advaita manjari - 5

[Guest guest]

Namaste Sri Sadananda,

Your extensive post is like

taking a sledge hammer to crack a nut. Unfortunately

you miss. You have framed the problem in such a way

that we must envisage experience without an

experiencer. Can a logical impossibility be good

grounds for anything? In the discussion of the 'as

though outside' view of objects Sankara likens this to

saying "Visnumitra appears like the son of a barren

woman". An observation is being made on the basis of

a logical impossibility - Visnumitra is like

(observation) a barren woman's son (logical

impossibility).

 

Now you may have good grounds for your idea that the

world is real/unreal/indeterminate for instance

scripture but this does not mean that this argument is

valid.

 

Where in Advaita is this argument used not I stress the

supposed conclusion?

 

Best Wishes, Michael

[Guest guest]

--- ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote:

> Namaste Sri Sadananda,

> Your extensive post is like

> taking a sledge hammer to crack a nut. Unfortunately

> you miss. You have framed the problem in such a way

> that we must envisage experience without an

> experiencer. Can a logical impossibility be good

> grounds for anything?

 

I am sorry Michael - I donot think I have framed the logical

impossibility. The problem of ideterminacy presents that as logical

impossibility itself - that is what in my opinion as indeterminacy or

anirvachaniiyam. Yes experienced cannot be provded without experiencer

but experiencer exist without the experienced as 'I am'. There lies the

dependent and independent things. That logical impossibility (that is

different from logical invalidity) is the nature of the problem, when it

is said that it is neither real nor unreal - that is the mitya as I

understand.

 

Michael - if you think I have not presented the correct adviatic stand,

please do correct me and educate me.

 

I have presented bringing the references you mentioned that is

consistent with my arguments. I gave enough detail to the references

you mentioned, primarily to show that I am not presenting just my own

20th century arguments, due to some abstract influence of Idealistic

theories. I think you need to provide me why you think that mine is not

correct adviata position. I am out of my wits now. To tell you honestly

I was not giving any specific refrence quotes in the vaadavali list from

Shankara Bhaashyaas until this time. Since you raised issue I had to

address it out of respect for you since I consider your comments are

more for establishing the truth rather than arguing that advaita is

worng and dvaita is right.

 

In the discussion of the 'as

> though outside' view of objects Sankara likens this to

> saying "Visnumitra appears like the son of a barren

> woman". An observation is being made on the basis of

> a logical impossibility - Visnumitra is like

> (observation) a barren woman's son (logical

> impossibility).

 

True as long as if you consider that non-real and real are only two

options we have. The non-real is non-existent like example you cited as

vandyaa putraH, son of a barren woman. Definitely the world does not

come under that category and that is precisely what Shankara's

discussion pertaining to 2-2-28. I never said the world is

non-existent either. It is not non-real does not implies that it is

real since real is defined as trikaala abhaaditam, that which remains

the same in three periods of time. That is the reason why I have

emphasized the double negative aspect involved in the suutra itself.

That is why I keep saying non-duality is inspite of duality. My

arguments are existence of the world is an indeterminate problem - one

can not say it exists and nor it is non-existent. Suutras 2-2-18 to

2-2-28 are in agreement with my conclusions.

 

Michael at this juncture I may have to call it a truce, since I ran out

of all my wits unless you can prove that I am worng, I have to rest my

case.

>

> Now you may have good grounds for your idea that the

> world is real/unreal/indeterminate for instance

> scripture but this does not mean that this argument is

> valid.

 

I appreciate if you can show me that it is invaid - I am not sure what

is 'instance scripture'. I used the same references you mentioned to

show that my understanding of advaita is not worng - I am ready to learn

if you can show me the invalidity of my arguments.

 

But besides that, I asked you how you can account the conscious entity

as substratum to inert entity. If the cause is cit, can the effect be

acit - unless of course you can imagin that - which comes back to as

mental modification.

>

> Where in Advaita is this argument used not I stress the

> supposed conclusion?

 

In advaitasiddi - Madhusuudhana saraswati discusses about the falsity -

clealy establishes the mithya is not opposite to real nor opposite to

unreal. That is the nature of jagat as jagat mitya statement. I think

Anand Hudli has discussed this text to some extent and may be stored in

the files. Couple of years ago in response to the questions by Charley

(from Australia - I think) and G.Murthy gaaru, I discussed some aspects

of the text. I may have to dig that post if I can find it.

 

The vivekachuudamani sloka I quoted is about the definition of maaya too

- whether it is Shankara's text or not it is considered as advaitic text

and at least pre-16th century and therefore cannot have been influenced

by the western Idealistic theories.

 

Best Wishes to you too and Happy new year to all.

 

Hari OM!

 

> Best Wishes, Michael

 

 

=====

What you have is His gift to you and what you do with what you have is your gift

to Him - Swami Chinmayananda.

 

 

 

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[Guest guest]

--- Ranjeet Sankar <thefinalmirage wrote:

> Namaste Sadanandaji,

>

> Things are a bit unclear here.

>

> Please correct me if I am wrong.

>

> When you say 'one cannot establish the world without a consciousness

> validating' , you are taking the 'world' here as just the nAma-rUpa.

 

 

Yes.

> The substratum of the chair in front of me doesnt need me or any other

> conscious entity to validate its existence.

 

Yes or no. The substratum of the chair itself is Brahman since that is

the material cause. But the 'me' or 'any other' is conscious entity

only. The inert part is only naama and ruupa - that cannot say I am

there. The Brahman part in the chair is the existence itself. One

cannot perceive Brahman since the perceiver is Brahman too.

 

We need to look at the perception process itself when I say 'there is a

chair out there'. The senses can only perceive the qualities of the

object and not the substantive - the form and color through the eyes,

the hardness by the touch etc. The mind takes the input from all the

senses and integrates and creates image to provide a locus for those

attributes. That is what is called as vRitti or a thought in advaita -

that becomes an object thought – ‘there -out there is an object with

these attributes’ – up to this is cognition process. Next the mind goes

into the memory to compare to see if it is similar to any other object

that I have perceived before - If it matches with the memory - I now say

yes that is a chair or that is a 'gaagaa buubu' etc - that is

re-cognition process. Along with it there is also another thought that

raises - "I am the seer of that chair out there' - thus I am a seer

thought and that is seen thought - both are thoughts that constitute the

mind. But both thoughts are in 'my consciousness' since I am conscious

of the thought that 'there is an object out there with these attributes.

Seer thought - which I associate with myself as I (in side) and seen

thought which I associate with the chair out there (outside) both are

thoughts in my consciousness - actually my consciousness is wrong usage

of the word - I am that consciousness. Every part of the chair thought

- substantive of that thought is the consciousness - I. The substantive

of the 'I am a seer thought' is also consciousness - Since both subject

and object constitute the same consciousness the perception is immediate

(aparoksha). Hence so-called object out there is a notion in the mind -

without the mind present one cannot establish there is an object out

there. The same consciousness splits into both subject and object. The

rest is ignorance –to say that subject is different from the object is

like - saying that one thought is different from the other thought - but

both are just waves in the ocean of consciousness - that raise in

consciousness, sustained by consciousness and go back into

consciousness. Hence there is nothing other than consciousness that I

am - World is nothing but Brahman too and I am Brahman too. World is

nothing but objects and I am subject - but both arise in the mind - as

subject as objects thoughts. Now where is the world - even the space

out there is space in my mind. Where is the mind? Mind itself is

nothing but consciousness as its substantive - the thoughts are nothing

but naama and ruupa. That is why I kept asking Michael how he could

explain cit as the material cause for the acit.

 

Can one establish the world out there independent of the consciousness?

It becomes an indeterminate problem - what Shankara calls it as

anirvachaniiyam. That it is there or not there - both are assumptions

without the consciousness substantiating it. Dvaitins assume that world

is real and I am real and the Iswara is real. But they do not recognize

that there is an inherent assumptions involved in the very division.

They have to resort to the statement - consciousness is the property and

not substantive. Scripture says so is again another statement. But

scripture also says Braham is the material cause - How can a conscious

entity the material cause and at the same time say that world is inert -

an unconscious entity. Therefore they have interpreted the scripture

that Brahman is not the material cause for the universe. Bhagavaan

Shankara takes a different approach - All pervading Brahman is like

consciousness pervading the body of jiivas and jagat. Once you assume a

model - one need to interpret the rest of the scripture accordingly.

They forget the total picture and give importance to word here or word

there or ending here or there that matches their model.

 

The reason I have not gone into this epistemological issue right now in

the vAdAvali is I have to analyze the mind first according to advaita.

So with this understanding if you reexamine your mail - it may become

clear.

> The chair is perceived. So

> 'something' is there. This 'something' will remain as such even if I

> am not

> there with my mind putting some nAma or rUpa on it.

 

Please examine this carefully 'something will remain there as such even

if I am not there with my mind' - but how does one know that - without

the mind become aware of it. There was extensive discussion between

Shree Nanda Chandran and myself along these lines in the advaitin - one

can tap from the archives, although the discussion got little entangled.

 

 

SankarAchArya

> himself

> says that the 'object' and 'its knowledge' differs.

 

Yes or no - Knowledge as per advaita is indefinable and eternal - but

chair is not indefinable or eternal. The object differs is only like

ring differs bangle and from gold since ring is only of particular form,

name, qualities and utility. Knowledge is the unchanging consciousness -

the knowledge of 'chair' is the recognition of the duality of the

subject-object in the total one substantive. One cannot define what is

knowledge – since that is Brahman and Brahman cannot be defined – only

object can be defined. One can only define knowledge of ‘ ‘.

 

The chair is not

> there

> but the object which is misinterpreted by my mind as the chair is

> necessarily there. My presence is needed only to validate the brown

> color,

> lenght, height and so on.

 

Yes, the thought of the chair is involved in the perception - but what

are the contents of the thought if I am conscious of the thought in my

mind. The thoughts constitute the name and form of the chair but the

substantive has to be consciousness only for me to be aware of the

chair.

>

> If this is not so, then it will amount to say that Brahman needs some

> 'other' conscious entity to validate It. Now this view is not at all

> admitted in any context whatsoever.

 

The first part of the statement is not right so the second part does not

follow. Bhraman, the conscious entity (as-though) splits itself as both

subject and object since remember the scripture says - I am Brahman and

even 'this is Brahman' and Brahman is akhandam - then if there is any

khandam or division that is only apparent and not real.

>

> Also in BSB 2.2.29, AchArya specifically says 'a pillar, for instance

> is

> never seen to be sublated at any time'. I believe he is trying to say

> that a

> pillar doesnt turn into thin-air just like a dream-object. The object

> remains as such; the nAma-rUpa will be sublated.

 

Yes the object that remains as such without the naama ruupa is that

substantive part which is Brahman, which is conscious entity since there

is nothing other than conscious entity. I am that conscious entity sans

the subject-object. The dream objects come under praatibhaashiika or

mental projections and so-called waking objects come under

vyaavahaarika. Both are sublated in sequence - one in the waking from

dream and other in waking to the higher knowledge that I am that Brahman

one without a second.

 

 

Interestingly, the

> comparison of dream and waking state which echos in the advaitic

> circles is

> dismissed by AchArya himself !

 

Not so. That is what Dvaitins argue. That is the reason why I did not

want to discussion of a particular sutra or bhaashya for them since that

will only lead to misunderstanding of the total perspective.

Unfortunately I had to bring that discussion to vAdAvali since Michael

raised that issue there. What is dismissed by Shankara if one looks at

the total picture is the objects assciated as the naama and ruupa - one

at praatibhaasika level and the other vyaavahaarika level- That is the

reason why first Shankara presents the adhyaasa bhaashya before he

discusses the suutra-s. Unless one reads the total presentation of

Shankara and understands - one is likely to misunderstand and attribute

that he is contradicting himself.

 

Ranjeet - I am taking the liberty to post this to the advaitin list

since others maybe benefited by these discussion.

 

Hari OM!

Sadananda

 

 

=====

What you have is His gift to you and what you do with what you have is your gift

to Him - Swami Chinmayananda.

 

 

 

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