advaita manjari - 5

[Guest guest]

Sri Sadananda wrote:(reply to Ranjeet Sankar

31st.Dec.03.)

 

"We need to look at the perception process itself when

I say 'there is a chair out there'. The senses can

only perceive the qualities of the

object and not the substantive - the form and color

through the eyes,

the hardness by the touch etc. The mind takes the

input from all the

senses and integrates and creates image to provide a

locus for those

attributes. That is what is called as vRitti or a

thought in advaita -

that becomes an object thought ‘there -out there is an

object with

these attributes’ up to this is cognition process.

Next the mind goes into the memory to compare to see if

it is similar to any other object that I have perceived

before - If it matches with the memory - I now say yes

that is a chair or that is a 'gaagaa buubu' etc - that

is

re-cognition process."

 

Namaste Sri Sadananda,

We have discussed this

particular theory of perception before. I think that

it is important to note that it seems to be a view

which is personal to yourself. Vedanta Paribhasa in

its discussion of perception gets on quite well without

it sticking to the very general outlines of experience

as direct and immediate. In fact I would suppose that

in that it takes a contrary position to the

cognition/recognition, input/output view that you

offer. In reality once the concept of a 'chair' is

established the recognition is immediate with no 'out

there' or 'in here' inferences. Those inferences are

the basis of representative realism and idealism

respectively. Swami Satprakashananda in his excellent

'Methods of Knowledge according to Vedanta' (an update

of V.P.) declares that Advaita Vedanta rejects the

representative theory.

 

"Perceptual knowledge is invariably marked by immediacy

and certitude, whereas inferential knowledge is by

nature indirect and indefinate. The one must not be

identified with the other. In every case of sense-

perception there is a direct or immediate apprehension

of the object present. This is what distinguishes

perceptual knowledge from inference, memory,

conception, imagination, and other forms of mediate

knowledge." (pg.73 op.cit.)

 

Your theory has in it an implication of serial

processing. The task is split up according to a

particular concept. A result is arrived at according

to a sequence eg. cognition/recognition. The empirical

picture confirmed by scanning is that of parallel

processing, simultaneously the red ball is processed in

areas dedication to shape, colour etc. Is there then a

central pooling in a 'global workspace' or whatever?

Does there have to be? We should be wary of being led

by the nose by conceptualising which has a view built

into it that can distort research. Remember the

Consciousness that permeates is the Witness.

 

Best Wishes, Michael.

[Guest guest]

Namaste Sadanandaji,

 

I will go through your below mail in a slow pace this time.

My reply (if any) will be posted as a seperate message.

 

Hari Om

 

 

-

"kuntimaddi sadananda" <kuntimaddisada

"Ranjeet Sankar" <thefinalsearch

Friday, January 02, 2004 07:47 AM

Re: Fw: advaita manjari - 5

 

 

Ranjeet - I missed this mail some how. Here is my understanding. You

can post it to the list if you feel comforable and if you think it helps

others too.

> --- Ranjeet Sankar <thefinalsearch wrote:

> > Namaste Sadanandaji,

> >>

> > Now can we say that the 'chair' in the next room exists even while I

> > are not

> > there to validate it?

>

 

The problem at that state is indeterminate. Since chair cannot

substantiate its own existence, conscious entity has to come in. Even

if one puts a video recorder on for the whole night - even that

recording has to be substantiated by my watching the video. This is what

in physics is knows as Schrodigers cat problem. Wigner tried to solve

that problme by boxing a human along with the cat, but once you box a

human he also becomes an object and I, conscious entity has to open both

boxes to see if cat is alive or dead. The problme remains indeterminate

until a conscious entity declares the existence of an object.

>

> The moment I enter the room the non-apprehension

> > of

> > the 'chair' creates the mis-apprehensions.

>

 

I am missing something here - What I cannot apprehend is 'brahman' which

is the self that I am. That non-apprehension of myself causes

misaprehension of my self as this local body-mind-intellect and am

different from the world of objects, including the space,time that

includes the room in the space that I am entering and the chair in the

room, etc. So non-apprehension of my true self, as I am the

existence-consciouness-infiniteness that is indivisible, is the cause

for all apprehensions of divisons of subject-object. I hope I am clear

now.

>

> But just like for the snake

> > to

> > appear the rope has to be there in the first place, the object has to

> > be

> > present for the non-apprehension to take place.

>

 

Not really - that is what dvaitins are arguing. Once I identify myself

with the mind-intellect complex, and non-apprehension of myself as

sat-chit-ananda, the projection of both subject-object complex occurs.

Questions you are asking is why those particular types of objects? It is

actually the impressions of the past or my impressions of the past (due

to memory and vaasanas) that I am projecting those particular objects

now. How past is the past or when did the first past! started - that

question too is invalid since the creation is beginningless and

ignorance is anaadi. In my B.S. Notes in the discussion of adhyaasa this

quesion was answered.

 

>This positioning of

> > the

> > 'something' as the substratum is the basis on which idealism is

> > refuted by

> > AchArya.

> > The idealistic view will be that only the snake exists, and not the

> > rope.

>

 

Idealistic view as I understand is the rope is also a thoght in the mind

and there is no rope otherwise. They dismiss the rope as well.

Shankara or Badarayana dismisses that as just the thought - since it is

experienced.

>

> > The advaitic view is that the rope has to be there in the first place

> > for

> > the snake to appear.

>

 

Yes for the snake vision - that is at the level of praatibhaasika

level.

 

But rope to is negated in the realization of my true self as the total

self that I am and there is nothing other than the true self which is

sat-chit-ananda swaruupa.

>

> The 'anirvachaniyatva' comes into the picture

> > only when

> > the reality of the whole system is questioned on the basis of the

> > (false)perception and not on the validation of the substantive.

>

 

Anirvachaniiyam - indeterminacy comes into picture as long as

conscousness is not there to substantiate it. Whether we question or

not, until the questioner, a conscious entity arries in the scene, the

problme is indeterminate since jadam or inert cannot establish itself.

That is the basis for anirvacaniyam. Perception means a conscious entity

is already there to perceive it. How I can I perceive it, if it not

there is the question of dvaitins - I would say until I perceive it, its

existence cannot be independently established.

 

If consciousness is the only thing there as the scriputures say, I am

now on more solid ground from indeterminacy to apparent vision of

objects, which are nothing but name and form on substantive, that is

myself.

> >

> > The analysis which you have provided is only on the I-thought and the

> > chair-thought but not on the object which presented itself as the

> > chair.

>

 

For me to see a chair - I have to have that chair samskaara for me to

see it there. How is that? How come others are also are seeing the

same chair too? The question is who are those other people who are

seeing the chair that I am seeing? Are they all not in my mind

projection too?

 

To understand this only we go to a dream world. In my dream let us say

I have discussions with you, you are there, I am there, and we both are

sitting on chairs. You are seeing the same chiars and the room and I am

also seeing the same chairs and the room - but all are resolved into my

own waking mind. Was there real chiar existing there and real you for

the discussions? Now you answer me. It is exactly the same way - the

chair and out there in the room and along others and the room itself and

the space itself where the room and I and others are there are all in

one myself.

>

> > The object which I mean is not the object in the subject/object dyad,

> > but

> > the 'something' which forms the substantive.

>

 

There cannot be any substantive that can be perceived as I outlined the

perception process. All I can perceive is the qualities but not an

object per se. The rest is all assumtions and conclusions.

>

> This type of analysis

> > leans a

> > bit on the western Idealistic approach which

> > is inherent in the advaitic system.

>

 

Sorry, I do not know what is western idealistic system. I think Greg

and now Benjamin answered your questions that western idealistic system

assumes the mind to start with - which is nothing but thoughts.

>

> >When AchArya says that the

> > object-pillar

> > never sublates, it definetely amounts to saying that there is no need

> > for

> > any conscious entity to validate the substantive !

>

 

What Shankara says is the substantive is not sublated - only the name

and form- but the substantive is myself - not something out there to

substantiate it. That has to be understood.

 

> Regardless of

> > whether the

> > knowledge is right or wrong, the level is pratibhashika, vyavahArika

> > or

> > pAramArtika, the time is past, present or future, the substantive

> > remains.

> > Only It remains.

>

 

Yes as long as I understand clearly that substative is myself - the

conscious entity that I am.

>

> The 'anirvachaniyatva' aspect on the validation of

> > the

> > substantive will shake the entire system.

>

 

Anirvacaniiyma is only for the independent existence of objects which

are name and forms. Once I come into picture, the apparente can exist

only apparently - like gold declaring that I can exist in different

forms and that is my glory - ring and bangle are not independet of gold.

That is why scriputure gives those specific examples.

>

> Brahman has be 'there'

> > regardless

> > of someone to validate it or not.

>

 

To say more correctly - I am there and I am independent of any

validation - aprameyam. I am not an obejct for either validation or

experience - I have to be there to validate anything else.

 

> > > Please examine this carefully 'something will remain there as such

> > even

> > > if I am not there with my mind' - but how does one know that -

> > without

> > > the mind become aware of it.

>

So even the statement that something will remain there as such is also a

notion in the mind too. The notions and the mind along with the memory

is all part of the mind - mind consists of four - mind, intellect,

memory and ego.

>

>

> > Yes, you are right. To validate something, mind has to be there. But

> > that

> > doesnt solve the problem. The object per se is not available to the

> > mind,

> > only the qualities are. So it is not possible to validate the

> > 'object'.

>

 

nor invalidate either by the mind with notions of duality.

 

>

> >But

> > its presence has to be accepted by the advaitin or else the system

> > will

> > re-model itself into Idealism!

>

 

I am not sure what you mean. The samskaara - with vaasana-s are part of

the prakRiti that manifests as maaya. The projection potential is

vaasana-s and that is due to prior samskaara - due to previous

misunderstanding that the world is out there and I am limited entity and

so on.

 

Yes idealism - may not be able to account all that.

Advaita is one with out a second - and that one is conscious-existent

entity. Anything else is only due to adhyaasa or error - the error

includes the accounting that which is not really there. Eveything else

is just models to account which cannot be deterministically accounted as

this or that when it is only an apparent entity. Hence anirvachaniima

is inherent in maaya - that which is not there but appears to be there.

>

> > The dream-object is something which has memory as its basis whereas it

> > is

> > not so in the case of objects perceived in the waking state. The fact

> > that

> > both are 'perceived' does not mean that both are the same. But I

> > confess I

> > couldnt help laughing when he says ' the fact that both fire and water

> > being

> > a 'substance' (having a common quality) doesnt mean that fire will be

> > cold

> > as water' !!

> >

> > Sadanandaji, I am not posting this to the list because I am not sure

> > whether

> > I am right or wrong. If I am wrong, I dont want to confuse anyone over

> > there. Kindly post it with your valuable corrections.

> >

> > Hari Om

> >

> > ranjeet

> >

 

 

Happy new year and feel free if I can make myself more clear.

 

Hari OM!

Sadananda

 

 

=====

What you have is His gift to you and what you do with what you have is your

gift to Him - Swami Chinmayananda.