mahavakyas and sAmAnAdhikaraNya

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Namaste Ram and all others interested in this topic,

 

I get very confused by all the mails that flood in

each day and never look to see if I am on the advaitin

or advaita or abhinavagupta or one of many other

interesting sites that I have signed up to.

Someone, somewhere had posted a question of the

experts on sAmAnAdhikaraNyaM. No one had picked this

up so I offered to post something which would explain

this topic through a kevala-advaitin interpretation of

the mahAvAkyas. I explained that the words being

posted were not mine but those of Dr.

T.N.Ganapathy...I think in a lecture in 1978...but

published as a monograph in 1982.

The booklet that I have of the monograph is very

battered and has no Sanskrit Devanagari script so I

was transliterating into ITRANS from the font used in

the booklet. There will be errors for which I

apologise, some from my own failing and some from the

text which I did not pick up. I had difficulty in

finding a way of e-mailing the important chart that

comes after the introductions and charts embeded in

the text. Also I do not know if my attempt at

foornoting survives cyberspace. Any questions I will

try to answer.

If Dr Ganapathy comes by this way I trust that he will

value his words reaching a wider audience. I got my

copy of the booklet by writing to the Ramakrishna

Centre in Chennai some years back and someone there

got a copy from the Vivekananda College in Chennai. I

do not know if this is still possible if anyone would

like to have a copy of the booklet.

I hope the following is of use to you:

 

Om sri ram

 

Ken Knight

 

INTRODUCTION

 

Swami Vivekananda said, “All Knowledge is Veda.”

Knowledge is eternal and therefore knowledge can only

be discovered, not created. The Vedas are the

repositories of all knowledge, secular and spiritual.

In our scheme of education all secular knowledge

should lead us to the higher knowledge or the

spiritual knowledge, the parA vidyA. The VedAnta is

the culmination of the Vedas and the mahAvAkya, the

‘great dictum’ is the logical conclusion of VedAnta.

The four Vedas which contain several Upanishads give

us the four mahAvAkyas, generally recognised as such.

These statements are ‘great’ in meaning and are

authoritative pronouncements on the essential identity

between the JivAtman and the ParamAtman according to

the Advaita system of philosophy. Generally it is held

by the Advaitins that the mahAvAkya by itself can

cause the direct cognition of this essential identity

while only VAcaspati MiShra, holds it is the

meditation on the meaning of the mahAvAkya that causes

this cognition and not mere Shabda (hearing the

mahAvAkya). Either way the full import of the

Mahãvãkya is to be correctly understood and this

realisation is the goal of all SAdhana. To those

initiated into the method of Shravana, manana and

nididhyAsana, the meaning of the mahAvAkya is

explained using the dialectical method. It is this

kind of reasoning that has been rendered into simple

readable English by Prof.T.N. Ganapathy in this book.

 

For the uninitiated, however, the meaning and message

of the mahAvAkyas may come through secondary

scriptures like the PurANas and even literature. A

distinctive characteristic of our national literature

is its capacity to convey the message of Mukti,

freedom. The meaning may also be brought home to us by

the testimony of seers. As such we come across

glimpses of this knowledge in the utterances of

prophets even outside the fold of Hinduism as for

example in the utterance of Christ “I and my Father

are one” and in the love poems of the Sufl mystics.

 

This profound philosophy of VedAnta which seeks to

discover unity, and its possible social implications

are elaborately discussed by Swami Vivekananda in his

lectures on J~nAna Yoga and Practical VedAnta. They

may be summed up as follows: “All reasoning ends only

in finding unity; so we first use analysis than

synthesis. In the world of science the forces are

gradually narrowed down in the search for one

underlying force. When physical science can perfectly

grasp the final unity, it will have reached an end,

for reaching unity we find rest. Knowledge is final.”

 

“Religion the most precious of all sciences, long ago

discovered that final unity to reach which is the

object of J~nAna Yoga.

All is the Self or Brahman. The saint, the sinner, the

lamb, the tiger, even the murderer as far as they have

any reality, can be nothing else because there is

nothing else... Nothing can be higher than this

knowledge, and in those purified by Yoga it comes in

flashes to the soul... This was discovered 4,000 years

ago, but has not yet become the property of the race,

it is still the property of some individuals only. For

the man who has become perfect, nothing remains but to

apply his understanding. He lives only to help the

world, desiring nothing for himself. What

distinguishes is negative — the positive is ever wider

and wider. What we have in common is the widest of

all, and that is ‘Being’.”

 

Again the process, the methodology of spiritual

striving, is given in the words of Swamiji, as, “The

awakening of the soul to its bondage and its effort to

stand up and assert itself — this is called life.

Success in this struggle is called evolution. The

eventual triumph, when all the slavery is blown away,

is called salvation, NirvANa, freedom. Everything in

the universe is struggling for liberty. When I am

bound by nature, by name and form, by time, space and

causality, I do not know what I truly am. But even in

this bondage my real self is not completely lost. I

strain against the bonds; one by one they break, and I

become conscious of my innate grandeur. Then comes

complete liberation. I attain to the clearest and

fullest consciousness of myself— I know that I am the

infinite spirit, the master of nature, not its slave.

Beyond all differentiation and combination, beyond

space, time and causation I am that I am.” So this is

the meaning of the mahAvAkya, and Swamiji has

elaborately dealt with the social implications of the

mahAvAkya in his lectures on Practical VedAnta.

 

There is another way to understand the meaning of

mahAvAkya which the Upanishad describes using a

brilliant poetic imagery. This can best be explained

using Swamiji’s paraphrase of the relevant verse. “Two

birds sat on one tree. The bird at the top was calm,

majestic, beautiful, perfect. The lower bird was

always hopping from twig to twig, now eating sweet

fruits and being happy, now eating bitter fruits and

being miserable. One day, when he had eaten a fruit

more hitter than usual, he glanced up to the majestic

upper bird and thought, “How I would like to be like

him!” — and he hopped up a little way towards him.

Soon he forgot all about his desire to be like the

upper bird, and went on as before, eating sweet and

bitter fruits, and being happy and miserable. Again he

looked up, again he went up a little nearer to the

calm and majestic upper bird. Many times was this

repeated until at last he drew very near the upper

bird; the brilliancy of his plumage dazzled him,

seemed to absorb him, and finally, to his wonder and

surprise, he found there was only one bird he was the

upper bird all the time and had but just found it out.

Man is like that lower bird but if he perseveres in

his efforts to rise to the highest ideal, he can

conceive of, he too will find that he was the self all

the time and the other was but a dream.”

 

If we delve into the meaning of our art, architecture,

poetry, or drama, we shall discover that the same

theme of unity is depicted in all these various

expressions of human will or emotion. Sister Nivedita

says, “The Indian picture expresses unity. The Italian

would have been full of broken suggestions... A true

picture must be suggestive.” Our philosophy and

psychology of aesthetics, and literary criticism again

are informed by this theme of unity. The evolution of

thought from BhaTTalollaTa to Abhinavagupta

illustrates this fact. This runs parallel to the

evolution of philosophical ideas from

NyAya-VaiSheshika to VedAnta. Some of these ideas are:

A real aesthetic enjoyment is possible, according to

our AlankArikas, only when BhAvas are universalised.

They lose their effects when perceived in a general

way. Again this enjoyment is alaukika or

transcendental (this comes very near to the Vedäntic

idea). Even grief depicted in literature creates only

joy in the mind of the sahR^idaya.

 

Thus we see that the theme of the mahAvAkya, the

essential unity of all existence, is the most

fascinating theme and provides us the key to

understand the hidden sources of our strength and

meaning of all our endeavours in various fields of

thinking and action. It is this that Swami Vivekananda

wanted to be broadcast in a language understood by the

common man. This problem has several aspects. The

author has made a good start in tackling one aspect of

the problem, of rendering in simple English the

traditional approach. We hope that he will continue to

work on this noble theme and convey its message

effectively to one and all.

 

 

SWAMI AMRITANANDA

Secretary & Correspondent

Ramakris/ina Mission Vivekananda College

 

 

 

 

FOREWORD

 

Dr. Ganapathy is to be congratulated on his brochure

on the mahAvAkyas mahAvAkya, wherein he has expounded

a highly technical subject in a non-technical manner,

without however sacrificing the profundity of the

subject in the interest of a simplified exposition.

The interpretation given is exclusively according to

the tradition of KevalAdvaita or pure Non-dualism, and

is meant to show that a mahAvAkya is called so because

it is akhaNDArthabodhaka — that is, it declares the

unitary and partless nature of the supreme Truth.

There are two steps in the establishment of this

thesis. First it is pointed out that the

above-mentioned relationship is established through

aikya-sAmAnAdhikaraNya or co-ordinate relationship of

the identity of the two terms of the vAkya (sentence)

like Tat tvam asi (That thou art). sAmAnAdhikaraNya

(co-ordinate relationship) occurs when the two terms

of a sentence have a common reference. But this need

not necessarily be one of identity. This is explained

by analysing sixteen forms of sAmAnAdhikaraNya and

showing how none of them except the aikya-

sAmAnAdhikaraNya can establish the true unity of the

twoterms, and therefore of the unity of existence as a

whole, which is the purport of all VedAnta.

 

The next step in the argument seeks to show how there

can be unity and a common reference even when the

two-terms —Tat, standing for IShvara and Tvam standing

for jIva — have, apparently different denotations.

This is achieved by the doctrine that words in a

sentence can have two meanings — one vAcyArtha or

manifest meaning, and the other lakshyArtha or implied

meaning. In the great sentence Tat tvam asi, the

manifest meaning of tat is IShvara, but the implied

meaning, Brahman, the attributeless Absolute. So also

in the case of tvam ‘you’ too, the implicit meaning

(lakshaNA) is Brahman while the manifest meaning

(vAcya) is the jIva. Thus the identity of both the

terms is obtained by the elimination of the adjuncts

of both. When this is done, their common substratum,

which is their implied meaning too, is found to be

identical. To further elucidate this point, the

various forms of lakshaNA, or meanings by implication,

are analysed. Of the three types of lakshaNAs

considered, what is called jahad-ajahal-lakshaNA

(exclusive-non-exclusive implication) ,is favoured as

applicable to the context of mahAvAkyas.

If a critique of the theme is allowed in a Foreword,

the present writer would like to offer the following

reflections. The whole thesis is based on the

acceptance of the idea that the purport of the VedAnta

is to teach the unity of all existence. This position

is unexceptionable. But the study of the Upanishadic

texts would show that there are two types of unity —

unity by sublation of all multiplicity, and unity

through the subordination of all multiplicity by the

one unifying principle. Now the traditional standpoint

of kevalAdvaita is that the first of these types of

unity alone is the ultimate position, and that

wherever the second type of unity is referred to, it

is only provisional, base camp to be abandoned and

negated ultimately.

 

Now is it absolutely necessary that a liberal doctrine

like that of VedAnta should be interpreted in such an

exclusive fashion? Why should only one kind of

sAmAnAdhikaraNya, namely Aikya-sAmAnAdhikaraNya, be

favoured? Some of the other kinds of co-ordination

like kArya-kAiraNa (effect and cause) and aMsAMShin

(part and whole) mentioned in the thesis can as well

be considered as applicable. There are some arguments

brought against them, but they are not convincing to

those who take this latter view of VedAnta. Similar

shortcomings can be found also in the type of identity

favoured by the kevalAdvaita. It can only lead to

endless controversy of an inconclusive nature,

weakening the doctrine of the VedAnta.

The better course therefore will be to hold that

VedAnta particular to show only the unity of

existence, accepting at the same time several types of

co-ordination like those of absolute identity, of part

and whole, of cause and effect, etc. Immediately the

objection will arise how the same sentence can have

conflicting meanings. The answer is that they are not

conflicting but complementary and that there is no

rule that a sentence can have only one meaning, which

is so in regard to a logicians sentence no doubt, but

not of a poet. In the compositions of great poets like

KAlidAsa and Shakespeare we get passages having more

than one layer of meaning. All these meanings co-exist

in the passages without any conflict. And if we

conceive of God more as a poet than a logician, we can

understand how His revelation can be multifaceted,

catering to the needs of men of different temperaments

and capacities. Scriptures are revelations only

because unlike the compositions of logicians and

grammarians, they are meant to cater to humanity at

large. And a mahAvAkya is the quintessence of

revelation. For the grammarian a mahAvAkya as opposed

to a laghuvAkya, is a sentence with a very large

number of words. For the logical Advaitin it is a

sentence of a few words teaching a great truth, namely

akhaNDArtha or the doctrine of non-difference. But

perhaps a saint and a seer will find its mahattva,

greatness, in that it is many-faceted, expounding the

unity of existence in its several aspects. The

greatness of mahAvAkyas consists in that they embody

several forms of co-ordination without any conflict.

Scriptural exegesis in VedAnta has to pass from the

sway of logical exclusiveness into the liberalism of

mystical all-inclusiveness.

 

Sri Ramakrishna Math, Madras,

4.12.1982.

SWAMI TAPASYANANDA

President

 

sAmAnAdhikaraNya

 

 

 

bAdhAyAM adhyAsa

viSheshaNa-viSheshya

aikya others

(1)

 

(11)

dosha-kR^ita

adosha-kR^ita

(2)

 

 

ShastrakR^ita sa~NketakR^ita guNakR^ita

(5)

(6)

 

sampad-upAsti pratika- upAsti

(3) (4)

 

jAti-vyakti

kriyA-kriyAvat guNa-guNin

upakaraNa-upakaraNin

(7)

(8) (9)

(10)

 

kArya-kAraNa

prakR^iti-vikR^iti stuti

upacAra aMShaMShin

(12)

(13) (14)

(15) (16)

 

 

1. bAdhAyAM Coordinate relation

in terms of contradiction

under adhyAsa comes dosha-kR^ita and adosha-kR^ita:

2. dosha-kR^ita Coordinate

relation due to error.

Under adosha-kR^ita comes ShastrakR^ita and

sampad-upAsti and pratika- upAsti, under ShastrakR^ita

comes

3. sampad-upAsti Coordinate relation

in terms of meditation on the excellence of something

4. pratika-upAsti Coordinate

relation in terms of meditation on a symbol.

Directly under adosha-kR^ita come sa~NketakR^ita and

guNakR^ita

5. sa~NketakR^ita Coordinate relation

based on convention.

6. guNakR^ita Coordinate relation

due to quality.

Under viSheshaNa-viSheshya come 7,8,9,10.

7. jAti-vyakti Coordinate

relation in terms of the universal and the particular

8. kriyA-kriyAvat Coordinate relation

that exists between the act and the doer.

9. guNa-guNin Coordinate

relation in terms of substance and attribute

10 upakaraNa-upakaraNin. Coordinate relation in

terms of an instrument and its possessor

aikya is by itself

11 aikya Coordinate

relation in terms of identity

under others come the rest.

12.kArya-kAraNa Coordinate relation

in terms of cause-effect

13 prakR^iti-vikR^iti Coordinate relation

in terms of matter and form

14. stuti Coordinate

relation in terms of eulogy

15. upacAra Coordinate relation in

terms of courtesy

16. aMShaMShin Coordinate relation

in terms of the part and the whole.

 

 

 

 

 

THE MAHAVAKYAS

 

At the outset it may be stated that the main aim of

this monograph is to show that the mahAvAkyas are the

declarations of the identity of individual self with

the Supreme Self.

 

Before we enter into a detailed discussion on the

subject proper, let us see what a vAkya or sentence

is. A sentence is a unit of words. It is a single and

complete expression of thought.

 

The collocation of words in a sentence is such that it

does not leave the hearer in the eager expectation of

hearing more to get an information complete in itself.

 

A sentence is defined as follows:

 

That sentence is a means of valid knowledge in which

the relation (among the meanings of words) that is the

object of its intention is not contradicted by any

other means of valid knowledge.

 

This means that a sentence is not a mere combination

of words. Every sentence should have at least two

words, a subject and a predicate. A sentence with an

intransitive verb (akarmaka) requires a minimum of two

words. A sentence with a transitive verb (sakarmaka)

requires a minimum of three words. Both these types

are called simple sentences (1aghu-vAkyas). A sentence

may also contain more words. It may run to several

pages with a large number of words in it. Only such

sentences because of their size and the number of

words they contain should be called mahAvAkyas in the

strict sense of the term. A mahAvAkya, on this

classification, is one which contains limitless number

of words. If this be the case how can we call the

following vAkyas which contain not more than three

words as mahAvAkyas.

 

The four major texts are:

(1) praj~nAnam brahma (Consciousness is Brahman)

(2) aham brahmAsmi (I am Brahman)

(3) tat tvam asi (Thou art That)

(4) ayam AtmA brahma (This Atman is Brahman)

 

Strictly speaking, the above texts cannot be called

mahAvAkyas. Yet they are. What is the criterion by

which we decide that they are mahAvAkyas? The

criterion is the message they contain viz., the truth,

that is, the declaration of the identity of the

individual self with the supreme Self.(1) Since these

vAkyas are said to be akhaNDartha-bodhaka (conveying

unitary impartite sense free from all distinctions),

they are called mahAvAkyas . These sentences contain

the kernel of the Vedas conveying the supersensuous

truth. mahAvAkyas are VedAnta aphorisms which inform

the seeker about things unknown by other means. All

other sentences are called avAntaravAkyas (subsidiary

sentences).

 

Let us see what type of vAkyas these four mahAvAkyas

come under, in order to facilitate our discussion on

them.

 

A sentence, though it consists of words, signifies

more than what its constituent words convey. “More is

meant than what meets the ear.” To grasp its import

one has to know not only the meanings of the

individual words, but also their relation. The

significance of a sentence is brought out by the

apprehension of the mutual relation of the meanings of

the constituent words.(2) The apprehension of this

relation is the verbal cognition.

 

Sentences are classified on the basis of their use

into two:

vyadhikaraNa and samAnAdhikaraNa. In vyadhikaraNa each

word in the sentence conveys a meaning that is

different from others. “The application, to one thing,

of several words having the same case of which there

is a different reason” is defined as sAmAnAdhikaraNya

or grammatical coordinate relation. Literally the word

sAmAnAdhikaraNya means ‘the relation of abiding in a

common substratum.’ In sAmAnAdhikaraNya the words are

shown to stand in that relation by their being in the

same case and in the same number. In vyadhikaraNa

vAkya the words have different case and number. The

four mahAvAkyas fall under the category of coordinate

relation or sAmAnAdhikaraNya.

 

Coordinate relation may be broadly classified into

four main types. They are: bAdhAyAM sAmAnAdhikaraNy

(coordinate relation in terms of contradiction),

adhyAsa sAmAnAdhikaraNya (coordinate relation in

terms of error), viSheshaNa-viSheshya sAmAnAdhikaraNya

(coordinate relation in terms of substance-attribute)

and aikya sAmAnAdhikaraNya (coordinate relation in

terms of identity).

 

AdhyAsa and viSheshaNa-viSheshya types have special

varieties under each head. In addition to the above

four main types and their subdivisions, five other

types of coordinate relation are also recognised. All

told, there are sixteen varieties of coordinate

relation. (see table above)

 

The aim of this monograph is to show that the

mahAvAkyas can be meaningfully interpreted to come

under aikya or abheda sAmAnAdhikaraNya. This is shown

first by demonstrating that no other type of

coordinate relation can satisfactorily explain the

true meaning of the mahAvAkyas ; secondly, it is shown

that only abheda sAmAnAdhikaraNya can give the

correct interpretation; and thirdly it is shown that

the mahAvAkyas are to be interpreted through

jahadajahallakshaNa (exclusive signification).

 

Before we proceed further let us make clear the

meanings of the words ‘Tat’ and ‘Tvam’ in ‘Tat tvam

asi.’ Caitanya is either associated with antaHkaraNa

or not. Caitanya associated with antaHkaraNa is jIva.

Caitanya not associated with antaHkaraNa is pure

Brahman. The jIva (associated with antaHkaraNa) is the

primary meaning (vAcyArtha) of the word ‘tvam’ and

Brahman is the secondary meaning (lakshyArtha) of

tvam. Similarly, the words denoting jIva (3) in the

other mahAvAkyas have both vAcyArtha and

lakshyArtha. Caitanya is either associated with mAyA

(nescience) or free from mAyA. The caitanya associated

with mAyA is iShvara; and the caitanya not associated

mAyA is pure caitanya. The pure caitanya is called

Brahman. The vAcyArtha of ‘Tat’ is iShvara; the

lakshyArtha of ‘Tat’ is Brahman. Similarly the words

denoting ‘iShvara’ (Brahman) in the other mahAvAkyas

have both primary and secondary meanings. iShvara is

the primary meaning, and Brahman the secondary

meaning. When associated with the limiting adjunct

(antaHkaraNa or mAyA), jIiva as well as iShvara is

different from Brahman. Without the limiting adjuncts,

jIva and iShvara are identical with Brahman.

 

Let us now explain the different types of

sAmAnAdhikaraNya (other than aikya) and show how they

are inadequate to bring out the true meaning of the

mahAvAkyas.(4)

 

1. bAdhAyAM sAmAnAdhikaraNya (coordinate relation in

terms of contradiction): Someone mistakes a post for a

thief. Another man corrects him saying that the ‘Thief

is a post’ (coraH sthANuH). The statement is intended

to show that the object is only a post. The terms

‘thief’ and ‘post’ are contradictorily related. Yet on

hearing the statement, the man, who has misunderstood

the post to be a thief, corrects himself by abandoning

the object ‘thief’. The coordinate relation, that

exists between the terms ‘thief’ and ‘post’ in the

above statement is in terms of contradiction.

 

If we accept this type of coordinate relation in

interpreting the mahAvAkyas (which express the truth

that jIva is Brahman), we have to abandon either the

jIva or Brahman. If jIva or Brahman is to be abandoned

by this process, the purpose of the mahAvAkyas is

lost.

 

Let us assume that either Brahman or jIva is to be

abandoned. If Brahman is to be abandoned by this

process, the purport of the mahAvAkya that ‘the jIva

is nothing but Brahman’ is lost. That is, Brahmanhood

which is to be attained by the jIva (by annihilating

ignorance), is itself negated or abandoned. This

cannot be the meaning of the mahAvAkyas which seek to

show the identity between the two. On the other hand,

if jIva is to be abandoned by this process of

bAdhAyAM sAmAnAdhikaraNya, the object with which the

Brahmanhood is to be identified is lost. And if jIva

is abandoned, to whom are the mahAvAkyas addressed?

Further, bAdhAyAM sAmAnAdhikaraNya cannot be applied

to the mahAvAkya ‘Tat tvam asi,’ as the word ‘Tat’ (in

the primary sense) denotes only iShvara and not

Brahman. Similarly the word ‘Brahman’ in the other

three mahAvAkyas denotes (in the primary sense) only

iShvara and not Brahman. The word ‘Brahman’ here

stands for saviShesha Brahman (Brahman with qualities)

and not nirveShesha Brahman (Brahman without

qualities). Since the aim of the mahAvAkyas is to show

the identity of the individual self with the ultimate

Self, they cannot be interpreted through bAdhAyAM

sAmAnAdhikaraNya.

 

In this connection it may be pointed out that some

Advaitins use this type of sAmAnAdhikaraNya in

interpreting the mahAvAkyas. But a careful examination

of such an interpretation will show that such thinkers

use aikya sAmAnAdhikaraNya and not bAdhAyAM

sAmAnAdhikaraNya. Even if bAdhAyAM sAmAnAdhikaraNya is

adopted in interpreting the mahAvAkyas, what is

abandoned is not the jIva in its essential nature,

since by brahmabhAva (brahmanhood) only the jIvabhAva

(jivahood) which is adventitious is lost. The

knowledge of the object as post abandons only the idea

that it is a ‘thief’ and does not abandon the

substratum, ‘object,’ itself. The Advaitins who use

bAdhAyAM sAmAnAdhikaraNya in interpreting the

mahAvAkyas do not accept the abandonment of Brahman.

As the question of sublating Brahman does not arise,

the abandonment can only be that of jIva and not of

Brahman. In the case of the abandonment of jIva what

is abandoned is the jIvabhAva and not the jIva.

Further, the word tat denotes, according to this

section of Advaitins, nirupAdhika Brahman

(unconditioned Brahman) which is mentioned before in

the sentence “svam apito bhavati.” (5) (He attains his

own nature) which occurs in the course of the

description of deep sleep. Yet the difference between

the Advaitins who accept bAdhAyAM sAmAnAdhikaraNya

and those who do not accept this type of coordinate

relation in interpreting mahAvAkyas is a difference in

upeya (end) for, both accept that the mahAvAkyas teach

the non-difference of the Atman from Brahman. Hence

both sections of advaitins accept, in essence, that

the aim of the mahAvAkyas is not to abandon the jIva

but to show the identity of the jIva with Brahman.

 

 

(2) DoshakR^ita-sAmAnAdhikaraNya (coordinate relation

due to error): This is one of the main varieties of

adhyAsa- sAmAnAdhikaraNya. AdhyAsa is the apprehension

of something as something else.(6) AdhyAsa-

sAmAnAdhikaraNya is broadly classified into

doshakR^itam and adoshakR^itam or AhAryajam. Mistaking

a rope for a snake is doshakR^itam. When we see a rope

as a snake we express our cognition in the form “This

is a snake”. This statement is due to erroneous

cognition (or bhrAntij~nAna). The difference in the

resulting statements distinguishes bAdhAyAM

sAmAnAdhikaraNya from doshakR^ita sAmAnAdhikaraNya

In doshakR^ita sAmAnAdhikaraNya, the difference

between the rope and the snake is not known. Though

the term ‘this’ stands for the rope, it is not known

because snake is superimposed on the ‘this’. As the

main aim of the mahAvAkyas is to remove false

knowledge, they cannot be interpreted through

doshakR^ita sAmAnAdhikaraNya. If it is argued that

this type of coordinate relation can be applied to the

mahAvAkyas, then the mahAvAkyas should have been in

the form “This is IShvara” or “This is jIva”. But the

mahAvAkyas are in the form ‘jIva is IShvara’. Hence

they cannot be interpreted through doshakR^ita

sAmAnAdhikaraNya, as the identity between Brahman and

jIva is not doshakR^itam which is nothing but

bhrAntij~nAna

adoshakR^itam (coordinate relation not due to error)

is classified into three types. They are:

(i) ShAstrakR^itam (coordinate relation due to

scriptures);

(ii) Sa~NketakR^itam (coordinate relation due to

convention);

and (iii) GuNakR^itam (coordinate relation due to

quality).

 

(3) & (4) Sampad-upAsti sAmAnAdhikaraNya, and

pratIkaupAsti sAmAnAdhikaraNya: The first type of

adoshakR^itam, viz., ShAstrakR^itam may be sub-divided

into two:

 

(i) Sampad-upAsti (coordinate relation in terms of

meditation on the excellence of something), and

 

(ii) Pratika-upAsti (coordinate relation in terms of

meditation on a symbol).

 

The statement “ManaH viShvedevAH” can be cited as an

example for sampad-upAsti. Here the numerical

many-ness (anantam) is mentioned as similarity between

the individual mind and viShvedevAH

 

Meditation upon the mind as Brahman and worshipping a

stone as VishNu are examples of pratika upcAsti. In

the first example we are asked to superimpose the idea

of Brahman on mind and in the second we are asked to

superimpose the idea of VishNu on the stone, even

though no point of similarity is mentioned between the

mind and Brahman or between VishNu and the stone. We

may distinguish sampad-upAsti from pratika-upAsti. In

sampad-upAsti the points of similarity are mentioned

whereas in pratika-upAsti it is not so.

 

Further, if the superimposed thing or idea is more

important than the substratum, it is sampad-upAsti,

e.g., “The preceptor is the God” (GururdevaH). If the

idea of substratum is more important than the

superimposed, it is pratika-upAsti e.g., “Om Brahma”.

In both the cases the idea of the substratum is not

abandoned.

 

Both sampad-upAsti- sAmAnAdhikaraNya and

pratika-uAisti- sAmAnAdhikaraNya are not applicable to

the mahAvAkyas for the following reasons:

 

(a) If the mahAvAkyas are to be interpreted as

statements for meditation, they should have contained

the word ‘upAsti’ directly in them. This is not the

case with the mahAvAkyas.

 

(b) It may be argued that even though terms indicative

of meditation are not included in the mahAvAkyas, they

are meant only as statements of meditation. This point

may be met by showing that, since moksha is given as

the fruit of these mahAvAkyas and as eternal

liberation cannot be produced by our meditation, the

mahAvAkyas cannot come under this category of

sAmAnAdhikaraNya.

 

© That which is worshipped cannot be Brahman.’(7)

The mahAvAkyas are not for the sake of including

upAsana on Brahman because when the non-dual nature of

Brahman is experienced, the knowledge of duality

disappears and one who has realised one’s identity

with Brahman, cannot meditate on Brahman.

 

(d) Statements of meditation should contain the word

‘iti’ (thus). The mahAvAkyas do not have the word

‘iti’.

 

(e) In the mahAvAkyas we are not asked to reflect on

the individual soul as if it is Brahman. It is

categorically stated in all the mahAvAkyas that the

jIva is Brahman itself.

 

(f) If we assume that the mahAvAkyas are upAsana

vAkyas (statements enjoining meditation) several

difficulties arise. Are we to meditate (i) on Brahman

as jIva or (ii) on jIva as Brahman? We cannot meditate

on Brahman as jIva for, in that case we will be

meditating on the highest or superior principle in

terms of the lower one. If we are asked to meditate on

jIva as Brahman, repetition of the mahAvAkya (8) is

not necessary.

 

In upAtsana there is no place for argument or

dialectic. Only where there is the employment of

argument or dialectic repetition is necessary. Since

the mahAvAkyas has been repeated nine times to clarify

the doubts raised by Shvetaketu it cannot be a upAsana

vAkya, but it must be a tattva-vAkya.

 

An objection may be raised to this line of argument by

pointing out that the other mahAvAkyas have not been

repeated at all and that therefore they, at least,

must be upAsana vAkyas. But it must be remembered that

the other mahAvAkyas are not meant to clarify any

doubts on the part of the student; they are uttered in

the course of teaching and not in the course of a

dialogue.

Further the moment these mahAvAkyas are uttered one is

able to grasp the identity between Brahman and Atman.

Three types of adhikArins (qualified aspirants) are

recognised in the Upanishads viz. uttama (best),

madhyama (average) and manda (below average).

Uttama-adhikArin is one who can understand the inner

truth even through the silence of the teacher. This is

the way DakshiNAmUrti teaches his disciples. The

madhyama-adhiAirin catches the inner meaning as soon

as he hears the statement. Only for the last category

of persons manda who have a bundle of doubts to be

dispelled by the process of dialectic, repetition of

truth is necessary.

Only the mahAvAkyas ‘tat tvam asi’ is uttered nine

times in the ChAndogya Upanishad during a dialogue

between the teacher and the student. In the case of

the other mahAvAkyas they are uttered not in the

course of a dialogue between the teacher and the

taught, but in the form of direct teaching by the

Upanishads themselves. Hence where direct teaching has

been resorted to, repetition is not necessary. The

difference among mahAvAkyas is a difference in the

methodology, of stating the truth. Further it can be

shown that the method of dialogue can also be

successfully applied to the other three mahAvAkyas.

Hence the objection does not stand scrutiny.

 

(g) If the mahAvAkyas are meant to be upAsana-vAkyas,

they should have come under the karmakANDa and not in

the j~nAnakAnda. So even with reference to the context

(or section) in which they occur, we cannot call them

upAsana-Atkyas.

 

Because of these reasons we cannot establish the

coordinate relation between Brahman and Atman in terms

of ShAstrakR^ita- sAmAnAdhikaraNya .

 

(5) ShAstrakR^ita- sAmAnAdhikaraNya (coordinate

relation based on convention): The best example of

this type of sAmAnAdhikaraNya is found in

superimposing the sound ‘a’ on the syllable ‘a’. The

coordinate relation that exists between the syllable

representing the sound ‘a’ (not the meaning of the

letter) and the akshara (syllable) ‘a’ is referred to

as sa~NketakR^ita. In spite of the coordinate relation

between the syllable and the sound of ‘a’, the

syllable cannot be identical with the sound ‘a’. It is

only a symbol for akAra-akshara. This type of

sAmAnAdhikaraNya cannot be resorted to in interpreting

‘identity statements’ like the mahAvAkyas, for we can

neither say that the ‘I’ is the symbol for jIva nor

say that jIva is the symbol for IShvara.

 

(6) In guNakR^ita-sAmAnAdhikaraNya, the coordinate

relation is a metaphorical one. When we say that

“Devadatta is a lion”, the coordinate relation is

between the common qualities (like valour and courage)

found in Devadatta and the lion. This type of

coordinate relation cannot be employed in interpreting

the mahAvAkyas for the following reasons:

 

(a) Brahman has been described as nirguNa, nishkriya,

ShAnta, etc. jIva is described as not bound

(aaMsAirin), etc. Hence this type of

guNakR^ita-sAmAnAdhikaraNya cannot be applied to the

qualityless Brahman or Atman.

 

(b) When we compare two things, the things compared

should be really different from each other; at the

same time they should possess certain common

characteristics which enable us to make the points of

comparison. We cannot apply this type of coordinate

relation to Brahman and jIva, for they are not really

different from each other, but they only appear to be

different.

 

© It may be argued that there are statements in the

Upanishads which describe Brahman as possessing

qualities; hence guNakR^ita-sAmAnAdhikaraNya may be

applied to the understanding of the mahAvAkyas. But a

little reflection will show that these mahAvAkyas are

statements which have been specifically stated in

order to negate such attributes in Brahman. Hence pure

Brahman is nirviShesha and nirguNa.

 

(d) Further, it may be argued that this type of

coordinate relation can hold good in the

interpretation of the mahAvAkyas since we view IShvara

as different from jIva, and jIva as different from

IShvara considering the primary meaning of these terms

(vAcycArtha). Both are sopAdhika (with a limiting

adjunct) and hence they can be compared on the basis

of their common qualities. If we can institute a

comparison between jIva and IShvara (because they are

different and yet have common qualities) a question

‘arises whether we compare jIva with IShvara or

IShvara with jIva.

 

We cannot compare IShvara with jIva, for according to

the definition of comparison, the higher cannot be

compared with the lower. On the other hand can we

compare jIva and IShvara on the basis of their common

qualities? Even this cannot be done, because there

cannot be any common qualities between jIva and

IShvara in the primary senses of these terms. Some may

argue that sentient quality is the common

characteristic between IShvara with jIva, and hence a

comparison is possible. If we accept this point of

view of comparison, then we can also compare a pebble

with IShvara by saying that they have ‘existence’ as a

common quality. This will defeat the very purpose of

comparison.

 

Thus we have shown that any variety of the adhyasa-

sAmAnAdhikaraNya cannot be resorted to in interpreting

the mahAvAkyas.

 

(7) JAti-vyakti-sAmAnAdhikaraNya (coordinate relation

in terms of the universal and the particular): This is

one of the four varieties of viSheshanNa-viSheshya-

sAmAnAdhikaraNya (substantive-attribute relation).

The other three varieties are kriya-kriyAvat, guNa

guNin and upakaraNa-upakaraNin.

 

Words which are placed in the coordinate relation as

in the expression ‘this cow’ refer to one and the same

object. Though the connotations of the words are

different — the word ‘this’ refers to the particular

(vyakti), and the word ‘cow’ refers to the universal

(jAti), they nevertheless refer to one and the same

object. This type of coordinate relation between jAti

and vyakti is known as JAti-vyakti-sAmAnAdhikaraNya.

 

 

 

 

 

But this type of coordinate relation cannot be adopted

in interpreting the mahAvAkyas, for jAti-vyakti

relation is applicable only to insentient objects.

Both jAti and vyakti are insentient. But IShvara and

jIva are sentient. Hence the mahAvAkyas cannot be

interpreted by this type of coordinate relation.

Further, Atman has been described as ‘agotram’,

‘avarNam’ meaning thereby that it cannot be classified

under any jAti. If one interprets the mahAvAkyas in

terms of jAti-vyakti- sAmAnAidhikaraNya, then a

question arises as to which of these two words refers

to jAti (universal) and which to vyakti (particular).

We do not have any valid reason to treat either

Brahman or Atman as jAti or vyakti; hence it is not

proper to interpret the mahAvAkyas in terms of

jAti-vyakti- sAmAnAdhikaraNya.

 

(8) kriyA-kriyAvat-sAmAnAdhikaraNya (coordinate

relation that exists between the act and the doer):

The coordinate relation that exists between the words

in statements like ‘Devadatta is standing’ (tishThan

devadattaH) is called kriyA-kriyAvat-sAmAnAdhikaraNya

But such a sAmAnAdhikaraNya cannot exist between the

words in the mahAvAkyas,. KriyA is action and kriyAvat

is that which has the action, or that which acts. In

the mahAvAkyas,, of the two terms, jIva and IShvara,

is Jiva the kriyA of IShvara, or IShvara the kriyA of

jIva? Both cannot be, because both are sentient

beings. Further, since Brahman and Atman are described

as nishkriya (actionless), akriya (without actions)

and vikriya (beyond actions) in the Upanishads, we

cannot resort to this type of coordinate relation in

interpreting the mahAvAkyas.

 

(9) guNa-guNin- sAmAnAdhikaraNya (coordinate relation

in terms of substance and attribute): The well known

example for this type of coordinate relation is ‘the

blue lily’ (nIlam utpalam). This expression denotes

one and the same thing which, while being a lily

(substance) has also the attribute ‘blue colour.’(9)

Adjectives are useful for the purpose of

differentiating objects belonging to the same class.

In the above example, in the class ‘lily,’ there are

many individuals which are red, white, blue, etc. So,

when we predicate a quality ‘blue,’ of a particular

individual of this class, this adjective serves not

only to distinguish it from others of different

colours, but also to negate the application of other

adjectives. Though the two words, ‘blue’ and ‘lily,’

have different connotations, they have the same

denotation. But this type of relation involving the

substantive-attribute relation cannot be applied to

the mahAvAkya. The oft-repeated form of the question

will arise here: 01 the two words referring to Brahman

and Atman, which is the substance and which is the

attribute? Neither Atman nor Brahman can be considered

as guNa or attribute, for only insentient things are

attributes of something else. Further, since Brahman

is unique, there is no ‘use of applying adjectives to

it. Adjectives applied to Brahman will be meaningful

only if it is a known entity (prasiddha) and since it

is not such an entity, any number of adjectives to it

is meaningless. Though there is the element of

identity in substance-attribute relation, the identity

that is referred to is a relational identity. But in

the mahAvAkyas, the identity that is referred to is a

non-relational identity. The identity is akhaNDArtha

non-relational, unitary identity. Hence guNa-guNin-

sAmAnAidhikaraNya cannot be applied to the mahAvAkyas.

 

(10) UpakaraNa-upakaraNin- sAmAnAdhikaraNya

(coordinate relation in terms of instrument and

possessor): To cite the best example of this type of

coordinate relation there is the statement, “The man

with a stick is Devadatta” (daNDI devadattaH). Here

the coordinate relation is in terms of the

‘instrument-possessor’ relation. It is obvious that

this type of coordinate relation cannot be made use of

in the explanation of the mahAvAkyas, since we cannot

interpret either the word that stands for Brahman as

the instrument of Atman or the word that stands for

Atman as an instrument of Brahman. Further, as Brahman

is niravayava (partless) this sort of coordinate

relation is inapplicable to the mahAvAkyas.

(12), (13) and (16): Now let us take up karya-karana

(coordinate relation in terms of cause-effect),

prakR^iti-vikR^iti and aMShAMShin varieties of

sAmAnAdhikaraNya together for discussion.

‘This book is Upanishad’ (granthaH upanishad) and

‘Ghee is life’ (AyurghR^itam) are cited as examples

for kArya-kAraNa- sAmAnAdhikaraNya. In these examples,

the coordinate relation is in terms of ‘cause-effect’

relation. The book, by itself, is not changed into the

Upanishad; only the knowledge that comes from it is

called Upanishad. In the same way, the ghee, by

itself, is not life. The book is kAraNa which contains

the kriyA i.e., the Upanishadic teaching. Similarly

ghee is the cause which enables one to have long life

(which is the effect).

 

‘The clay pot’ is the example given for

prakR^iti-vikR^iti- sAmAnAdhikaraNya (coordinate

relation in terms of matter and form). Here, unlike

the previous examples given for kArya-kAraNa-

sAmAnAdhikaraNya, the clay itself becomes the pot.

 

‘Sparks of fire’ is the example given for aMShAMShin-

sAmAnAdhikaraNya (coordinate relation in terms of part

and the whole). The coordinate relation between spark

and fire is aMShAMShin. It is also called

avayava-avayavin coordinate relation. The sparks are

not the bits of fire; they are bits of firewood only

on which we have the fire. Fire is one and the sparks

are the parts of the one fire. The relation between

‘sparks’ and ‘fire’ in the said expression is termed

as ‘part-whole’ relation.

 

Now we have to show that all the above mentioned three

types of coordinate relation are not applicable to the

mahAvAkyas,. If we try to interpret them in terms of

kArya-kAraNa, we have to say that either jIva is the

cause and IShvara is IShvara the effect or that

IShvara is the cause and jIva is the effect. The

Upanishad do not lend Support to the view that jIva is

the cause, and IShvara the effect. Further, on this

view if we have to treat IShvara as effect, then

IShvara cannot be eternal. So IShvara cannot be the

effect of jIva.

 

On the other hand, if we hold the view that vara is

the cause and jIva the effect, then that which is the

cause cannot be eternal. Cause-effect relation can

hold only between non-eternal entities. Since IShvara

and jIva are eternal entities cause-effect

relation cannot hold between them. Similarly the

coordinate relation that exists between IShvara and

jIva is not that of prakR^iti-vikR^iti-

sAmAnAdhikaraNya. In this type of coordinate relation

one becomes the other. But according to the Upanishad

neither jIva becomes IShvara, nor IShvara becomes jIva

The mahAvAkyas, are statements which have come to

establish the identity between jIva and IShvara

(Brahman). They do not say that many jIvas have come

out of IShvara.

 

In the same way we cannot resort to aMShAMShin-

sAmAnAdhikaraNya to explain the coordinate relation

that exists between jIva and IShvara, because neither

jIva is a part of IShvara nor IShvara a part of jIva.

 

(14) and (15) Stuti-sAmAnAdhikaraNya (coordinate

relation in terms of eulogy) and

upacAra-sAmAnAdhikaraNya (coordinate relation in terms

of courtesy): When we call a man (who is not Indra

himself) “You are Indra” the coordinate relation

(between the word ‘you’ and the word ‘Indra’) is in

terms of eulogy. Knowing fully well that the man is

not Indra, we still call him Indra. We use the term

‘Indra’ as a term of eulogy.

In upacAra-sAmAnAdhikaraNya we call a man who is very

close to the king as a king, or the P.A. to the

principal as principal, since he does the important

work of the king or the principal even though he is

not the king or the principal as such. Here the

coordinate relation is in terms of upacAra (courtesy).

In both the cases we are calling a thing by what it is

not.

 

These two types of sAmAnAdhikaraNya exhibit a

coordinate relation between a thing and what it is

not, and not between a thing and what it is. It is

obvious that these two types of coordinate relation

cannot be resorted to in interpreting the

mahAvAkyas,since they are statements of truth and not

statements of eulogy or courtesy. When jIva is called

Brahman, we are not praising jIva; we say that in

essence jIva is Brahman. If we try to resort to either

of these coordinate relations, we will be landing

ourselves in absurdities. We cannot praise IShvara as

jI va.

This is obviously absurd. Nor can we praise jIva as

IShvara, since jIva is not really different from

IShvara.

 

If it be said that Shruti is praising jIva as IShvara,

it may be pointed out that Shruti is not deriving any

gain by praising jIva; further, ShrutivAkyas are

disinterested statements. The praise is intended for

the purpose of conveying the sense of identity between

jIva and IShvara vara. Therefore the mahAvAkyas are

neither ShrutivAkyas nor upacAravAk.yas.

 

So far we have shown that the different types of

coordinate relation, other than aikya, are inadequate

to bring out the true meaning of the mahAvAkyas. Now

we have to show that the mahAvAkyas, can be

interpreted only in terms of aikya- or abheda

sAmAnAdhikaraNya.

 

(11) Aikya-sAmAnAdhikaraNya (coordinate relation in

terms of identity): Let us explain this by taking the

well-known example, so’yaM devadattaH, “This is that

Devadatta”. This judgment refers to the identity

(aikya) of the individual (Devadatta) in spite of the

differences in respect of time, place and

circumstance. An individual who was seen a few days

ago at a certain place is seen today at a different

place under other circumstances. When we say that he

is the same man, we overlook the unessential

differences and emphasize the essential identity of

the person.

 

This is an identity judgment. But the words ‘this’ and

‘that’ represent a pair of incompatible determinants.

“...‘this’ means here ‘as determined by the present

time and space’, as seen here and now; and ‘that’

means ‘as determined by some other time and space’, as

seen at some other time and space .... Still there is

not the least doubt about the fact that we do mean

something, and mean nothing short of an identity.” So

we have to bring out the import of the term ‘this’ and

‘that’ contained in the sentence ‘This is that

Devadatta’ in order to justify that they refer to the

same thing.

The clarification is done in two stages. The first

stage of interpretation is called aikya-

sAmAnAdhikaraNya. Though the two terms stand to denote

two incompatible determinants, since they are in

grammatical apposition5 we conclude that, in some

manner, the two terms must denote the same thing. That

is, here we show the coordination between the two

words. But if we take the literal meanings of the two

terms we cannot say that they stand for the same

thing. So we have to sublate the incongruous elements

in the words ‘this’ and ‘that’. This is the second

stage called lakshaNA. That is, we have to go beyond

the primary meanings of these words to their implied

meanings.

 

Besides primary meanings, words and sentences have

implied meanings. Primary meaning (10) is something

directly meant by a word. An implied meaning (11) is

its secondary meaning. In case the primary meanings of

words of a sentence prove inadequate for the

apprehension of their logical connection and their

import, then the implied meanings are sought for. In

other words, where the primary meanings lead to a

contradiction, we resort to lakshaNA or secondary

signification in order to get at the purport of the

sentence.

 

lakshaNA or secondary signification is of three kinds:

 

(1) jahllakshaNA (exclusive secondary implication),

 

(2) ajahallakshaNA (non-exclusive secondary

implication), and

 

(3) jahadajahallakshaNA (exclusive non-exclusive

secondary implication).

 

(1) When the primary meaning is altogether given up

and a new meaning is acquired it is jahallakshaNA.

‘The village in the Ganges’ is a classic example of

the primary meaning being rejected. The reason for

treating it as an example of jahallakshaNA is that

the village and the river Ganges stand to each other

as the supported Adheya) and the support AdhAzra).

When it is interpreted literally the primary meaning

does not hold good. A village cannot be in the Ganges

immersed in it. All that it means is that it refers to

a particular village on the bank of the river Ganges.

In the primary sense, the word ‘Ganges’ refers to the

river not the bank. So we are leaving the primary

meaning river (Ganges) but take, instead, the ‘bank’ (

which is associated) with the river Ganges, as the

secondary meaning. Now there is no contradiction in

understanding the meaning of this expression.

(2) When we add a suitable meaning in understanding

the sentence without abandoning the primary meaning it

is called ajahallakshANA. Here the primary meaning is

not discarded, but it is supplemented. ajahallakshANA

is therefore, explanation by implication in which a

word, instead of discarding its own meaning, implies

something else together with its primary meaning. When

it is said that ‘The red is rushing forward,’ the

implication is ‘someone with the red colour is rushing

forward’. Here the quality that is described is added

to the object in which that quality is inherent. The

primary meaning is included in the implied meaning. In

this way, without rejecting the primary meaning, an

explanation by the secondary signification is

accepted.

 

(3) When a part of the primary meaning is preserved

and another part of it is rejected, it is called

jahadajahallakshANA z; e.g., “This is that Devadatta”.

It is by rejecting the incongruous element that we

arrive at the identity of the person referred to. In

this judgment, a part of the meaning of the words

‘this’ and ‘that’, viz., Devadatta, is taken and the

other part of their meanings viz., ‘qualified by

present time’ and ‘qualified by past time’, is

rejected. Such an interpretation is known as

bhAga-tyAgalakshANA.

 

In this connection it may be pointed out that lakshANA

is used not only when there is contradiction of

primary meanings (mukhyArthaAdha), but also wherever

we want to get the true purport of the sentences. That

is, secondary signification may be adopted in places

even when the primary meaning does not suffer

contradiction. What is intended to be conveyed above

is

the meaning of a sentence (tAtparyavishaya). And if a

sentence does not directly express its intended

meaning, then it should be obtained from noting the

implied meaning of the words in the sentence. (12)

 

In the sentence, “Protect the bowl of curd from the

crows, there is no contradiction of primary meaning of

words; but if we take the primary meaning only then it

goes against the intention of the sentence

(tAtparya-anupapatti). The tatparya is the protection

of the curd not only from the crows, but also from

other creatures that are likely to spoil the curd. So

the term crows, in addition to the primary meaning

implies all creatures that can spoil the curd. Here,

in the above example, we resort to ajahallakshANA and

take the lakshANA of the sentence. We do so not

because the primary meaning is contradicted but

because it goes against the intention of the sentence;

and the purport can be grasped only by resorting to

lakshANA. But in all the three examples cited for

jahallakshANA, ajahallakshANA and jahadajahallakshANA

we get the implied meaning of the expressions by

pointing out the inadequacy of the primary meaning of

words in getting the purport of the sentences.

 

Now the question arises as to the specific kind of

lakshANA (secondary signification) that could be

adopted in interpreting the mahAvAkyas. This depends

on the primary and the secondary meanings of the words

constituting the mahAvAkyas. Let us take ‘tat tvam

asi’ as representing all the mahAvAkyas and try to

apply these three lakshANA, one by one. (13)

 

The primary senses of the words ‘tat’ and ‘tvam’ are

IShvara and jIva respectively. IShvara is omniscient

and is known mediately (paroksha). jIva is ignorant

and known immediately (aparoksha). The contradiction

between them is too apparent to be reconciled. Is it

ever possible that there can be any unity between two

such mutually exclusive entities? Any literal

interpretation would contradict the accepted meanings

of both these terms. But we would do violence to the

spirit of the Shruti text if we should, on that

account, reject the underlying identity that is

implied.

 

The aim of the Shruti is to inculcate the identity

between Atman and Brahman. If we take the intention of

the Shruti text into consideration, jahallakshANA is

unacceptable in interpreting the mahAvAkyas. For, if

we leave the primary senses of these two terms

completely, then what is the secondary meaning that is

to be taken to show their identity? There is none,

because the terms ‘tat’ and ‘tvan’ through

jahallakshANA totally abandon their primary meanings

IShvara and jIva. Further, in the example cited to

explain jahallakshANA the village and the river Ganges

stand to each other as the sustained and the

sustainer. But such is not the case between ‘that’ and

‘thou’ in the sentence ‘that thou art’. Hence it is

not a case of jahallakshANA.

 

Nor can we interpret the maMvakyas through

ajahallakshANA, where we are free to add to the

primary meaning. If our aim is to find out the

underlying identity that is implied in the mahAvAkyas,

then there is no point in adding something which,

instead of stressing the identity, would widen the

differences already there in their primary senses.

Hence ajahallakshANA will not satisfy our need.

 

The only alternative is that a part of the direct

meaning of each of the two words, has to be

eliminated, and the remaining part of them is to be

retained just as in the example, “This is that

Devadatta.” In the example “This is that Devadatta,”

it is by rejecting the incongruous that we arrive at

the identity of the person referred to. We should

apply the same principle with reference to “tat tvam

asi.” In this mahAvAkya, when the individual self is

asserted to be identical with Brahman, the individual

self as characterised by agency, suffering and

ignorance is not asserted to be identical with

Brahman.

 

In the mahAvAkya, “that thou art,” the word ‘thou’

stands for the self or consciousness as characterised

by immediacy,

finitude and parviscience. The word ‘that’ stands for

the self or consciousness as characterised by mediacy,

infinitude and omniscience. In interpreting this

mahAvAkya, a part of the primary meaning of the term

‘thou’ is abandoned and a part of it is retained; and

a part of the primary meaning of the term ‘that’ is

abandoned and a part of it is retained. We abandon the

‘immediacy-mediacy’ ‘finitude-infinitude’ and

‘parviscience-omniscience’ senses of the terms ‘thou’

and ‘that’ respectively and get beyond them to the

self or consciousness which is common and is implicit

in both. That is, while rejecting one part of the

primary meaning of the terms ‘thou’ and ‘that,’ we

retain the other part of the primary meaning of the

terms ‘thou’ and ‘that’, namely ‘consciousness.’

Therefore, the final import of ‘tat tvam asi’, viz.,

the identity of the individual self with the ultimate

Self is established by jahadajahallakshANA or

bhAgavatyAga lakshANA.

 

Now, it may be asked: Will it not be enough to have

lakshANA for one word only in the mahAvAkyas instead

of applying lakshANA to both the words? The intention

of the question is that it is enough that we take one

of the words in each of the mahAvAkyas in the

secondary sense and the other word in the primary

sense, and thereby deny that the mahAvAkyas are

declarations of the identity of the individual self

with the supreme Self. The argument in support of this

view is as follows.

 

If the purpose of resorting to lakshANA is to avoid

contradiction of primary meanings, then this can be

done successfully by resorting to lakshANA for one

word only. Hence there is no necessity for construing

both the terms in the secondary sense.

 

Assuming that we can have lakshANA for one word only

in the mahAvAkyas, the question arises: Are we to have

lakshANA for the first word only or for the second

word only? Let us say that we take the first word only

in lakshANA in each of the mahAvAkyas.

 

The mahAvAkyas are:

 

(i) tat tvam asi,

(ii) a ham BrahmAsmi

(iii) ayam AtmA Brahma, and

(iv) praj~nAnam Brahma.

 

The first word in ‘tat tvam asi’ is ‘tat’. The first

words in the other three mahAvAkyas are ‘aham’ ‘atmA’

‘praj~nAnam’. The word ‘tat’ in its primary sense

refers to IShvara and the first words in the other

three mahAvAkyas, in their primary sense, refer to

jIva. If we take the first word in each of the

mahAvAkyas in the secondary sense, and the second word

in the primary sense it would be as follows:

 

tat …………………………………. lakshANA

………………………………..caitanya

tvam…………………………………. primary

sense……………………………..jiva

asi

Here we say that caitanya is jIva. Here there is no

contradiction of meanings of the words if we take the

first word only, in the secondary sense.

 

In the other three mahAvAkyas,

 

First word (denoting jIva)…………………………..

lakshANA…………………………….caitanya

Second word (Brahman)……………………………primary

sense…………………….IShvara (14)

 

We say that ‘caitanya is IShvara’. Here also there is

no contradiction of meanings of the words in the

mahAvAkyas if we take the first word only in the

secondary sense. In short, by resorting to lakshANAfor

the first word only, we are able to show that there is

no contradiction of meanings of words. The difficulty

here is that, if we take all the four mahAvAkyas

together, then there is contra~ diction between the

first mahAvAkya and the other three. For, the first

mahAvAkya on the above interpretation says that

‘caitanya is

jIva’ and the other three, on the above

interpretation, say that caitanya is IShvara. This

goes against the doctrine that all mahAvAkyas convey

one and the same truth (ekArtha-bodhaka). Hence,

taking the first word only in the secondary sense

leads to contradiction among the mahAvAkyasthough

there is no contradiction between the meanings of each

of the words in the mahAvAkyas.

 

Let us see what happens if we take the second word

only in lakshANA in each of the following mahAvAkyas.

 

tat……………………………………………….primary

sense………………………………….IShvara

tvam……………………………………………..secondary

sense…………………………………..caitanya

asi

 

Here we say that ‘caitanya is IShvara’. In the other

three mahAvAkyas:

 

First word (denoting jIva)……………………primary

sense………………………….jIva

Second word (Brahman)…………………. Secondary

sense……………………caitanya

 

Here we say ‘caitanya is jIva’.

 

Here also there is contradiction among the

mahAvAkyaseven though there is no contradiction

between the meanings of each of the words in the

mahAvAkyas. For, the first mahAvAkya, on the above

interpretation, says that ‘caitanya is IShvara’ and

the other three, on the above interpretation, say that

‘caitanya is jIva’. This goes against the doctrine

that all the mahAvAkyas convey one and the same truth.

In either way, whether we take the first word only in

the secondary sense or the second word only in the

secondary sense, both lead to incompatibility between

the first and the other three mahAvAkyas.

 

It may be argued that, (without resorting to

lakshANAeither to the first word only, or to the

second word only) we can

take the word denoting IShvara only (wherever it

occurs) in the secondary sense, and show that there is

no contradiction among the words in the mahAvAkyas,

and also show that there is no incompatibility between

the first and the other three mahAvAkyas. On this

assumption, if we take the word denoting IShvara in

the secondary sense wherever it occurs in the

mahAvAkyas, then we have to take the word denoting

jIva in the primary sense wherever it occurs; or if we

take the word denoting Jiva in the secondary sense

wherever it occurs in the mahAvAkyas, then we have to

take the word denoting IShvara, in the primary sense

wherever it occurs.

 

On this assumption, let us first take the word

denoting IShvara only in the secondary sense in the

mahAvAkyas and see what happens. In ‘tat tvam asi’ the

word ‘tat’ stands for IShvara in the primary sense,

and in the other three mahAvAkyas the word denoting

Brahman stands for IShvara in the primary sense. Now

we have to take the word denoting IShvara in the

secondary sense in all the four mahAvAkyas.

 

tat

 

tvam

asi

 

primary sense IShvara

secondary sense caitanya

jIva primary

sense

 

In the other three mahAvAkyas:

 

 

 

 

aham/AtmA/Praj~nAnam

Brahman

 

 

 

IShvara - primary

sense

 

 

primary sense

Jiva

caitanya – secondary sense

 

 

 

In both sets of mahAvAkyaswhat we say according to

this interpretation is that ‘caitanya is jIva’. On

this view we will be compelled to conclude that the

main purport of the Upanishads is not to say about the

ultimate reality (Brahman), but to say something about

the jIva. Further, it will amount to saying that the

knowledge of the jIva will lead to complete

liberation. Obviously this is not the purport

(tAtparya) of the Upanishads.

The intention of the Upanishad is to liberate jIva

from bondage, by showing that the jIva in essence is

Brahman itself. The Upanishadic aim is to release the

jIva from its ‘jIvabhAva’ and to make it realise its

essence, namely ‘BrahmabhAva’. This aim of the

Upanishad is thwarted if it be said that the jIva’s

aim is to attain ‘jIvabhAva’ by acquiring a knowledge

of the jIva’. Further, knowledge of the “jIvabhAva’ is

not a release from bondage but a push into it. This

way of applying lakshANAto the word denoting IShvara

only, wherever it occurs in the mahAvAkyas, leads to

the opposite purport of the mahAvAkyas, and thereby we

do violence to the spirit of the Shruti. Further, by

this process we have reduced the status of

IShvara-caitanya to a lower level i.e., the level of

the jIva. Hence it is not correct to resort to

lakshANAfor the word denoting IShvara in the

mahAvAkyas.

 

Now it may be argued that we can resort to lakshANA

for the the word denoting ‘jIva’ only wherever it

occurs in the four mahAvAkyas, taking the word that

stands for ‘IShvara’ in the primary sense. Let us

apply this procedure to the mahAvAkyas and find

whether this interpretation holds good.

 

Tvam, aham, AtmA , praj~nAnam……. these words

denoting jIva would mean in the secondary sense to

refer to caitanya (pure). Then the meaning of the

mahAvAkyas would be ‘caitanya is IShvara.’ This

reduces nirguNa Brahman to saguNa Brahman. Even though

this way of interpretation may not lead to any

contradiction in the meanings of the words, it is

incompatible with the ideal of liberation and the

tAtparya of the Upanishads. It is also contrary to the

statement of the Upanishad “Brahmavid brahmaiva

bhavati.”

 

Further, by taking the word denoting ‘jIva’ only in

the secondary sense, what is left will be the caitanya

in the limited sense because it is this caitanya with

which alone the element of antaHkaraNa is associated

before. The denotation of the word jIva is caitanya

limited by antaHkaraNa.

 

When we resort to lakshANA for the terms denoting

‘jIva’, antaHkaraNa only is left out. ‘That which

remains is ‘limited’ caitanya.

 

According to the vAcyArtha, the caitanya that remains

will be limited caitanya. Let us illustrate this by an

analogy. If one looks at a building through a mirror,

the building that is seen by him is the building

limited by the scope of the mirror. If we remove

mirror and ask him what is it that he saw in the

mirror, he would say that he saw a building. The

“building” which has been referred to by him is the

building that he saw in the mirror and not “the

building itself as such.”

 

In the same way, if we resort to lakshANA for the term

denoting jIva, the caitanya that is referred to (and

remains after the removal of antaHkaraNa) is the

limited caitanya (which was known earlier through

antaHkaraNa). According to the primary meaning of the

word denoting ‘IShvara’ in all the four mahAvAkyas,

the caitanya that is referred to is the akhaNDa

(unlimited or rather of an infinite) caitanya…………..

(akhaNDa in the relative sense only, because the

caitanya that is referred to in IShvara is like a

building seen through a relatively bigger mirror).

Then the four mahAvAkyas are to be interpreted as

identifying the limited caitanya with the unlimited

caitanya of IShvara.

 

This would be an identity of the unlimited with the

limited. (15) Again, by identifying jIva -caitanya

with the IShvara -caitanya we have completely

forgotten the aim of jIva. The aim of jIva is not to

identify itself with IShvara (which is the vAcyArtha

of the word denoting IShvara), but to identify itself

with Brahman which is completely akhaNDa. Hence we

cannot resort to lakshANA for the word denoting jIva

only.

So far we have shown that we cannot apply lakshANA (i)

only to one word, namely the first word; (ii) only to

one word, namely the second word; (iii) only to one

word, namely the word denoting if IShvara; and (iv)

only to one word, namely the word denoting jIva. This

amounts to the fact that we have to resort to lakshANA

for both the words in interpreting the mahAvAkyas.

 

In this connection it would be interesting to pass in

review the view that natural interpretation of the

mahAvAkyas is possible

without resorting to lakshANA or even bAdhAyAM

sAmAnAdhikaraNya. For example, take the sentence “The

pot is non-eternal” (ghataH anityaH). Here the word

‘pot’ denotes the individual (vyakti) which has the

sAmAnya or jAti (universal) ‘potness’ in it. Here the

individual pot is non-eternal, whereas ‘potness’ is

eternal. When we say that pot is non-eternal, the

natural reference is to the individual pot and not to

‘~ti’ viz., ‘potness’ as such, even though the word

pot may stand for the individual pot as well as

‘potness’. The non-eternality in the said expression

can be indentified with the individual pot (which is

non-eternal), and not with ‘potness’ (which is

eternal).

 

The non-eternality referred to here has the

appropriateness of association with the ‘vyakti’ and

not the jAti’. This is the natural interpretation of

the statement, “The pot is non-eternal”. When we speak

of the non-eternality of the pot, we do not say that

we are taking the ‘vyakti’ by lakshANA. No one will

say that the above statement is a vAkya to be

interpreted through lakshANA. Let us explain it

further. When someone says, “Pot is non-eternal,’ the

non-eternality may be associated with the individual

pot directly by the principle (nyAya) “padArthaH

padArthena anveti na tu tad ekadeShena” . (one meaning

fits in with another but not with a part of it only).

 

But let us assume that someone says, “Pot is eternal”

here, according to the principle (nyAya) cited above,

we have to connect ‘eternality’ only with pot, and not

with ‘potness’ because ‘potness’ is part of the pot

(padArtha ekadeSha) and not a separate padArtha

(entity). But we cannot connect the eternality with

the individual pot, because the individual pot is

non-eternal, and hence we have to apply lakshANA to

the word ‘pot’, and interpret it in the secondary

sense of ‘potness’ and connect the eternality only

with the ‘potness’ which is the ‘jAti’; thus when we

speak of the eternality of the pot, we resort to

lakshANA. But when we speak of the non-eternality of

the pot, we do not resort to lakshANA ,but connect

non-eternality by a natural interpretation with the

individual pot,. So everyone understands without

resorting to lakshANA the meaning of the statement

which is a natural one. In the same way, ‘tat tvam

asi’ also may be interpreted. Then the caitanya

referred to in both the the words is appropriately

identified.

 

Therefore our final view is that the mahAvAkyas are

sentences which indicate a single, non-relational

entity underlying their terms. If the validity of a

sentence depends on its purport, and not on its

literal meaning, then all the mahAvAkyas convey the

identity of the individual self with the supreme Self.

 

Before concluding, it would be better to examine the

view that ‘identity propositions’ are, by their very

nature impossible for the simple reason that they are

restatements (anuvada). “The thing itself is identical

with itself” makes no meaning. Hence treating the

mahAvAkyas as a case of restatement amounts to

rendering them meaningless. This type of criticism can

be met easily by examining what a re-statement

(anuvAda) is. In a restatement i.e., anuvAda, we

repeat what has been stated earlier (like a tape

recorder) or express a truth that is known already

e.g., “Heat is a remedy for cold” (agnirhimasya

bheshajam).

 

Both the interpretations are not applicable to the

mahAvAkyas. When we say, “This is that Devadatta,” the

‘this’ may be taken as anuvAda in the first sense of

repetition, but the word ‘that’ cannot be taken as a

case of repetition. Similarly in the mahAvAkya ‘Thou

art that’, ‘Thou’ may be taken as a case of

repetition, but not the word ‘that’. This sense of

anuvAda does not fit in here. The mahAvAkyas therefore

is not an anuvAa or re-statement in the first sense of

repetition. When we say, “This is ‘that’ Devadatta” to

a man who wants to know whether ‘this’ Devadatta is

identical with the Devadatta seen earlier, we are then

expressing a truth that is not known earlier to the

man. There is an element of newness or a new idea in

this statement. He has come to know what is not known

to him earlier (aj~nAtasya j~nAnam). The same is the

case with the mahAvAkyas.

 

The mahAvAkyas set out to say ‘something that is not

known hitherto. Hence, on this count also, it is not

anuvAda.

Further, identity is not a real relation. One thing

cannot become identical with another. Either it is

always identical, or it is always different, and so it

never becomes identical. The identity of the self and

Brahman is an eternally accomplished identity. Only we

are ignorant of it. The aim of the mahAvAkyas is to

remove this ignorance. The Self was, is, and shall

ever remain Brahman. The knowledge by identity is not

judgmental. We do not describe Brahman or add anything

by way of qualification to Brahman. In’ the instance

that we have taken to explain identity, i.e., “This is

that Devadatta,” the ‘this’ and the ‘that’ are only

seemingly different. Similarly is the case with the

‘thou’ and the ‘that’ in ‘That thou art’. In point of

truth they are just one and the same entity. To know

the difference ‘is not a problem for us. We just start

with it. The’ problem is ‘about unity or identity. It

is the knowledge of the unity that is rewarding and

that demands both effort and discernment. The

difference between Brahman and jIva is known to all.

But their identity is hidden for us. We need to

recognize, to bring out, or to re-discover this

identity and when we do so, the two do not become one.

There is only one real substance which has appeared to

us under two different names and forms. When the

superimposition goes, the one substratum reveals

itself and comes to stay for ever.

 

jIva is Brahman itself. When we speak of the identity

of jIva and Brakman, one may get the impression that

there are two entities which are sought to be

identified. This impression arises as a result of the

use of language. Nowhere are the words of George Eliot

more appropriate than there — “Our language is but a

broken lamp.”

 

Footnotes

 

1 The first mahAvAkya is a lakshaNavAkya

(definition); the second is an anusandhAna vAkya

(sentence of practice); the third is an upadeShavAkya

(sentence of instruction); while the last one is an

anubhavavakya (sentence of experience).

2. This has four conditions: expectancy (AkA~NkshA);

consistency (yogyatA); contiguity (Asatti); the

knowledge of the purport (tAtparyarj~nAna). Vide the

vedAntaparibhAshA, Chapter 4.

3. Praj~NAnam, ayamAtma, aham

4 Thus jIva and Brahman are not two distinct things;

similarly IShvAra and Brahman are not two distinct

things. They are the same conceived of from two

different standpoints. They are non-different only

when the limiting adjuncts are completely negated.

5. ChAndogya UpaniShad VI. 8.1

6 adhyAso nAma atasmiMstabuddiH Introduction to

Shankara’s commentary on the Brahma SUtras

7. nedaM vadidam upAsate Keno Upanishad 1.5 ‘That

which speech cannot reveal, but which reveals speech;

know that alone as brahman not this that people

worship.’

8.Tat tvam asi is repeated nine times in the ChAndogya

Upanishad

9 This type of guNa-guNin- sAmAnAdhikaraNya is to be

distinguished from guNakR^ita- sAmAnAdhikaraNya in

that the former case is found in the substance itself,

whereas in the latter case the adjectives found in the

one are also found in the other. In the former the

quality is exclusive; it is not so in the latter.

10 mukhyArtha, vAcyArtha, ShakyArtha and abhidheyArtha

are synonyms which denote the primary meaning.

11 lakshyArtha and gauNArtha are Sanskrit words used

to denote implied or secondary meaning.

12The following principles are resorted to to get the

real purport of scripture. These are known as the

sixfold criteria or shad-li~nga. They are:

• Upakrama-upanisaMhAra-aikya (unity of the initial

and concluding passages)_

• abhyasa (repetition)

• apUrvatA (novelty)

• phala (fruit)

• arthavAda (commendation)

• upapatti (intelligibility in the light of

reasoning)

13 We can apply to this sentence the sixfold criteria

in the following way. The teacher UddAlaka begins by

saying that the ‘Real’ alone ‘was’ in the beginning

and ends in concluding that ‘all this is of the nature

of the Self’. The unity of purpose revealed by

correlating the beginning and the end seems to be the

establishment of the doctrine of non-dual reality. The

test ‘That thou art’ is repeated nine times; the

conclusion is a novel one because it can be known only

through the Vedas and not through perception or

inference. This teaching is highly commended in the

passage just preceding it, where it is said that by

knowing this truth all that is worth knowing is known.

The portion dealing with creation is the arthavAda of

this mahAvAkya. The fruitfulness of this dialogue

between the teacher and the taught exhibits upapatti

or reasoning. The true import of the text as

ascertained by the six tests is the identity of the

jIva with Brahman

14 Sarvaj~natvaviShishTaH asaMsArI IShvara

15 In both places wherever the words jIva or Brahman

occur, we are not referring to Brahman-caitanya but to

caitanya limited by antaHkaraNa or caitanya limited by

mAyA. Compared to jIva-caitanya, IShvara-caitanya is

akhaNDa

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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