The Real and the Unreal

[Guest guest]

Namaste Sri Sadananda,

 

You wrote re the vexed subject of Qualia (sing.quale)

"the fact that the senses perceive only the qualities

and not substantive (substantive being Brahman which

cannot be perceived)..."

 

I would like to point out that 'substantive' does not

have the same meaning as 'substratum'. Substantive

as used in the family of theories that have sense-

data as a central notion means more or less the

dubious concept of matter. ...."the world is

ultimately intelligible as a vast machine composed of

a uniform matter forming tiny corpuscules (roughly

the atomic theory, although not all corpuscularians

accepted indivisible atoms)." ((from Locke by Michael

Myers)) As Benjamin will tell you, if you ask him

nicely, this is not a sustainable thesis.

 

Luckily enough Sankara has had something to say on

just this issue in B.S.B. II.ii.27. He describes it

as the Buddhist view: "When external objects are

assumed, they must be either the individual atoms or

an aggregate of them -a pillar for instance. Of

these the knowledge of the atoms cannot be acquired

through a perception of the pillar etc., for the

atoms are not objects of perception."

 

Here Sankara had the opportunity to embrace the theory

of atomic/corpuscular/matter/substantive in which

qualities inhere. He did not. If not, why not? The

core of the answer is to be discerned in the Preamble

but however a shorter way with this fallacy may be

adopted from Vedanta Paribhasa (on Perception). The

inevitable terminus of the substantive and sense-

data/qualities theory is that perception is a sort of

inference. V.P. clearly distinguishes between the

two. "Mediacy and immediacy can be present in the

same Consciousness."(pg.24) In the fire on the hill

(again) the smoke is a perception and the fire is an

inference. Perception on the other hand is described

as following:

 

"So knowledge that is limited by mental states in the

form of particular objects, is a perception in

respect of such knowledge, and when it is not

different from the Consciousness limited by objects

that are present and are capable of being apprehended

by particular organs."(pg.28Advaita Ashrama edn.)

 

In other words when you are fully present to the

object you can perceive it.How best to express how

this differs from Realism in Western philosophy seems

on the tip of my mind. It is a will-o-the-wisp.

 

Best Wishes, Michael.

[Guest guest]

Namaste,

 

Michaelji said:

>As Benjamin will tell you, if you ask him

>nicely, this is not a sustainable thesis.

 

What?!!! Where does this come from? Michael, you are quite a

character. Is there a picture of your face on the web? I am getting

a bit curious to see your mugshot, notwithstanding the maya aspect.

:-)

 

Anyhow, regarding the subject of 'qualia', this came into prominence

among academic philosophers and psychologists in recent years due to

the effort of David Chalmers, who has an excellent website full of

all kinds of papers at

 

http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/

 

The site seems to be down today, but I have accessed it often in the past.

 

He is famous for stating (or clarifying) the 'hard problem' regarding

consciousness. That is the fact that we are conscious at all. Many

researchers in brain function assume that we can explain

consciousness solely in terms of electro-chemical processes. To me,

it is obvious that such an approach is based on a fundamental

misunderstanding. No motion of atoms and particles can 'explain

consciousness'. I could elaborate, but this should be fairly

self-evident to those with some philosophical perspicuity (which

unfortunately does not include enough philosophers these days).

Chalmers rightly states that simply describing the neurological

processes is the 'easy' part; the 'hard' part is to explain how the

mystery of consciousness arises. To draw attention to this mystery,

he asks us to ponder the 'qualia' themselves, the qualities of

consciousness as they immediately arise to awareness, e.g. redness or

sweetness. Too often, researchers get lost in mere mechanical

descriptions of the brain processes and become blind to the mystery

of consciousness itself.

 

Of course, the brain does not even exist as a material object, but

let us not belabor the point.

 

Hari Om!

Benjamin

[Guest guest]

advaitin, Benjamin <orion777ben> wrote:

>>

> Of course, the brain does not even exist as a material object, but

> let us not belabor the point.

>

 

Namaste, Benjamin-ji,

 

I was thinking all along that the brain is a bundle of neurons and

cells, the working of which is reasonably clear to the neurologist.

You say the brain is not a material object. Can you explain?

 

PraNAms to all advaitins.

profvk

[Guest guest]

Namaste Benjaminji,

 

Very nicely put. Nothwithstanding our different perspectives on the

reality of the world as seen in consciousness, I enjoy reading your

posts. I have read some of your earlier posts on consciousness and

modern physics, and I must say that I read them with relish!

 

With regards,

Chittaranjan

 

 

 

advaitin, Benjamin <orion777ben> wrote:

>

> Namaste,

>

> Many

> researchers in brain function assume that we can explain

> consciousness solely in terms of electro-chemical processes. To

me,

> it is obvious that such an approach is based on a fundamental

> misunderstanding. No motion of atoms and particles can 'explain

> consciousness'. I could elaborate, but this should be fairly

> self-evident to those with some philosophical perspicuity (which

> unfortunately does not include enough philosophers these days).

> Chalmers rightly states that simply describing the neurological

> processes is the 'easy' part; the 'hard' part is to explain how the

> mystery of consciousness arises. To draw attention to this

mystery,

> he asks us to ponder the 'qualia' themselves, the qualities of

> consciousness as they immediately arise to awareness, e.g. redness

or

> sweetness. Too often, researchers get lost in mere mechanical

> descriptions of the brain processes and become blind to the mystery

> of consciousness itself.

>

> Of course, the brain does not even exist as a material object, but

> let us not belabor the point.

>

> Hari Om!

> Benjamin

[Guest guest]

Namaste ProfVK

>> Of course, the brain does not even exist as a material object, but

>> let us not belabor the point.

>I was thinking all along that the brain is a bundle of neurons and

>cells, the working of which is reasonably clear to the neurologist.

>You say the brain is not a material object. Can you explain?

 

 

This is my old 'matter does not exist' theme, which I thought would

bore people by now, so that is why I did not want to 'belabor' it.

But since somebody actually cares, I am only too happy to repeat the

argument as simply as I can. Thank you for caring!

 

My view of Advaita is to take the fundamental truth that

'consciousness is everything' as seriously as possible. So, for

example, perceptions are clearly part of consciousness, since there

is 'sentience' or 'awareness' present whenever someone has a

perception of, say, a red patch. And I cannot distinguish between

consciousness of the red patch and the red patch itself, though some

claim they can.

 

Now these perceptions, which are clearly in consciousness, are

generally taken by dualists and materialists (which includes almost

all scientists) to be produced by 'material objects' which are

believed to be somehow 'outside' of consciousness. That is, the

so-called matter is believed to be an inert and unconscious lump of

something which is sharply distinguished from our perception of it.

In particular, the perception is believed to be caused by light

striking the material object and entering the (still material) eye

and nervous system, where it somehow gets converted to consciousness.

This consciousness is believed by materialists to 'reside' in the

nervous system in some mysterious way, which they cannot even begin

to explain (thus showing the utter incoherence of their view).

 

My view is entirely different and rather more scientific, in my

opinion. I take the perceptions, i.e. the observables, as the only

certain entity and work out from there. (Notice that scientists

proudly proclaim that they believe only in 'what can be observed',

which contradicts their hypothesis of matter, which in turn proves

that they are not good philosophers.) So working with only the

observables in consciousness, namely the perceptions, I understand

the so-called 'world' as nothing but a set of coordinated dreams in

different 'jivas' or 'streams of consciousness'. Nisargadatta and

many other Advaitins say this too. (At the ultimate level the jivas

are not distinct but reduce to Brahman, but that is another story.)

 

So the entire world can easily be explained as coordinated sequences

of perceptions in different dreamers or jivas. These perceptions are

coordinated by what we call the laws of physics. Of course, this

applies only to jivas in their waking state.

 

Hence, even the body and brain are nothing but sequences of

perceptions. My hand is no more than my perception of it; my blood

is no more than the 'red patch' mentioned above (with also a certain

texture and taste); and to my brain surgeon, my brain is no more than

his perception of it, however vivid. Since I cannot (presumably)

perceive my own brain and remain alive, my perception of it is a moot

question, but if I could, it would still be only perception.

 

Now, this is not to deny that perceptions of my body, and in

particular of my nervous system, are coordinated with other elements

of consciousness, such as thoughts and feelings. Indeed, the proper

description of neurological research is nothing but the discovery of

*correlations* between perceptions called 'brain' and 'nerves' and

the thoughts and feelings associated with various states of brain and

nerves.

 

To be precise, note that for each 'person' being analyzed there is

not one single 'brain'. Rather, different people observing that

'person' each have their own 'representation' of that person's brain

- namely those perceptions referred to as 'that person's brain'.

(Usually, these consist not of wet grey perceptions of brain stuff,

but of the electrical signals and so forth produced by equipment.

All of this is nothing but perception. The entire scientific

experiment is a dream, as is everything in the so-called world.) The

task of the neurological scientist is then simply to correlate those

perceptions of brain and nerves with the so-called 'internal states'

of the person, namely, his thoughts and feelings, e.g. by zapping him

with electricity and asking him how he feels.

 

I hope this is clear enough for now, since I don't want to bore

people to death. Notice that nothing here in any way violates

whatever discoveries are made by neurological science. Rather the

theory is simply being streamlined by eliminating the unobservable

and irrelevant 'material brain'. We are simply sticking to

observables, which is what scientists should do, and which is

consistent with Advaita's insistence that only consciousness exists.

 

Hari Om!

Benjamin

[Guest guest]

--- ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote:

> Namaste Sri Sadananda,

> I would like to point out that 'substantive' does not

> have the same meaning as 'substratum'. Substantive

> as used in the family of theories that have sense-

> data as a central notion means more or less the

> dubious concept of matter. ..

 

Thanks Michael - Did not realize the difference. I am using them in the

sense as I understand them - I assume that the substantive is the

material or the material cause - which is again Brahman- which is again

the substratum if one ignores the superficial entities that define one

object that differs from another object. Hence I am using them in the

same sense. I am not sure the differences between the 'substratum' and

'substantive' is substantive enough! Thanks for bringing that issue.

Yes I am using them in the same sense.

 

 

..."the world is

> ultimately intelligible as a vast machine composed of

> a uniform matter forming tiny corpuscules (roughly

> the atomic theory, although not all corpuscularians

> accepted indivisible atoms)." ((from Locke by Michael

> Myers)) As Benjamin will tell you, if you ask him

> nicely, this is not a sustainable thesis.

 

Of course I know it does not sound like substantially sustainable theory

of matter even! Quite aware of quantum mechanical problems in the

ultimate particle theories.

>

> Luckily enough Sankara has had something to say on

> just this issue in B.S.B. II.ii.27. He describes it

> as the Buddhist view: "When external objects are

> assumed, they must be either the individual atoms or

> an aggregate of them -a pillar for instance. Of

> these the knowledge of the atoms cannot be acquired

> through a perception of the pillar etc., for the

> atoms are not objects of perception."

 

I take his last statement to mean- they are beyond perceptual limit of

the instruments of perception as he was aware of at that time. Last

Saturday I started a new text for my Salisbury. Md. students -

DhakshiNamuurthy Stotram of Adi Shankara- I donot know how much you are

familiar with that text. Because of the profoundity of the text

Shankara's own student, Sureshwara, himself wrote the first commentary

on it as 'Maanasollaasa'. Anyway it took my whole two classes to

explain the very first sloka - dRisyam darpana...tulyam nijaantargatam

.... The text starts with a bang - about the reality of the world - the

space - inside and out side as well as the analogy with the dream

objects and dream world - and whole Advaita doctrine. Sureswara's

commentary, which had the stamp of approval from his teacher, provides

the lines in between. The point is, B.S. commentary on specific suutra

magnified out of proportion could lead to misunderstanding -

particularly the subsequent suutras after 2-2-29 related to the dream

objects.

> Here Sankara had the opportunity to embrace the theory

> of atomic/corpuscular/matter/substantive in which

> qualities inhere. He did not. If not, why not? The

> core of the answer is to be discerned in the Preamble

> but however a shorter way with this fallacy may be

> adopted from Vedanta Paribhasa (on Perception). The

> inevitable terminus of the substantive and sense-

> data/qualities theory is that perception is a sort of

> inference. V.P. clearly distinguishes between the

> two. "Mediacy and immediacy can be present in the

> same Consciousness."(pg.24)

 

Yes Michael - I do agree with the analysis that perception is immediate

as the 'substantive' or 'substratum' of both perceived and perceiver

since both are thoughts - as Ramana puts as idam vRitti and aham vRitti.

In contrast to anumaana - cognition is immediate but recognition is

mediate due to memory coming into picture. Many a time we cognize

immediately but fail to recognize it due to loss of memory. Yes

anumaana has to relay on mediacy but pratyaksha is immediate. I do

agree with that - Immediacy is related to the same substantive for both

the seer and the seen - which is the consciousness-existence that I am.

That is my understanding.

 

In the fire on the hill

> (again) the smoke is a perception and the fire is an

> inference. Perception on the other hand is described

> as following:

>

> "So knowledge that is limited by mental states in the

> form of particular objects, is a perception in

> respect of such knowledge, and when it is not

> different from the Consciousness limited by objects

> that are present and are capable of being apprehended

> by particular organs."(pg.28Advaita Ashrama edn.)

 

I agree with the statements.

>

> In other words when you are fully present to the

> object you can perceive it.How best to express how

> this differs from Realism in Western philosophy seems

> on the tip of my mind. It is a will-o-the-wisp.

 

If we recognize that the perception involving perceiver and perceived -

for both of which the consciousness is the very substantive and

substratum (I am taking it as the material cause for both) the

perception is immediate since the relation between the two is direct.

If it involves a secondary process of anumaana - then (anumaana comes

into picture only when we can not grasp by pratyaksha) then we are

mediate process that takes time - some time years depending on the

degree of the understanding of the vyaapti j"~naanam and that is where

elaborate discussion of concomitant relationships do enter.

 

Since I am not too familiar with the realism or the idealism of the

Western Philosophy ( as Benjamin keeps pointing out that his idealism is

different from the idealistic idealism), I keep going back to my

understanding of advaitic nature of the realty. I do appreciate your

'Will-O-the wisp' problem.

 

Meanwhile Chattaranjanji had a question related to Vedanta Paribhaasha -

you maybe able to provide him a better answer.

 

 

Hari OM!

Sadananda

 

>

> Best Wishes, Michael.

>

 

=====

What you have is His gift to you and what you do with what you have is your gift

to Him - Swami Chinmayananda.

 

 

 

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[Guest guest]

--- Benjamin <orion777ben wrote:

> I hope this is clear enough for now, since I don't want to bore

> people to death. Notice that nothing here in any way violates

> whatever discoveries are made by neurological science.

 

But Benjamin for some reason you left the dwaitins hanging in their

neurological state!

 

Hari OM!

Sadananda

> Hari Om!

> Benjamin

>

 

 

=====

What you have is His gift to you and what you do with what you have is your gift

to Him - Swami Chinmayananda.

 

 

 

SiteBuilder - Free web site building tool. Try it!

http://webhosting./ps/sb/

[Guest guest]

advaitin, kuntimaddi sadananda

<kuntimaddisada> wrote:

> --- ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva@e...> wrote:

> > Namaste Sri Sadananda,

> > I would like to point out that 'substantive' does not

> > have the same meaning as 'substratum'. Substantive

> > as used in the family of theories that have sense-

> > data as a central notion means more or less the

> > dubious concept of matter. ..

>

> Thanks Michael - Did not realize the difference. I am using them

in the

> sense as I understand them - I assume that the substantive is the

> material or the material cause - which is again Brahman- which is

again

> the substratum if one ignores the superficial entities that define

one

> object that differs from another object. Hence I am using them in

the

> same sense. I am not sure the differences between the 'substratum'

and

> 'substantive' is substantive enough! Thanks for bringing that

issue.

> Yes I am using them in the same sense.

>

 

Namaste,

 

A fascinating overview of Western and Eastern approaches to

Logic is presented in this article by philosopher Stephen Palmquist.

Hope Gregji and others will have more to say on this.

 

 

http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/gl/GL3.html

 

The Logic of Simple Synthetic Integration

 

Men all pay homage to what understanding understands, but no one

understands enough to rely upon what understanding does not

understand and thereby come to understand. --

Chuang Tzu [C55:5.288]

 

".........The detrimental consequence of such an analytic frame of

reference stems from the fact that we in the West have been trained

from an early age to assume (unconsciously) that all of life

(thought, intuition, and all the experiences which they compose) can

be adequately interpreted only in terms of the principles of identity

and non-contradiction. As a result we find it difficult, if not

impossible, even to countenance the idea that there may be a

different way of thinking properly about aspects of the world which

are not bound by the formal limits of our analytic thought patterns.

The analytic frame of reference merely heightens the stark contrast

between the two methods. Eastern cultures tend to be more open to the

possibility and value of such "non-logical logic". ("To know non-

knowledge is the highest good", says Lao Tzu [L532:71].) Indeed,

their openness to synthetic integration and their interest in its

formal basis may help to explain why, as any reader of ancient

Chinese or Indian philosophy will readily affirm, the philosophers of

the East often seem from our analytic perspective to be inconsistent

and unclear in their mode of expression. For just as the intuitive

experience of the Western philosopher too often lacks integrity

because of his inability to force it into the analytic mould, which

he has mastered and in which he excels, so also the Eastern

philosopher too often lacks consistency because of the inherent

difficulty in expressing certain thoughts according to the mould

provided by the synthetic integration which characterizes his

approach to life. True integrity and logical consistency are possible

only when both of these extremes join hands and learn from each

other, so that synthetic integration and analytic division are seen

as complementary modes of philosophical inquiry, each with their own

legitimate logical foundation. ....................."

 

 

Regards,

 

Sunder

[Guest guest]

Hi Chittaranjan,

 

Brilliant Part IV exposition! I am managing to read all of these posts and

understand most! (Have you thought of writing a modern commentary on the

BSB?)

 

Having just been looking back through the 'Notes on Spiritual Discourse of

Shri Atmananda' for some quotations I had marked up for the website, I did

note a couple of points, which I would like to throw in to the discussions.

 

Firstly, what is the justification for according perception any primacy as a

guide to the reality (or not) of a world? How can perception tell you

anything more than that there has been a perception? I.e. how could

perception in itself ever point to the existence of anything other (than the

perception)?

 

Secondly, here is note 719 from Sri Atmananda - I'll let it speak for

itself:

 

"When you ask why, when, where etc., in relation to the Reality, you take it

for granted

that why, when, where etc. are more real than Reality itself. This position

is absurd.

Therefore no such question can be asked, relating to the Reality."

 

Best wishes,

 

Dennis

[Guest guest]

Namaste Shri Michaelji,

 

 

advaitin, "Dennis Waite" <dwaite@a...> wrote:

> Hi Chittaranjan,

>

> Brilliant Part IV exposition! I am managing to read all of

> these posts and understand most! (Have you thought of writing

> a modern commentary on the BSB?)

 

Thank you for your appreciatory words Michaelji. I am afraid that I

don't have the qualification to write a commentary on the BSB. I

don't even know Sanskrit as you might have seen from my remarks

on 'svarupa lakshana' and 'tatastha lakshana'. Besides I don't

understand large parts of the bhashya, expecially the fourth chapter.

I am a student.

 

> Having just been looking back through the 'Notes on

> Spiritual Discourse of Shri Atmananda' for some quotations

> I had marked up for the website, I did note a couple of

> points, which I would like to throw in to the discussions.

>

> Firstly, what is the justification for according perception

> any primacy as a guide to the reality (or not) of a world?

> How can perception tell you anything more than that there has

> been a perception? I.e. how could perception in itself ever

> point to the existence of anything other (than the perception?

 

I appreciate what is being said here. In this regard, there is the

problem of discerning the nature of things perceived, and there is

the problem of accounting for what we see - exactly as we see it -

because we see it that way. Perception tells us what perception tells

us - nothing more, and quite as importantly, nothing less. It points

to the existence of what is perceived by virtue of the content of

perception having the form 'that it exists'. These forms with all

their attributions are this world exactly as we see it.

 

If we approach this topic from the perspective of Yoga, then there

are the vrittis and the form-al objects of these vrittis. The vritti

emerges in consciousness as nama-rupa, the name and the object of the

name. So, how can one speak about a thing by naming it and then

denying the form that that name points to? I am agreeing with what

has been said, but I believe that when its full meaning is fleshed

out, it does point to the 'otherness' of objects because

the 'otherness' is contained in the form that perception perceives.

 

> Secondly, here is note 719 from Sri Atmananda - I'll let it

> speak for itself:

>

> "When you ask why, when, where etc., in relation to the

> Reality, you take it for granted that why, when, where etc.

> are more real than Reality itself. This position is absurd.

> Therefore no such question can be asked, relating to the

> Reality."

 

I accept this. Questions cannot question the Ground from which

questions arise.

 

 

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan