Fate and Free Will

[Guest guest]

--- Sunder Hattangadi <sunderh wrote:

>

> I wonder if the two views could be reconciled if we accept the

> existence of 'lokas'other than this bhu-loka, as implied in Katha

> Upanishad II:3:5:

>

Sundar

Any loka (kshetram) is the field of experience where there is an

experiencer and experienced. The notion that I am experiencer makes one

jiiva when he identifies with one upaadhi - if he identifies with total

upaadhi, he beomces Iswara (kshetraj~nyam cha api maam viddhi sarva

kshetreshu bhaarata) But as long as bhoktRitva bhaava is there

kartRitva bhaava is also there and the whole nine yards remain, however

transperant that cloth is!

 

Hari OM!

Sadananda

 

 

 

=====

What you have is His gift to you and what you do with what you have is your gift

to Him - Swami Chinmayananda.

 

 

 

The New Search - Faster. Easier. Bingo

http://search.

[Guest guest]

Namaste Murthygaru and Sadanandaji:

 

The dialog between you two were quite stimulating for getting a

better perspective of the notion of 'Fate and Free-will." Though

your view points give the impression that you don't agree, these

discussions are quite relevant for a clearer understanding of the

notion of 'free-will.'

 

I believe that Murthygaru is trying to explore how the 'notion of

free-will' varies between persons with different levels of spiritual

maturity. I agree with him the exercise of 'free-will' does vary

between persons with different levels of spiritual maturity.

 

In Bhagavad gita (especially in chapter 14) the Guna aspects of Jiva

has been described in great details. According to Gita, tamasik

natured Jiva behaves differently from the rajastik natured Jiva and

they both behave differently from a Satvik natured Jiva. Gita also

provides the hints that the goal of a Jiva should be to become

Satvik. In addition, it provides the advantages of being a Satvik and

disadvantages of being a tamasik. Though these classifications could

be also labelled as notions, they are quite essential for a seeker to

achieve his/her spiritual progress.

 

No one denies the important fact spelled out Sadaji that there are no

gradations in 'self knowledge.' However our understanding of 'self-

knowledge' varies and it can be determined by the level of our

spiritual maturity and also implicitly governed by our 'gunas.' We

can't deny the existence of the notion of gradation of the

understanding of 'self-knowledge.' It is like saying that 'Truth is

one,' but the understanding of the Truth do varies between persons.

The above statement itself could be regarded as the distinction

between 'Paramarthika' and vyavahara level of reality.

 

The notion of 'free-will' for Dhryodhana was quite different from the

notion of 'free-will' for Yudhistra. The characters of Mahabharat

such as Bhisma, Drona, Vidura, Arjuna, Bhima, Dridhrasta, Karna,

Kunti, Gandhari and others have demonstrated different levels of

understanding of the notion of 'free-will.'

 

Finally, all the discussions under 'fate and free-will' demonstrate

the fact that the understanding of 'what is vyavahara level of

reality' varies between the discussants. Isn't it due to the spell of

mAyA?

 

Warmest regards,

 

Ram Chandran

[Guest guest]

At 05:54 AM 4/25/2003 -0700, kuntimaddi sadananda wrote:

Anyway I still maintain that they have proved that everything is

>predetermined either (at least to my satisfaction).

 

 

Did you mean to have the word "not," as in "they have not proved"? At least

Benjamin has not proved it. His argument depends on a premise that he asks you

to accept - something like "If science were to prove that all events are

caused." By events, he includes mental events. That's at best a conditional

argument. Even if it were valid, its initial premise is unproved....

 

--Greg

[Guest guest]

Sri Venkat:

"Now the definition of Vyavahaarika level is based on the common experience

that I exist. This experience is based on the fact that I act."

 

Dennis: A laudable attempt to summarise the position and make logical

deductions! I was with you up to the second sentence above. I do not agree,

however, that our belief that we exist is based upon the assumption that we

act. That 'I exist', I would argue, is the one thing of which we are

certain. Even if we awoke suspended in a sensory deprivation chamber without

sensory input of any kind, we would be aware that we existed. The mistake is

to associate this feeling of existence with 'something else'. But that is

what happens in vyavahArika. I say 'I am a person' and I have the feeling of

free will. Both are mistaken. However, I can exert self-effort (in a

deterministic manner of course!) and endeavour to eliminate the ignorance

that obscures the reality.

 

I quite liked Murthy-ji's statement to begin with:

"I would prefer a model of a gradation in vyavahArika, whereby thoughts in

the vyvavahArika are gradually evolved so that the strong kartr^itvabhAvam

which is the defining characteristic of vyavahArika slowly looses its grip

on the jIvA as that entity 'moves' toward moksha."

And he asks:

"The question we are tackling here is: which, of the many thoughts in

vyavahArika, is closest to paramArtha?"

I wonder, can *any* thoughts be even remotely close to paramArtha?

 

But Sada-ji then replied:

"Hence That there is gradation in self-knowledge also stems from not having

understood the nature of the self. It cannot be half-snake and half rope."

And one has to agree. The shruti and sages tell us that it is a rope but

still we are afraid to go near it. The intellectual understanding is there

but it is not enough. It is obviously like learning to ride a bike - one

minute you keep falling off and then suddenly you are riding; no half

measures.

 

He later says:

"The apparent free-will in vyavahaara if known as apparent the problem is

already solved - in that case there is no more vyavahaara."

 

Speaking from my own experience, this is not the case!

 

Murthy-ji later tries to make out a case for degrees of knowledge within

vyavahArika and it is persuasive but ultimately I think I have to disagree.

You see, knowledge of reality is ultimately meaningless. What we are really

talking about is getting rid of ignorance. I think I have thought of a

metaphor which may help. Back when I was a child in the industrial north of

England, we used to have an outside toilet. The way it worked was as

follows. Whenever the sink in the kitchen was emptied, the waste water

flowed into this underground bucket which gradually filled. As soon as it

actually became full, it pivoted, tipped and emptied, thus flushing the

waste away from the outside toilet. It seems that knowledge in vyavahArika

is like this. We read more and more, discuss on the list, listen to teachers

etc. and our minds become more and more full of this so-called knowledge.

Then, at some point the mind actually become 'full' as it were and then it

all empties away (flushing away the rubbish). The mind (ego) is emptied and

'we' are left 'enlightened'. So the true 'knowledge', i.e. realisation is

not itself a gradual thing at all, it is an all-or-nothing; the emptying of

the bucket. It was only the pseudo-knowledge, which was really a sort of

negative ignorance that was gradual; the filling of the bucket.

 

Best wishes,

 

Dennis

[Guest guest]

I have just finished reading the article recommended by Benjamin (Apparent

Mental Causation Sources of the Experience of Will by Daniel M. Wegner and

Thalia Wheatley). I would just like to say that it is well worth reading.

Not only does it summarise the Libet experiments but it also gives details

of much more recent ones, including one to create the impression of free

will in a situation where the cause was known to be external.

 

Here are two summary paragraphs from the end of the article:

 

"The experience of will is the way our minds portray their operations to us,

then, not their actual operation. Because we have thoughts of what we will

do, we can develop causal theories relating those thoughts to our actions on

the basis of priority, consistency, and exclusivity. We come to think of

these prior thoughts as intentions, and we develop the strong sense that the

intentions have causal force even though they are actually just previews of

what we may do. The real causal mechanism is the marvelously intricate web

of causation that is the topic of scientific psychology. The sense of will

is not directly connected to this web and instead is an expression of our

tendency to take what Dennett (1987) has called an "intentional stance"

toward people. The intentional stance involves viewing psychological

causation not in terms of causal mechanism but rather in terms of agents who

have desires and beliefs that cause their acts. Conscious will is part of

the process of taking an intentional stance toward oneself.

 

"The unique human convenience of conscious thoughts that preview our actions

gives us the privilege of feeling we willfully cause what we do. In fact,

unconscious and inscrutable mechanisms create both conscious thought about

action and create the action as well, and also produce the sense of will we

experience by perceiving the thought as the cause of action. So, although

our thoughts may have deep, important, and unconscious causal connections to

our actions, the experience of conscious will arises from a process that

interprets these connections, not from the connections themselves. Believing

that our conscious thoughts cause our actions is an error based on the

illusory experience of will-much like believing that a rabbit has indeed

popped out of an empty hat."

 

Best wishes,

 

Dennis

[Guest guest]

--- Sunder Hattangadi <sunderh wrote:

> advaitin, kuntimaddi sadananda

> <kuntimaddisada> wrote:

> >

> > --- Gummuluru Murthy <gmurthy@m...> wrote:

> >

> > > The only attributes of vyavahArika that are relevant

> > > in paramArtha are the purity of the heart and the readyness

> > > of the ego for surrender.

>

> > Murthy gaaru - please study the yogavashishhTa slokas you have

> provided-

> > see what they say. Anyway my understanding of the scriptures of

> advaitic

> > nature negates the gradations in that knowledge. The discussion is

> also

> > not that irrelevant for saadhana since one should have a clear

> vision of

> > what is the nature of the reality and role of saadhana.

>

> Namaste,

>

> If I understand both of you correctly:

>

> There are gradations in knowledge = krama-mukti (pipIlikA mArga - the

> ant's journey)

>

> There are no gradations in Knowledge = sadyo-mukti (viha~Ngama mArga -

> the bird's flight)

>

> Both would appear to be confirmed in:

>

 

=====

What you have is His gift to you and what you do with what you have is your gift

to Him - Swami Chinmayananda.

 

 

 

The New Search - Faster. Easier. Bingo.

http://search.

[Guest guest]

Hello All,

When freedom comes everything is different but the sages say

 

that their nature is unchanged. We are caught in the paradox

 

that arises when metaphysical and temporal reality are

 

conflated. It will be pointed out to me that reality is

 

non-dual. True but it is also not-one (pure monism). It is

 

beyond conceptual polarisation.

 

The trap for the unwary is mixing up intellectually the

 

different levels of reality. If I am already there then what

 

do I need to do? Just hang out. That my Penny Catechism tells

 

me is the sin of presumption - " a foolish expectation of

 

salvation, without making proper use of the necessary means to

 

obtain it".

 

Morality presumes determinism and is not vitiated by it. There

 

is managable compulsion and 12 step programs. There is even

 

surrender to a higher power. All this is evidence. Should the

 

cosmic scope of causality change anything? I mean seeing that

 

we don't know or can't even conceive of the nature of freedom

 

then appending 'free' on to 'will' is senseless. The best we

 

can manage is to hold that using free is shorthand for more or

 

less free, more or less bound.

 

I append to this some sources where Sankara discusses this

 

topic.

 

Looking in Upa. Sah. I find right at the beginning of chap.II

 

the statement of the conflict between the world of causality

 

and that of our true nature. It is expressed in terms of the

 

desire for freedom from pain and suffering which recurs

 

endlessly as life follows life. The conclusion the seeker

 

comes to is that if pain and suffering is part of one's nature

 

then there can be no escape from it. However if it is part of

 

the realm of causality then by removing the cause it could be

 

overcome.

 

-Listen, my child, this is not your true nature, but causal.

 

Ignorance and misidentification is what keeps us stuck in the

 

realm of causality. Sankara does not discuss the freedom of

 

the will per se. He takes it as given that there is no true

 

freedom to be had in the causal domain. The self that you take

 

yourself to be you assume to be an agent and an experiencer.

 

In reality the Self is none of these things.

 

In B.S.B. Sankara discusses at some length the Jiva as agent.

 

((II.iii.33-40)) The scriptures would be pointless unless the

 

individual soul were an agent. The agency of the Jiva is

 

mentioned in the Scriptures.

 

The agency of the Jiva goes through various vicissitudes.

 

"Moreover the soul is not wholly independent in the matter of

 

activities yielding results, for it has to depend on particular

 

space, time and cause. An agent does not cease to have its

 

agentship just because it has to depend on accessories; for a

 

cook can very well be a cook even though he has to depend on

 

fuel, water, etc. And because of a diversity of the

 

accessories, it is nothing contradictory for the soul to engage

 

in an irregular way in activities yielding good, bad and

 

indifferent results."

 

The agent it seems is other than his instruments. At the

 

urging of the soul/agent ego meditation leading to samadhi is

 

taken up.

 

The consideration of whether agentship is natural to the soul

 

is treated in this section II.iii.40. Should agentship be due

 

to the nature of the Jiva then the jiva could never transcend

 

that agentship as your nature can never be forsaken. If it

 

could then it would not be your nature. This essentialist type

 

argument is the same as that in Upa.Sah. Agentship is due to a

 

limiting adjunct of the Self. The opponent asks whether action

 

can be avoided and thus the expression of agentship. This the

 

Vedantin dismisses as impossible for as long as identification

 

is present then the expression of one's powers as one's own is

 

inevitable.

Best Wishes, Michael.

P.S. An excellent run of stimulating discussion under Dennis'

 

stewardship, Thank you.

 

 

 

 

 

[Guest guest]

advaitin, "ombhurbhuva" <ombhurbhuva@e...>

wrote:

> Morality presumes determinism and is not vitiated by it. There

>

> is managable compulsion and 12 step programs. There is even

>

> surrender to a higher power. All this is evidence. Should the

>

> cosmic scope of causality change anything? I mean seeing that

>

> we don't know or can't even conceive of the nature of freedom

>

> then appending 'free' on to 'will' is senseless. The best we

>

> can manage is to hold that using free is shorthand for more or

>

> less free, more or less bound.

 

 

Namaste,

 

Would someone please comment on this passage from

Shakespeare, especially if it is relevant to the issue?

 

 

http://www.4literature.net/William_Shakespeare/Measure_for_Measure/8.h

tml

 

........ But man, proud man,

Dress'd in a little brief authority,

Most ignorant of what he's most assur'd,

His glassy essence, like an angry ape,

Plays such fantastic tricks before high heaven

As makes the angels weep; who, with our speens,

Would all themselves laugh mortal.

 

Thank you.

 

Regards,

 

Sunder

[Guest guest]

Namaste all.

 

Here is a private mail I sent to Dennisji together with his

response. I hope I am not confounding matters.

 

Pranams.

 

Madathil Nair

 

________________________

 

MRN TO DENNISJI:

 

Advaitins aver that the Lord is the result giver. Results can be

actions. E.g.: 'A' slaps 'B'. 'B' reacts. 'B''s reaction, which is

an action, is the result here. Although 'B' has the seeming options

to return the slap, to not react (even not reacting is an action

here) or to react differently, if whatever his reaction is a result,

it should then be considered as coming from the Lord. Since all our

actions are results on final analysis, the Lord being the result-

giver, does it not derive that we have no free will of our own? It

is the Lord who decides both actions and results. If there is any

feeling of independence, it is only seeming or apparent or a delusion.

 

Besides, actions and results are a beginningless and endless chain.

There cannot be any first action or an end result. The only possible

resolution is to take them both back to the Lord in the same manner

as we advaitins logically reduce this vyavahAra to paramArta. So,

the Lord is the ultimate actor as well as result-granter. Where then

is freewill?

 

I have seen the word "notional" used by Sadaji who believes that

there is free will. "Notional" means hypothetical or imaginary.

Does he then really mean that there is no freewill?

 

I am sending this private mail because I am confused who says what on

the List, although I am quite convinced that our freewill is only

seeming.

 

I, therefore, thought I would not add to the confusion by posting to

the List without consulting you. As discussion leader, if you find

there is substance in my argument, please forward this to the List

with your answer. If I am wrong, please let me know in the manner you

find fit.

___________

 

DENNISJI'S ANSWER:

 

You will realise from my comments earlier that I am unable to relate

to this idea of things 'coming from the Lord'. To my simplistic mind,

actions are just happenings. We neither do them nor cause them, they

just happen as part of the constant apparent movement in the

seemingly separate universe. Why Propose yet another separate agency

to account for them?

 

I believe that Sadananda acknowledges that there is no free will but

is simply insisting that, whilst we believe in our separate identity

we are seemingly able to make self-effort towards specific ends and

that this belief is identical to believing that we have free will.

 

Please post it (together with my comment if you like).

 

_____________________

[Guest guest]

Hi Dennis,

 

One last attempt using as few words as possible.

 

Now we are all agreed that the factual position is

 

"I do not have free will"

 

The issue to be settled is whether the `do not' in the above

statement attaches itself to the `I' or to the 'free will'.

Again we are all agreed that in a very real sense the `I'

does not exist. So a form of the above statement making this position

clear will be

 

"(I do not) have free will"

 

Restating in everyday English

 

"I that does not exist has free will"

 

or in other words,

 

"The vyavahaarika I has free will"

 

You yourself almost reached the same conclusion in the following

statement of yours.

> We can still call it 'self-effort' in that it is my (notional) self

> that is making that effort but that effort is not made 'freely' in

> the sense of having a choice to do, not do or do other.

 

In this statement the 'do not', I feel, has got attached to both 'I'

and 'free will'.

 

My way of stating all this may seem very irritating. The only reason

I persist is because I have a feeling that probably we are all

talking the same thing but not realising it.

 

Regards

Venkat

[Guest guest]

--- Madathil Rajendran Nair <madathilnair wrote:

> I have seen the word "notional" used by Sadaji who believes that

> there is free will. "Notional" means hypothetical or imaginary.

> Does he then really mean that there is no freewill?

 

Yes in reality it is hypothetical if one knows that it is only notional

- But jiiva's notion is that it is not notional but real when he

operates and that makes him jiiva - unreal becomes real and real is not

recognized. That is the essense of adhyaasa too.

> DENNISJI'S ANSWER:

>

> I believe that Sadananda acknowledges that there is no free will but

> is simply insisting that, whilst we believe in our separate identity

> we are seemingly able to make self-effort towards specific ends and

> that this belief is identical to believing that we have free will.

 

Yes Dennisji is right to some extent. But I am not simply insisting it

- since that insistence is also within vyavahaara and vyavahaara itself

is notional. But as long as jiiva-hood is there notional vyavahaara is

recongnized as real and within that notional reality - free will also

falls - Hence I keep saying like a broken record that the ontological

status of free will is of the same degree as vyavahaara which is of the

same degree as jiiva-hood. End of the record.

 

Hari OM!

Sadananda

 

 

=====

What you have is His gift to you and what you do with what you have is your gift

to Him - Swami Chinmayananda.

 

 

 

The New Search - Faster. Easier. Bingo.

http://search.

[Guest guest]

Namaste:

 

Duality exists as long as we distinguishes between 'known'

and 'unknown.' The things that we don't know, we attempt to

speculate. We don't know 'Brahman' and speculate that Brahman is

that it is! We don't know our 'fate' and we attempt to speculate it

through our 'free-will.' We don't know whether there are two states

of reality called, "Paramarthika" and "Vyavaharika" and once again we

speculate by defining them with our imaginative thoughts.

 

One of the simplest way of clarifying our understanding (once again

speculation) is by stating that Paramarthika is an unknown state and

Vyavahrika is the known state of experience. Given this

understanding, Brahman is unknown and Jiva is known. The true nature

of Brahman is known only to the Brahman. The world that Jiva knows

contains many Jivas with varying characteristics and every Jiva is

confined to the boundary of his/her knowledge. Every Jiva develops

his/her own beliefs and theories from what he/she knows.

 

The advaita vedantic philosophy is one such theory that the Jivas of

this list agree to accept. Then those who believe in this Siddhantha

(philosophy) need to understand what we believe. It seems that once

again we face the duality - what we know and what we don't know.

Once again, we seem to have a different level of understanding of

Advaita Siddhantha, also we don't have the humility to accept this

fact. Interestingly even though we don't know what is 'Paramarthika'

everyone seems to agree that there is no free will. By definition, we

know 'Vyavaharika' but we don't know whether there is free will!

There are several contentions: 1. Everything that we do is

deterministic and there is no free will; 2. Everything happens due

to 'God's will;' 3. We have to operate as though we have the 'free

will' and operate to the best of our ability and 4. We have free will

and we possess the ability to change our 'fate.' From my

understanding of Shankara's advaita philosophy, I believe that the

contentions 2 and 3 do not violate the implied framework. The

contention 1 is valid under the Paramarthika level of reality and

contention 4 is false.

 

Warmest regards,

 

Ram Chandran

[Guest guest]

--- Ram Chandran <rchandran wrote:

> There are several contentions: 1. Everything that we do is

> deterministic and there is no free will; 2. Everything happens due

> to 'God's will;' 3. We have to operate as though we have the 'free

> will' and operate to the best of our ability and 4. We have free will

> and we possess the ability to change our 'fate.' From my

> understanding of Shankara's advaita philosophy, I believe that the

> contentions 2 and 3 do not violate the implied framework. The

> contention 1 is valid under the Paramarthika level of reality and

> contention 4 is false.

 

Ram - no. 1 is not paaramarthika either - in the paaramaarthika state -

there is no question 'we' and 'do'. Action implies duality and no

duality in that state.

 

2 and 3 are essentially the same except one is more educated guess than

the other. God exists in vyavahaara only.

 

In 3 I will make a change in the statement - instead of we have to

operate - I will change it to 'we operate' but put have to after the

'and'. and we have to do to best of our ability - niyatam kuru - as

vidhi vaakyam. and 4 is false only from paaramaarthika level and

considered as real in the vyavahaara level - If 4 is known as false you

are already in 1 and you do not have 4 to say it is false! You are in

catch 22 state!

 

Hari OM!

Sadananda

 

>

> Warmest regards,

>

> Ram Chandran

>

>

>

 

 

=====

What you have is His gift to you and what you do with what you have is your gift

to Him - Swami Chinmayananda.

 

 

 

The New Search - Faster. Easier. Bingo.

http://search.

[Guest guest]

>From Sadananda's post m16902"

>> DENNISJI'S ANSWER:

>>

>>

>> I believe that Sadananda acknowledges that there is no free

>> will but is simply insisting that, whilst we believe in our

>> separate identity we are seemingly able to make self-effort

>> towards specific ends and that this belief is identical to

>> believing that we have free will.

>

>Yes Dennisji is right to some extent. But I am not simply

>insisting it - since that insistence is also within vyavahaara

>and vyavahaara itself is notional. But as long as jiiva-hood

>is there notional vyavahaara is recongnized as real and within

>that notional reality - free will also falls - Hence I keep

>saying like a broken record that the ontological status of

>free will is of the same degree as vyavahaara which is of the

>same degree as jiiva-hood. End of the record.

 

This argument breaks down if science can somehow demonstrate that the

psychological events involved in making decisions obey strict cause

and effect. (That is, if event A occurs, then event B follows every

time.) In that case, all our actions are determined, and even within

vyavahaara one cannot speak meaningfully of free will. This is

simple logic, and nobody has presented the slightest good argument to

refute it.

 

Sri Sadananda needs to distinguish between the psychological

impressions (e.g. of free will) that may occur to the mind engrossed

in vyavahaara, on the one hand, and the undeniable consequences of

logic, on the other. Of course, as I have said many times, it

remains to be seen if psychological events do indeed follow this

strict cause and effect. I do not know. But the argument I have

seen on this list that logic cannot determine the ultimate truth is

irrelevant in this particular case.

 

Om!

Benjamin

[Guest guest]

--- Benjamin Root <orion777ben wrote:

> Sri Sadananda needs to distinguish between the psychological

> impressions (e.g. of free will) that may occur to the mind engrossed

> in vyavahaara, on the one hand, and the undeniable consequences of

> logic, on the other. Of course, as I have said many times, it

> remains to be seen if psychological events do indeed follow this

> strict cause and effect. I do not know. But the argument I have

> seen on this list that logic cannot determine the ultimate truth is

> irrelevant in this particular case.

>

> Om!

> Benjamin

Benjamin - is there logic without mind? - I submit that 'everything' is

psychological - hence I am calling it as notional!

Hari OM!

Sadananda

 

=====

What you have is His gift to you and what you do with what you have is your gift

to Him - Swami Chinmayananda.

 

 

 

The New Search - Faster. Easier. Bingo.

http://search.

[Guest guest]

Many thanks to everyone who participated in this discussion (and I hope that

all of those who did not nevertheless found it interesting and diverting and

possibly even useful). It occurred to me that some might expect me to

attempt to summarise the issues and perhaps draw some conclusions but, given

the massive number of posts on the topic, I'm sure that most will excuse me

if I claim that such a task would be formidable indeed and I simply do not

feel that the effort would be justified. (Or, to put it another way, the

force of all of the other things that motivate this instrument is greater so

I find myself unable to exert the necessary self-effort.)

 

It might have been nice to reach a consensus of opinion on the subject since

it is a key issue in the philosophy but at least I think that all of the

arguments have been presented by one or another, fairly and comprehensively.

As I indicated in my response to Sri Nair, I for one am now looking forward

to the next discussion on bhakti vs j~nAna - and having Greg perform the

role of trying to tie it all together!

 

Best wishes,

 

Dennis

[Guest guest]

Hi Dennis,

 

Er, tie what together?

 

--Greg

 

At 05:45 PM 4/29/2003 +0100, Dennis Waite wrote:

 

As I indicated in my response to Sri Nair, I for one am now looking forward

to the next discussion on bhakti vs j~nAna - and having Greg perform the

role of trying to tie it all together!