Is the World Self or Non-self?

[Guest guest]

Hello Ananda,

What I was aiming to do in that

impressionistic piece was to sketch the trajectory of a

mind guided towards non-duality, the generic product as

distinct from own brand advaita and advaita proper. It

is too tender a plant to be subjected to analytic

rigour but yet I believe that it is useful to ask what

sort of experiences might give rise to certain lines of

enquiry. Metaphysical intuitions seize us from time to

time even if the positions that we attain without

understanding their inner logic may be superceded. It

seems to me that the irreducible altereity of the

object is what gives Advaita its particular power. You

have to admit that it is the ultimate in lateral

thinking.

 

I am reading very carefully your account of Shri

Atmananda and his analysis of how impressions are put

together. I will have some comments to make on that

but if I may ask a question - Did Shri Atmananda read

extensively in western philosophy?

 

After I wrote that post I came across some observations

by Schopenhauer on the object. I add them for your

interest,

Back Soon,

Best Wishes, Michael.

 

As a codicil to my general consideration of the

advaitic approach.:

 

The cup in its intense particularity has proved to be

a gateway to 'suchness'. Says Schopenhauer: "Inward

disposition, predominance of knowing over willing, can

bring about this state in any environment. This is

shown by those admirable Dutchmen who directed such

purely objective perception to the most insignificant

objects, and set up a lasting monument of their

objectivity and spiritual peace in paintings of *still

life*. It is worthwhile to consider what S. meant by

the will " ...but comprehends things free from their

relation to the will. Thus it considers things without

interest, without subjectivity, purely objectively; it

is entirely given up to them in so far as they are

merely representations, and not motives. Then all at

once the peace, always sought but always escaping us on

that first path of willing, comes to us of its own

accord, and all is well with us."

 

There appears to be a conflict in his idea of art as

absorption by the individual object and his account of

the freedom from the tyranny of the will that comes

from contemplation of the Platonic idea. However he

says that the concept is other than the Idea in that it

is sterile as far as art is concerned. How then does

he distinguish between object, concept and idea?

 

Michael Tanner in his chapbook on Schopenhauer (the

Great Philosophers series) finds this an incoherent

position but if I may offer a way that obviates this.

Take the concept as a purely logical construct gained

by abstraction from sense data(S.'s questionable

position) and the Idea as something existing under the

auspices of The One, the True and the Good. Then the

object shines in that space like an eternal idea. It

is that which makes it to be knowable. The more it

approaches pure object the more it trembles on the edge

of pure subject. Theoretically, which is all that I

can offer at this point, I might liken it to the

passage from nirvikalpa to sarvikalpa samadhi.

 

Eliot has an observation on just this point in 4

Quartets.

 

"For most of us there is only the unattended

Moment, the moment in and out of time,

The distraction fit, lost in a shaft of sunlight,

The wild thyme unseen, or the winter lightning

Or the waterfall, or music heard so deeply

That it is not heard at all, but you are the music

While the music lasts. These are only hints and

guesses,

Hints followed by guesses; and the rest

Is prayer, observance, discipline, thought and action.

The hint half guessed, the gift half understood, is

Incarnation.

Here the impossible union

Of spheres of existence is actual,

Here the past and future

Are conquered, and reconciled, " (from The Dry

Salvages)

[Guest guest]

In a message dated 10/21/2003 6:45:32 AM Eastern Standard Time,

awood writes:

> This brings to my mind the concept of 'svarupa' or 'nature'. It's literal

> meaning is of

> course 'own form'; and it refers to the inner being of an object, as

> experienced from the

> standpoint of the object itself. As one considers an object more and more

> deeply, one

> enquires further and further past various superficial appearances that have

> been mediated

> by limited and partial faculties. The enquiry is aimed at the object's own

> nature,

> independent of the changing views that show it differently.

>

> But, in order to achieve that aim, one falls deeper and deeper back into

> one's own

> thoughts and intuitions, in a process of reflecting what perceptions really

> mean. To know

> an object better, one falls deeper back into one's own self, beneath the

> surface show of

> perceived phenomena. This is only possible if the object in itself is

> somehow found

> within. And there the object must be known in identity, as what one is

> oneself

 

Here are a few excerpts on this subject that are contained in my eBook

"People Super Highway; the Mystique & Quest of Soul" :

 

Noumenal Reality or Noumenal Self

In Kant's model, the ultimate reality of things is quite different from what

they appear to be. Kant defined the perceiving of things through the senses of

our Empirical Self as Phenomenal Reality. In contrast to Phenomenal Reality

is Noumenal Reality which is characterized by Kant as purely an intellectual or

nonsensual reality in which a thing is as it is without being perceived. He

called this "Noumenal Reality" as a "thing-in-itself" (Ding an sich) and we

humans are unable to conceive or fathom such a nonsensuous reality Kant

maintained, since we perceive objects and things only through our senses.

 

Kant further believed that the "Mind" does not produce the world of our

experience - rather, it overlays its ideas upon the data collected by the senses

which then add up to form new experiences along with the older one. From this,

Kant implied that things and entities possess an external reality that is

independent of senses and "Mind." Additionally, this external reality does not

contribute to our wealth of knowledge - it only reminds us that the knowledge we

have of it is limited in nature.

------------------------

In Kant's model of reasoning, the second pure reason co-relates events that

are part of our experiences to the concept of Cosmos or World-Self. The

cosmological ideas according to Kant exist merely in principle and can never be

truly

experienced through the Empirical Self as they are too far removed to allow

their actual realization. Therefore, these cosmological ideas just serve as a

rule for cosmic phenomenon.

-------------------------

Bergson's contribution in the perception of objects has mostly to do with how

they are observed. He maintained that one gets a relative view (knowledge) of

the object when observing it from an external point. The knowledge gained

through that type of observation is symbolic in nature and generalized enough so

that it can be applied to all similar objects.

 

The absolute knowledge about an object is acquired only when one enters the

object and gets to know it the way it really is from inside -- i.e. be part of

its internal structure and movements. Bergson said on this internal

vantagepoint:

 

"One would know the object as it really is and moves and not only as

translated into the symbolic language of points and units of distance. For what

I

experience will depend neither on the point of view I may take up in regard to

the

object, since I am inside the object itself, nor on the symbols by which I

may translate the motion, since I have rejected all translations in order to

possess the original."

 

Bergson knew that one cannot get a feel for an object's "essence" by looking

at its exterior, as essence is essentially an internal characteristic known

only to the object itself and no one else. We use symbols to describe the object

when we view it from outside but if we enter it, then no symbols are needed,

for we know the object absolutely since we "become" one with it, Bergson

observed.

 

Bergson used the term "analysis" to describe the above process of "going

around an object" or perceiving it through observation. He believed this was a

critical function that intellect performed. Intuition, in Bergson's sense, comes

into play when one becomes intimately familiar with the internal structure of

an object. By intuition Bergson meant:

 

"The kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an

object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently

inexpressible."

--

 

For more on this and related subjects, please visit:

 

<A

HREF="http://www.peoplesuperhighway.com/">http://www.PeopleSuperHighway.com</A>

 

Dave Anand

 

 

 

 

[Guest guest]

Michael,

 

Thanks for the reply about "... the trajectory of a mind guided towards

non-duality"

(message no 19100, from ombhurbhuva

Mon, 20 Oct 2003 14:59:31).

 

In particular, you asked:

 

"Did Shri Atmananda read extensively in western philosophy?"

 

To this, I have to give a mixed reply. Yes, in the sense that he was

well-informed and

very perceptive about western culture and philosophy, partly through reading and

partly

through discussion with others. But no, in the sense that he was not at all the

scholarly

type whose learning and understanding was centred on books. He was a

well-educated man of

his own society and time, very modern in his outlook but not westernized. His

main

language was Malayalam, in which he had quite some skill at poetic and literary

composition. He had learned English well and could express himself very clearly

and

persuasively in it, though he spoke with a strong south Indian accent. And his

ability for

reasoned discourse (in both Malayalam and English) was sharpened by a long

career as a

police officer and public prosecutor in the Travancore State administration. I

think he

had an elementary knowledge of Sanskrit (in the way that English students used

to have an

elementary knowledge of Greek and Latin), but he wasn't a Sanskrit scholar.

 

His learning and information came more from intense reflection and living

discussion. In

the latter part of his life, that discussion included many European disciples,

some of

whom were well-read in western philosophy and discussed its ideas and

philosophers with

him. He was quite clear that advaita is no monopoly of India, and that each

society has

its founding sages who have reached non-dual truth. In particular, he said that

Socrates

must have been a sage, from the way that he faced death. So also Shakespeare,

for his

extraordinary ability to enter so deeply into the spirit of so many different

characters

(only possible for one who stands firmly in the inmost ground that all

individuals share

in common). Similarly, he spoke of Tennyson and Einstein as having reached or

come near to

a non-dual state.

 

None of this was said in any systematic or pedantic way, but came out here and

there in

the course of lively discussions, involving many people of very different

backgrounds,

over many years (the European disciples in the nineteen forties and fifties, the

Malayali

disciples in the late twenties and the thirties as well).

 

In the codicil at the end of your post, you say (in explanation of

Schopenhauer):

 

"Take the concept as a purely logical construct gained by abstraction from sense

data

(S.'s questionable position) and the Idea as something existing under the

auspices of The

One, the True and the Good. Then the object shines in that space like an eternal

idea. It

is that which makes it to be knowable. The more it approaches pure object the

more it

trembles on the edge of pure subject."

 

This brings to my mind the concept of 'svarupa' or 'nature'. It's literal

meaning is of

course 'own form'; and it refers to the inner being of an object, as experienced

from the

standpoint of the object itself. As one considers an object more and more

deeply, one

enquires further and further past various superficial appearances that have been

mediated

by limited and partial faculties. The enquiry is aimed at the object's own

nature,

independent of the changing views that show it differently.

 

But, in order to achieve that aim, one falls deeper and deeper back into one's

own

thoughts and intuitions, in a process of reflecting what perceptions really

mean. To know

an object better, one falls deeper back into one's own self, beneath the surface

show of

perceived phenomena. This is only possible if the object in itself is somehow

found

within. And there the object must be known in identity, as what one is oneself.

So as you

say, the more the pure object is approached, "the more it trembles on the edge

of pure

subject".

 

The trembling can of course be spectacular. It may be accompanied by all sorts

or

marvellous and mystical experiences, which show the mind and personality

expanded far

beyond their normal limitations. The question then arises: what value is there

in that

show of expansion and its mystical experiences? They qualify advaita with a

sense of

expanded power and grandeur and attraction. So this is the question of how far

advaita

should be qualified; or whether all qualities should be completely given up, by

going

right over the edge to where no duality at all is left between pure object and

pure

subject?

 

Ananda

[Guest guest]

Hello Ananada,

I'v been looking at the account of the perception of a glass of

milk and its enjoyment. It seems to me to be more akin to a wine tasters

experience of a glass of wine in that it is a sophisticated analysis of what is

going on as its going on with a lapse of a few seconds for the full palatte of

sensations to unfold. Like that it is a retrospection and not the lived

reality. In its way it is a sophisticated artefact, a parsing and analysis of

the act of drinking a glass of milk. The idea that the experience of drinking a

glass of milk is assembled out of those components is not convincing any more

than the sentence spoken by a native speaker has first a subject established and

then a predicate, then how about some adverbs. Then I'll put those together

with a qualification and how about a parenthesis. You get the picture! No one

constructs a sentence like this. Drinking milk with such attention is a second

order activity. Seeing something is not having all the sense data assembled

into an object in our consciousness by some deep background consciousness. It

seems to me that Sankara's advaitic tradition witness is much clearer than this

and less open to misunderstanding.

 

Different sense modalities do not contradict each other or are even contrary to

each other unless something is amiss which points again I think to the

totalisation of the original object. It looks like, smells like but doesn't

taste like milk. This is a surprise and is only so because the totalisation is

the background reality that is given. You didn't have to put it all together in

order to find the odd sense out. I was given a cup of what I though was coffee.

It was soup. I spat it out. 'This is horrible coffee'. But when I knew it

was soup I enjoyed it.

 

You say: "in this way, the 'mAyA' theory and its 'causal ignorance' are

essentially psychological. They describe the apparent world as arising

psychologically, from a hidden depth of mind (both individual and universal).

Shri Shankara is quite explicit that this psychological

arising is based on ignorance, thus pointing out that it must not be taken too

seriously or too literally. Its consideration is only a preliminary or

intermediate step, on the way to a more exact enquiry that is directly

philosophical."

 

Cosmic maya and individual ignorance are linked in the creative power of the

absoloute symbolised by the Supreme Lord and the superimposition of the

individual(jiva). The equation of Jiva and Shiva is bigger than the mind of an

individual. "To gain the infinite universal individuality the miserable little

prison individuality must go."

We are dealing here with an orientation that is human nature itself.

 

Best Wishes, Michael.

 

-- In advaitin, Ananda Wood <awood@v...> wrote:

>

> Shri Atmananda spoke of a glass of milk, asking what one's senses say about

it, in

> particular. One's eyes say that it is a sight, a particular white shape. As

sugar is

> stirred into it, one's ears report it as a tinkling sound. The nose reports it

as an

> odour. The sense of touch says first that it is a warm sensation in one's

hand, then a

> pressure on one's lips and a flowing warmth in one's mouth. The tongue reports

it as a

> special flavour, of sweetened milkiness.

>

> If one considers each sensation on its own merit, it says something quite

different from

> the others. In fact, the differing sensations contradict each other

hopelessly. The white

> shape of sight reported by the eyes is completely different from the tinkling

sound

> reported by the ears, and again quite different from the sweet flavour on the

tongue, and

> so on. How on earth, Shri Atmananda asked, can one trust such contradictory

accounts? For

> an impartial assessment, it must be recognized that none of these particular

impressions

> is quite reliable, that each says something not quite true.

>

> What about putting the impressions together, as partial evidences that have

been reported

> differently, from each standpoint in particular? Oh yes, said Shri Atmananda,

that can be

> done. But it can only be done from a further and deeper standpoint, which is

detached from

> the particular standpoint of each sense or each sensation. And even though

detached, this

> deeper standpoint must somehow stay present through the differing reports of

our changing

> faculties. It must be shared in common, by each of the sensual and mental

standpoints

> whose different reports it reconciles.

>

>

>

[Guest guest]

Dear Michael,

 

You wrote (svahauk, 23 Oct 2003, message 19150):

 

"I've been looking at the account of the perception of a glass of milk and its

enjoyment.

It seems to me to be more akin to a wine tasters experience of a glass of wine

in that it

is a sophisticated analysis of what is going on as its going on with a lapse of

a few

seconds for the full palette of sensations to unfold. Like that it is a

retrospection and

not the lived reality. In its way it is a sophisticated artefact, a parsing and

analysis

of the act of drinking a glass of milk. The idea that the experience of drinking

a glass

of milk is assembled out of those components is not convincing ..."

 

I would say that you are quite right to reject this account of perception as

absurd. The

account is indeed artificially constructed. But not for the sake of something to

believe

in. Instead, it's meant as an investigating argument. Its purpose is to show up

the

absurdity of our habitual thinking, in which we believe that experience is

constructed by

assembly from components. So, to accomplish its own purpose, the argument must

in the end

show up its own absurdity and ask for its own rejection. If the argument were to

end up

convincing anyone of some constructed belief, that would be a misuse. The only

proper use

is to throw all constructs into question, so as to point towards an

unconstructed truth

where no components need assembly to complete them.

 

The need for completion arises only because something is amiss in the way we

interpret our

perceptions. This is how I understand you, when you go on to say:

 

"Different sense modalities do not contradict each other or are even contrary to

each

other unless something is amiss which points again I think to the totalisation

of the

original object. It looks like, smells like but doesn't taste like milk. This is

a

surprise and is only so because the totalisation is the background reality that

is given.

You didn't have to put it all together in order to find the odd sense out...."

 

Would I be stretching your meaning too far if I were to suggest the following?

As you here

use the word "totalisation", it does not mean an assembling from components.

Instead, it

is a reflection from our sensual and mental pictures, into their "background

reality". The

pictures seem at first fragmented, showing something that seems missing. But,

through more

careful questioning, attention is directed to the background where an

unconstructed unity

is found in each seeming fragment, leaving nothing out at all. So, what you call

"totalisation" is simply a standing back, in an immediate reality where no

fragments can

be found in need of totalling.

 

If we can agree on such an interpretation of "totalisation", then the difference

between

us is mere words. Would you agree that "background reality" is essentially the

same as

"background consciousness"? I definitely share your distaste for the phrase

"deep

background consciousness", which you concocted in your message. And I would

extend that

distaste to a similarly concocted phrase: 'deep background reality'. The

background seems

'deep' only from the standpoint of the pictures. Standing in the background,

depth

disappears and it turns out that the background is immediate in all the pictures

it

supports. It is their living and immediate 'reality', which we call

'consciousness' as

well.

 

I would say that we are here engaging in a special kind of argument, where words

and

thoughts are used like pesticides. The intention is to kill off the pestilence

of

misconception. Thus thoughts of 'reality' and 'truth' are used, to exterminate

what's

misconceived. But if the exterminating thoughts remain, they form a damaging and

poisonous

residue, from which more misconception must arise. So, to do their work

properly, words

and thoughts must have a built-in self-destruction, just like a properly

effective

pesticide. And they must be used in such a way that activates their

self-destruction

totally, without the slightest trace of residue remaining left behind.

 

Easier said than done, of course. Hence this kind of wrangling in which we get

caught up.

 

Ananda

[Guest guest]

Hello Michael,

 

In reply to your 26th Oct posting (ombhurbhuva, message 19176), I must apologize

that our

wires seem to keep getting crossed. Here's one more try at looking for a shared

understanding.

 

About "totalisation", I heartily agree that the 'sense of sums being done in the

background' is inappropriate. In fact, the advaita position here is that

'totality' is not

something achieved by doing sums at all. Doing sums is an activity of body and

mind. It is

thus an essentially partial activity that cannot reach totality or wholeness.

 

So, one way of looking for totality is to ask inwards -- for an inmost

standpoint that is

common to all the different views created by our physical and mental acts. Would

you allow

that this is a legitimate way of looking for totality and wholeness -- by

skeptical

questioning and philosophical reflection towards an inmost standpoint where no

difference

remains between what knows and each object that seems known?

>From such an inmost standpoint, it would indeed turn out that each object is

already whole

in itself -- in its own svarupa -- without the need of doing any totalling. And

thus the

whole svarupa of an object is already given or presumed, in each perception of

it. Or as

you say, "the flash of nacre presumes the whole shilling".

 

Naturally, it must be admitted that this philosophical approach is only one way,

among

many others of investigating the idea of 'totality'. In the passage that you

quote from

William James, the approach is not directly philosophical, but proceeds instead

through

psychology. It thus speaks of "the actual unit" of psychological experience,

which it

calls "the total mental state, the entire wave of consciousness or field of

objects

present to the thought at any time".

 

Yes, I'd agree that psychological ideas, like "the total mental state" or "the

entire wave

of consciousness", can be useful in their own right. So also metaphysical ideas,

like

"objects ... given as wholes". But, as William James explicitly suggests, such

ideas have

implications that may not be defined by any mental outlines. When that is so,

would you

not agree that such ideas can also act as a "spur to further enquiry" beyond the

mind, and

hence beyond psychology?

 

In your posting, you spoke of such a spur to questioning as "ironic". I'd say

this is true

only in the sense that such enquiry must undermine all pretensions which it

finds mixed

into its ideas. But it is not true that the enquiry is an ironic pretence, which

isn't

meant to be taken seriously. The enquiry is deadly serious, in the sense that it

uses

thoughts of truth to exterminate whatever isn't true. That calls for great care

and

discernment, carried out beyond all compromise with physical or sensual or

mental

partiality.

 

Ananda

[Guest guest]

In a message dated 10/27/2003 10:35:10 PM Eastern Standard Time,

sunderh writes:

> Parallel Universes !

>

> http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articleID=000F1EDD-B48A-1E90-

> 8EA5809EC5880000&chanID=sa008

 

Good Read, Thanks

 

Dave Anand

 

 

 

[Guest guest]

advaitin, ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva@e...> wrote:

> The subject/object dyad as

> part of the growth of the cosmos can never comprehend

> itself fully. The consciousness that would try to

> comprehend it is doomed to fail.

>

> There is a still point and serious enquiry is a way but

> if as the great ones say we are already there an

> element of irony must be present.

 

Namaste,

 

The cosmos appears to be growing in strange ways too, such as

Parallel Universes !

 

http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articleID=000F1EDD-B48A-1E90-

8EA5809EC5880000&chanID=sa008

 

[if the link does not work, it will have to be copied/pasted in full

in the URL address box].

 

"Is there a copy of you reading this article? A person who is not you

but who lives on a planet called Earth, with misty mountains, fertile

fields and sprawling cities, in a solar system with eight other

planets? The life of this person has been identical to yours in every

respect. But perhaps he or she now decides to put down this article

without finishing it, while you read on.............."

 

 

Regards,

 

Sunder

[Guest guest]

as regards to knowing with perception and knowing with realisation i remember a

buddhist legend of a blind saint chakshupala .who was blind but yet enlightened.

 

i would like the knowledgable members of this forum to give me some insight into

this matter which i have been contemplating for quite sometime.

 

how much influence does the mere presence of an external mind have over a

persons thinking. i think satsangha has more scientific explanation.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

k kaushic

engineering year 1

national university of singapore

 

 

 

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