Philosophy and sadhana

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Hello Michael, Benjamin and others interested in this question,

 

Michael wrote (ombhurbhuva, 4 Dec, # 19972):

 

"This [shri Atmananda's] position [on mind and objects] is technically

known as mediate realism and it is an inherently unstable one. Under

pressure it tends to degenerate into Idealism and likewise Idealism

tends to mutate into it. Putting it bluntly, if all you know is a

mental appearance how do you know that there is anything 'outside'

corresponding to it. Nothing in your data tells you so."

 

As I see it, this is a confused distortion of Shri Atmananda's

position. For him, mind is no more or less than a seeming function

which mediates between consciousness and objects. Accordingly, the term

'mediate realism' could be used to describe the idealist position. But

this usage of the term is a little different from Michael's. In this

different usage, the idealist position would be described as a 'mediate

realism' that takes a sadhaka from dual falsity to non-dual truth --

from the mistaken realism of object-subject falsely dualized, to the

true realism of non-dual consciousness.

 

So yes, Shri Atmananda would agree with Michael that 'idealism' is

inherently incoherent and unstable. But he did not talk in the way that

Michael does, when saying that "mediate realism ... tends to degenerate

into Idealism and likewise Idealism tends to mutate into it." Instead,

he spoke of idealism being helpfully unstable -- in the sense that when

it is taken seriously enough, in its own right, it tends to dissolve

itself into non-dual consciousness.

 

Perhaps, instead of merely theorizing about idealism, we should ask a

practising idealist, like Benjamin, what his experience is, in this

regard. Of course different idealists would give us different answers.

But, if Benjamin is listening, I'd be interested in his take.

 

Further, Michael wrote:

 

"I have scanned B.S.B. II.ii.28 (not 29, sorry Dennis) into

http://homepage.eircom.net/~ombhurbhuva/vijnanavada1.htm and there you

can read for yourself what Sankara's position is (Swami Gambhirananda's

trans. Advaita Ashrama publ). That it is different from what you are

saying is obvious to me but I could be wrong and maybe I'm missing

something."

 

Thank you for providing the Gambhirananda translated passage. Having

now had time to read it and do a little comparison with the Sanskrit

original (from http://www.sankara.iitk.ac.in/bsutra.php3), I must tell

you that I see no real disagreement between Shri Shankara and Shri

Atmananda here. Only to be expected of course, since Shri Atmananda

explicitly belongs to the Shankara tradition. The difference that you

find obvious comes from interpreting Shri Shankara differently.

 

I've printed out the translated passage and marked in the margins how

the original Sanskrit terms are translated by the English 'perception',

'cognition', 'knowledge', 'awareness' and 'consciousness'. It is no

simple, word to word translation. In a written message like this, it

would take too long to go into all the details of terminology and

meaning, but I'll attempt a broad explanation.

 

In the early part of the passage the Sanskrit 'upalabdha' ('taking

possession of', 'acquiring', hence 'conception' or 'perception') is

translated as 'perception' and sometimes as 'cognition'. Later on, the

word 'cognition' translates various Sanskrit terms, but it mainly

translates the Sanskrit 'vijnyana' ('differentiated knowing' or

'discernment'). 'Knowledge' generally translates 'jnyana'. 'Awareness'

variously translates 'pratilabdha' ('receiving back', 'recognizing'),

'jnyana' ('knowing'), 'grahana' ('grasping'), 'anubhava'

('experience'). 'Consciousness' translates 'vijnyana'.

 

Actually, the word 'consciousness' occurs only once in the whole

translated passage. And, to me, it is a mistranslation, a little bit of

a slip up in an otherwise helpful translation. The problem is that it

translates 'vijnyana', which is a differentiated mental action that

discerns different things. No such mental action can be consciousness

itself. Consciousness is the very identity of self -- the knowing that

is identical with being. That is no action of any instrument like mind.

An instrument is an object that acts on objects other than itself.

Immediately following this part of the passage (where 'vijnyana' has

been translated as 'consciousness'), Shri Shankara goes on to describe

instrumental action as 'kriya'; and here he says pointedly, 'svatmani

kriya avirodh ...', which is rightly translated as 'there can be no

action on oneself'.

 

This whole passage from the BSB, 2.2.28 is about 'vijnyana' or

'discernment'. And what it says is that discernment is a

differentiating action of mind, which only acts upon objects other than

itself. The mind is not knowing in itself. Instead, the mind is only an

instrumental act, going out from knowing self to differentiated

objects. Of such action, the passage says explicitly: 'There can be no

action on oneself.'

 

In the Upanishads, there is a very specific word for 'consciousness'.

That word is 'prajnyana'. In that word, the prefix 'pra-' has a double

meaning, related to the English 'pro-' and 'pre-'. 'Pro-' means

'onward' and 'pre-' means 'prior'. (Yes, it is one of those strange

tricks of language that these two prefixes are closely related, though

they seem to have such different meanings.) So the Sanskrit prefix

'pra-' implies two things. For a start, it implies onward continuity

and hence changelessness. And further, it implies a prior principle

that comes first and hence an underlying reality from which appearances

have arisen. Putting these two together, 'prajnyana' describes a

changeless knowing (jnyana) that underlies appearances, as their true

reality. That is 'consciousness', the underlying principle that's shown

in common by all states and appearances of knowing.

 

In this passage from the BSB, 2.2.28, the word 'prajnyana' does not

occur at all. For a good reason. This passage is very indirect, in the

way that it points to prajnyana or consciousness. The direct concern is

with vijnyana or discernment. In the word 'vijnyana', the prefix 'vi-'

implies 'differentiation'. So, vijnyana is a differentiating

knowledge -- with a knowledge of *this* seen to be different from a

knowledge of *that*.

 

Thus the passage speaks of the difference between 'ghata-jnyanam'

('knowledge of a pot') and 'pata-jnyanam' ('knowledge of a cloth'). And

it says that the difference here is only 'visheshanayor' -- it is only

in the 'differentiating two'. The difference it not 'visheshasya

jnyanasya' -- it does not 'belong to the knowledge that is [thus]

differentiated'. That knowledge in itself is the same, appearing

differently in the two differentiating acts of knowing a pot and

knowing a cloth. Such differentiating acts are not knowledge in itself,

but only changing appearances of its changeless reality. They are

changing acts of vijnyana or discernment, quite different from the

changeless reality of prajnyana or consciousness.

 

As Shri Shankara refutes the vijnyana-vadi idealists, he says that they

can't have their cake and eat it. Vijnyana is a changing act of

discerning mind, which differentiates one thing from another. For

anyone who keeps on standing in the discerning acts of vijnyana,

differences remain -- between different things discerned, between the

acts of discernment and the objects discerned, and between different

acts of discernment. Thus standing intellectually in difference and

change, it is self-deceptive theorizing to assert that no difference is

found there -- between the discerning mind and the objects it discerns.

The mind that makes such an assertion is lying to others and to itself.

In this lying, it pretends that that its vijnyana or discernment is

self-illuminating. And so it falsely claims to have reached the final

goal -- where no further discernment is needed to reach that

consciousness which needs no claim nor any changing act to shine.

 

To overcome this self-deception of discerning mind, Shri Shankara

points out that vijnyana or discernment is a mental act does not shine

by itself, but needs something else to illuminate it. And that

something else he calls 'vijnyana-sakshi' or the 'witness of discerning

mind'. Here is how he describes it (towards the end of BSB 2.2.28):

 

vijnyAna-grahaNa-mAtra eva vijnyAna-sAkshiNo

grahaN'-AkAnksh'-AnutpAdAd

anavasthA shank' Anupapatteh

 

Here is Svami Gambhirananda's translation:

 

"... once an awareness of the cognition occurs, no further desire to

apprehend the witness of the cognition can arise; and so there is no

possibility of infinite regress."

 

But I think that the original can also be translated as follows (and

here I would be grateful for any corrections from those who have more

than my very limited knowledge of Sanskrit):

 

vijnyAna-grahaNa-mAtra eva vijnyAna-sAkshiNo

-----------

What follows from the witness of

discerning mind is nothing else

but a pure apprehension of

the mind's discerning functioning.

 

grahaN'-AkAnksh'-AnutpAdAd

--------------------------

In that, there is no rising up

of any apprehension still

mixed up with mind's expectancy.

 

anavasthA shank' Anupapatteh

----------------------------

And there, no lack of steadiness,

nor any sense of an unsettled

doubt, can possibly be found.

 

Here, Shri Shankara is saying that when the witness is actually

reached, all trace of mental expectation is dissolved in final truth,

which is thus known with utter certainty. As he finds fault with the

idealist position, the direction of his argument is not to weaken the

position by driving it outwards, toward material objects. Instead, he

is asking the idealists to give up their remaining confusion of mind

with objects -- so uncompromisingly that they come fully inward to a

totally detached witness, completely free of objects and their

expectation in the mind. It's then that the mind dissolves in

objectless consciousness, and the idealist position is finally

strengthened to its final conclusion, in the impartial certainty of

non-dual truth.

 

At this point, it may help to give examples, as Michael asked, of how

mind 'is a confusion of knowledge with ignorance, which produces a

compromised and misleading appearance of truth mixed up with falsity'.

 

Well, let's take Shri Shankara's examples about 'knowledge of a pot'

and 'knowledge of a cloth'. What does it mean to say that a pot is

perceived? As the pot appears in experience, what we call its

'perception' refers to an act through which some sense-organ or the

mind (or some combination) has produced the appearance. The mind takes

this act to be 'knowledge' of the pot.

 

But this act is only a doing which produces an effect. The effect is

the appearance of the pot. As the pot appears, the effect of its

appearance is known. That knowing is an illumination from

consciousness. That is what the word 'knowing' means. It refers to the

shining of consciousness, which illuminates the pot's appearance.

 

This appearance of a pot has been produced by various doings in the

world and in the perceiving body and mind. These doings are what

produce the pot's appearance, as their effect. That is what the word

'doing' means. It refers to the producing of the pot's appearance, by

happenings in the world and by personal acts of the perceiving body and

the conceiving mind.

 

In short, the words 'knowing' and 'doing' refer to quite different

things. On the one hand, the word 'doing' refers to the physical and

mental producing of the pot's appearance. On the other hand, the word

'knowing' refers to the shining of consciousness, which illuminates

this appearance that has come about by doing.

 

And yet, when the mind confuses these two different things, as it takes

personal perceptions and conceptions to make up the 'knowledge of a

pot'. In this so-called 'knowledge', the pot appears to be partly known

and partly unknown, as the clear knowing of consciousness is confused

with the partial ignorance of perceiving and conceiving acts.

 

In actual fact, the pot is known by consciousness alone. And that

knowing is non-dual. There, the pot itself is known, as identical with

the consciousness that knows it. The pot's reality is consciousness

itself. So also the reality of mind and body that perceive or conceive

the pot. That is the undifferentiated ground of consciousness and

reality, where knowing and being are identical.

 

It's only appearances that seem to differ, at various levels of

apparent mind and body. At these levels, the so-called 'knowing' of the

pot seems to be a perceiving or conceiving activity of mind and body.

And this activity seems different from the pot that is thus 'known'.

Moreover, there seem to be different 'knowings' or 'knowledges' -- with

a 'knowledge of a pot' seeming different from a 'knowledge of a cloth'.

 

But, such so-called 'knowings' or 'knowledges' are misleading

confusions of knowing and doing. In particular, they confuse an

impartial knowing that is completely true with sensual and mental

doings that are partly false and misleading. The so-called 'knowledge

of a pot' is thus a compromised and misleading appearance of a pure and

impartial consciousness mixed up with partial sense-perceptions and

ideas and intuitions of the pot. Through this confusion, these

sense-perceptions, ideas and intuitions mix up the pure truth of the

pot with an impure falsity of superimposed forms and names and

qualities perceived by sense and conceived by mind.

 

There is only one way to know the pot correctly, with true objectivity.

That is to stand back from body, going back completely through all

partial mind to an impartial stand in consciousness itself. It's only

there -- completely detached from body and from mind -- that the true

reality of 'a pot' or 'a cloth' is rightly known.

 

So I agree with Michael that advaita does not stop with 'subjectivity',

but goes on to a consideration of 'objectivity' as well. Where is the

disagreement then? Perhaps Michael has put his finger on it when he

says:

 

"You say 'This distancing of knower and known is dvaita or duality'. In

these discussions I always took non-duality to be the non-duality of

atman and Brahman and duality by extension to mean a transcendent

Brahman. Roughly a transcendent/immanent opposition. What you propose

is a topic for epistemology."

 

Yes, there is a difference here between what Michael here says and Shri

Atmananda's approach. According to Shri Atmananda, the basic duality is

that of subject and object (or knower and known). In fact, Shri

Atmananda avoided the concept of 'brahman', in his direct approach. He

regarded this concept as belonging to the cosmological approach -- the

approach that first builds an advaitic picture of the world, and then

reflects from that picture to non-dual truth.

 

Here, a crucial question is at stake, about the basic purpose of

philosophy. Is that purpose system-building or enquiry? Must philosophy

proceed by building major systems that explain the physical and mental

world, or can it enquire more directly from a sadhaka's everyday

experience into truth?

 

Yes, it is true that the Brahma-sutras organize Upanishadic concepts

into an advaita system. And, as indicated by their very name, the

Brahma-sutras greatly emphasize the concept of brahman, in the system

that they build. So does Shri Shankara, as he builds his maya theory,

through his commentaries on the Upanishads and the Brahma-sutras.

 

But, according to Shri Atmananda, such system-building is not true

philosophy. Strictly speaking, it is better described as 'cosmology'.

In this sense, Shri Shankara's maya theory is his cosmology. It is an

intellectual system that he built for explaining the world in advaitic

terms, in the course of debates with various opponents who were not

strict advaitins. The purpose of this system is more scholastic than

philosophical. It is to establish an advaita school of thought, in

relation to other schools of thought.

 

So the maya theory is only a preliminary introduction, for those who

are coming to advaita from elsewhere. As an advaita sadhaka proceeds to

actual enquiry, this theory of the world has to be left behind. I would

say that Shri Shankara himself makes that clear, by making 'ajnyana' or

'ignorance' the basis of the theory. By basing his theory of world on

what he calls 'ignorance', he is deliberately undermining this very

theory that he puts forward. He is making this theory self-imploding or

self-dissolving, when it is taken seriously. By this self-undermining

theory, he means to take the sadhaka away from all scholastic systems.

 

It is thus not in the maya theory that Shri Shankara appears in his

true light, as a philosopher. His actual philosophy is shown

elsewhere -- in particular passages where he is not system building,

but instead directing the sadhaka to a questioning enquiry. This was

Shri Atmananda's position on Shri Shankara, as I understand it. There

is of course no question of Shri Atmananda saying that Shri Shankara

was wrong. Only that parts of Shri Shankara's works were appropriate to

particular conditions of his time, and those parts need to be

understood as such today.

 

The main issue here is the relationship of philosophy and sadhana.

According to Shri Atmananda, genuine philosophy is quite beyond the

reach of scholarship and debate. It's only intellectual systems that

can lie within the domain of scholarship and debate. In the end, no

genuine philosophy can be the system-building work of scholars and

debaters. Its only as a spiritual sadhana, of questioning enquiry, that

any philosophy is genuinely practised. And then it is essentially an

individual enquiry, carried out by individual sadhakas and teachers, in

search of a truth in which all intellectual systems must dissolve.

 

Perhaps this question, of philosophy and sadhana, could be taken up for

discussion on the Advaitin List, at some later stage. Not specially in

the context of Shri Atmananda's teachings, but in a broader way for the

advaita tradition in general, in relation to philosophies outside of

India as well.

 

Ananda