Guest guest Posted July 27, 2001 Report Share Posted July 27, 2001 > >I am a little confused about the above. Is the claim that mAyA is >postulated because of Sruti-based anupalabdhi pramANa, or is it >that the appearance of jagat is based on the anupalabdhi? > >Note that mAyA as triguNAtmikA prakRti is mentioned throughout gItA. >It is not something new invented by Sankaracarya or borrowed from >some Buddhist school. If any other school is to be identified in this >context, we have to look for prakRti according to sAMkhya and/or yoga. > >Vidyasankar Vidya - Implication, as I understand, is the use of maaya as sadasat vilakshaNa is shruti based anupaladbi rather than directly shruti statements to that effect. In B.G geeta - my recollection is maaya is used in reference to parameswara shakti but not in the sense of sat asat vilakshaNa. daiviim esha guNamayi mama maayaa durathyayaa. I am not sure if there is any specific references to maaya in the sense it is defined in advaitic traditions in Giita either. Equation of maaya to prakR^iti we have to go back again to the referenced swataaswatara Upanishad statement. Am I wrong? Hari Om! Sadananda -- K. Sadananda Code 6323 Naval Research Laboratory Washington D.C. 20375 Voice (202)767-2117 Fax:(202)767-2623 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 27, 2001 Report Share Posted July 27, 2001 Namaste~ Can any of the scholars explain the exact or precise meaning or derivation of the word- Maya? Lord Sri Krishna says: --- Maya is "Manomayam"-mental creation. --Gunaas which are "chittaja"(born in chitta)are only Maya --"Gunasya mayamatreshu". --"Jagat,mano,vaak,praana samhitam sarvam maaya". --That which points out to Me is Maya -(Gunebhyascha Param). --In Spanish Maya means net.(Indra jaal)-The net of Indriyaas in which we are caught. --As Maya also is Lord's creation and play--"Mama Maya"--Bhagawan Ramanuja calls it Lord's Leela! Respectfully submitted Ananda Sagar --- "K. Sadananda" <sada wrote: > > > >I am a little confused about the above. Is the > claim that mAyA is > >postulated because of Sruti-based anupalabdhi > pramANa, or is it > >that the appearance of jagat is based on the > anupalabdhi? > > > >Note that mAyA as triguNAtmikA prakRti is mentioned > throughout gItA. > >It is not something new invented by Sankaracarya or > borrowed from > >some Buddhist school. If any other school is to be > identified in this > >context, we have to look for prakRti according to > sAMkhya and/or yoga. > > > >Vidyasankar > > Vidya - > > Implication, as I understand, is the use of maaya > as sadasat > vilakshaNa is shruti based anupaladbi rather than > directly shruti > statements to that effect. > > In B.G geeta - my recollection is maaya is used in > reference to > parameswara shakti but not in the sense of sat asat > vilakshaNa. > daiviim esha guNamayi mama maayaa durathyayaa. I am > not sure if > there is any specific references to maaya in the > sense it is defined > in advaitic traditions in Giita either. Equation > of maaya to > prakR^iti we have to go back again to the referenced > swataaswatara > Upanishad statement. > > Am I wrong? > > Hari Om! > Sadananda > > > > > -- > K. Sadananda > Code 6323 > Naval Research Laboratory > Washington D.C. 20375 > Voice (202)767-2117 > Fax:(202)767-2623 > > Make international calls for as low as $.04/minute with Messenger http://phonecard./ Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 27, 2001 Report Share Posted July 27, 2001 Namaste, Here is one analysis by Prof. Ranade [A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy, 1968, 2nd ed,; Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan; p. 162 ff.] which I found interesting: ".....One of the chief ways in which an attempt is generally made to trace the source of the doctrine of Maya in the Upanishads is to find in a Concordance references to a word like Maya, and to argue therefrom as to the presence or otherwise of that doctrine in the Upanishads. Such a procedure is an entirely ridiculous one, in as much as it finds the existence of a doctrine like that of Maya in words rather than in ideas. To find out whether the doctrine of Maya is present in the Upanishads or not, we must examine the ideology of the Upanishads, and see whether this affords us sufficient justification for saying that the doctrine is to be met there........ ........When we consider that we have the conceptions of a veil, of blindfoldness, of a knot, of ignorance, of not-being, of darkness, of death, of unreality and uncertainty, of untruth, of crookedness and falsehood and illusion, of the power of God, of this power as identical with nature, of meshes, of semblance, an as-it-were and an appearance, and finally of a word, a mode nad a name, let noman stand up and say that we do not find the traces of the doctrine of Maya in the Upanishads!" This chapter and the next one are fairly long, but worth a study. Another great philosopher, S.Radhakrishnan, in the introduction to "The Principal Upanishads", has devoted 12 pages to the concept of Maya. Both Ranade and Radhakrishnan agree that Gita is not a systematic philosophical treatise and one cannot expect an elaboration of the concept of Maya in its many nuances and meanings. Both also agree that Shankara's [and Gaudapada's] inspiration for the concept is present in the Upanishads. Regards, s. advaitin, "K. Sadananda" <sada@a...> wrote: > > > >I am a little confused about the above. Is the claim that mAyA is > >postulated because of Sruti-based anupalabdhi pramANa, or is it > >that the appearance of jagat is based on the anupalabdhi? I am not sure if > there is any specific references to maaya in the sense it is defined > in advaitic traditions in Giita either. Equation of maaya to > prakR^iti we have to go back again to the referenced swataaswatara > Upanishad statement. > Sadananda > Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 30, 2001 Report Share Posted July 30, 2001 > > >5. Finally, all that said, there is no reason why the mAyA that is >parameSvara Sakti cannot also be described as sad-asad-vilakshaNa. >The later authors in the Advaita tradition are close enough in spirit >and in intent to Sankaracarya himself. mAyA is not the same as the >pure Brahman (sat) and it is not like the hare's horns, i.e. totally >unreal (asat or atyanta asat). That is why it is said to be a thing >that is other (vilakshaNa) than either sat or asat. > >Vidyasankar Thanks Vidya for your comments. The point that is being raised is not the validity of maaya or its definitions or its usage of it in Adviatic tradition. The question is only, is there a direct or implied reference in shastra - particularly in the ten upanishads to the concept of maaya - Is maaya brought in as logical explanation taking advaitic statements- tat tvam asi or aham brahmaasmi- to explain how one appears to be many or is there direct shaastric pramaaNa. From what I gather from all the responses so far is that Shreeman S.M.S. Chari appears to be right in his comments that direct reference to it in the Upanishhat-s in the meaning associated in advaitic doctrine is not there. I agree with your comments on anupalabdi. As Siddharthaji mentioned arthaapatti may be more appropriate. Other aachaarya-s consider all these are only shades of a anumaana pramaaNa. Referenced question pertains to direct shruti pramaaNa for maaya. Question on maaya does not necessarily validate alternate theory of Ramanuja to explain the one ness of jiiva and Brahman. That is a separate issues that one should examine. I intend to post slowly my understanding of his talks in both the lists and we should discuss at that time objectively and impartially the extent of the validity of his comments or analysis. Hari Om! Sadananda -- K. Sadananda Code 6323 Naval Research Laboratory Washington D.C. 20375 Voice (202)767-2117 Fax:(202)767-2623 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 30, 2001 Report Share Posted July 30, 2001 > Such a procedure is an entirely ridiculous one, in as much >as it finds the existence of a doctrine like that of Maya in words >rather than in ideas. To find out whether the doctrine of Maya is >present in the Upanishads or not, we must examine the ideology of the >Upanishads, and see whether this affords us sufficient justification >for saying that the doctrine is to be met there........ Sunder, while I agree with the spirit of Shreeman Ranade's comments, I beg to disagree that looking of reference to maaya in upanishads is a ridiculous one. If it is there, I am sure the question of looking for the reference would not have arisen and every body would have quoted profusely. We have basically three pamaaNas to gain knowledge - pratyaksha, anumaana and shaastra. Since first two are not valid for aadhyaatma vidya, we are left with shaastra. As a astika philosophy, shruti pramaaNa is the essential basis for establishing the ontological status of the concepts. >.......When we consider that we have the conceptions of a veil, of >blindfoldness, of a knot, of ignorance, of not-being, of darkness, of >death, of unreality and uncertainty, of untruth, of crookedness and >falsehood and illusion, of the power of God, of this power as >identical with nature, of meshes, of semblance, an as-it-were and an >appearance, and finally of a word, a mode nad a name, let noman stand >up and say that we do not find the traces of the doctrine of Maya in >the Upanishads!" > Both also agree that >Shankara's [and Gaudapada's] inspiration for the concept is present in >the Upanishads. > Yes - it provides a logical explanation. When alternate explanations also provided for the same, we are faced with the question of basis on which one can accept one concept over the other. Looking for the validity of the concept is necessary before we accept or reject. I do not think that process should be considered as in vain. Hari OM! Sadananda >Regards, > >s. > > >advaitin, "K. Sadananda" <sada@a...> wrote: >> > >> >I am a little confused about the above. Is the claim that mAyA is >> >postulated because of Sruti-based anupalabdhi pramANa, or is it >> >that the appearance of jagat is based on the anupalabdhi? >I am not sure if >> there is any specific references to maaya in the sense it is >defined >> in advaitic traditions in Giita either. Equation of maaya to >> prakR^iti we have to go back again to the referenced swataaswatara >> Upanishad statement. > >> Sadananda >> > > Sponsor ><http://rd./M=210156.1528653.3092245.1456761/D=egroupweb/S=1705075991:\ HM/A=734164/R=0/*https://www.joinonespirit.com/mybookclub/healthyliving/bookclub\ s/osp/JoinFast/c2/c2_coupon.htm/?src=015_02_hh_273_181_1433> > >Discussion of Shankara's Advaita Vedanta Philosophy of >nonseparablity of Atman and Brahman. >Advaitin List Archives available at: ><http://www.eScribe.com/culture/advaitin/>http://www.eScribe.com/culture/advait\ in/ >To Post a message send an email to : advaitin >Messages Archived at: ><advaitin/messages>\ advaitin/messages > > > >Your use of is subject to the ><> -- K. Sadananda Code 6323 Naval Research Laboratory Washington D.C. 20375 Voice (202)767-2117 Fax:(202)767-2623 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 30, 2001 Report Share Posted July 30, 2001 > >So, we should conclude that when telling us how one appears to be many, >and how to go back to the one, the chAndogya Sruti is implying mAyA, in >the mature Advaita conception of the term. If Sruti directly referred to >it here, there would be no room for any other interpretation! There may >be a reason why this is so. The tradition of brahmavidyA leaves room for >many approaches, each suited to different kinds of adhikArin-s. > >Best, >Vidyasankar Vidya - you are right. Interpretation is logical and no question about it. If other daarshanika-s explained the same using a different model logically from their point then that interpretation also carries the same validity - logical interpretation rests on anumaana pramaana in one form or the other. Then one has to look at total perspective to see which interpretations sound more logical, at the same time agree with shaastric statements. It is not just the kinds of adhikaarin-s that we are concerned about. That is only one factor. We have to be clear about the nature of the goal and sadhana obviously depends on the goal. I have no question in my mind that advaita stands absolutely correct in the sense that existence of one's own self is absolutely non-negatable and beyond any pramaana - apremeyam. I recognize, of course, that current understanding from modern science in terms of relativity of the universe lend its support to vyavahaara satyam. Identity of aatma to brahman that advaita Vedata emphasizes is obviously based on shruti pramaana. maaya has been brought in to account for the equation and the non-reality of the plurality. I do have some concerns about bhaava ruupa aj~naana to account for projection. This came up when Shree Anand Hudli presented Shree Ananda Giri's vyaakhyaana on Shankara bhaashya. I hope to bring these issues when I start writing Ramanuja's laghu and maahaa puurvapaksha and siddhaanta-s. I am examining other sidhaantins to see what their real objections to the adviata are and how far they are valid and on what basis - on the basis of logic or on the basis of shaastra or on both. For that I need to have clear understanding first from their perspective so that I can understand their puurvapaksha objections correctly, before one dismisses their arguments. Another point of interest - Is it true that shataduushanii of Vedanta Deshika has not been responded on item by item basis. Apparently Shree Ananta Shaastri? wrote very recently 'shata bhuushanii' but apparently it does not specifically address the dialectic arguments presented in the Shataduushanii. Madhusuudhana's Advaita Siddhi addresses mostly the dialectic arguments of Vyaasa Tiirtha's of Dviata-school - NyaayaamR^ita. This is what I gather. Hari OM! Sadananda -- K. Sadananda Code 6323 Naval Research Laboratory Washington D.C. 20375 Voice (202)767-2117 Fax:(202)767-2623 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 31, 2001 Report Share Posted July 31, 2001 > >Exactly. Does the validity of Advaita really have to depend on how many >times words like maya or nirguna occurs in the shruti? Maya and nirguna >refer to that which is beyond thought - Nanda - There is some internal contradiction in your statement - I realize of course that it cannot be avoided. References to nirguna and maya are themselves are thoughts and you say they indicate that which is beyond thoughts. Maaya is a concept brought in to account for one appearing as many. It is neither pratyaksha or loukika anumaana based. Only pramaaNa left is shaastra - and question is where exactly it occurs in the meaning given by Shankara. It is inevitable or logical etc all follow once we accept that (a) 'sat eva idam agra asiit' - of Ch. Up. referring to that existence alone was there before creation and (b) that sat refers to the undifferentiated Brahman without any internal differences and © the equation of identity of jiiva and brahman in their essence from shruti's declaration - ' aham brahma asmi' or tat tvam asi. >so it is only natural that the >shruti rather than dwelling on these which cannot be easily expressed >concentrates on that which can be taught/easily referred to. I am not convinced of your argument to say that is why shruti did not dwell on maaya in the fashion that is used in advaita philosophy. If advaita philosophy could express maaya in the fashion we can understand, shruti could have expressed it too. > >There're numerous verses in the shruti which teach "one who made himself >into many" etc But given the diversity that we experience in the world how >do we reconcile that with a single reality? Schools earlier than Advaita >tried to split it into the changing and the unchanging - which contradicts >the existance of a single reality. With mayavaada which questions the basis >on which such diversity is apprehended we're able to reject the differences. >In short if somebody says things are different, we ask,"how do you know" and >then disprove his assertion by deconstructing the fundamentals of his >proposition. It is an epistemological dialectic attack by which we disprove >difference. I agree upto this point. >But again what should be noted is that reason is only able to >prove the non-validity of difference (the whole of Citsukhiyam is towards >establishing differencelessness) but is not able to establish unity. This is >fundamentally because unity is beyond thought - it is being - it is the >thing in itself. I am not sure I agree with your above statements. Shruti did indeed provide the unifying statements - by the mahavaakya-s establishing oneness - sarvam khali idam brahma - brama vit brahma eva bhavati - etc - along with example illustrating the creation in the Ch. Up. vaachaarambanam vikaaro naama dheyam etc. The problem is not lack of these unifying statements. Shruti also provided statements differentiating too and problem arose in the samanvaya of these two types of statements - unifying statements and also differentiating statements. Shankara took the approach that the unifying statements are absolute while the others are vyavaharic and of secondary value. Madhva took an opposite view - the differences are absolute and the other can be interpreted differently. Ramanuja brings in a concept of unified and yet divergent status by bring one ness in essence but plurality all other aspect - an organic relation between jiiva and Brahman. All are trying to account the unity and diversity. Hence we cannot blame the shruti for not making unifying statement. It may be more comforting to say that these different statements are intended for different adhikaari-s as Vidya mentioned. -- K. Sadananda Code 6323 Naval Research Laboratory Washington D.C. 20375 Voice (202)767-2117 Fax:(202)767-2623 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 31, 2001 Report Share Posted July 31, 2001 > >Agreed, but with caveats. What sounds more logical to one person >does not to another, and vice versa. Different interpretations >cannot all have the same validity at the same time. That they all >depend on anumAna in some sense is accepted. But it is a different >question whether the specific anumAna(s) made by one school are >equally valid as compared to those made by another school. > >And finally, when we look for agreement with SAstric statements, >we cannot arbitrarily limit ourselves to the ten or twelve major >Upanishads. All the major commentators, including Sankaracarya, >have quoted numerous other texts in their works. So when discussing >Sankara and Ramanuja, we should look at these other texts too - >e.g. subAla upanishad, paingala upanishad, etc. There is no point >in claiming that a particular thing is not found in the major texts, >when even the bhAshyakAra of each tradition has referred to other >so-called minor texts. So we have to refer to all the texts that >are legitimately concerned in the discussion. True. Only problem is we do have concerns which are authentic and which are not. The ten is mentioned is only for the fact that all the three achaarya-s refer to them. Other wise we will end up as in Madhva tradition bringing in references that no one else have access to or accept as pramaaNa. That is absolutely unscientific approach. Frankly I do have problem even accepting 'Brahmasuutra' as pramaaNa since it is the opinion of an individual - baadaraayana - and one can accept it only as such. Equation of Baadaraayana with Vyaasa is taken for granted and I am not sure that is valid either. > >>kinds of adhikaarin-s that we are concerned about. That is only one >>factor. We have to be clear about the nature of the goal and >>sadhana obviously depends on the goal. I have no question in my mind > >It is in the disagreement about the nature of the goal that most of >the philosophical disputes arise between Advaita and other schools. >At the core, the debates about mAyA, avidyA/ajnAna etc. are all >rejections of the Advaitic conception of the highest Brahman and the >identity of Atman with Brahman. Exactly - I could not have said it better. That is precisely the reason why one has to make sure one is convinced of the path he chooses. For that only critical thinking is required and analysis we are doing in these adviatin lists helps us all, if do it objectively without emotional attitudes clouding the issues. >Re: SatadUshanI, I have heard it often repeated that no one in the >Advaita tradition has refuted the work. I wonder how much truth there >is to this. Within the 20th century itself, in addition to Nurani >Anantakrishna Sastri's SatabhUshanI, there is also the work called >advaitAmoda, by Vasudev Sastri Abhyankar. The text has been published >recently, with an English translation and commentary by Michael Comans >of Australia. It might interest readers to know that Comans is closely >associated with Swami Paramarthananda of Madras and the Arsha Vidya >Gurukulam's Swami Dayananda Saraswati. > >I have found that not many, even among Advaitins, are aware of the >advaitAmoda text. Without seeing what it has to say, I would like to >reserve judgement on whether the points raised by SatadUshanI have been >addressed adequately or not. It is good to know that. Do you have any further details on that adviatAmoda text in term of publishers and where it is available etc? Hari OM! Sadananda >Best wishes, >Vidyasankar -- K. Sadananda Code 6323 Naval Research Laboratory Washington D.C. 20375 Voice (202)767-2117 Fax:(202)767-2623 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 31, 2001 Report Share Posted July 31, 2001 advaitin, "K. Sadananda" <sada@a...> wrote: > > > Within the 20th century itself, in addition to Nurani > >Anantakrishna Sastri's SatabhUshanI, there is also the work called > >advaitAmoda, by Vasudev Sastri Abhyankar. The text has been published > >recently, with an English translation and commentary by Michael Comans > >of Australia. It might interest readers to know that Comans is closely > >associated with Swami Paramarthananda of Madras and the Arsha Vidya > >Gurukulam's Swami Dayananda Saraswati. > It is good to know that. Do you have any further details on that > adviatAmoda text in term of publishers and where it is available etc? ************* Advaitamoda by Vasudevsastri Abhyankar Title: Advaitamoda by Vasudevsastri Abhyankar : a study of Advaita and Visistadvaita / translated from Sanskrit with a commentary in English by Michael Comans ; with a foreword by J.W. de Jong. Author: Comans, Michael. Abhyankar, Vasudeoshastri, 1863-1942. Advaitmoda. Published: Delhi : Sri Satguru Publications, 1988. Edition: 1st ed. Subject: Abhyankar, Vasudeoshastri, 1863-1942. Advaitamoda. Advaita. Vedanta. Series: Sri Garib Das oriental series ; no. 80 Material: lvii, 623 p. ; 23 cm. Note: Bibliography: p. 607-615. Thesis (Ph.D.)--Australian National University, 1986. Includes index. ISBN: 8170301688 : $60.00 System ID no: BFH-7209 Holdings: CLEVELAND/John G. White Coll. B132.A3 C65 1988x -- Reference -- Use in Library Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted August 1, 2001 Report Share Posted August 1, 2001 > > >I know that is a problem, but it seems to me that in debates between >two traditional schools of thought, we have to do the following - >2. use an intersection set (not a union set) of the texts referenced > by the established authors of the two schools in question, Intersection set is a good idea. I know Shree Sunder Hattangadi is very good in this, if he takes this task - that will be a great service to Vedantins who are interested in the comparative analysis. >3. keep out perspectives from a third school of thought. I think discussion will be more useful from the point of issue rather than from the point of a school. I do not think in the final analysis we are interested in learning which school is right or wrong but what is the right understanding given all the facts and propositions. The great achaarya-s have proposed their theories based on their understanding of theory of knowledge and tarka at that time. Their arguments were tuned to the accepted theories and principles of nyaaya, standardized in their times. Science has progressed significantly from the point of understanding of nature- for example - concepts of space and time and their interrelations and lack of absoluteness- perceptions through the mind etc. Since these concepts have ontological implications in the interpretations of Vedanta mantra-s, I feel it is important to have a fresh look at the basis of the theories, without ignoring the fact that we are discussing issues that are of adhyaatmika type. For example, Bhagavaan Ramanuja's doctrine rests squarely on the integral relation between the dharma and dharmi or attributes and locus of these attributes, that is the objects. Experience, as interpreted by then existing theories of knowledge, formed a basis of pratyaksha pramana. Experience is taken as knowledge - Here we need to separate subjectivity and objectivity and reality associated with these two. Shree Ramanuja after addressing these concepts on epistemological basis he extended them to jiiva and brahman, treating them as dravya-s, in the language of Vedanta Deshika, or essentially as objects. As I see, a clear distinction is needed to separate axiomatic statements versus statements based on facts or knowledge - perceptual or otherwise. This is where I think critical evaluation is needed. Otherwise any other discussions or debate between just two schools of thought will not add much in terms of new understanding. Dialectic arguments in SatadhuushaNii are mostly based on epistemological issues and I am not sure those arguments will stand if we look from the current understanding of the nature of knowledge. > 1 ensures that we tackle the traditions on their own terms. If you mean by that the definitions of the terms used in each tradition, yes. In the process it is important also to standardize the terms independent of the tradition so that anyone outside the school of thought will be less confused when comparing one tradition to the other. >2 ensures that we have a set of references that has to be acceptable > to both sides of the discussion. The intersection set between the > sources explicitly used by Sankara and Ramanuja is definitely greater > than the major Upanishad texts. True. For example Shankara it appears did not refer to Madukya Upanishad in his Vedanta suutra bhaashya. I am not sure why, although he wrote separate bhaashhya on it. For that same reason Ramanjua also did not referenced it either, while Madhva used Goudapaada karika sloka as a puurvapaksha. I consider Mandukya as an absolutely scientific treatise since it examines all the three states of consciousness as in integral unit of human experience for analysis rather than taking partial data such as just the waking state as the basis. Br. Up. addresses the dream and deep sleep to some extent but not as focused as Mandukya. >3 ensures that we decompose a complex multi-body problem into simpler > two-body problems, so to speak. Of course, the debate between dvaita > and advaita is as interesting as (or perhaps more than) the debate > between viSishTAdvaita and advaita, but we must remember that there > is also a debate between viSishTAdvaita and dvaita in the background. As I stated if the emphasis is issue-based rather than the school-based, we can be more objective and gain better understanding - One can restrict to schools - adviata and vishishhta adviata from the point of analysis on the issues. But if the discussion is solely based on the schools, I am not sure anything new will come out the discussions. > >The Comans translation-cum-commentary was published in 1988, by Satguru >Publications, Delhi. There is an earlier private edition of the Sanskrit >original from Bombay, in 1975. As usual our great Sunder is quick and provided complete details of the book in the advaitin list. Hari OM! Sadananda > >Best, >Vidyasankar -- K. Sadananda Code 6323 Naval Research Laboratory Washington D.C. 20375 Voice (202)767-2117 Fax:(202)767-2623 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted August 1, 2001 Report Share Posted August 1, 2001 advaitin, "K. Sadananda" <sada@a...> wrote: > > Intersection set is a good idea. I know Shree Sunder Hattangadi > if he takes this task - that will be a great > service to Vedantins who are interested in the comparative analysis. ********Namaste, This is a new term for me! I shall be happy to undertake the service if I know exactly [by an eaxample] what will be involved. Regards, s. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted August 1, 2001 Report Share Posted August 1, 2001 >advaitin, "K. Sadananda" <sada@a...> wrote: > >> >> Intersection set is a good idea. I know Shree Sunder Hattangadi >> if he takes this task - that will be a great >> service to Vedantins who are interested in the comparative analysis. > > >********Namaste, > >This is a new term for me! I shall be happy to undertake the service >if I know exactly [by an eaxample] what will be involved. > >Regards, > >s. Sunder What that means is to gather the list of references cited by Shankara in his Bhaashhya and list of references cited by Ramanuja and picking out only those quoted by both (intersection set) as agreed upon references by both schools of thoughts. One can extend this to post Shankara and post Ramanuja scholars - this is to weed out the references which are not acceptable simultaneously for both. For example both have quoted Vishunu Purana but not other purana-s such as Skhanda purana which Madhva alone quotes. Taking for example for the concept maaya if adviatins used some reference upanishad which is not referred by vishisshTadvaitins then it cannot come under the intersection set. This way we do not have to worry about whether a particular upanishad is authentic or not etc. It will provide a common basis for discussion. This is what Vidhya meant by the intersection set. The union set just combined references of both which include not only the intersection set but those that have been referenced by only one system of school and not other. Hari Om! Sadananda -- K. Sadananda Code 6323 Naval Research Laboratory Washington D.C. 20375 Voice (202)767-2117 Fax:(202)767-2623 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted August 1, 2001 Report Share Posted August 1, 2001 Will be glad to be of help to the extent where I can access the materials. [i do not have any purana texts]. s. This is what Vidhya meant by the > intersection set. The union set just combined references of both > which include not only the intersection set but those that have been > referenced by only one system of school and not other. > > Hari Om! > Sadananda Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted August 3, 2001 Report Share Posted August 3, 2001 >nanda chandran <vpcnk wrote: > >So words like maya and nirgua is used express the inexpressible. Can you >practically show something that's formless in the world that we experience? >Even with air or water - the first we merely feel and do not see and the >second takes the shape of whatever container hold it. Or atleast everything >has a form at the time we perceive it - the mere fact that we see something >points to the existence of form. Formlessness is beyond conception and we >can only infer it as the opposite of that which is with form. Nanda - I am not sure you are right about this. Form is only one attribute of an object where eyes are the pramaaNa or means of that knowledge. Converse that every object should have a form is not necessarily valid. If I close my eyes and smell something - I have a feeling that there is an object that forms a locus for the smell and I do not think any form is required for conceptualization. Concept can be centered on an object but that need not have a form. I agree that there must be some object that has locus for the smell - but this is an inference by the mind since it has fundamental postulate based on experience that three cannot be attributes without a locus for the attributes. Your last sentence above, I do not thing is valid either both i.e. the first part and the last part. Most of the abstract mathematics do not necessarily associated with tangible forms. Your argument is exactly what Bhagavaan Ramanuja and Shree Vedanta Deshika uses to formulate that every object must have attributes and every attribute must have an object. The attributes, dharma-s (adravya-s in V.D's notion) and the locus of the attributes, dharmi (dravya-s) are different but have integral relation between the two since one cannot conceive independent of the other. The postulate, which is based on experience, is that we perceive both the object and the attributes simultaneously in our experience of an object. This argument is next extended to Jiiva and Paramaatma, considering each one as an object. I am finding a major problem in these postulates which appears to be parallel to your statement, hence I brought the issue. 'Can I ever perceive an object?' is the fundamental question I am facing. The 'form' you mentioned and the colors are through the eyes and are attributes of an object, but not an object per sec. Similarly, the smell, touch, taste and sound. These are attributes and not an object? Now, how and when we perceive the object? Senses can only perceive the attributes and the degrees in the attributes. But can we ever perceive an object- if so how? We experience an object therefore there is an object is not absolutely right statement. Experience is not knowledge and experience need to be understood - then it becomes knowledge if that knowledge of the experience is not invalidated by a better knowledge. From my understanding, we never perceive an object! - Mind has to come in to integrate all the perceptions into locus and infer - underline infer- that there is an object with those attributes. This inference is based on fundamental inference made by the mind that there cannot be attributes without a locus and hence there is an object with those attributes. Form, color, smell, touch, taste sound are not the object. The existence of the object is inference based on the above fundamental inferential conclusion. Ultimately my own existence is lended to the object's 'isness' - hence puurnaat purnam udachyate makes sense. I wrote this just get you to argue since you love arguments! And not to dump my understanding on your head. I am taking the liberty to send this to Shree Krishna Kalale and Mani Varadarajan to make sure I am not misinterpreting Bhagavaan Ramanuja's and Vedanta Deshika's theories on Epistemology. > >So point to be understood here is that language/thought (one can't exist >without the other) is not absolute and only relative. Your are absolutely right about that - but relative to what? - relative to my existence? 'Object out there' is a thought in my mind due to integral and inferential relation of the attributes and the object thought. The thought has to be in my consciousness for me to be conscious of the thought. Hence the thought and hence the object associated with the thought become relative to my existence. In a way - 'I am' lending the support to the 'is-ness' of the object. > >>Maaya is a concept brought in to account for one appearing as many. > >Again I will say this. Almost without exception every school of Indian >philosophy points to chitta vritti nirodah as the way to liberation. The >mind/thought has to cease for one to be liberated. I am not sure your are right here either. From the Adviata point, as I understand, it is not chitta vritti nirodha - That can never happen as along as one is embodied! or can happen if one becomes a stone without a mind! - or stoned! What is liberation in advaita is to drop the notions in the mind or misunderstanding that 'I am this or that' - identification with the upaadhi-s - that is identification of subject with the object- that is not the same of annihilation of upaadhi-s. - sarva bhuutastam aatmaanam, sarva bhuutanicha aatmani - all beings are in me and I am in all beings - The subject pervades the object as consciousness. Subject includes the object since objects have no independent existence as discussed above. Subject-object distinction is only play of the mind or should I say - play in the mind or on the mind! or one can say the play is my vibhuuti since mind being inert cannot itself play without me lending my support. According to VishhiTaadvaita what you say is not right either- There nidhidhyaasana culminates into the bhakti ruupa j~naana in the mind only. Only in videha mukti - the jiiva gains sarvaj~natvam since mind is not needed for the sarvaj~natvam. They call that as dharma-bhuuta j~naana in contrast to swaruupa j~naana since jiiva-s are considered as many and tiny. Hence from both philosophies, you are not absolutely right. You may be right from Ramanuja's point but there it is not just the mind -mind/thought ceases only one is no more embodied. > So how can one after >liberation *think* that he's the only one? Then even reality will be within >the grasp of thought - which the shruti denies. Brahman is being. It is >beyond thought. It is existence without thought. The moment you try to >think/express it, you make the infinite, finite and the absolute, relative. Sorry Nanda - It is not existence without thoughts - it is existence in spite of the thoughts. Thoughts raise in me, subsist by me and go back into me -I pervade every thought but every thought is different from me. Since each thought is locus of an object - one can say - yathova imaani bhuutani jaayane -- etc are valid absolutely as thought raise, stay and go back into me. > >How so? > >Because as explained above - thought/language is a mere pointer and doesn't >have absolute substance. Knowledge in the conventional sense is only linking >together of all these pointers for practical utility. But if we go back to >the fundamental concepts and try to dig beyond it, we find that they have no >substance. Knowledge through language/thought is the anti-thesis of true >knowledge, which is self knowledge - atma jnaanam. The distinction between >the two is that while the former revels in the duality of subject and >object, the latter is knowledge of the subject only - it is self-knowledge >and non-relational and non-dependent on anything other than itself. It is >knowledge as the thing in itself. Nanda - you are right in your statements but somehow drift in terms of conclusion- thoughts are not absolute alright and that is a fact but that does not mean that to be one with the absolute one need to eliminate the thoughts. It is like the waves, waves are the ocean yet waves are not the ocean, and one need eliminate the waves to have darshan of the ocean. Seeing the waves is seeing the ocean as they are its glory - pasyam me yogom aiswaram - Look at my glory - All being are in me but yet I am not in them - and they are not me. They are my glory. Yet I pervade everything in unmanifested form - maya tatam idam sarvam jagat avyakti muurthinaa. - since manifestation is objectification and thoughts come into picture since they are locus for objects presumably out there. > >Maya is about unreality and so in a strict sense it has only marginal >relevance in the teaching of reality. Does anyone say that just by knowing >the world is unreal - maya - we can be liberated? If so, anybody who >understands the Madhyamika Shaastram will be liberated. No, Atma Jnaanam - >knowledge of the self - alone can liberate. This is also the reason why >Vedanta is above Madhyamika - because it is the Brahma Sutra - it teaches >about reality - Brahman. True - the question is only 'does shruti provide direct reference to maaya?' - to the same degree as it points to Brahman. No one gets liberated by just verbally knowing that 'this is maya' or 'I am brahman'. It is not understanding as understanding as a thought but understanding as understanding as a fact - as JK puts it. > >The sages of the Upanishads taught about the way to reality - either they >taught atma jnaanam or maunam or yoga. Sometimes they also described/pointed >to reality - but these teachings are not absolute as no expression/thought >can grasp the absolute. Also it is not really necessary they they should >teach about the world - Nanda - you are missing the point - if they could tell about Braham which is avyaktam, which cannot be expressed, they could have told about maaya too in the same language they used. Your assertion that it is not necessary for them to tell about maaya is a matter of your opinion and there is no problem in that as long as we accept that as such. For those who are seeking a direct shruti pramaana for maaya in the way Shankara used it, for them it is necessary - the rest is an explanation for those who are convinced or from those who are not convinced - is it not? > infact teachers like the Buddha considered it a >hindrance as such effort will take you away from what's truly required. It >is with Nagarjuna that the maya doctrine is reasoned out - even with him his >purpose was different - he wanted to prove to relativity of what we call >knowledge and the difference between that and the real knowledge. And with >Shankara/Advaita that it is reconciled with reality/Brahman. >So ultimately maya is fully reconcilable with the intellect. As Gaudapaada >says only that which is taught by the shruti and is substantiated by reason >is the truth and nothing else. Else anybody can read anything in the Brahma >Sutra and claim that is the truth. Reason is the key and the true guide. And >maya is a product of reasoning. Precisely - the word you used is 'reasoned out' - essentially what is called anumaana pramaaNa. But I would argue more than that in defence of maaya - it is not just loukika anumaana but shruti based anumaana which all aachaary-s use it in one form or the other for some of their concepts. Hari Om! Sadananda > >Again there's a difference between : statement - reasoning - reality. -- K. Sadananda Code 6323 Naval Research Laboratory Washington D.C. 20375 Voice (202)767-2117 Fax:(202)767-2623 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted August 7, 2001 Report Share Posted August 7, 2001 I am presenting the discussion with Nanda to highlight the issues involved as a part of our discussions -If in the process if the concepts get cleared, the purpose of the discussions is achieved. . Sadananda -------- Nanda:What we mean by truth of a thing is its essential nature. The truth of the object is beyond our perceptual powers for the simple reason that the mind and the object are two distinct entities. Knowing is only what we *know of* something - it is only a mental representation of the object and not the thing in itself. The truth of the object is what it is in respect to itself and not what we make of it. In itself it is being. Even as we ourselves are. Sada: you are zeroing on the problem - What we 'know of'- is the only means of knowledge available to us for the objects. Is there any other way of knowing the object - or knowing the existence of the object other than through the mind? you mentioned- the truth of the object - what it is in respect to itself? -it can never be known since its existence cannot be independently established without the I, the knower along with the instrument of my knowledge, my mind, present to establish the existence of the object. That is exactly what I am emphasizing. There is no way one can establish the independent existence of the object without I and my mind preset to establish it. That seems to be the truth of the object! That is why 'shR^ishhTi-dR^ishhTi and dR^ishhTi-sR^ishhTi theories came up in advaita along with ajata vaada. 'I see it therefore it is' and 'It is therefore I see it' - both essentially rests in the final analysis my seeing or perception to establish the existence of the object. You posed the question - can the computer exist if I am not aware of it. I call this an indeterminate problem. (in advaita - it resorts to anirvachaniiya or inexpressible) There was some discussion in advaitin list that was raised by Shree Gummuluru Murthy - Can the objects exists when there is no mind such as in deep Sleep State. I call this as indeterminate problem. . There is no way to establish the truth of the object that includes its existence independent of the observer. What or who remains as the final truth - the observer (he becomes an observer when there is a thing to be observed - otherwise just awareness or consciousness) is only fact that need not have an independent means to know - which is my own existence and my own consciousness. Praj~naanam Brahma, tat tvam asi or aham brahma asmi or sarvam khali idam brahma all zero in to the fact that consciousness has to be essence and unlimited. Hence my statement the existence of the objects are through the mind as thoughts in the mind which is in my consciousness since I am conscious of these. Thus consciousness has to pervade it for me to be conscious of the thought and objects which are locus for the these object-thoughts - what Ramana calls it as 'idam vR^itti'. -' this' thought. Sada: > From my understanding, we never perceive an object! - Mind has to >come in to integrate all the perceptions into locus and infer - >underline infer- that there is an object with those attributes. Nanda : when you see a cow, do you infer its existence based on your perception of its horns or hoofs? It is immediate spontaneous knowledge of the cow as an external object. Sada: The key word in your statement is 'infer its existence' - that is precisely the point. There is an inference of the existence of the object by the mind when perception - volition and cognition of object takes place in the mind along with recognition using the past knowledge to identify the cognized object. - If there is no past memory to recognize, we only cognize and ask -what is that we are seeing? - The knowledge involves mind's cognition and subsequently mind's recognition. These cognition-recognition based on the observed data of attributes of the objects can be subsequently negated if additional information or data (attributes) become available. If the previous knowledge is negated by subsequent information or data we call this illusory knowledge or bhrama, and if the previous knowledge based on limited information is further confirmed we call that as valid knowledge, prama. Even this confirmed knowledge can get negated as we get more and more data of the objects - thus classical mechanics valid up to a point that leads to quantum mechanics etc. Ultimately all are relative when we gain the absolute knowledge which never be negated - yat j~naatvaa na param j~neyam - There is no more to know. That knowledge involves - sarva bhuutatstam aatmaanam sarva bhuutaani cha aatmani - all being are in me and I am in all beings - I being the conscious entity, the subject and not an object. Nanda: Of course that perception includes the perception of horns and hoofs as well as the association of the perceived object with past experience/knowledge as a cow. "Cow" is a word you have given to the object and that concept necessarily includes the attributes - horns, hoofs etc. Without the attributes there's no "cow" either. Each only exists in relation to the other. But the truth of that thing which you call a "cow" is what it is in itself and not what we make of it. Sada: The point is there is no 'cow' either without the attributes and there is a cow with those attributes is an inference in the mind which is in my consciousness - The existence of the cow and its cow-ness are ultimately supported by my inference which in turn is supported by consciousness-existence that I am. Sada:>This >inference is based on fundamental inference made by the mind that >there cannot be attributes without a locus and hence there is an >object with those attributes. Nanda:The locus that you mention is a physical thing - it is being - something apart from your conceptions of it. The problem in ignorance lies in people mistaking their conception of the locus as the thing itself. The thing in itself is being and your thought as a separate entity can neither affect it nor know it absolutely. Sada: I think we seem to differ as you outlined in the first line of your statement. The mind gathers sense input which can only give attributes of the objects - integrating all the input - volition - the mind provides a locus - since there is an inherent inference involved that there cannot be attributes without a locus - cognition of the locus with those attributes that gathered up to that point is inferred - The point is this - there is no way one can independently establish the existence of the object without mental processes involved which include inferences by the mind. Without the mind as in deep sleep existence of the objects cannot be established. Whether the objects exists or not when the mind is not functioning or cognizing - is a invalid problem or more correctly an indeterminate problem - grouped under the same anirvachaniiya aspect of advaita vedanta. When I discussed this with Shreeman Chari, he mentioned to be me that my arguments are parallel to Vij~naana vaada rather than advaita. I have to differ from him. From my understanding this is what I call anirvachaniiya aspect of Advaita only - although original definition of anirvachaniiya may be more restricted. ShR^ishhTi-dR^ishhTi and the converse of it and ajaata vaada of GauDapaada are looking at this indeterminate problem from different angles. They all converge to the same fact, which I know that you concur is I alone am - I being consciousness- am being the existence. Nanda: Anyway let's not break our minds trying to work this out - we're not trying to know the mind, are we? We want to know our self, which is not the mind. Sada: What you say Nanda is not true - In the final analysis - knowing the mind is knowing the truth too - When we say we are not the mind - neti - it does not mean I am one and the mind is another - then it is dvaita. I am not 'the mind' alone - I include the mind and everything else -They are in me and I am not in them is the true knowledge - Hence Ramana says: manasantu kim maargane kR^ite naiva maanasam maarga aarjavaat - inquire into the nature of the mind and when one inquires the mind (notional mind) drops out and that is the direct path. J. Krishnamuurthy says - observer the mind with all its conditioning - in the very observation the conditional mind get unconditioned and not by any other process since any 'other process' is only another reconditioning. Everyone is zeroing in the mind - mana eva manushhyaanaam kaaranam bhandha mokshayoH| bandhaaya vishhaayaasaktam moktyai nir vishayam srutam|| Mind is the cause for bondage as well as for liberation. Entanglements with the objects are the bondage and Freedom is freedom from this attachments from the objects. If we understand the objects that they do not have independent existence other than what we lend it to them, we understand the truth of the objects and it cannot have any hold on us - that is what an inquiry of the mind - mind with the notions- should lead to. Nanda: We should be wary of such misdirected effort for as the Isha says : those who seek knowledge for the sake of knowledge itself (i.e, knowledge which is not aimed towards knowing oneself) will go to worlds of blinding darkness. Sada: True knowledge of the objects - that is knowledge about the objects - that constitute the learning of the nature of the snakes to find out what kind of snake that we are seeing. But understanding the true nature of the objects is in turn understanding the reality of the objects which is I am or Brahman is - either way - yo mam pasyati sarvatra sarvatra mayi pasyati - who sees me everywhere and everything in me - says Krishna - EVeryting in consciousness -existence and consciousness-existence everywhere. The objects are thoughts in my mind and thoughts are in my consciousness - There is no separate reality out there - That is true knowledge. Sada: >Form, color, smell, touch, taste sound >are not the object. The existence of the object is inference based >on the above fundamental inferential conclusion. Ultimately my own >existence is lended to the object's 'isness' - hence puurnaat purnam >udachyate makes sense. >I wrote this just get you to argue since you love arguments! Nanda: The distinction between an argument, a debate and a discussion blurs, doesn't it? If you get a bit intense in a discussion, it becomes a debate and if it loses focus/gets lost in ego struggles, it becomes an argument! Sada: Yes. But we both know what we are trying to do - not interested in just arguing for argument sake but only to focus on our understanding of the nature of the reality of ourselves and the world around. Nanda: Of late I don't want to think anymore - just relax and be myself - which ironically is the hardest thing to do! Because for the normal man to live is to live by the senses - all activity of the senses necessarily trigger the brain - to think. So literally to live is to live with the mind. Consciousness is always at work in its modes of duality. It has to abide in itself for it to not be bothered by thoughts. Then there's self-existence. You've to experience what it is to exist without the mind, to know what bliss is. Sat-chit-ananda is not anything to be acquired. It is your true nature which always is. If you delink yourself from the mind, it is sat-chit-ananda. On its own consciousness is asparsha. Sada: Good Nanda - all the best in your attempts. Nanda: But who're you? Apart from what you know *of* yourself - as it is with objects - what do you know of the true you? Without relating yourself to something else, what do you know of yourself? Sada: If you, Nanda, can inquire about yourself without the relating yourself - all the best. My way of looking inquiry involves mind and mind involves thoughts and thoughts involves two types - 'I am thought' and "this is' thought - what Ramana calls it as ' aham vR^itti' and 'idam vR^itti' - inquiry idam and aham cannot be avoided since at present I take myself as aham idam - I am this - neti neti involves negating this identification - this can be achieved by understanding either aham or idam or both in their true sense - since only I am is lending support to idam too - and that is my point. Sada: >>Maaya is a concept brought in to account for one appearing as many. > >Again I will say this. Almost without exception every school of Indian >philosophy points to chitta vritti nirodah as the way to liberation. The >mind/thought has to cease for one to be liberated. >I am not sure your are right here either. From the Adviata point, as >I understand, it is not chitta vritti nirodha - That can never happen >as along as one is embodied! or can happen if one becomes a stone >without a mind! - or stoned! Nanda: If that's so why do they say that the Self abides in itself in deep sleep? As per you view since the mind is inactive in sushupti, the self must be jada. If so then how do you wake up as the same person who went to sleep? Sada: You have misinterpreted my statement - I am the one who is really active all along - In my presence the mind becomes active - since mind is in me and not separate from me since mind is thoughts and thoughts are in my consciousness since I am the consciousness. In deep sleep I alone am without the mind to cognize the attributes of the objects and thus inferring the existence of the objects. In waking up the mind becomes active or I lend support to the mind - the mind with the same memory that was stored in its memory. It is the same memory with which I identify, makes me feel I am the same person. I never implied that self is jadam anytime - it is the other way around. The existence-consciousness - self lends its existence to the mind and objects - otherwise they do not have independent existence - Whether they exist or in turn the world exists when I am asleep is again indeterminate problem since it can never be established without my presence! Sada: >What is liberation in advaita is to >drop the notions in the mind or misunderstanding that 'I am this or >that' - identification with the upaadhi-s - that is identification of >subject with the object- that is not the same of annihilation of >upaadhi-s. - sarva bhuutastam aatmaanam, sarva bhuutanicha aatmani >- all beings are in me and I am in all beings - The subject pervades >the object as consciousness. Subject includes the object since >objects have no independent existence as discussed above. >Subject-object distinction is only play of the mind or should I say >- play in the mind or on the mind! or one can say the play is my >vibhuuti since mind being inert cannot itself play without me >lending my support. Nanda: This is fine. But the problem lies in defining how such knowledge will arise? Keep in mind the shruti dictum that the Self is not to be known as an object. So all conventional knowing/understanding which necessarily involves duality is ruled out. Even your logical reasoning that nothing exists apart from your consciousness, since it is only because of consciousness that you perceive things, cannot be the way. (actually you're a prachanna bauddha as it is a semi-Vijnaanavaada stance and not the Advaitic metaphysical position :-). Sada: How such knowledge arises - it is not a process to answer how - With the mind you go beyond the mind - it is like pole Walt. - It is actually swataH sidhham - it is dropping the misunderstanding - by recognizing as a fact that there is no object out there that is real other than the play of the mind - The world is the projection of the mind and the mind is in me - or in my consciousness - Since I don't know Vij~naana vaada - I cannot be branded as a semi-vij~naana vaadin. At least you have now another person who agrees with you - that is Shreeman Chari). But if you really examine correctly what I am saying is absolute Adviata vaada - May be I have used different jargon to establish the same fact. If you can establish the existence of the world independent of my mind and consciousness lending its support - I will buy your argument - I maintain without these the problem becomes indeterminate. Everything is nothing but Brahman becomes absolute fact from my analysis that it is pervaded by consciousness that I am. Besides the problem of creation - inert objects arising from consciousness is difficult to answer from what was there before the creation - Sadeva soumya idam agra asiiit etc. Hence what I am arguing is absolute Advaita Vedanta only. What is Advaitic metaphysical position? Is it different from what I have presented - let me know. As I understand what it says- the attributes are illusory and existence alone is real But that existence cannot be established by the mind - mind can see the attributes only - I am the existent-conscious entity lending my existence to the objects since there is no other consciousness separate from I. Hence aham brahma asmi follow along with sarvam kali idam brahma - everything is Brahman and everything is I - How can everything be I - I have given an explanation since everything includes all things and each thing is an object is a thought in my mind and that is in my consciousness - The apparent duality - subject-object distinction is play of the mind - - you can say that is my liila since it is a play - one appearing as many. How is this not Advaita? - I like to know - educate me Nanda. Nanda: So how can one after >liberation *think* that he's the only one? Then even reality will be within >the grasp of thought - which the shruti denies. Brahman is being. It is >beyond thought. It is existence without thought. The moment you try to >think/express it, you make the infinite, finite and the absolute, relative. Sada: >Sorry Nanda - It is not existence without thoughts - it is existence >in spite of the thoughts. Thoughts raise in me, subsist by me and go >back into me -I pervade every thought but every thought is different >from me. Nanda: What's the "me" here Sada? Are you thought? If you're not thought and apart from it, how can thought "arise in you" or "go back" into you"? Thought is one thing and you are another thing. You've to let go of all this commonsense thinking. As GauDapaada says all objective play of consciousness is only imagination. Sada: Yes - I am not saying anything different from what GauDapaada says - is it? I don't see the difference in its essence. I am not a thought - but I am not different from thought either - See Krishna statement which superficially looks this apparent contradiction - 'They are in me but I am not in them -but again they are not all in me - see my glory in all these." Ch.9. - Now look back what I wrote in terms of thoughts, objects and how I as consciousness to pervade the thoughts and thus the objects - They are in me yet I am not them - I am not the cow - horse or book that I perceive - yet there are thoughts and they exist in my consciousness and I lend my existence only for to them as their substratum - Is it not Advaita? On what basis it is not Nanda? Sada:> It is like the waves, waves are the ocean >yet waves are not the ocean, and one need eliminate the waves to have >darshan of the ocean. Seeing the waves is seeing the ocean as they >are its glory - pasyam me yogom aiswaram - Look at my glory - All >being are in me but yet I am not in them - and they are not me. They >are my glory. Yet I pervade everything in unmanifested form - maya >tatam idam sarvam jagat avyakti muurthinaa. - since manifestation is >objectification and thoughts come into picture since they are locus >for objects presumably out there. Nada: Sada let go of all these grand concepts. They might sound grand, but have little utility. The waves that you mention are the thoughts - but the self is apart from the thoughts. You should be careful to distinguish between psychology and metaphysics. If your spiritual effort is based on metaphysics - like waves and ocean etc - you're not going to know the self. You'll just have grand conceptions of it. Concentrate on psychology - know yourself as the stillness apart from the thoughts. Metaphysics is by its nature itself beyond thought. When you know yourself you'll know metaphysics automatically - or rather you'll be it. Sada: Nanda I am not entangled in psychology-metaphysics - I am only going after the truth in these. Please know that plurality is not the problem nor the thoughts - the notion that plurality is reality is the problem - taking the objects real is the problem - considering them I am Brahman that includes the objects too is the true knowledge. Beyond thought - neti neti have to be correctly understood - it is not dismissing the thoughts but understanding that they are not different from me. As I see it -it could be that we may be saying the same thing in different language. Sada: >True - the question is only 'does shruti provide direct reference to >maaya?' - to the same degree as it points to Brahman. No one gets >liberated by just verbally knowing that 'this is maya' or 'I am >Brahman'. It is not understanding as understanding as a thought but >understanding as understanding as a fact - as JK puts it. Nanda: Sada doesn't the shruti say that reality is beyond the intellect? Does it not say that the Self is not to be known as an object? So why are you breaking your head trying to "know" yourself? Let go of all this useless addiction to logic - it will not lead to calm/peace/nirvaana. The self is to be known as the subject and this necessarily means not using the brain. You are it. Keep quiet and abide in yourself. When the agitation of the mind and body has died down, your true nature will shine by itself. Sada: Going beyond intellect Nanda is not shutting of the intellect - you will never be able to do that - what it means only see the truth behind the intellect through the intellect. That is what effectively means using the intellect to go beyond the intellect. May be we have different understanding of what inquiry of the nature of reality means. Asking the mind to shut up becomes a problem since mind by nature cannot shut up - mind is nothing but thoughts and asking thoughts to be quiet is like asking the ocean to be free from waves. Anyway good luck in your efforts and keep me posted how are progressing in shutting out the thoughts. Brahman is inquiry - inquiry involves understanding the true nature of things and beings in their absolute sense by not dismissing them as irrelevant. Understanding involves use of intellect. It is essentially turning inwards to understand the very essence of the intellect. - Observing the mind means the same or analyze the analyst also means the same. Who am I inquiry is also means the same. Inquiry involves the application of the intellect and not shutting of the intellect. That is what meditaion is or dhyaana involves. For a bhatka the object of inquiry is the Lord for a advaitin the ultimate object of inquiry is one own self which is consciousness-existence-bliss - the swaruupa of ones self which is not different from the swaruupa of the Lord - since everything ultimately exists in consciousness that includes the body, mind and intellects with all its thoughts of objects! Hari Om! Sadananda -- K. Sadananda Code 6323 Naval Research Laboratory Washington D.C. 20375 Voice (202)767-2117 Fax:(202)767-2623 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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