Is the World Self or Non-self?

[Guest guest]

At 10:21 PM 10/15/2003 +0100, ombhurbhuva wrote:

Part of the problem with the 'object' is the subject/predicate fallacy. We

imagine that there is something existing that is red, sweet scented, with

thorns, of layered petals etc. We think that if we take all those predicates

away that there will be something left over which is an object called a rose.

The rose is all those things together and not an existent other than them.

 

==========Very good point, I like the clear way you said it. That notion of

essence is a very appealing and prevalent and sticky one.

 

ombhurbhuva wrote:

Here's a puzzle: which comes first the concept of 'object' or objects.

 

=========When you say "first" do you mean chronologically first within a given

person? Or "first" as in anterior or basic, such that the "subsequent" depends

on the "first" in some non-reciprocal way?

 

ombhurbhuva wrote:

If you didn't have the concept you couldn't pick out individual items or actual

entities and without the encounter with actual entities you the concept would

not become activated.

 

=========Are you sure this is what you want to say? The first half of this is

demonstrably false. A chipmunk can pick an acorn or a farmer can pick a berry

without having the relatively abstract concept of "object." On the other hand,

a more abstract enterprise would require the concept of "object." For example,

the discussion we're having now depends on having the concept of "object." But

dinner can be eaten without having that concept.

 

--Greg (going home for dinner about now...)

[Guest guest]

Dear Shri Ananda,

 

I have a clarification to seek from you on your reply to Shri Mani. In that

 

You Wrote

At the surface, whatever may appear has somehow shouted louder than its

competitors. This

is our perception of apparent objects. As you point out, we assume it to be a

"first

knowledge", which we initially receive for further consideration. But it turns

out that

this assumption is a mistake. The reception here is by our senses and our minds.

What they

initially receive is just a superficial show, of their own outward acts. All

that seems

knowledge in this show depends on make-believe, which needs examining more

carefully.

Further consideration leads elsewhere, beneath the show and all of its

constructing acts.

 

What then is found beneath the show? In order to find out, one has to go down

oneself --

beneath all mind-conceived assumptions -- to what you describe as "immediate or

direct

knowledge". Seen in itself, it is that knowledge which in truth comes first,

before the

mind can start assuming or conceiving.

 

 

Venkat - M

I agree with you that it is the knowledge or the conscious principle that is

underneath the Body/Mind Complex which converts the 'image' formed on the mind

screen into knowledge. But unfortunately the image that is formed on the mind

screen is not a true one but has already been subjected to the following

distortions:

 

1. Inattention or selective attention. This depends on interest which is

determined by previous impressions on the mind.

 

2. The pure sensation created by perception becomes both involuntarily and

inseparably mixed with feelings and other impressions related to the object of

perception that is stored in memory.

 

Thus the image that is formed on the mind screen is a distorted one and such a

distorted image is converted to knowledge by the conscious principle that is

underneath the body/mind mechanism. By definition the conscious principle does

not distort because it is pure, without motives etc.

 

To simplify matters let us call the process of formation of image on the mind

screen first knowing. (It is even possible to call this a second knowing if we

consider pure sensations that are registered on perception to be the first

knowing. But I would like to keep things simple here).

 

And the process of conversion of that image into knowledge the second knowing.

(In fact such division of knowing was suggested by you in a mail a few days

back).

 

Now you say that the second knowing is real knowing because without it there is

no knowledge. While I entirely agree with you here, the second knowing, it seems

to me, is subserviant to or dependent upon the first knowing in the sense that

it can only faithfully convert the image of the first knowing into knowledge,

without any capacity to correct the distortions that have taken place in the

first knowing. If so, can such a subserviant process be real knowing?

 

More importantly, in a manner of speaking, if the world outside is sat

(existence) and the conscious principle underneath the body/mind complex is

chit, as long as distortions take place at the body/mind level, samsara or

imagined lack of fullness seems inevitable. In other words there is real

existence (sat) outside and real knowledge (chit) inside the body/mind complex.

And they cannot come into contact with each other beacuse of which samsara is

inevitable and moksha impossible. What is the way out?

 

Sadhana Chatushtaya? If this is the answer, why do we spend such a

disproportionate amout of time on technical discussions in vedanta when instead

we should be concentrating on acquiring the four-fold qualifications? In other

words why do we spend so much time on describing our present condition or the

destination, when we should really be making the journey?

 

Pranams,

Venkat - M

 

 

 

 

 

 

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[Guest guest]

Hello Greg,

I am following the notion of a concept as

a power excercised in acts of understanding. The

possesion of a concept is probably simultaneous with

its excercise. How concepts are acquired is a

difficult subject. Some of them at least may be 'hard

wired' and are evoked in the appropriate situation.

The abstraction theory of their acquisition is

plausible for some concepts but as you will be aware

concepts like 'negation', ' coloured' are hard to

account for in this way.

 

You could have the concept of 'object' without being

able to give any account of it by simply attending to

what interests you and being able to separate that from

all other stimuli. The squirrel does that with nuts so

in a sense it has the concept of nut = food. The human

concept of object may be a more refined and logical

development of this. In a panpsychist view of the

world everything is an object for everything else. Is

that the broadest description of consciousness that can

be offered? I merely throw this out as random musing.

Best Wishes, Michael.

[Guest guest]

Got it - I did get the idea that it was a musing-type question.

 

--Greg

 

At 09:53 PM 10/16/2003 +0100, ombhurbhuva wrote:

>Hello Greg,

> I am following the notion of a concept as

>a power excercised in acts of understanding. The

>possesion of a concept is probably simultaneous with

>its excercise. How concepts are acquired is a

>difficult subject. Some of them at least may be 'hard

>wired' and are evoked in the appropriate situation.

>The abstraction theory of their acquisition is

>plausible for some concepts but as you will be aware

>concepts like 'negation', ' coloured' are hard to

>account for in this way.

>

>You could have the concept of 'object' without being

>able to give any account of it by simply attending to

>what interests you and being able to separate that from

>all other stimuli. The squirrel does that with nuts so

>in a sense it has the concept of nut = food. The human

>concept of object may be a more refined and logical

>development of this. In a panpsychist view of the

>world everything is an object for everything else. Is

>that the broadest description of consciousness that can

>be offered? I merely throw this out as random musing.

>Best Wishes, Michael.

>

>

>

>

>Discussion of Shankara's Advaita Vedanta Philosophy of nonseparablity of Atman

and Brahman.

>Advaitin List Archives available at: http://www.eScribe.com/culture/advaitin/

>To Post a message send an email to : advaitin

>Messages Archived at: advaitin/messages

>

>

>

>Your use of is subject to

[Guest guest]

Dear Shri Venkatraman,

 

You asked for a clarification about the relationship between image-forming

perception and

underlying consciousness. In particular, you wrote (on 16 Oct 2003 06:04:48

+0100 -- BST):

 

"To simplify matters let us call the process of formation of image on the mind

screen

first knowing.... And the process of conversion of that image into knowledge the

second

knowing...."

 

So we agree that perception is a process of image formation. But when you get to

calling

it 'first knowing', I'm inclined to be skeptical. Image formation and knowing

are two

different things. So when you use the word 'knowing' to describe the perceptual

formation

of an image, I would say that the description is confused. And I would try to

clarify the

confusion by asking what we mean by the word 'knowing'. Clearly, as you admit,

'knowing'

must be present along with an image-forming perception, otherwise the image

could not

appear. But what exactly is this presence called 'knowing', which is needed for

an image

to appear?

 

You then go on to speak of 'the process of conversion of that image into

knowledge' and

you want to call it the 'second knowing'. Here, there is another process, which

interprets

the image, as it is taken into knowledge. Again, something called 'knowing' must

be

present, but we still have to ask just what it is, in order to be clear about

what we are

saying. As an image is perceived and interpreted, what is this presence called

'knowing'

that continues through the processes of perception and interpretation?

 

At this point I would say that some further skepticism is needed. It isn't quite

right to

say that the process of interpreting an image is a 'second knowing'. As you

rightly point

out, if we define such a 'second knowing' which is identified with

interpretation, it "is

subservient to or dependent upon the first knowing" which is identified with

perception.

And you rightly ask that if this is all we are going to come up with, "why do we

spend

such a disproportionate amount of time on technical discussions in vedanta...?"

 

Yes indeed, I agree that it's sad to go round and round in technical circles.

And when

that happens, it is only natural to ask your question: "What is the way out?".

Advaita

tends to answer this question reflectively, by looking in, to see what is

driving these

vicious circles round and round. The intention is to clear away confused

assumptions and

mistaken identifications which form a tail-chasing spin -- like interpretations

that

follow on from perceptions, which follow on from interpretations, and so on.

 

The confusion here is our habitual identification of knowledge with processes of

perception and interpretation -- or with any kind of process for that matter. In

the end,

for any process to be actually experienced, there must be a knowing that stays

present,

while changing states of process come and go. That knowing presence is called

'consciousness'. It stays, while changing things appear and disappear. All

processes are

changing acts, which must be known in order to appear. But consciousness is that

which

knows, by its mere presence, at every moment of experience. As consciousness,

its very

being is to know. It does not know by any act that it puts own, but just by what

it always

is, in its own nature.

 

In short, it's only processes that act, and only consciousness that knows.

Perceptions and

interpretations are changing acts of process. As such, they are quite different

from

knowing, which is the timeless and actionless presence of consciousness,

throughout

experience. In this sense, it is quite wrong to identify knowing with perception

and

interpretation, as we so often do, through unexamined habits of ingrained

belief.

 

By questioning such false assumptions, advaita seeks a clear and uncorrupted

understanding. Is that pie in the sky? The only way to find out is to keep on

digging the

ground from under one's own feet -- and to keep falling and stumbling

accordingly -- until

true clarity is found.

 

Ananda

[Guest guest]

Michael said:

 

"Part of the problem with the 'object' is the

subject/predicate fallacy. We imagine that there is

something existing that is red, sweet scented, with

thorns, of layered petals etc. We think that if we

take all those predicates away that there will be

something left over which is an object called a rose.

The rose is all those things together and not an

existent other than them."

 

But what about the alien who has no eyes, detecting it using echo location,

has no nose but delights in the aura of its radioactive decay and eats it

for a snack? If we each have our own set of associated attributes and know

nothing of the other's set, does it still make sense to say that there is no

'independent' object? (Note I am playing devil's advocate here!) And what

about an extreme example where one of us can detect attributes of a supposed

object but the other can't?

 

Someone (not you I'm sure!) might want to say that the red, sweet scents

etc. are in my mind while the radioactive aura and echoes are in the alien's

mind so that there is still no independent object. My response to that of

course would be that they had fallen into my trap and were now postulating

an independent alien object!

 

Best wishes,

 

Dennis

[Guest guest]

Hello Dennis,

Your what about the alien question opens up so many areas of

speculation that I dizzy at the thought of following it all through. There is

something that it is like being an alien which will always be closed off to us,

just as there is something that it is like being Dennis W. that is similarly

opaque. However that does not mean that the alien might not have the concept

of a rose. Note in my cunning double negative I am not saying that the alien

has the concept of a rose only that we can't rule it out or in a priori. As I

wrote to Greg I am adopting the notion of a concept as a capacity excercised in

acts of understanding. (cf.Mental Acts by Peter Geach) Concepts are inevitably

linked to experiences but are not founded on them. As Berkeley rightly

asserted you could have the concept of a triangle as such without ever

encountering one that was neither equilateral nor scalene.

 

Did you ever come across Thomas Nagel's paper 'What is it like to be a bat?'

It's on

http://members.aol.com/NeoNoetics/Nagel_Bat.html

 

Some concepts are definitely not experientially based and are perhaps part of

natural logic wiring in the brain/mind. I skip blithly over a gap that has

swallowed a legion of philophers. Essentially the mood is against the tabula

rasa of Locke, the clean slate that we are born with so to speak and that our

further empirical adventures indite. Chomsky postulated the Language

Acquisition Device in the brain/mind which allows the random input of language

stimuli to have a grammer extracted from it.

 

What it is like to be M.R. no one can know but the concepts that M.R. has in

common with D.W. ensure that communication is possible. Misunderstanding

implies understanding. Could the alien and I talk to each other or would we be

forced to nod by means of the eternal Platonic forms of Mathematics as in the

movie 'Contact' or the scales of Kodaly - 'Close Encounters'.

 

May the force be with you, Michael.

 

advaitin, "Dennis Waite" <dwaite@a...> wrote:

> Michael said:

>

> "Part of the problem with the 'object' is the

> subject/predicate fallacy. We imagine that there is

> something existing that is red, sweet scented, with

> thorns, of layered petals etc. We think that if we

> take all those predicates away that there will be

> something left over which is an object called a rose.

> The rose is all those things together and not an

> existent other than them."

>

> But what about the alien who has no eyes, detecting it using echo location,

> has no nose but delights in the aura of its radioactive decay and eats it

> for a snack? If we each have our own set of associated attributes and know

> nothing of the other's set, does it still make sense to say that there is no

> 'independent' object? (Note I am playing devil's advocate here!) And what

> about an extreme example where one of us can detect attributes of a supposed

> object but the other can't?

>

> Someone (not you I'm sure!) might want to say that the red, sweet scents

> etc. are in my mind while the radioactive aura and echoes are in the alien's

> mind so that there is still no independent object. My response to that of

> course would be that they had fallen into my trap and were now postulating

> an independent alien object!

>

> Best wishes,

>

> Dennis

[Guest guest]

Dear Michael,

 

Thank you for your "impressionistic" account of the advaitic approach

(ombhurbhuva, on 16

Oct 2003 13:50:32). It brings to mind a line of reasoning that I heard explained

some 45

years ago, by Shri Atmananda.

 

You wrote:

 

"For Advaita you need two hands, one to hold on to the subject and the other for

the

object. You start from the basic common sense position. I see this cup in front

of me.

Even though there are many aspects on the subject's side, memories of cups, cups

in

different materials etc. yet this cup before me resists being anything other

than this

individual particular cup. In itself it is inert, unconscious and yet at the

same time it

is 'in' me as my consciousness of it. Its particularity and its inertness resist

my

reduction of it to an element within my consciousness and in fact the more I can

divest

myself of all associations with cups in the past and become focussed on this one

the more

mysterious and profound the experience of it becomes."

 

Shri Atmananda spoke of a glass of milk, asking what one's senses say about it,

in

particular. One's eyes say that it is a sight, a particular white shape. As

sugar is

stirred into it, one's ears report it as a tinkling sound. The nose reports it

as an

odour. The sense of touch says first that it is a warm sensation in one's hand,

then a

pressure on one's lips and a flowing warmth in one's mouth. The tongue reports

it as a

special flavour, of sweetened milkiness.

 

If one considers each sensation on its own merit, it says something quite

different from

the others. In fact, the differing sensations contradict each other hopelessly.

The white

shape of sight reported by the eyes is completely different from the tinkling

sound

reported by the ears, and again quite different from the sweet flavour on the

tongue, and

so on. How on earth, Shri Atmananda asked, can one trust such contradictory

accounts? For

an impartial assessment, it must be recognized that none of these particular

impressions

is quite reliable, that each says something not quite true.

 

What about putting the impressions together, as partial evidences that have been

reported

differently, from each standpoint in particular? Oh yes, said Shri Atmananda,

that can be

done. But it can only be done from a further and deeper standpoint, which is

detached from

the particular standpoint of each sense or each sensation. And even though

detached, this

deeper standpoint must somehow stay present through the differing reports of our

changing

faculties. It must be shared in common, by each of the sensual and mental

standpoints

whose different reports it reconciles.

 

That common standpoint Shri Atmananda called 'consciousness'. Please correct me

if you

think I'm wrong, but I would say that the Sanskrit words 'prajnyanam' and 'cit'

are often

used in advaita philosophy to denote just such a common ground of

'consciousness', in

which each individual may take an impartial stand.

 

When advaita philosophy is viewed from the outside -- in particular by many

academic

scholars -- such an underlying consciousness is taken to be an assumption that

advaitins

make, in order to build up their advaitic systems. But, in what I take to be the

living

practice of advaita, this outside view is a mistake. The living practice is not

system-building, but a reflective enquiry beneath all constructed systems. The

word

'consciousness' is not meant for assumption or belief by mind. In fact, it's

just the

opposite. The word is intended to direct enquiry beneath all assumptions and

beliefs,

which must accordingly be left behind as the meaning of the word is

investigated.

 

So, whenever the word 'consciousness' is used, it implies a question of

something to be

found, like using the symbol 'x' in an algebraic equation. With this questioning

sense of

the word, it may be said that no particular object can be perceived or conceived

by sense

or mind themselves, without falling back on consciousness to put different

reports of that

object together. And even to recognize the particularity of any object,

particular

perceptions and conceptions aren't enough. To recognize particularity, it has to

be known

that this object is different from others that were seen before. For that, one

has to

stand in a consciousness which has continued through the difference.

 

In your message, you went on to say:

 

"How does the object without leaving off being what it is become an element 'in'

my

consciousness? Could it be that this 'in' is the first wrong step? Suppose

subject and

object are both manifestations within another consciousness? In that way the

object is

what it is in truth even though it appears to be within the subject's

consciousness. It is

self-effulgent shining as it actually is."

 

Perhaps the mistake lies specifically in the way that the 'in' is conceived, as

"an

element 'in' my consciousness"? It's only as an element in consciousness that

the object

is shown in a partial and distorted way. When one thinks that one's mind and

senses have a

consciousness that's made of mental and sensual elements, then objects appear as

those

elements, mentally and sensually distorted. But if one could understand the

psycho-sensual

subject and its seeming object "as manifestations within another consciousness",

then

perhaps the rest of what you say should follow.

 

But what is it that you suggest as "another consciousness"? Is it made of

elements, like

the conceiving of our minds and the perceiving of our senses? If it manifests a

subject

that is different from it, how far would the manifested subject be an object of

perception

and conception? How far could such an object be a knowing subject?

 

So long as the sense of "another" is attached to consciousness, it seems to me

that such

questions must continue to be troublesome, in an advaita enquiry. At least, that

is so

where advaita is sought unqualified. Perhaps that's what you are considering --

how far

advaita should be qualified. Sorry, I'm having some difficulty connecting to

your

approach, and this message is an attempt to try looking for a connection,

perhaps not too

successfully.

 

Ananda

[Guest guest]

Dear Shri Anandaji,

 

Some thoughts crossed my mind when I saw your learned reply to

Michaelji. Although I have expressed similar opinions earlier on

this forum, I thought there is no harm in repeating them if they

kindle advaitic thinking.

 

In the place where I am stationed since many years now, there are no

mosquitoes, perhaps because the environment is too hostile for their

survival or because the place is so very clean and neat. (I don't

to the latter view, however.)

 

Back in Palghat, Kerala, where I hail from, it is a different

story. Inspite of repellents and airconditioning, one cannot

escape the wrath of these insects. Bombay, where you had been, and

Pune, where you are now, I am sure, are no different. Imagine then my

plight of being exposed all of sudden to mosquitoes after a long

lapse of peaceful nights in the Arabian desertland.

 

It was against this background that the mosquitoes became my advaitic

gurus. During one of my vacations in India, they rolled me into

thinking what constitutes a mosquito bite experience.

 

I am at rest with my eyes closed. There is one of the gurus on my

uncovered right foot. The teaching begins. What is it? A mosquito

bite. There is the image of *my* foot. Mind you, it is only a

mental image of a very particular part of what I call my *whole

body*. There is a hungry mosquito sitting there. Again an image that

has nothing to do with the *real* mosquito sitting there because the

one biting is most probably anopheles whereas the mental image is

that of a culex I had confronted long back in the Kerala backwaters.

Let me get rid of both the images. What remains? A mosquito bite

sensation. What is it? Just a sensation. Where is it? It is purely

a `sensation consciousness'. Why do I suffer from it? (Thought, nay

thought-consciousness). I suffer because of `I am bitten

consciousness' (Again thought – nay, thought consciousness). If it is

just a sensation, why is it different from a pleasant sensation? At

the purest, fundamental level, can sensations be different? They

can't be. (All thought consciousnesses!). How do I feel the bite?

Science comes in with the image of a brain (again image) and tactile

experience conveyed to it through neuronic transmission or whatever.

 

What has happened in this entire process in terms of what we call

consciousness? First bite consciousness, i.e. unpleasant sensation

consciousness which at its basic level cannot be different from a

pleasant sensation consciousness, then foot consciousness, followed

by culex consciousness, then brain consciousness, neuronic

transmission consciousness, different thoughts consciousnesses -

the list cannot end. Most of them are mental images or thoughts which

have nothing to do with *reality*. When all these happened, where

was this bite sufferer called "I"? Then, the "I" thought ("I"

thought-consciousness) dawns. If we analyze through these flitting

*consciousnesses*, something becomes very evident. When the foot

consciousness occurred, logically the bite consciousness wasn't

there, when brain consciousness was there, there was no culex

consciousness and so on. The sufferer "I" consciousness wasn't there

till I asked the question: Who suffers?! Yet, all of us are

sufferers when it comes to mosquitoes. What a tragedy!

 

Let us forget the suffering and go back to the situation. In all the

different stages of the `sensation' (which expire in micro micro

seconds), there is a common denominator and that is consciousness.

This applies to Michael's special cup too. Like a group photograph

consciousness that flits between `indidividual colours

consciousnesses', `faces of the individuals in the photograph

consciousnesses' and `thoughts-consciousneses with regard to my

knowledge of the individuals in the photograph' and then finally

the ` "I" consciousness' which dawns when I enquire about who is

seeing the group photograph, the cup consciousness can also be split

into different consciousnesses ad infinitum. But yet, the experience

of seeing the special cup or seeing the group photograph cannot

escape the common denominator called consciousness.

 

However, the so-called `seer' (the subject "I") of the cup and

photograph, who was earlier the sufferer vis a vis the mosquitoes is

never there. He is not there even in the "I" consciousness because

that also is purely consciousness. There is only consciousness

pervading every bit of what is happening, which I would like now to

capitalize as Consciousness because of Its all-pervasiveness. Then

why are we seeing in bits and suffering too. There is actually no

seeing or suffering. There are only `seeing consciousness'

and `suffering consciousness' which are fundamentally not different

from each other. If they are understood as the one and only

Consciousness, the seeing and suffering ends and one *sees*

ultimately. Now, if one asks the question "Who *sees*?", the answer

is: "There is no *seer*. Only "*seeing* consciousness".

 

This applies to our body too, which we always *experience* in parts.

Body-parts consciousnesses! A `full-body' experience is only a

thought or a mental image that we conjure up. A full-body mental

image consciousness! Yet, we spend a lot of time and money to keep

*the image* intact and deathless if possible without getting

dissolved in Knowledge. We also erect an entity called mind and give

it undue importance when all that there really is a stream of

consciousnesses which reduces itself into Consciousness on enquiry.

 

Consciousness remains. There is only Consciousness. No seeing or

suffering with the involvement of a subject at all on final analysis

because the thought of a subject's existence is `subject-thought

consciousness'. This is not suggestive of infinite regression as the

enquiry cannot go any farther than Consciousness that pervades

everything without a beyond or inside. Infinite regression then

becomes `infinite regression consciousness'.

 

Then what to say of objects when we have done away with the subject!?

Why do we keep asking the vain question if objects are in

consciousness or outside it!? The mosquito bite sufferers that we

are, we cannot find any better questions to ponder.

 

Now don't ask me if I am able to spend my vacations without mosquito

repellents. That is another story. The sufferer who has written this

has no tall claims to make! If other advaitains can do without

repellents after reading this, I would be more than happy.

 

PraNAms to my mosquito gurus and to all advaitins too.

 

Madathil Nair

_____________________________