Guest guest Posted March 31, 2002 Report Share Posted March 31, 2002 Satyan wrote: > Non discrimination presupposes an individual with a non > discriminating mind and it also presupposes entities real and unreal > (ie duality) to be discriminated between. However, aren't we trying > to analyse what is even causal to the individual and the mind and > the first appearance of duality? ie what is it that brought about > the individual/mind/duality to begin with. > Vedanta puts forth the causal body model to explain (on the > empirical level for the ignorant but seeking intellect) the > cause for the individual mind and intellect. Stig ji wrote: > Why do you think "the causal body model" and trigunatmika maya > are necessarliy brought in in order to explain the cause of the > individual mind and intellect? > Personally, I can´t see how adhyasa and > avidya could be satisfyingly explained by bringing the > post-Shankara theories into the picture. If mUlAvidyA is > considered as necessary in order to explain adhyasa, then why > don´t we have to explain the cause and existence of mUlAvidyA? > And if we somehow tries to explain the cause of mUlAvidyA, then > we have to explain the cause and existence of this cause etc. in > infinitum. This way of reasoning apparently leads to an infinite > regress. Atmachaitanyaji wrote: > If you try to clarify your position by stating that even in your > theory Root Ignorance is also false from the Absolute view point, > and that it is only from the empirical view that we put forth this > teaching. . Then I reply that our disagreement is, of course, only > from the empirical point of view. I have received some answers to my questions from later posts. I think that the point Stigji raised about the infinite regress and also the points Sri Atmachaitanyaji made with respect to the differentiation between empirical/transcendental views helped a lot in seeing that a causal body may not after all be necessary to explain everything. One thing that I am still struggling with is an issue from the empirical view alone which is: if we dismiss the need for a causal body, and try to explain everything based on adhyasa alone, how do we explain that the same individual who goes to sleep also arises from sleep. Can we explain this phenomenon from the purely adhyasa standpoint without bringing in the causal body? Are we saying that the basic adhyasa is there even in deep sleep? If so, what is this adhyasa in sleep? What is the not-self whose characteristics are superimposed on the Self? I would really appreciate if Sri Atmachaitanyaji/Sri Stigji and other learned members kindly clarify this doubt. regards, --Satyan Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted March 31, 2002 Report Share Posted March 31, 2002 Hari Om !! advaitin, "satyan_c" <satyan_c> wrote: > Satyan wrote: > > One thing that I am still struggling with is an issue from the > empirical view alone which is: if we dismiss the need for a causal > body, and try to explain everything based on adhyasa alone, how do >we > explain that the same individual who goes to sleep also arises from > sleep. Can we explain this phenomenon from the purely adhyasa > standpoint without bringing in the causal body? > I would really appreciate if Sri Atmachaitanyaji/Sri Stigji and other > learned members kindly clarify this doubt. > > regards, > --Satyan We do not dismiss the need for a causal body. But, redefine the conception of a 'causal body', if we had an ontological entity representing a 'causal body' in mind earlier. In its place now, consider an epistemological entity representing 'Avidya' or primary 'non-apprehension'. This 'causal body' which is called 'Avidya' in other words is not gone in deep sleep. >Are we saying that the > basic adhyasa is there even in deep sleep? If so, what is this adhyasa > in sleep? What is the not-self whose characteristics are superimposed > on the Self? > Yes, we are saying that adhyasa is there in deep sleep because 'Avidya' or non-apprehension is there in deep sleep. Even in deep sleep we say 'I was ignorant; I did not know any thing; I did not even know myself; I had bliss etc." But, you see that 'existance' is clearly accepted. No one says, 'I did not exist in deep sleep.' So, also we must accept that MIND did not go away in deep sleep. The only thing is that the Aham Vritti and Idam Vrittis of the MIND are no longer there; But, Vrittis of Priya, Moda, Promoda are still present (I can not explain much about these in deep sleep) which are the Vrittis that arise to give the 'experience' of Happiness/Joy/Bliss and as ONLY these Vrittis are illumined by the 'Atman', the only thing we are able to say is that "I existed in deep sleep; I was ignorant of myself (meaning I did not know the world or objects; I was Happy". This is the basis for continuity of Individuality through the three states. Based on the above we must take that the MIND exists through all the three states. Now, can someone explain to me about this 'Anadi' MIND. I remember, even Gaudapada in the Mandukya defines MIND as 'Anadi'? I also feel that 'I do the Superimposition' is not a satisfactory answer. It is contrary to the Absolute Non-Creation theory. Any lower levels of explanation should not contradict the ultimate Truth, unless even here by 'I', we mean 'Absolute Consciousness - Atman'. It does not look sensible to accept the existance of 'jeevas' who do superimposition of world on the 'Atman'. We all know creation wherein Jeevas are a part was never there. I know some basic arguments for this acceptance of Jeevas was that 'Atman' can not suffer the pangs of this world. But, why should we accept this 'suffering' which itself is an illusion, a thought. Om Namo Narayanaya !! Srikrishna Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted April 1, 2002 Report Share Posted April 1, 2002 Namaste Satyan, You ask, "if we dismiss the need for a causal body, and try to explain everything based on adhyasa alone, how do we explain that the same individual who goes to sleep also arises from sleep. Can we explain this phenomenon from the purely adhyasa standpoint without bringing in the causal body?" You question is from the empirical viewpoint and you would like an empirical answer. There are several ways to approach this matter. 1. As empirical explanations go, what's wrong with the empirical explanation given by neurosychology? The brain's identity over time guarantees the similarity of the supposed individual, which is merely an emergent epiphenomenon of the brain's activity. No causal body in this explanation. 2. You might ask a preliminary question first. Are you even sure that the same person really *does* go to sleep then wake up? Or does it just *seem* like it? Imagine for a moment if one person woke up with the memories from someone else. It would come to the same thing. It would seem like Satyan went to sleep, then woke up. The difference cannot be proven. This shows how flimsy a thing is identity. Why bother? And it suggests a few more questions which are also more basic than the deep sleep question -- (a) Is there true identity retained even between one instant and the next, given the gaps between thoughts which are akin to deep sleep? (b) What is it that makes an identity *your* identity? Whatever you can point to as an answer to (b) would be a further case of superimposition, and would allow the question, "what makes *that* phenomenon *yours*? And so forth, ad infinitum. The only way to escape the infinite regress in (b) is when the belief dissolves that "me,mine," and separate identity are something substantial and real. 3. In advaita terms, everyone's deep sleep is the same. Theoretically, if everyone fell into deep sleep at the same time, then all identities could get mixed up, switched, combined, or lost. So the retention of identity is sometimes explained by reference to Ishvara, who on the cosmic scale keeps track of all the jivas' identities during deep sleep. I think this is a very beautiful explanation!! It is a great example of the way the bhakti approach enhances the jnana approach. Om! --Greg At 05:28 PM 3/31/02, satyan_c wrote: >Satyan wrote: > >> Non discrimination presupposes an individual with a non >> discriminating mind and it also presupposes entities real and unreal >> (ie duality) to be discriminated between. However, aren't we trying >> to analyse what is even causal to the individual and the mind and >> the first appearance of duality? ie what is it that brought about >> the individual/mind/duality to begin with. > >> Vedanta puts forth the causal body model to explain (on the >> empirical level for the ignorant but seeking intellect) the >> cause for the individual mind and intellect. > >Stig ji wrote: > >> Why do you think "the causal body model" and trigunatmika maya >> are necessarliy brought in in order to explain the cause of the >> individual mind and intellect? > >> Personally, I can´t see how adhyasa and >> avidya could be satisfyingly explained by bringing the >> post-Shankara theories into the picture. If mUlAvidyA is >> considered as necessary in order to explain adhyasa, then why >> don´t we have to explain the cause and existence of mUlAvidyA? >> And if we somehow tries to explain the cause of mUlAvidyA, then >> we have to explain the cause and existence of this cause etc. in >> infinitum. This way of reasoning apparently leads to an infinite >> regress. > > >Atmachaitanyaji wrote: > >> If you try to clarify your position by stating that even in your >> theory Root Ignorance is also false from the Absolute view point, >> and that it is only from the empirical view that we put forth this >> teaching. . Then I reply that our disagreement is, of course, only >> from the empirical point of view. > >I have received some answers to my questions from later posts. I think >that the point Stigji raised about the infinite regress and also the >points Sri Atmachaitanyaji made with respect to the differentiation >between empirical/transcendental views helped a lot in seeing that a >causal body may not after all be necessary to explain everything. > >One thing that I am still struggling with is an issue from the >empirical view alone which is: if we dismiss the need for a causal >body, and try to explain everything based on adhyasa alone, how do we >explain that the same individual who goes to sleep also arises from >sleep. Can we explain this phenomenon from the purely adhyasa >standpoint without bringing in the causal body? Are we saying that the >basic adhyasa is there even in deep sleep? If so, what is this adhyasa >in sleep? What is the not-self whose characteristics are superimposed >on the Self? > >I would really appreciate if Sri Atmachaitanyaji/Sri Stigji and other >learned members kindly clarify this doubt. > >regards, >--Satyan Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted April 1, 2002 Report Share Posted April 1, 2002 Namaste Gregji I did come across this same explanation given by Shankara in his commentary on the Brahma Sutras where he questions who wakes up from sleep if the identity is not retained in sleep? But I can't remember which verse. Thanks gregji. Kathi > > Gregory Goode [sMTP:goode] > Tuesday, April 02, 2002 1:48 AM > advaitin > Re: Re: Whence Adhyasa (and Causal Body) > > Namaste Satyan, > > You ask, > > "if we dismiss the need for a causal body, and > try to explain everything based on adhyasa alone, > how do we explain that the same individual who > goes to sleep also arises from sleep. Can we > explain this phenomenon from the purely adhyasa > standpoint without bringing in the causal body?" > > You question is from the empirical viewpoint and you would like an > empirical answer. There are several ways to approach this matter. > > 1. As empirical explanations go, what's wrong with the empirical > explanation given by neurosychology? The brain's identity over time > guarantees the similarity of the supposed individual, which is merely an > emergent epiphenomenon of the brain's activity. No causal body in this > explanation. > > 2. You might ask a preliminary question first. Are you even sure that the > same person really *does* go to sleep then wake up? Or does it just > *seem* like it? Imagine for a moment if one person woke up with the > memories from someone else. It would come to the same thing. It would > seem like Satyan went to sleep, then woke up. The difference cannot be > proven. This shows how flimsy a thing is identity. Why bother? And it > suggests a few more questions which are also more basic than the deep > sleep question -- > > (a) Is there true identity retained even between one > instant and the next, given the gaps between > thoughts which are akin to deep sleep? > > (b) What is it that makes an identity *your* identity? > Whatever you can point to as an answer to (b) would > be a further case of superimposition, and would allow > the question, "what makes *that* phenomenon *yours*? > And so forth, ad infinitum. > > The only way to escape the infinite regress in (b) is when the belief > dissolves that "me,mine," and separate identity are something > substantial and real. > > 3. In advaita terms, everyone's deep sleep is the same. Theoretically, if > everyone fell into deep sleep at the same time, then all identities could > get mixed up, switched, combined, or lost. So the retention of identity > is sometimes explained by reference to Ishvara, who on the cosmic scale > keeps track of all the jivas' identities during deep sleep. I think this > is a very beautiful explanation!! It is a great example of the way the > bhakti approach enhances the jnana approach. > > Om! > > --Greg > > At 05:28 PM 3/31/02, satyan_c wrote: > >Satyan wrote: > > > >> Non discrimination presupposes an individual with a non > >> discriminating mind and it also presupposes entities real and unreal > >> (ie duality) to be discriminated between. However, aren't we trying > >> to analyse what is even causal to the individual and the mind and > >> the first appearance of duality? ie what is it that brought about > >> the individual/mind/duality to begin with. > > > >> Vedanta puts forth the causal body model to explain (on the > >> empirical level for the ignorant but seeking intellect) the > >> cause for the individual mind and intellect. > > > >Stig ji wrote: > > > >> Why do you think "the causal body model" and trigunatmika maya > >> are necessarliy brought in in order to explain the cause of the > >> individual mind and intellect? > > > >> Personally, I can´t see how adhyasa and > >> avidya could be satisfyingly explained by bringing the > >> post-Shankara theories into the picture. If mUlAvidyA is > >> considered as necessary in order to explain adhyasa, then why > >> don´t we have to explain the cause and existence of mUlAvidyA? > >> And if we somehow tries to explain the cause of mUlAvidyA, then > >> we have to explain the cause and existence of this cause etc. in > >> infinitum. This way of reasoning apparently leads to an infinite > >> regress. > > > > > >Atmachaitanyaji wrote: > > > >> If you try to clarify your position by stating that even in your > >> theory Root Ignorance is also false from the Absolute view point, > >> and that it is only from the empirical view that we put forth this > >> teaching. . Then I reply that our disagreement is, of course, only > >> from the empirical point of view. > > > >I have received some answers to my questions from later posts. I think > >that the point Stigji raised about the infinite regress and also the > >points Sri Atmachaitanyaji made with respect to the differentiation > >between empirical/transcendental views helped a lot in seeing that a > >causal body may not after all be necessary to explain everything. > > > >One thing that I am still struggling with is an issue from the > >empirical view alone which is: if we dismiss the need for a causal > >body, and try to explain everything based on adhyasa alone, how do we > >explain that the same individual who goes to sleep also arises from > >sleep. Can we explain this phenomenon from the purely adhyasa > >standpoint without bringing in the causal body? Are we saying that the > >basic adhyasa is there even in deep sleep? If so, what is this adhyasa > >in sleep? What is the not-self whose characteristics are superimposed > >on the Self? > > > >I would really appreciate if Sri Atmachaitanyaji/Sri Stigji and other > >learned members kindly clarify this doubt. > > > >regards, > >--Satyan > > > > Discussion of Shankara's Advaita Vedanta Philosophy of nonseparablity of > Atman and Brahman. > Advaitin List Archives available at: > http://www.eScribe.com/culture/advaitin/ > To Post a message send an email to : advaitin > Messages Archived at: advaitin/messages > > > > Your use of is subject to > Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted April 3, 2002 Report Share Posted April 3, 2002 In a message dated 4/3/02 3:14:34 PM Eastern Standard Time, gmurthy writes: > This also is the conclusion that follows from the injunctions > about rites and meditations; for else the injunctions about rites > and meditations become useless, since on the supposition of some > other soul waking up, the conclusion will be that any one becomes > free as soon as one goes to sleep. And if this be the case, then > would you tell me what is the need of undertaking a rite or a > meditation that will yield its fruit in future? Again, on the > hypothesis that some other (bound) soul wakes up, it will either > meanthat some soul that had been working through a second body > wakes up (in the sleeping body under consideration), in which > case there will be the predicament of that (active) soul's > activity ceasing in that second body. Or if it be held that the > soul sleeping in the second body wakes up in the first, then that > supposition is useless; for when one sleeping in any body can wake > up in that very body, what do you gain by supposing that some one > sleeping in one body wakes up in another? > > If it be held that a free soul wakes up in the body (in which > another had slept), . . . > But can a body be borrowed for some shorter or longer amount of time, that is, might it be possible for some soul entity to occupy a live body when the normal soul owner is not particularly well attached to the body. Consider a drunken man, having had much too much alcohol. Here is one wishing to flee the coup. Often times, spoken words and actions occur in such a highly inebriated state that seem to have nothing, whatsoever, to do with the 'normal' personality of the person. Moreover, there is no memory of the event (on the following day along with a very big hangover), though there can well be memory of events just preceding and sometimes right after the drastic change of personality characteristics. In such cases of inebriation, if these are external entities who are momentarily entering, they usually are not particularly enlightened, quite the contrary. Almost everyone has seen such a thing, drunken fools. Indeed, my own fearless and reckless youth has personally experienced such things. But as the soul-mind-sensory-organ interconnections become more established upon sobering up, the 'visitor' is quickly pushed out again. If this is the case, then also, why may we not have the same on the other end of the spectrum, i.e., some remarkably few individuals do seem to take on the characteristics and personalities of others, at least for a time, and possibly even of the more enlightened types of avatars. If this does occur, is the transformation of consciousness a 100% delineation between two entities, as a digital step function containing either myself or somebody else, or is it of a variable mix density as X% of myself along with Y% of somebody else. The latter case would imply that the characteristics of personality are formed out of discrete separate pieces. This is surely the implication of vâsanas and/or samskâras. This is very interesting, indeed, most fascinating. I wonder how the many vedanta scholars here might view such a concept? jai guru dev, Edmond Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted April 3, 2002 Report Share Posted April 3, 2002 namaste. re: is it the same jIvA that goes to sleep and wakes up the next day: I recently came across shri shankara's comment on this in His brahmasUtrAbhAShya. While commenting on the sutrA III.ii.9, the revered AcArya says (and I quote swami Gambhirananda's translation) "But the very same soul returns from sleep because of the reasons of action, remembrance, scriptural authority, and injunction." Doubt: It is being considered whether the one who awakes from the merger in Existence is the same at the time of awakening as one was at the ime of merger, or whether it may either be the same entity or some one else. Opponent: When under this doubt, the conclusion arrived at is that there is no hard and fast rule. Why? When a drop of water is thrown into a mass of water, it becomes one with the mass. And when an attempt is made to take it up again from there, it is impossible to have that very same drop. Similarly, when the sleeping soul has become one with the supreme Self and has attained quiscence (i.e. freedom from everything), that very soul cannot wake up again. Hence the conclusion is that the waking being may be either the original soul, or he may be God, or some other individual soul. Vedantin: To this the aphorosist says, "But (it is) the very same soul", which has gone to sleep and attained its own Self, that rises up again, and it is none else. What are the reasons for that? Because of the reasons of action, remembrance, scriptural authority, and injunction. We shall elaborate the reasons separately. To begin, the selfsame soul alone can awake, and none else, because an unfinished action is seen to be resumed. Thus one is seen to take up and finish a piece of work left incomplete on the previous day. One cannot reasonably engage oneself in some work left incomplete by another, since a contrary view will lead to unwarranted conclusions. Hence it is understood that the same person is the doer of the same work on the previous and next days. If the person waking up be different, then there should be no memory of what was perceived earlier, which proposition is contrary to what is evident in the recollection, "I saw this on the previous day". For something seen by one cannot be remembered by another. And a recognition like, "I am that very person", in which one's own identity is recognized cannot be imagined to occur if some other soul should wake up. >From scriptural texts it is known that the selfsame person wakes up, as for instance, "He comes back again, in the inverse order to his former condition, the waking state" (Br. u. IV.iii.16), "All these creatures who repair to this world of Brahman everyday, do not know It" (Ch. u. VIII.iii.2), and "Whatever they might have been here (in the previous waking state) - be it a tiger, a lion, a wolf, a boar, a worm, an insect, a gnat, or a musquito, they become these very creatures then (after waking from sleep)" (Ch. u. VI.ix.3). These and other texts occurring in the context of sleep and waking up cannot be reconciled if the waking soul be different. This also is the conclusion that follows from the injunctions about rites and meditations; for else the injunctions about rites and meditations become useless, since on the supposition of some other soul waking up, the conclusion will be that any one becomes free as soon as one goes to sleep. And if this be the case, then would you tell me what is the need of undertaking a rite or a meditation that will yield its fruit in future? Again, on the hypothesis that some other (bound) soul wakes up, it will either meanthat some soul that had been working through a second body wakes up (in the sleeping body under consideration), in which case there will be the predicament of that (active) soul's activity ceasing in that second body. Or if it be held that the soul sleeping in the second body wakes up in the first, then that supposition is useless; for when one sleeping in any body can wake up in that very body, what do you gain by supposing that some one sleeping in one body wakes up in another? If it be held that a free soul wakes up in the body (in which another had slept), then liberation will become terminable. It is illogical that one for whom ignorance has ceased should become embodied again. Herby is also refuted the view that God wakes up in the body, since in Him ignorance is eternally absent. Besides, the defects of deriving some unearned result and losing something earned will be inevitable on the supposition that some other soul wakes up in the body after sleep. And it was argued that just as a drop of water thrown into a mass of water cannot be singled out, so also a soul merging in Existence cannot spring up again. That is being refuted. In the analogy it is quite in order to say that the (selfsame) drop of water cannot be singled out, since there is nothing to mark out its individuality. But here we have karma and ignorance as the factors making the (individual) distinction. The two cases are thus different. Moreover, it is a matter of experience that though milk and water, when mixed together, cannot be separated by anyone of the human race, still they can be separated by ducks. Besides, there is no such entity, different from the supreme Self, which has to be distinguished from existence like a drop of water from a mass of water. It has been shown more than once that Existence Itself comes to be called indirectly a soul, because of the intervention of limiting adjuncts. This being the case, as long as a soul continues to be bound up with a particular set of adjuncts, so long do we deal with it as the very same one, and when it comes to be bound with another set of adjuncts, we deal with it as though it is different. That very same set of adjunts persists in sleep and wakefulness on the maxim of the seed and seedling, so that the reasonable position is that the selfsame soul wakes up from sleep." Regards Gummuluru Murthy ------ Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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