Existence of Objects

[Guest guest]

Hello Greg,

At this point it may be worthwhile to clarify

just what it is we are talking about. Sensations and

feelings are evoked by the object. Misled by the

subject-predicate way of describing things we may

imagine that over and above all the things that may be

said about the object there is some irreducible entity

that persists. This object has generally been

dismissed by idealists as something that could not

exist as an element in consciousness for anyone.

Berkeley took this to mean that it could not exist at

all in that it was inconceivable.

 

A realist could also reject matter in that particular

metaphysical sense whilst holding that there were real

entities out there. Feelings and sensation are reality,

subjectivity is an empirical datum and all beings

everywhere are in a nexus of intersubjective reality.

 

This is not mysticism just physics. The Primary and

Secondary qualities of Locke which Berkeley rejected

were supposed to be a support for the New science of

Newton. Moving on....

 

All these considerations are complicated by our

discussing them within the realm of Advaita with its

varient meanings for reality, appearance,illusion,

knower, known etc. which explains the feeling of

picking up mercury with a fork that they give rise to.

 

As well as that the Idealist thinks that his analysis of

perception reveals the nature of ultimate reality.

Shankara in the preamble is not concerned about the

exact mechanism of how superimposition works. Some

say...others assert....others say. "From every point

of view, however, there is no difference as regards the

appearance of one thing as something else." That

consciousness should be at all and of course that it

should be *of* something which is other than the

subject and not just the 'content' of his consciousness

or the given by reflexion, is his main concern.

 

Best Wishes, Michael.

[Guest guest]

At 01:14 PM 10/7/2003 +0100, ombhurbhuva wrote:

appearance of one thing as something else." That

consciousness should be at all and of course that it

should be *of* something which is other than the

subject and not just the 'content' of his consciousness

or the given by reflexion, is his main concern.

 

 

=====So we agree!

 

--Greg