advaita manjari - 5

[Guest guest]

--- ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote:

 

>

> Namaste Sri Sadananda,

> We have discussed this

> particular theory of perception before. I think that

> it is important to note that it seems to be a view

> which is personal to yourself. Vedanta Paribhasa in

> its discussion of perception gets on quite well without

> it sticking to the very general outlines of experience

> as direct and immediate.

 

Yes. There are further extensive commentaries on it too. I suggest you

study if you can, the more recent book by Professor Bina Gupta on the

"Perception in Advaita Vedanta'. Very analytical and beautifully

written. - It is also a commentary on the commentary of Vedanta

Paribhaashha by Ananta Krishna Shastri - I think it is called

'Paribhaashha Prakaashika' - The exact title may be wrong. But one can

access the web site of Professor Bina Gupta. She is a scholar on her

own right.

 

 

In fact I would suppose that

> in that it takes a contrary position to the

> cognition/recognition, input/output view that you

> offer. In reality once the concept of a 'chair' is

> established the recognition is immediate with no 'out

> there' or 'in here' inferences.

 

I do not think so - the spatial cognition also occurs as part of the

cognition of the form - since form includes the spatial coordinates.

Because of the stereographic vision provided by the 7deg of-set by the

two eyes - that is why we have 3-D pictures using polarized light

photography- there and here, near and far, are part of the perception in

relation to the spatial relations- All are part of the cognition - which

is immediate part of the perception. Subsequent inference does occur as

we look at the driving mirrors and with a caution that things are closer

than what you 'see'? as out there.

 

Those inferences are

> the basis of representative realism and idealism

> respectively. Swami Satprakashananda in his excellent

> 'Methods of Knowledge according to Vedanta' (an update

> of V.P.) declares that Advaita Vedanta rejects the

> representative theory.

 

I am not familiar with Swami Satprakashananda's analysis. I do not know

what is representative realism or idealism either that he is rejecting

and I am not sure on what basis he is rejecting either.

 

May be you should present the analysis in detail.

 

When one cognizes the object, one cognizes that I am seer too and the

immediacy of the perception is due to the fact that the substantive of

both is the consciousness that I am. That includes the cognition of out

there, closer and far off etc as part of the perceived objects in

relation to perceived spatial coordinates that go with the stereographic

perception.

 

>

> "Perceptual knowledge is invariably marked by immediacy

> and certitude, whereas inferential knowledge is by

> nature indirect and indefinate.

 

Agreed - I have no conflict with that. The difference even the spatial

coordinates are part of that immediate cognition too. One can infer

later it is not that far or that closure based on some other analysis

and there comes inference.

 

The one must not be

> identified with the other. In every case of sense-

> perception there is a direct or immediate apprehension

> of the object present.

 

True - I have not disagreed even if it sounds like. - I would put it

this way - it is immediate apprehension of object. Now present is a

tricky word with caution. What is truly 'present' is the existence and

existence is not perceived! what is perceived is only attributes by the

senses. The rest is History or HIS STORY.

 

This is what distinguishes

> perceptual knowledge from inference, memory,

> conception, imagination, and other forms of mediate

> knowledge." (pg.73 op.cit.)

 

Yes - I agree. my statements if you look carefully fully endorse that.

If it sounds different then sounding different is not my intention

either. If the substantive of both perceived and the perceiver is the

same, from that substantive which is nothing but I am, the self itself,

there is no out there and in there and therefore the perception is

immediate. Hence out there and in there are notions in the mind only

that goes with the notion that there is object present too which is

different from I. If that I is the substantive of both, how can it be

different from I?

>

> Your theory has in it an implication of serial

> processing.

 

No I do not think so - cognition is immediate as soon as the sense input

with image processing occurs in the measurable time scale of immediacy,

which is immediate is the time scale of perception process (at the speed

of light or speed of sound - etc - seeing the lightening vs. listening

lightening etc).

 

The task is split up according to a

> particular concept. A result is arrived at according

> to a sequence eg. cognition/recognition. The empirical

> picture confirmed by scanning is that of parallel

> processing, simultaneously the red ball is processed in

> areas dedication to shape, colour etc.

 

True - as part of the sight perception - those are attributes of the

object not the substantives.

 

Is there then a

> central pooling in a 'global workspace' or whatever?

 

Sense inputs are necessarily parallel since they are independent. Some

tastes come in sequence too. Mind is the central pooling - perception

involves volition and then cognition process - some take their own time

and cognition proceed in sequence as the input is arrived. That

generally seems to be the perceptual experience.

 

> Does there have to be? We should be wary of being led

> by the nose by conceptualising which has a view built

> into it that can distort research.

 

I agree, the reserch on perceptual process is still continuing.

 

Remember the

> Consciousness that permeates is the Witness.

 

Not completely. Consciousness permeates both witness and witnessed.

Otherwise we are splitting that which cannot be split. Consciousness as

Witness is only for the beginning stages of meditation. Please study

Aatmananda's teaching that Shree Ananada Wood provided on Witness

aspect.

 

 

Michael I have not stated that perception is not immediate - in fact

that is what is 'aproxa j~nanam' and the self-realization is also of the

same nature - it is immediate since mediate knowledge is contradictory

to self-existent self-conscious entity. If you think I have stated that

way , then is wrong and that definitely is not my understanding either

and if I say the implied meaning of my statement either.

 

The problem is - is there an object away from the self that I am - 'I

perceive therefore it is' is taking the witness stand and declare. But

witnessed is also I since both perceived and perceiver are both I, the

self-existent self-conscious entity the substantive for both since I

cannot truly 'perceive' the substantive. My analysis only explains why

the substantive is not perceived and there seems to be inference by the

ignorant that object out there is present because I perceive it since I

takes myself as the perceiver that is different from perceived. For

transactional reality that is O.K since transactions involves

identification with the perceiver that is different from perceived.

Hence the conclusion that I perceive therefore the object is present

(obviously outside the perceiver). But is it real? - it is only

transactionally real and therefore not unreal as the suutra you pointed

out declare. Transactional reality is not unreal, it is transactonally

real- but yet not absolutely- One should be careful in these

demarcations. Now one can see why suutrakaara used double negative

there in that suutra - to reject the reality from absolute but accpeting

rality at the transactional level while rejecting unreality like son of

a barren women. The analysis is exact - Advaita Vedanta as I understood

follows correctly at both vyavahaarika and paramaarthika levels.

 

The more important question that Ranjeet currently asking privately is -

Why I see chair and not a table unless what exists is a chair and not a

table etc. proving that chair indeed exists and not a table. This is a

very interesting question involving the samskaara that carries with the

world that I percieve and deal with. I discussed in my notes on

adhyaasa bhaashya of Shankara in response to the question why projection

of snake, etc. To understand correctly one has to go into the analysis

of the type of the world 'i' deal with in contrast to the one 'he or

she' deals with as well as the analysis of parallel system - like the

dream world and dream objects at Pratibhaasika level.

 

No Michael, I do not think I am misinterpreting Vedanta Paribhaashha.

But I may be looking it with the current state of understanding of the

mechanics of perception as I understand these process. I fail to see

any contradictions in my analysis.

 

 

Best Wishes to you too.

 

Hari OM!

Sadananda

>

> Best Wishes, Michael.

>

>

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[Guest guest]

Namaste Sri Sadananda,

 

The broad general point I was making is that for

advaita the main thing is not the general mechanics of

perception whether serial, parallel or whatever it is

the immediate nature of our awareness that tells us

anything about the changeless nature of the self.

Using inferences on the relative plane as to whether

the perception is in the mind or outside the mind is

rejected. In general if the object is perceived it is

there as it is. It is the relative plane we are

talking about here so let us exhaust the possibilities

of that plane before we mine the absolute for some

nugget such as 'there is no in nor out in the absolute.

Nor up nor down nor sideways either:). This is

Sankara's approach and one which allows reason to run

its course.

 

 

Mistakes are made but they are correctable which is why

a theory of error is important for a realist

epistemology and impossible for an idealist one. In

that connection to make a scectical point about

perception using the dream state is contrary to the

thinking of B.S.B. II.ii.29.

You say to Ranjeet Sankar:

To understand this only we go to a dream world. In my

dream let us say

I have discussions with you, you are there, I am there,

and we both are sitting on chairs. You are seeing the

same chiars and the room and I am also seeing the same

chairs and the room - but all are resolved into my own

waking mind. Was there real chiar existing there and

real you for the discussions? Now you answer me. It is

exactly the same way - the chair and out there in the

room and along others and the room itself and the space

itself where the room and I and others are there are

all in one myself.

 

This is a confusing analogy perhaps for the commonality

of a shared world in the absolute.

 

Sankara has this to say about perception in Upadesa

Sahasri Chap.II.

 

#75. The teacher said to him,"your doubt is not

justifiable, for you, the Self, are proved to be free

from change, and therefore perpetually the same on the

ground that all the modifications of the mind are

(simultaneously) known by you. You regard this

knowledge of all the modifications which is the reason

for the above inference as that for your doubt. If you

were changeful like the mind or the senses (which

pervade their objects one after another), you would not

simultaneously know all the mental modifications, the

objects of your knowledge. Nor are you aware of a

portion only of the objects of your knowledge (at a

time). You are, therefore, absolutely changeless."

 

Sankara could no doubt have supplied some interesting

yogic information about perceptual mechanics. He did

not because it is not relevant. He could have gone to

the absolute to tell us about how in and out of the

mind is not relevant. He did not. The quality of

immediacy of the perception itself is the story. No

excursions into the cosmic, stay planet side.

 

Best Wishes, Michael

[Guest guest]

Namaste Sadanandaji,

 

The major problem is when we bring in the entire advaitic concepts into

sutra 2.2.28. While discussing this sutra, AchArya doesnt say anything

similar to the lines of 'Consiousness is Brahman', 'Consciousness is all'.

'The substratum of the Subject and object is One'. Infact, he considers the

object, the perception of the object, and the subject to be different and

even asks the Idealist to admit that! This is clearly evident when he says

"an external object is known through a cognition which is different from

the object." This sutra is discussed entirely on the vyavahArik plane and

in my humble opinion the unity in the subject-object substratum is not

relevant here.

 

The Idealist view is that external object is 'non-existent'. The simple and

straight forward refutation is that it is NOT 'non-existent' because 'it is

perceived'. The Idealist ignores this saying that it is the *perception*

which is perceived, and not the object per se. The vedantin's objection is

that *something* other than the perception has to be admitted for the

perception to take place. Now the vedantin cannot hold this view and say

elsewhere 'we cannot validate that 'something' ' ! The *something* is there

and is mis-apprehended by the perceiver. It is so simple(in the

vyavahArik plane). The perception is not possible without that *something*.

The validation part is *whether the perception(nAma-rUpa) is real or

unreal*, which comes at a later stage and not with the raw existence of

that *something*.

 

I will make myself more clear what I meant by "non-apprehension creates

mis-apprehension".

There are two things to be considered here.

1) Non-apprehension of the Self as Brahman.

2) Non-apprehension of the world as Brahman.

The right apprehension of the Self as Brahman will end the entire discussion

on perception! So for discussing the process of perception and the existence

of the world, the non-apprehension of the Self has to be admitted. It is

also

mentioned in the preamble that even the vedas has an ignorant as the

cognizer! After it has been admitted as such, the entire process of

mis-apprehension (projection of the world) due to non-apprehension(of the

reality) is discussed.

 

I believe the samskAra of the 'chair' which you had mentioned in the mail is

the same as the one refuted by AchArya under sutra 2.2.30. He says that no

*tendency* can arise unless there has been perception of some 'object'. I am

sorry if you really meant something else.

 

You took my word literally when I said "The advaitic view is that the rope

has to be there in the first place for the snake to appear." and chained it

to prAtibhAshika level. I took the rope as Brahman and the snake as the

nAma-rUpa. The presence of the rope is the firm ground from which the snake

originates. This is not just dvaita. I dont think Dvaita recognizes the

substratum-superstratum demarcation. If the snake in the rope-snake is taken

as unreal, how can it be Dvaita? Logically, Dvaita necessarily should mean

minimum two *Real* entites !

 

You said:

> There cannot be any substantive that can be perceived as I outlined the

> perception process. All I can perceive is the qualities but not an

> object per se. The rest is all assumtions and conclusions.

 

Sadanandaji, are we boiling down to the conclusion that the basis of advaita

is an assumption?

 

You said:

> For me to see a chair - I have to have that chair samskaara for me to

> see it there. How is that? How come others are also are seeing the

> same chair too? The question is who are those other people who are

> seeing the chair that I am seeing? Are they all not in my mind

> projection too?

>

 

The moment we say that the object is 'in my mind projection', we are adding

fuel to the Idealistic vision! The nAma-rUpa may be a *projection in the

mind*, but not the substratum. The Idealist view is not true because

*things*(the term object will be misleading!) are not in the mind alone. The

realist view is not true because what the realist mean by the 'something'

out there is not the real *thing*.

 

You said:

> To understand this only we go to a dream world. In my dream let us say

> I have discussions with you, you are there, I am there, and we both are

> sitting on chairs. You are seeing the same chiars and the room and I am

> also seeing the same chairs and the room - but all are resolved into my

> own waking mind. Was there real chiar existing there and real you for

> the discussions? Now you answer me. It is exactly the same way - the

> chair and out there in the room and along others and the room itself and

> the space itself where the room and I and others are there are all in

> one myself.

>

 

The same dream analogy is used by the Idealist in similar lines to prove

non-existence of the external world. AchArya refutes it saying that

'seeing' as in perception and 'remembering' as in a dream are totally

different in nature. I agree that the dream analogy is used in yet another

way in advaitic circles.

 

 

You said:

> If consciousness is the only thing there as the scriputures say, I am

> now on more solid ground from indeterminacy to apparent vision of

> objects, which are nothing but name and form on substantive, that is

> myself.

 

 

I like the words "as the scripture say" in your lines. Here I totally agree

with you.

 

 

Finally you also said:

"Anirvacaniiyma is only for the independent existence of objects which are

name and forms."

 

Phew..this is what I have been saying all along!!

 

Corrections are most welcome..

 

Hari Om

[Guest guest]

--- Ranjeet Sankar <thefinalsearch wrote:

> Namaste Sadanandaji,

>

> The major problem is when we bring in the entire advaitic concepts

> into

> sutra 2.2.28.

 

Ranjeet - Shankara's position is outlined in the adhyaasa bhaashya that

starts before even the analysis of the first suutra.

 

Examination of one suutra somewhere in the middle is like describing

elephant looking closely at the tail. This is one of the reasons why I

refuse to indulge in the discussion of suutra here or suutra there. The

discussion was brought in since Michael brought that suutra to emphasize

that the Advaitic position on the nature of the world as real since is

experienced. My only response is that even if one examines the suutra

it only says the world not unreal. The rest is once interpretation of

the tail without examining the total perspective of Advaitic position

which Shankara provides as panoramic view using adhyaasa bhaashhya.

 

I think I have presented my understanding and leave the subject with

that.

>

> I will make myself more clear what I meant by "non-apprehension

> creates

> mis-apprehension".

> There are two things to be considered here.

> 1) Non-apprehension of the Self as Brahman.

> 2) Non-apprehension of the world as Brahman.

> The right apprehension of the Self as Brahman will end the entire

> discussion

> on perception! So for discussing the process of perception and the

> existence

> of the world, the non-apprehension of the Self has to be admitted. It

> is

> also

> mentioned in the preamble that even the vedas has an ignorant as the

> cognizer! After it has been admitted as such, the entire process of

> mis-apprehension (projection of the world) due to non-apprehension(of

> the

> reality) is discussed.

 

Adhyaasa is the essence of non-apprehension and the resulting

misapprehension.

 

It is non-apprehension of myself, period. Due to non-apprehension of

myself, I misapprehend that 'Aham jiivosmi' or I am jiiva by identifying

myself with the upaadhii-s, and therefore the world is different from me

etc.

 

Did the world exist before I non-apprehended - That question goes back

to root of avidya-jiiva and their interrelation. Did jiiva notion come

first or avidya came firth. There is anyonya ashraya or interdependency

- It is similar to seed came first or tree came first. Hence Shankara

says it is anirvachaniiyam or inexplicable. This is the same problem in

the arguments - does the world exists therefore I perceive it or I

perceive therefore the world exists? Indeterminacy is inherent in the

system since the question is posed to the intellect which itself is a

product of the intellect. One has to transcend to see the truth and

from that absolute the existence of jiiva and the world both just

disappear - or it becomes just apparent like gold existing as ring,

bangle or bracelet.

> I believe the samskAra of the 'chair' which you had mentioned in the

> mail is

> the same as the one refuted by AchArya under sutra 2.2.30. He says

> that no

> *tendency* can arise unless there has been perception of some

> 'object'. I am

> sorry if you really meant something else.

 

Please study the adhyaasa bhaashya again. There is no chair unless

samskaara is there and there is no samskaara unless the chair is there.

It is like the first question a vedantic student asks when my first

vaasana-s started? or when did this creation begin? - These are

beginning less and any further discussion will be going in circles since

it is cyclic process without any beginning.

> Sadanandaji, are we boiling down to the conclusion that the basis of

> advaita

> is an assumption?

 

Advaita is the nature of reality, which is Brahman. The rest are

superimpositons that include the subject- object distinction and the

unreality of the object as the object is inert. Since the subject is

the conscious entity and consciousness is nothing but Brahman

(praj~naanam brahman) and I am that conscious entity and therefore I am

that Brahman. The inert thing, which is nothing but world, is only

apparent since there is nothing other than consciousness and any inert

that appears to exist cannot not be real. The rest are all unnecessary

jumbled inf. that only confuses the issue rather than that helps to

understand.

> You said:

> > For me to see a chair - I have to have that chair samskaara for me

> to

> > see it there. How is that? How come others are also are seeing the

> > same chair too? The question is who are those other people who are

> > seeing the chair that I am seeing? Are they all not in my mind

> > projection too?

 

To understand this aspect only we have the whole Mandukya upanishad

explaining the dream state. The chair in the dream not only I am seeing

but you and all the dviatins who are in my same dream. But when I am

dreaming, the chair is real as well as the other observers too. If I in

my dream reading BS 2-2-28 declare that that chair is real since I

experience it, suutrakaara will say no I did not say it is real all I

said is it is not unreal since it is not like son of a barren woman,

since you are experiencing it. Now would I ask that question whether

that chair and the other dvaitins too are real when you I am awaken from

my dreamy state. Now if I as a dreamer asks how I am seeing that kind

of chair instead of other kind or table or some other thing - all one

can say it is due to samkaara which is beginning less from the dreamer

point.

 

Now you see why one should examine the problem from total perspective,

otherwise one will end up with wrong assumptions or conclusions.

 

I think I have made my understanding known and I am going to leave it

with that for one to think and contemplate.

 

> The moment we say that the object is 'in my mind projection', we are

> adding

> fuel to the Idealistic vision! The nAma-rUpa may be a *projection in

> the

> mind*, but not the substratum.

 

I am not really concerned with 'Idealistic or non-idealistic position'.

Without the mind present, there is no world - which does not mean the

mind is the world. If I go from waking state to dream state I have

negated the waking world and entered into a dream world and when I go

next to deep sleep state both waking and dream words disappeared and I

am in the no-mans world. Only thing that is real in all these there

states is only myself - the conscious entity - the rest are

superimpositions. That is the position of advaita.

 

Ranjeet, further discussion on the so-called idealist position once adds

to fule to the confusing fire! I refuse to indulge in that discussion.

> Finally you also said:

> "Anirvacaniiyma is only for the independent existence of objects which

> are

> name and forms."

 

Sounds like I need to correct my statement if I put it that way.

Anirvachaniiyam is for all inert things other than the self that I am.

I am the only self-existing self-conscious entity. If there is anything

other than me that I perceive, then that is only apparent and not real.

I plus apparently many things is still one - that is real that is I and

that is advaita. The apprent things are not different from me since I am

substantive for that too, since in principle there is nothing other than

me.

 

>

> Phew..this is what I have been saying all along!!

 

Good. Now we can end the discussion on this topic.

>

> Corrections are most welcome..

>

> Hari Om

>

>

>

>

>

 

 

=====

What you have is His gift to you and what you do with what you have is your gift

to Him - Swami Chinmayananda.

 

 

 

Find out what made the Top Searches of 2003

http://search./top2003

[Guest guest]

--- ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote:

> Namaste Sri Sadananda,

>

> The broad general point I was making is that for

> advaita the main thing is not the general mechanics of

> perception whether serial, parallel or whatever it is

> the immediate nature of our awareness that tells us

> anything about the changeless nature of the self.

> Using inferences on the relative plane as to whether

> the perception is in the mind or outside the mind is

> rejected. In general if the object is perceived it is

> there as it is. It is the relative plane we are

> talking about here so let us exhaust the possibilities

> of that plane before we mine the absolute for some

> nugget such as 'there is no in nor out in the absolute.

> Nor up nor down nor sideways either:). This is

> Sankara's approach and one which allows reason to run

> its course.

 

Yes Michael,

 

What you say is right at the relative plane. I realize that you are

discussing at the relative plane. That is what is exactly the reference

state of vyavahaara - that relative plane. I have no disagreement with

that.

 

The question and the arguments of the dviatins is not that level. For

them the world is real even in the absolute sense - jiiva satyam, jagat

satyam and paramaatma satyam.

 

At the paramarthika level the self-exiting self-conscious entity alone

is -and I am that Brahman.

 

As long as the reference states are clearly identified there is no

confusion. We both agree but that is not the position of the dvaitins.

The arguments I have presented are that consciousness that I am is

independent existing entity. The world, which is inert, has no

independent existence and depends on the consciousness that I am - hence

the statement is from the absolute. Once we go to relative plane, yes I

am a tiny subject that little 'i' that is different the vast universe in

front of me. That is the relative plane -where the space and time

concepts are ontologically of the same state as the world.

>

> Mistakes are made but they are correctable which is why

> a theory of error is important for a realist

> epistemology and impossible for an idealist one. In

> that connection to make a scectical point about

> perception using the dream state is contrary to the

> thinking of B.S.B. II.ii.29.

 

Now we both are essentially agree in essence. Frankly as I have stated

to Ranjeet I am not really concerned about idealists or realists since I

have no understanding of both.

> You say to Ranjeet Sankar:

> To understand this only we go to a dream world.

 

......

> This is a confusing analogy perhaps for the commonality

> of a shared world in the absolute.

 

Well - the analogy is essentially intended to understand how in a

particular relative plane the relatively real appear to be absolutely

real unless one realizes that the reality is only at relative plane and

not from absolute plane. Since the discusion cannot be done sitting in

the absolute plane, we use the dream analogy to drive the point - that

is the very purpose of the analogy of the dream state. In fact Shankara

provded a beautiful sloka on the dream state and its analogy to the

waking state in Atma Bodha- concluding that - sakaale satyavat bhaati

prabhode satyasat bhavet - as long as dream is going on, the dream world

appears to be real and only when awakened it is realized that 'every

thing' is unreal. So is the waking state.

 

The analogy is intended to resolve the confusion not create more.

Anyway that was the purpose of dream analysis and the essence of whole

Mandukya Upanishad too.

>

> Sankara has this to say about perception in Upadesa

> Sahasri Chap.II.

>

 

 

 

> #75. The teacher said to him,"your doubt is not

> justifiable, for you, the Self, are proved to be free

> from change, and therefore perpetually the same on the

> ground that all the modifications of the mind are

> (simultaneously) known by you. You regard this

> knowledge of all the modifications which is the reason

> for the above inference as that for your doubt. If you

> were changeful like the mind or the senses (which

> pervade their objects one after another), you would not

> simultaneously know all the mental modifications, the

> objects of your knowledge. Nor are you aware of a

> portion only of the objects of your knowledge (at a

> time). You are, therefore, absolutely changeless."

 

I have no disagreements with the contents Michael. The last statement

rings the bell. The absolute changeless alone is defined as real and

any changing things by that cannot be real. (they are unreal either)

since the substantive of the changing things is nothing but Brahman,

that you are.

> Sankara could no doubt have supplied some interesting

> yogic information about perceptual mechanics. He did

> not because it is not relevant. He could have gone to

> the absolute to tell us about how in and out of the

> mind is not relevant. He did not. The quality of

> immediacy of the perception itself is the story. No

> excursions into the cosmic, stay planet side.

 

Michael the very analysis of the dream experiences itself will do, since

that is the common experience, without going into any yogic states.

 

Anyway the point is made. Yes what you said is right from the relative

plane. That is precisely what my discussion was too - the distinction of

subject-object, perceiver-perceived are all in the relative plane only.

But from the self-existent self-conscious entity that I am, then

subject-object duality is only apparent but not real. What is real is

only that I am, the conscious entity. The world being inert has no

independent existence from consciousness that I am. The world exists or

does not exists is an indeterminate since it cannot establish its

existence since it is inert.

 

Since we both agree that there is relative and absolute references, only

discussion is what is the best way of presenting or arguing it without

confusing the other - Michael - that again is relative. Let us agree to

disagree then what is the more appropriate approach. The disagreement is

in the method of appraoch rather the contents of the discussion.

 

With this I would like to end the discussion. I still wish that you

present the discussion series taking the Vedanta Paribhaasha text, in

whatever format you like to present the topics.

 

Hari OM!

Sadananda

 

 

=====

What you have is His gift to you and what you do with what you have is your gift

to Him - Swami Chinmayananda.

 

 

 

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[Guest guest]

Namaste Sadanandaji,

 

Thanks for your corrections.

 

A quick note..

 

I can perceive only the form and name of the 'chair' in front of me.

 

As for the substratum, the scriptures guide me...

 

That immortal Brahman alone is before, that Brahman is

behind, that Brahman is to the right and left. Brahman alone

pervades everything above and below; this universe is that

Supreme Brahman alone. - mundakOpanishad 2.2.11

 

I dont need to validate this. Lets call it ''Blind faith'.. :-)

 

Hari Om

 

 

-

"kuntimaddi sadananda" <kuntimaddisada

> I think I have made my understanding known and I am going to leave it

> with that for one to think and contemplate.