as if they were copies of the same common models? What's under

such a coincidence?

To this you answer:

"Even the notion of other people or other points of view seeming to see the

same

things -- even these are appearance. The notion of "thought in the mind" is

not even a thought in the mind. It is an appearances in the consciousness

of no one. No one owns the place from which all things arise. Therefore,

there is no plurality of observers to see things."

This is an interesting answer. And one that is not commonly held, even by

many so-called advaitins, who believe in the existence of many jivas, each

with its own karma, its own antakharana, its own ahankara, its own moksha,

etc. But I agree with you rather than with them: there is no plurality of

observers. There is only one seer, the one Atman, the same in all jivas. So

what is really a jiva? Not an observer, not a doer, not an experiencer ...

not a subject. This is the crucial point: I (as an individual) am not a

subject; and you (and all the other individual jivas) are not subjects. So

what are "we" (as individuals)?

Or in other words: why is it that the one subject-observer, the Atman,

appears to become many subjects? In each of "us" (individual jivas) there is

the sense "I am", and that is the one irrevocable fact for each of us: no

one can deny its own existence. And yet we, as individuals, are not

subjects. What then?

(Caveat: in the next paragraphs I will use the word "object" meaning not

"external, separate entity" but "appearance within consciousness".)

Following Ramesh Balsekar, I would say that each of us individuals (with

different histories and locations) are objects, but a special kind of them.

Not inert objects but living objects, that is, instruments or frames through

which the Seer sees and lives the whole of phenomenality. So in each of us

individual jivas there takes place an observation. The observer is the same,

but the observation varies according to the nature and conditioning of each

jiva. That would account for the relatively slight differences in the

observations, due to the variety of jivas. But my question is: does it

account for the similarities? In each of us there appears a dream, the

dreamer is one and the dreams are surprisingly similar. If the things

appearing in each dream are not copies of outside separate entities, why do

they appear in all dreams?

Or, using another simile taken from Nisargadatta, our lives are like a

movie. Each of us is like a movie theater in which a film is being

projected. Whatever appears in the movie is imaginary (that is, it has no

real independent existence). Only the light and the screen are real (they

exist even when no movie is projected). Both the light and the screen are

the same Atman. And yet in each of us (in each theater) the movie is

practically the same, with slight "personal" differences. Why the same movie

again and again?

Miguel-Angel

June 17, 2001

Hi Miguel,

Enjoying our discussion here!

A lot depends on how you interpret "existence." If that word is used as a

predicate, such as "walks" or "is red," then there has to be a subject for

the predicate to apply to. So when you say of anything, even Martians,

that it doesn't exist, you might ask, just what are you saying this

*about*? To what are you attributing non-existence? An existent Martian or

a non-existent Martian? And if it's a non-existent Martian, what is it

that lacks that existence? From all this, I'm not concluding that Martians

actually do exist, rather that existence claims make no sense other than an

in a very circumscribed, conventional way, like, that dandruff on my

shoulder or the coffee in the cup. But it doesn't make sense in any way

that stands up to analysis.

In advaita discussions, I'm using the word "existence" to mean something

like, "stands on its own, under its own power, independent of awareness."

According to this rendering, it doesn't make sense of anything to say that

it exists or doesn't exist. How are you using the term? Re-phrase my

earlier teacup statement to say that it makes no sense to speak of teacups

which will serve as the object of thoughts...

If you agree that it makes no sense to speak of a multiplicity of jivas as

true separate subjects , then where is the interest or charge associated

with the question you ask later? That question melts away with the first

one. Because the question you ask below is really about *seeming* subjects

rather than *actual* subjects.

This is where you mention Ramesh's notion, which I have heard him deliver

at length in seminars. In the model, Consciousness (the Seer) is the only

and unbroken enlivener, and the individual mind/body mechanisms (the jivas)

serve as the frames. Years ago, I heard Ramesh give the example of a set

of kitchen appliances like a toaster, a microwave, a blender and a

dishwasher. Each one has its individual characteristics, and the same

electricity enlivens each one in a different fashion.

This is a provisional concept designed to answer just a few questions --

about free will, and about the the seeming multiplicity of viewpoints. It

may satisfy these questions, but at the expense of other things, which it

just pushes back a few levels. If these were a person's only questions

while getting into Advaita, then this answer might serve even though it

depends on materialistic assumptions. But if someone inquires just a bit

further, then they will quickly discover two huge dualisms in this

kitchen-appliance answer: (1) The dualism between consciousness and the

mechanism that consciousness functions through (i.e., consciousness and the

body/mind complex), and (2) The dualism implied by the multiplicity of

mechanisms (i.e., the various body/minds). This is also a concept that the

Western mystical organization called the Rosicrucians gave back in the late

1930's....

If everything is an appearance in consciousness, and if consciousness is

not personal or owned by the "jiva," then what does it serve to have a

story-answer for the question why different persons experience the same

thing? Before one asks "Why is it that X is the case?" isn't it

appropriate to first ask, "Is it even true that X is the case?" Actually,

if one must ask the question about the multiplicity of viewpoints while

resonating with the kitchen-appliance model, then it can be made to answer

this question too. Because one of the ways Ramesh uses the model is to

answer when people ask "Why does one person do this and another person do

that?" The answer if one doesn't look too closely, is that "That's the way

these appliances are wired!"

Hari OM!

--Greg