Fate and Free Will

[Guest guest]

A quote from Schopenhauer on Free Will (just to keep the topic bubbling

over):

 

"It is six o'clock in the evening, the working day is over. Now I can go for

a walk, or I can go to the club; I can also climb up the tower to see the

sun set; I can go to the theater; I can visit this friend or that one;

indeed, I also can run out of the gate, into the wide world, and never

return. All of this is strictly up to me, in this I have complete freedom.

But still I shall do none of these things now, but with just as free a will

I shall go home to my wife. Now this is exactly as if water spoke to itself:

I can make high waves (during a storm), I can rush down hill (in the river

bed), I can plunge down foaming and gushing (in the waterfall), I can rise

freely as a stream of water into the air (in the fountain), I can, finally,

boil away and disappear (if its hot enough); but I am doing none of these

things now, and am voluntarily remaining quiet and clear water in the

reflecting pond. As the water can do all those things only when the

determining causes operate for the one or the other, so to man can do what

he imagines himself able to do only on the same condition. In the case of

each motive, the man thinks that he can will it and so can fix the

weathervane of his will at this point, but this is sheer delusion. For this

"I can will this" is in reality hypothetical - and caries with it the

additional clause, if I did not prefer the other. But this addition annuls

that ability to will!"

 

And here's an interesting summary of the conclusions from the Libet

experiments that I downloaded a few days ago (unfortunately, I don't seem to

have recorded the source):

 

"In a ground-breaking series of experiments first reported in 1973 (see

Benjamin Libet, Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious

will in voluntary action, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1985, 529-566),

Benjamin Libet, et al., showed that the earliest experiential awareness of a

sensory stimulus occurs about 500 msec (0.5 sec) after the stimulus itself.

 

"This demonstrates that none of our experiences of perception are in real

time, but in fact are delayed by about one-half second after the actual

events. This delay is the time required for neurological electrical

potentials (the readiness potential RP, which was measured by using

electrodes surgically implanted in the brain) to rise to the level necessary

for experiential awareness. This means that it is impossible to respond

volitionally in less than 500 msec to any stimulus since our experience is

always delayed by that much. However, Libet showed that meaningful

unconscious behavioral responses can occur in as little as 100 msec after a

stimulus, showing that meaningful behavior need not be conscious behavior.

 

"In 1983, Libet, et al., reported an even more profound set of experiences

in which the subjects, rather than responding to sensory stimuli, were

"volitionally" initiating muscular acts. The experiments showed that the

readiness potential RP began 550 to 1050 msec before the muscular response,

but the experiential awareness of the willingness to perform the action

followed the onset of the RP by about 350 msec. In other words, we become

aware of a decision only after the decision has already been made at a

subconscious emotional level.

Libet's experiments point to a general concept which must always be valid.

This is that everything that happens must happen before we can become aware

of it. There is always a time lag between any neurological or sensory

process and our awareness of the thought, feeling, sensation, or action

which represents it. In Libet's experiments, this gap ranged between 350

msec and 500 msec, but the exact value is unimportant. So long as this gap

exists, no matter how large or small, whether it is one hour or one

microsecond, our experience of the objective present must always come in the

objective past (in the subjective present). In other words, the subjective

present always lags the objective present.

 

"The consequences of this insight are extraordinary, revolutionary, and

far-ranging. It means that any thought, feeling, sensation, or action always

occurs objectively before we become aware of it subjectively and hence there

is no possibility that we can avoid it."

 

Best wishes,

 

Dennis

[Guest guest]

Namaste Sri Dennis!

>I can will this" is in reality hypothetical - and caries with it the

>additional clause, if I did not prefer the other. But this addition

>annuls that ability to will!"

 

You know that I basically agree with you on free will. But just for

amusement, here is an experiment you might perform.

 

Put two bowls in front of you. One filled with something you like,

say, pudding. And the other with something you don't like, say,

eggplant. Now take a bite from the eggplant, just to prove you have

free will.

 

Now, how is Schopenhauer wrong? Well, naturally, I set this up to

answer the question myself, because I'm that kind of devious person.

In that one case where you took a bite of eggplant, your desire to

make a point was stronger than the desire to eat pudding or eggplant.

Besides, you know that you can come back in a few minutes and eat the

pudding anyway.

 

So, I am agreeing with you and Schopenhauer after all. But I though

that this might be food for thought!

 

Om!

Benjamin

[Guest guest]

Namaste again Sri Dennis,

 

Your previous discussion on Benjamin Libet's experiments is

really quite amazing and full of spiritual implications.

 

See http://www.escribe.com/culture/advaitin/m16778.html

 

I had not heard of this, even though I am always poking around the

web. I hope the list members read that carefully and think about it.

You are quite right to bring in relevant new empirical information to

supplement the study of scriptures.

 

You said you lost your reference. I found one PDF file that

seems quite relelvant, but unfortunately it is 3 MB:

 

http://www.cbrss.harvard.edu/events/emc/papers/wegner&wheatley.pdf

 

Another interesting looking PDF (only 500 KB) is:

 

http://ntp.neuroscience.wisc.edu/neuro630/zeman.pdf

 

Of course, there's a lot of stuff out there.

 

 

Om!

Benjamin