Why should things Exist? (Advaita and Vishishtadvaita)

[Guest guest]

Namaste Chittranjanji.

 

You are simply nonpareil in articulation and the best ever boon to

land on this List!

 

Reading your efflorescence, I now have a doubt. Am I an advaitin or

a vishiStAdvatin!?

 

I am wary of treading the treacherous lands of ontologies, for I

can't trust my walking list of language. Advaita, be it vishiStA or

non-vishiStA, is better understood in silence. I, therefore, believe

it is prudent not to take sides with either school who are in a vain

bid to make water-tight compartments. The heartening thought is that

I understand both you, Sankara and the vishiStadvaitins.

 

You are absolutely right about adhyAsA. But, look at the amount of

talking we did about it on this list in early 2002.

 

PraNAms.

 

Madathil Nair

______________________

 

 

advaitin, "Chittaranjan Naik"

wrote:..........butt meanwhile I would like to attempt a reply to

your (Ranjeetji's_ other > question on:

>

> VISHISHTADVAITA ONTOLOGY

[Guest guest]

In my post 21317, please read 'walking stick' instead of 'walking

list'. I am (nay my brain) is simply getting old!.

 

MN

 

advaitin, "Madathil Rajendran Nair"

<madathilnair> wrote:

......> I am wary of treading the treacherous lands of ontologies, for

I

> can't trust my walking list of language. ....

[Guest guest]

Namaste Nairji,

 

I'd say that it is this list that is a boon to me rather than the

other way around. It provides me with that much needed satsang after

the long hours spent everyday amongst worldly people. But, as

Benjaminji says, this list has a way of becoming addictive.

 

I too have had this same doubt about whether I am an Advaitin or

Vishishtadvaitin, and certainly I've been labelled a Vishishtadvaitin

in Vadavali (but of course Shri Jay had to say it with a question

mark seeing that I like to hold on to the doctrine of vivartavada).

But like you, I am not too concerned with the label as long as I

understand which way the truth lies.

 

I've read some of your posts of 2002 and I must say that our views on

adhyasa have a lot in common. I am also much impressed by your

doctrine of Lighting Up.

 

Pranams,

Chittaranjan

 

 

advaitin, "Madathil Rajendran Nair"

<madathilnair> wrote:

> Namaste Chittranjanji.

>

> You are simply nonpareil in articulation and the best ever boon to

> land on this List!

>

> Reading your efflorescence, I now have a doubt. Am I an advaitin

or

> a vishiStAdvatin!?

>

> I am wary of treading the treacherous lands of ontologies, for I

> can't trust my walking list of language. Advaita, be it vishiStA

or

> non-vishiStA, is better understood in silence. I, therefore,

believe

> it is prudent not to take sides with either school who are in a

vain

> bid to make water-tight compartments. The heartening thought is

that

> I understand both you, Sankara and the vishiStadvaitins.

>

> You are absolutely right about adhyAsA. But, look at the amount of

> talking we did about it on this list in early 2002.

>

> PraNAms.

>

> Madathil Nair

> ______________________

>

>

> advaitin, "Chittaranjan Naik"

> wrote:..........butt meanwhile I would like to attempt a reply to

> your (Ranjeetji's_ other > question on:

> >

> > VISHISHTADVAITA ONTOLOGY

[Guest guest]

Namaste Nairji,

>I am (nay my brain) is simply getting old!

 

 

I like your use of the word 'nay'. Even Brits don't speak English

that well anymore! :-)

 

Benjamin

[Guest guest]

Namaste Sri Chittaranjan-ji,

>Therefore it is not right to say

> that objects don't exist, because such denial is a denial of their

> existential core, which in the ultimate analysis is a denial of

> Brahman itself. Therefore, according to Vishishtadvaitins,

>Advaitins

> are crypto-Buddhists.

 

 

I must say that if the above is really the argument of the

Vishishtadvaitins, then they have thoroughly misunderstood advaita or

they had a completely different understanding from mine. Advaitins

deny the snake(world) but not the rope(brahman).

 

> THE RELATION IN WHICH THE WORLD STANDS TO BRAHMAN

>

> Brahman and the world stand to each other in the relation of

> substance and attributes. There is no duality between substance and

> attribute because the attribute is none other but the description

>of

> substance. In other words, the world is the body or prakara of

> Brahman.

 

 

If that is the case, then brahman is no longer free from defects!

Probably that is the reason why Madhva had to introduce dvaita,

though he too was a vaishnava. Coming to advaita, the defects of the

snake(world) are not the defects of the rope(brahman). Well, by the

way, to be honest, I dont know if brahman has to be free from defects.

 

>It is not right to say that Brahman is nirguna because there

> is never a substance that is nirguna.

 

 

Well, but brahman does not belong to any class - "neti neti". So no

conclusions about brahman can be drawn by looking at the objective

world. brahman is not always considered as existence either. Please

look up BG 13.12 (or) 13.13 (depending on which version you use) or

RV 10.129.1.

 

>Now the question arises with respect to statement#2 i.e., "the

> universe is unreal if perceived apart from the Self": Is there

> anything at all that is apart from Brahman? Is there any place, any

> time, any realm, any remote corner of the mind, where Brahman is

>not

> to be found? Then what is meant by the phrase "the universe if

> perceived apart from the self"?

>

> I would like to suggest that this twisted phrase does not point to

> anything except to a knot in the heart. There is never anything

apart

> from Brahman. Apartness from Brahman is the play of delusion. It

> belongs to that primordial knot of the heart that is to be

> unravelled. Therefore, the only meaningful statements that remain

> are:

>

> 1. Brahman is real

> 2. Brahman is the universe

>

> Therefore the world is real because Brahman is the world. (To those

> of us who retain the effects of modern schooling, it is necessary

to

> note that there is no "outside world" here – because any

> outside "outside" of space is a nonsensical expression).

 

 

I would suggest statement 2 that the "universe is unreal" means that

the "universe is unreal just as the snake in the rope is unreal".

That said, no statement is redundant or meaningless. Why? For a

complete destruction of false knowledge of the rope(brahman) as a

snake(world) it necessary to know two things -

 

1. That (which I think to be a snake) is a rope(brahman).

2. That (by the way) is not a snake (as I think).

 

The false knowledge is simply so strong that it wont get away unless

and until statement #2 is mentioned. The rope is not only a rope but

it is also a negation of the snake when prior wrong knowledge exists.

Similarly, since prior wrong knowledge of mistaking brahman to be the

world is natural (AchArya in BSB), i.e. beginningless, the statement

that the "universe is unreal" is necessary.

 

I think, atleast in an advaita list we must sincerely attempt to

understand the teachings of our advaita AchAryas. Far too many people

have said too many things about advaita.

 

> This makes the ontologies of Advaita and Vishishtadvaita

>essentially

> the same as far as the world is concerned.

 

 

Sorry Sir, but I dont agree with you, for the relation between the

substance and attribute is quite differnet from the (above) relation

between snake and rope.

 

>I believe the difference,

> in so far as there is a doctrinal difference, arises from the fact

> that Vishishtadvaita takes its position strictly from the vantage

> point of paramarthika sathya. This is evident from its theory of

> error – both the snake and the rope are real; likewise the objects

of

> the dream are real. Advaita, on the other hand, takes its vantage

> point from vyavaharika sathya. Thus, a pratyaksha that is sublated

>is

> not real because it has to be consistent with the empirical

>validity

> of the prevailing pratyaksha that the object of the sublated

> experience is false.

 

 

It is obvious that dream and waking state are not equally real. Even

if paramArthika satya standpoint is used, then both will be unreal,

but I dont see how both can be equally real from any viewpoint. As

for advaita, its point of view does include both vyavahArika and

paramArthika stand points. From the former we claim, both are not

equally real. From the latter we claim both are absolutely unreal. I

have not seen any version of advaita which is limited in its

viewpoints.

 

> I submit that it is the same truth that is revealed by Advaita and

> Vishishtadvaita, but they do so from different vantage points. Most

> importantly, both of them do not deny the reality of the world.

 

 

Needless to say Sir, I disagree.

 

> I believe that the nature of superimposition has been grossly

> misunderstood by many interpreters of Advaita with the result that

> avidya has been made out to be the material cause of the universe.

> This is in direct contradiction to Shankaracharya's clear statement

> that Brahman is the material cause of the universe (Brahma Sutra

> Bhashya, Chapter I, Section IV, Topic 7).

 

 

In as much as the "world appearance" is concerned, avidya is the

material cause. The mistaken perception (avidya) is the reason why I

see the rope(brahman) as the snake(world) and thus it is in this way

my mistaken perception(avidya) is the material cause of the snake

(world). In as much as the world itself is concerned, brahman is the

material cause. Just as the snake(world) and the rope(brahman) are

both referred to by the same "That", exactly in the same way brahman

is the material cause of the universe. What is the material cause

depends on what you see as the world. So much is my understanding.

 

 

Regards

Raghavendra

[Guest guest]

Namaste Chittaranjanji,

 

Thank you for your admirable mail on Advaita and VishishTadvaita. I intend

to read BhAshyam of RAmAnujAchArya some time later. From your post,

VishishTadvaita looks interesting.

 

I dont know whether I am a realist-advaitin in the strict sense. The problem

is that we believe we know something and that our understanding is

fool-proof. But the moment we start putting our understanding in words, we

find ourselves groping within self-contradictory statements and it takes a

lot of time and effort to untie the knots. I am passing through such a phase

right now.

 

I do agree on your statements on Reality of the Universe, but not sure to

which extend. If any advaitin claims avidya to be the 'material cause' of

the universe, he needs to be in the library for some more time. As you

rightly said, the topic on avidya, adhyAsa and mAya is too knotty. We can

only understand it. We cannot put it into words. One who sees it, sees it

(yah pashyati sah pashyati!!).

 

Also, I am not as secular minded as you are. Neither was RAmAnujAchArya for

that matter :-)

 

Hari Om

 

 

-

"Chittaranjan Naik" <chittaranjan_naik

 

I submit that it is the same truth that is revealed by Advaita and

Vishishtadvaita, but they do so from different vantage points. Most

importantly, both of them do not deny the reality of the world.

 

I believe that the nature of superimposition has been grossly

misunderstood by many interpreters of Advaita with the result that

avidya has been made out to be the material cause of the universe.

This is in direct contradiction to Shankaracharya's clear statement

that Brahman is the material cause of the universe (Brahma Sutra

Bhashya, Chapter I, Section IV, Topic 7). Sri Shankaracharya has to

be interpreted in such a manner that there is overall coherence in

the interpretation. If one considers the contradictions in the

interpretations, I think one can say with some justice that the

theory of the world being a superimposition is one such

superimposition grafted by interpreters into Advaita. I think the

superimposition of avidya has to be carefully sifted from the

perceived world revealed in pratyaksha before one can fully

comprehend what Adi Shankara meant by superimposition.

 

Pranams,

Chittaranjan

[Guest guest]

Namaste Kalyanji,

 

As I am not a Vishishtadvaitin, I beg to be excused from answering

questions related to the specific tenets of Vishsihtadvata. I will

therefore restrict myself in this post to only those points that

relate to Advaita (including of course those points on which I find

similarity between Advaita and Vishishtadvaita).

 

As I'd mentioned in my previous post, I am apprehensive about getting

involved at this moment in a discussion about adhyasa, but I am not

averse to having it explained to me. I would rather seek

clarifications from you since you take a definite stand on the

matter.

 

advaitin, "Raghavendra N Kalyan"

<kalyan7429> wrote:

> Namaste Sri Chittaranjan-ji,

>

> It is obvious that dream and waking state are not equally real.

> Even if paramArthika satya standpoint is used, then both will

> be unreal, but I dont see how both can be equally real from any

> viewpoint. As for advaita, its point of view does include both

> vyavahArika and paramArthika stand points. From the former we

> claim, both are not equally real. From the latter we claim both

> are absolutely unreal.

 

 

Dear Kalyanji, you almost use the word "we" as if I am excluded from

being an Advaitin!

 

There is another question that I have here regarding this two-fold

characterisation of sathya. Do you preserve vyavaharika "sathya" in

paramarthika sathya? What happens to the asathya that characterises

vyavaharika "sathya" -- is it preserved? In what way does Advaita

include both standpoints? It is important to realise that there is

only one sathya, and that vyavaharika "sathya" is tainted by asathya

and as such is not the perspicuity of sathya in so far as one is

unable in the vyavahara of samsara to unravel the knots of the

tainting.

 

> I think, atleast in an advaita list we must sincerely attempt to

> understand the teachings of our advaita AchAryas. Far too many

> people have said too many things about advaita.

 

I sincerely seek the correct understanding from you.

 

> I have not seen any version of advaita which is limited in its

> viewpoints.

 

But you are limiting Advaita to the viewpoint that both the dream and

the waking state are absolutely unreal! It would seem that I am not.

I am saying that the world is unreal when the denotation of the

word "world" is a superimposition, and that the world is real when

the denotation of the word "world" is its true substratum.

 

> In as much as the "world appearance" is concerned, avidya is the

> material cause. The mistaken perception (avidya) is the reason

> why I see the rope(brahman) as the snake(world) and thus it is

> in this way my mistaken perception(avidya) is the material cause

> of the snake (world). In as much as the world itself is concerned,

> brahman is the material cause. Just as the snake(world) and the

> rope(brahman) are both referred to by the same "That", exactly

> in the same way brahman is the material cause of the universe.

> What is the material cause depends on what you see as the world.

> So much is my understanding.

 

I am completely baffled by all this. If both the dream and the waking

state are unreal then what is left over for Brahman to be the

material cause of in as much as you say that it is avidya that is the

cause of the "world appearance".

 

Also in the mistaken perception of the snake in the rope, where does

the snake come from? The superimposition of the snake on the rope is

due to avidya, but where does the meaning of snake come from. Are you

saying that all meanings come from avidya? If so, does the meaning of

the word "Brahman" come from avidya?

 

Please realise that the snake in the rope is not generated by avidya;

it is only the superimposition of this thing called snake, which is a

real thing in the world, on to the rope, which is also a real thing

in the world, that is due to avidya. In the snake-rope analogy, the

real thing called snake is absent in the locus where there is present

this real thing called rope. Both snake and rope are real entities in

the world. It is impossible to mistake the rope for a snake unless

there be in this world a real snake, for nobody ever mistakes

something to be something else that never existed. So when you say

that the world is unreal in paramarthika sathya, where does the

possibility of the object (i.e., world) seen in the mistake come

from. The superimposition can come from avidya, but not the very

possibility of the world that the avidya superimposes on to the

substratum. The possibility of a thing can only come from the reality

of the thing. (See Shankara Bhashya)

 

It is important to keep the locus in mind when we use an analogy. An

analogy is not applicable to everything in the analogy but only to

the locus to be explained. The analogy of the snake and the rope is

for bringing out the error of superimposition and not for proving the

unreality of snake in as much as the unreality of the particular

instance of snake is dependent on the reality of the snake in the

world. Unless you explain where the unreality of the world comes from

in your version of paramarthika sathya, your analogy of snake and the

rope is meaningless.

 

With regards,

Chittaranjan