World of objects

[Guest guest]

--- ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote:

>

> However then we have to consider how 'the object and

> its knowledge differ'. This level of

> conceptualisation occurs after, in the ontlogical

> sense, superimposition has made mind possible. That

> does not mean that the object has become somehow

> derealised or that there are primary qualities which

> are real or that the secondary qualities (mind

> dependent) hang on material substance. The object

> does not dissapear into the subject. Because it can

> be superimposed it is other than the subject. How

> this otherness came to pass when in fact being is

> indivisible is a question that is inscrutable

> (anirvacanaya?).

>

> Best Wishes, Michael.

 

Michael - I could not digest a single sentence. I tried to read couple

of times to see if I can make something out of it. But to tell you

frankly, I failed miserably. I may need to translate it into Indian

English for me to understand.

 

Hari OM!

Sadananda

 

=====

What you have is His gift to you and what you do with what you have is your gift

to Him - Swami Chinmayananda.

 

 

 

Calendar - Free online calendar with sync to Outlook.

http://calendar.

[Guest guest]

advaitin, ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva@e...> wrote:

>

> "For Galileo, the secondary qualities are not merely

> functions

 

Namaste,

 

To answer or comment on all this verbiage, is somewhat difficult for

me however; The mind doesn't exist, it never did. For where is it in

sleep etc? If it did exist it would be perceived in highest samadhi---

it isn't.

 

Now speaking relatively.

With regard to the other convolutions; colour texture etc are all in

the illusory mind and are really particular to the individual. We

don't all perceive the same exact colour etc. So indicating an

illusion or hallucination, holographic or not. So perceiving

something we are in fact effecting its qualities and giving it

qualities and so called substance. Another reason for presuming the

world to be an illusion is simply that it doesn't make any sense.

A bird will be born with no karma, fall out of the nest and die. What

sense does that make? Hallucinations have no sense..

My own saying for all this is;

'One doesn't have to understand the molecular structure of water to

get out of the swimming pool'.

 

.....ONS...Tony.

[Guest guest]

Namaste Sris Sadananda, Greg, Tony,

>From B.S.B.II.ii.28:

"For external things are perceived as a matter of

fact. It is wrong to say that external things do not

exist merely on the ground that cognition is seen to

have the likeness of an object, because the very

likeness of an object is not possible unless the

object itself be there, and also because the object is

cognized outside. So also it has to be admitted that

the regularity in the simultaneous appearance of the

cognition and its object is owing to the relation of

causality between them and not owing to their

identity. Again, in (such forms of awareness as)

“knowledge of a pot”, “knowledge of a cloth’

difference is seen in the two qualifying parts, pot

and cloth, but not in the substantive part knowledge,

even as in the case “a white cow” and “a black cow”

we find that whitenness and blackness alone differ,

but not so the cowhood. And the difference of the one

(viz cowhood) from the two (whiteness, blackness)

stands out clearly, as also the difference of the two

from the one. Therefore an object and its knowledge

differ. Similar should be our comprehension in the

cases of the seeing of a and the remembrance of a

pot. Here also the substantives. seeing and

remembering differ, but not so the adjectival viz

pot; this is just as in the cases of the cognitions,

“the smell of milk”, and “the taste of milk”, where

the substantives smell and taste alone differ, but

not so the adjectival part milk."

 

Here Sankara is saying that when an object is known it

is known directly. We do not know its qualities and

from that infer that an object is out there, the

likeness is the object. The regularity and

consistence of the appearance of an object is due to

their really being an object out there. An object

which was identical to its own appearance in

consciousness could not guarantee that sort of

immediacy. When he says that the object and its

qualities are one, in my reading of it,he would I

think be denying the object is really a substance in

which qualities inhere or that there are two things

conjoined in relationship (a)matter (b)its qualities

which are mind dependent(what Locke called secondary

qualities). What Tony was saying about 'my red' and

'your red' is based on the premise that the mind is

conscious by itself. In Advaita the mind is jada but

appears to be chit because of the mutual

superimposition of itself on Consciousness and

Consciousness on it. When the mind begins to look

around and try to make sense of the world viewing

itself as a centre of consciousness and the world as

other than it the Advaitin would hold that it is under

this illusion because superimposition has taken

place. This was what I was trying to convey, and

failing, by the phrase 'ontological order'.

 

This initial condition is simultaneous with the lived

experience of perception and it explains why the

object is sensed directly as it is.

Sw.Satprakashananda (Methods of Knowledge pg.105)

quotes Vedanta-paribhasa (VP 1) :

"The perceptuality of objects, such as a jar, consists

in their being not different from the subject

(percipient consciousness).

The absence of difference from the subject does not

indeed mean identity; it means having no existence

apart from the subject. To be explicit, since a jar,

etc., are superimposed on the Consciousness limited

by them, their existence is but the existence of the

Consciousness associated with the object, for the

existence of what is superimposed is not admitted to

be something over and above that of its substratum.

And since the Consciousness associated with the object

is but the Consciousness associated with the subject,

the latter Consciousness alone is the substratum of a

jar, etc., and hence their existence is but that of

the subject, and not something else. So the

immediacy of a jar, etc., (in knowledge) is proved."

 

A qualities of matter view or 'my red'(qualia) is

predicated upon (dependent upon) a Mind/Body

construction or mind really being conscious, in other

words forgetting that absolute primal unity. As V.P.

pg.38 says: "In the topic under consideration, since

the mind is insentient and hence incapable of

revealing objects, it is a limiting adjunct of

Consciousness which reveals things. This witness in

the individual self is different in each individual".

 

But still error is possible and the individual mind

orders reality in different ways as it reflects on

its experience. This is where concepts come into

play, whiteness, blackness, cowhood, smell of milk,

taste of milk etc. In this way 'an object and its

knowledge differ' without that being an admission that

their is a noumenal object out there of which its

qualities are the phenomena. In fact concepts come to

more than sensible qualities (as Berkeley pointed

out). But that is perhaps another days work.

 

The full text of B.S.B. II.ii.28 is on

http://homepage.eircom.net/

~ombhurbhuva/vijnanavada1.htm

 

I am absolutely open to correction and welcome it and

I hope that this note clarified my previous

obscurity.

 

Best Wishes, Michael.

[Guest guest]

Namaste,

 

At 10:31 PM 6/12/2003 +0100, ombhurbhuva wrote:

>This initial condition is simultaneous with the lived

>experience of perception and it explains why the

>object is sensed directly as it is.

 

This is one, just one, of the advaitin theories of creation, namely

sRshTi-dRshTi vAda (what has been created is perceived). But there are also two

other main theories that deal with the relation between observation and objects.

Namely, dRshTi-sRshTi vAda (perception is simultaneous with creation), and ajAti

vAda (creation is not an absolute, real event).

 

Perhaps you have seen the web page on advaita-vedanta.org that goes into these

issues:

 

http://www.advaita-vedanta.org/avhp/creation.html

 

Harih Om!

 

--Greg

[Guest guest]

Namaste Greg!

>This is one, just one, of the advaitin theories of

>creation, namely sRshTi-dRshTi vAda (what has been

>created is perceived). But there are also two other

>main theories that deal with the relation between

>observation and objects. Namely, dRshTi-sRshTi vAda

>(perception is simultaneous with creation), and ajAti

>vAda (creation is not an absolute, real event).

 

When Swami Tejomayananda, head of Chinmaya Mission and successor to

Swami Chimayanandaji himself, was in Washington D.C. for a yagna, I

took the (possibly presumptuous) liberty of slipping him a rather

long-winded note in which I gave an account of my version of

subjective idealism (among other things) and asked him if this was

compatible with Advaita. The relevant words in my note were:

>In fact, I believe that only consciousness exists, and that matter and energy

>are ultimately reduced to consciousness... There is no such thing as matter

>and energy existing 'outside' of consciousness. They are mere bundles of

>perceptions within consciousness

 

This was in the context of arguing that science alone, in my opinion,

was powerless to explain the existence of the world, and that a

'transcendental source of reality' akin to Brahman was indeed

necessary. Furthermore, the Source and the world are the same (i.e.

consciousness); the Source does not create a distinct world

(material, spiritual or otherwise), as in Genesis.

 

Whew! I must have been a naive and presumptuous person way back then

(last summer). Anyhow, after a month or two I got back a brief note

with a cryptic comment to the effect that Advaita teaches different

theories of creation, depending on the level of the student. I don't

have the note with me right now, but it did not say much more than

this.

 

Well, that doesn't fully settle the question, but it does agree with

your contention that Advaita has several theories of creation,

ontology, etc.

 

So does the Gita. One finds the dualism of Samkhya (Purusha and

Prakriti), and well as the monism of Advaita ('See me in

everything'). I think this is because the vast majority of humanity

clings to some kind of dualism, however subtle. The full-fledged

psycho-monism (my creative word) of subjective idealism and of

nondual traditions is quite a conceptual leap for virtually everyone.

('You mean the world disappears when I'm not looking at it?' Yes!)

Nevertheless, that is the clear and elementary logical implication of

the Mahavakyas (in my humble opinion and Sri Sadanandaji's too,

unless I have very seriously misunderstood him, which I am sure I

have not).

 

Om!

Benjamin