Why should things Exist? (Advaita and Vishishtadvaita)

[Guest guest]

Namaste Ranjeetji,

 

advaitin, "Ranjeet Sankar"

<thefinalsearch> wrote:

>

> -

> "Chittaranjan Naik" <chittaranjan_naik>

>

> > Superimposition is not what the world is; it is a certain

> > peculiarity of how the world appears divorced and skewered

> > through avidya. The world under avidya conceals its

> > substratum, and this world as it is seen under avidya,

> > seemingly divested of its true substratum, is not

> > seen as subsisting in Brahman but is seen as independent,

> > and this world seen as such (separated) is the cause of the

> > theory of superimposition. Superimposition can only arise

> > in duality, and the duality of the superimposed-world and

> > Brahman-on-which-superimposed is false. When the

> > superimposition is removed, the world doesn't go

> > away, but the superimposition goes away together with

> > the itselfnesses of objects and then they are not

> > itselfnesses, but One It-Self or Brahman. Then it becomes

> > Vishishtadaita. But this world is all like that statue,

> > and when it is seen like that, it becomes Advaita.

> > Anirvacaniya stands between Vishishtadvaita and Advaita.

> > That anirvacaniya is swantantriya and Yogamaya for Brahman,

> > and maya with the obscurations of avidya for us. This is

> > my humble opinion.

>

> Namaste Chittaranjanji,

>

> When time permits, could you please elaborate on the above,

> particularly on what you said about vishishTadvaita?

>

> Hari Om

 

 

I'm sorry Ranjeetji that I wasn't able to reply to your mail (#

21166) earlier. One reason for this is that I was a bit apprehensive

of touching on the topic of superimposition, primarily because I'm

unable to find suitable words to express the subtle distinction that

separates superimposition from the world. I'm still trying to find an

analogy, but meanwhile I would like to attempt a reply to your other

question on:

 

VISHISHTADVAITA ONTOLOGY

 

In Vishishtadvaita, the world is real; it is not an illusion. To

understand the ontology of Vishishtadvaita, we would need to

understand the following:

 

1) The meaning of existence as predicated of objects

 

2) The relation in which the world stands to Brahman

 

 

THE MEANING OF EXISTENCE AS PREDICATED OF OBJECTS

 

In Vishishtadvaita, the existence that is predicated of objects is

Brahman itself. When I say that an object exists, the predication of

existence is what points through the attributes of the object to its

existential ground that is none other than Brahman. Brahman is

partless, and hence the "isness" of everything is Brahman. This is

Vishshtadvaita, the non-duality in which the entire universe has only

Brahman as the existential ground. Therefore it is not right to say

that objects don't exist, because such denial is a denial of their

existential core, which in the ultimate analysis is a denial of

Brahman itself. Therefore, according to Vishishtadvaitins, Advaitins

are crypto-Buddhists.

 

 

THE RELATION IN WHICH THE WORLD STANDS TO BRAHMAN

 

Brahman and the world stand to each other in the relation of

substance and attributes. There is no duality between substance and

attribute because the attribute is none other but the description of

substance. In other words, the world is the body or prakara of

Brahman. It is not right to say that Brahman is nirguna because there

is never a substance that is nirguna. There is substance, and there

is the way in which the substance is, which is its nature. This

nature is the attributive descriptions of substance. One can't say

there is substance and that it doesn't have a nature, as this is a

complete failure to understand the nature of substance. Substance is

the "isness" and attributes are the "way it is". Attributes are co-

terminous with substance and there is no intermediate relation (like

inherence) between them. There is no "between" them. There is

no "them", there is only non-duality. This is Vishishtadvaita, the

non-duality in which Brahman is the substance and attributes are the

vishesha of the substance standing as the body of Brahman.

Vishishtadvaita paints an immensely grand picture of the splendour of

Brahman.

 

 

COMPARISION BETWEEN ADVAITA AND VISHISHTADVAITA ONTOLOGIES

 

I am not sure if I will have many takers for what I am about to say,

but I am comforted by the fact that you are one of the few here that

share with me an understanding of Advaita that admits of a realistic

interpretation. I would like to begin with an extract taken from the

book "Guru Ramana" by S.S.Cohen:

 

Quote:

 

A disciple remarks that Shri Bhagavan often says that Maya and

Reality are the same. How can that be?

 

Bhagavan: Shankara was criticised for his view on Maya without

understanding him. He said that:

 

1. Brahman is real

2. The universe is unreal

3. Brahman is the universe

 

He did not stop at the second, because the third explains the other

two. It signifies that the universe is real if perceived as the Self,

and unreal if perceived apart from the Self. Hence Maya and Reality

are one and the same.

 

Unquote.

 

 

Now the question arises with respect to statement#2 i.e., "the

universe is unreal if perceived apart from the Self": Is there

anything at all that is apart from Brahman? Is there any place, any

time, any realm, any remote corner of the mind, where Brahman is not

to be found? Then what is meant by the phrase "the universe if

perceived apart from the self"?

 

I would like to suggest that this twisted phrase does not point to

anything except to a knot in the heart. There is never anything apart

from Brahman. Apartness from Brahman is the play of delusion. It

belongs to that primordial knot of the heart that is to be

unravelled. Therefore, the only meaningful statements that remain

are:

 

1. Brahman is real

2. Brahman is the universe

 

Therefore the world is real because Brahman is the world. (To those

of us who retain the effects of modern schooling, it is necessary to

note that there is no "outside world" here – because any

outside "outside" of space is a nonsensical expression).

 

This makes the ontologies of Advaita and Vishishtadvaita essentially

the same as far as the world is concerned. I believe the difference,

in so far as there is a doctrinal difference, arises from the fact

that Vishishtadvaita takes its position strictly from the vantage

point of paramarthika sathya. This is evident from its theory of

error – both the snake and the rope are real; likewise the objects of

the dream are real. Advaita, on the other hand, takes its vantage

point from vyavaharika sathya. Thus, a pratyaksha that is sublated is

not real because it has to be consistent with the empirical validity

of the prevailing pratyaksha that the object of the sublated

experience is false.

 

I submit that it is the same truth that is revealed by Advaita and

Vishishtadvaita, but they do so from different vantage points. Most

importantly, both of them do not deny the reality of the world.

 

I believe that the nature of superimposition has been grossly

misunderstood by many interpreters of Advaita with the result that

avidya has been made out to be the material cause of the universe.

This is in direct contradiction to Shankaracharya's clear statement

that Brahman is the material cause of the universe (Brahma Sutra

Bhashya, Chapter I, Section IV, Topic 7). Sri Shankaracharya has to

be interpreted in such a manner that there is overall coherence in

the interpretation. If one considers the contradictions in the

interpretations, I think one can say with some justice that the

theory of the world being a superimposition is one such

superimposition grafted by interpreters into Advaita. I think the

superimposition of avidya has to be carefully sifted from the

perceived world revealed in pratyaksha before one can fully

comprehend what Adi Shankara meant by superimposition.

 

Pranams,

Chittaranjan

[Guest guest]

Hello All,

 

Conventionally we use the term 'real' in various ways. We speak of real

butter, a real Rolex, real ghee etc. We know what we are talking about.

In this sense Sankara states that the object is real because it is

perceived. However when we come to the metaphysical realm (science of

first principles, how things must fundamentally be for things to appear as

they do etc.) then concerns and questions about the real, the necessary,

the contingent, the absolute, the unchanging etc. come into play. As this

realm is not accessible to perception, in order to express our intuitions

about it we may be forced to use analogies. I skip over the contentious

issue whether these inklings about contingency and the real are themselves

absurd confections of the overheated mind. For us the important point to

remember is that an analogy expresses a relationship and is not itself a

direct picture. The rope/snake analogy is fraught because it has been used

in various ways and it has taken on the colouration of the background of

the discussion. In theory of error considerations about complex and simple

perceptions it is used in a way which links it directly to normal

perception. That is a special epistemological arena of its own. In the

present context the rope/snake analogy is one of 'proportionality'.

Brahman:Creation =(like)Rope:Snake.

 

We know this says you. Indeed! However distortion enters in when the two

elements of masking and substratum are not kept in view. Generally what

has been happening is that we obsess about illusion and forget about the

substratum. The latter is brought to the fore in the analogy of upadhi.

The individual self *is* pure Consciousness limited by the mind. In this

manner of speaking we are moving towards an expression of identity but that

move is modified by the concept of non-duality which is also expressed as

non-difference when the cause/effect relationship is considered. There are

a cluster of analogies which modify and balance each other. The reality is

out of this world.That there is little talk about upadhi indicates the

sway of illusionism.

 

This is a vast topic. In summary an analogy is not a picture, in natural

theology it is an attempt on the inexpressible. For those interested in

the Western tradition 'Existence and Analogy' by Mascall is a classic.

 

Best Wishes, Michael.

 

P.S. the analogy of identity given through material identity eg. clay/pots,

plates, vessels etc. is likewise not a theory about physics, about ultimate

'urstuff' or the like.

[Guest guest]

Namaste:

 

Whether we accept it or not, from the advaitic point of view, we are

all vishistadvaitin at the vyavaharika level! At the vyavaharika

level, we do need the pole (Narayana) to cross-over the hurdle of

samsara!!

 

Warmest regards,

 

Ram Chandran

 

advaitin, "Chittaranjan Naik"

<chittaranjan_naik> wrote:

> Namaste Kalyanji,

>

> As I am not a Vishishtadvaitin, I beg to be excused from answering

> questions related to the specific tenets of Vishsihtadvata. I will

> therefore restrict myself in this post to only those points that

> relate to Advaita (including of course those points on which I find

> similarity between Advaita and Vishishtadvaita).

[Guest guest]

Namaste SrI Chittaranjan-ji,

 

> As I'd mentioned in my previous post, I am apprehensive about

getting

> involved at this moment in a discussion about adhyasa, but I am not

> averse to having it explained to me. I would rather seek

> clarifications from you since you take a definite stand on the

> matter.

 

Please note that whatever I say to you is just my own understanding

of the AchArya. For all that I may say, I might end up learning from

you. (remember gArgya and ajAtaSatru)

> Dear Kalyanji, you almost use the word "we" as if I am excluded

>from

> being an Advaitin!

 

I am sorry Sir if that offended you, but I meant "we all", though of

course I have no right to speak for you or other members here.

 

> There is another question that I have here regarding this two-fold

> characterisation of sathya. Do you preserve vyavaharika "sathya" in

> paramarthika sathya? What happens to the asathya that characterises

> vyavaharika "sathya" -- is it preserved?

 

No Sir. brahman and brahman alone is the ultimate satya.

>In what way does Advaita include both standpoints?

 

ajAti vAda is the paramArthik standpoint while vivarta vAda is the

vyavahArik standpoint. You may say that I said that brahman alone is

the ultimate satya and I am again bringing in ajAti vAda. So are

there not 2 satyas here? Well, the answer for that is simple. ajAti

vAda is nothing but a negation of the phenomenal world in its

entirety. And the negation of the world etc. is synonymous with

brahman, just as the computer infront of me is also the negation of a

television or a cow etc.

 

>It is important to realise that there is

> only one sathya, and that vyavaharika "sathya" is tainted by

>asathya

> and as such is not the perspicuity of sathya in so far as one is

> unable in the vyavahara of samsara to unravel the knots of the

> tainting.

 

 

Of course there is only one satya. If we really know and believe that

there is only one satya, then there is no need for scriptural study,

no need for us to study our (our both!) AchArya's bhAshya-s etc. Are

you ready to accept all this? Are you ready to do nothing???!!!! It

is for people who need to come up to that level that the concept of

vyavahArika satya is there. It does not mean that it is also a satya.

 

Btw, do you worship Siva, ViSNu etc? If yes, why are you doing that?

Why do you need to do that if you are already brahman? Why do you

need chitta-suddhi when you are already brahman? Sorry about the mode

of questioning, but my questions have a definite purpose and I hope

you are seeing it.

 

> I sincerely seek the correct understanding from you.

 

I was just taking exception to your statements which would imply that

some of AchArya's statements were not meaningful. I already wrote in

my previous mail why the statement # 2 is also necessary.

 

> But you are limiting Advaita to the viewpoint that both the dream

>and

> the waking state are absolutely unreal!

 

 

The unreality of everything(including dream and waking states) =

negation of everything = brahman. If brahman is limited, then advaita

is limited!

 

> I am saying that the world is unreal when the denotation of the

> word "world" is a superimposition, and that the world is real when

> the denotation of the word "world" is its true substratum.

 

 

And I did not disagree with you on that matter. But from whence did

waking and dream states start having the same reality?

 

> I am completely baffled by all this. If both the dream and the

waking

> state are unreal then what is left over for Brahman to be the

> material cause of in as much as you say that it is avidya that is

the

> cause of the "world appearance".

 

 

brahman is the material cause of the world, in exactly the same way

as the real rope is the material cause of the snake. Take away the

rope and there is no snake! That does not mean that the snake(world)

in the rope(brahman) has an existence.

 

> Also in the mistaken perception of the snake in the rope, where

>does

> the snake come from?

 

 

The snake in the rope is neither there nor will ever be there in the

rope. The "snake" itself comes from remembrance probably.

 

>The superimposition of the snake on the rope >is

> due to avidya, but where does the meaning of snake come from.

>From the class called snakes.

>Are you

> saying that all meanings come from avidya? If so, does the meaning

>of

> the word "Brahman" come from avidya?

 

The word brahman which is reserved for conventional useage itself

comes from avidya. The referrent of the word "brahman" does not come

from avidya, though the reference itself could come from it.

> Please realise that the snake in the rope is not generated by

>avidya;

 

The "snake" itself is not generated by mistaken perception. That does

not mean that it is not generated by avidya. If it were as real as

brahman, then your substratum of the snake, which is brahman, would

be moving whenever the snake moves.

> it is only the superimposition of this thing called snake, which is

>a

> real thing in the world, on to the rope, which is also a real thing

> in the world, that is due to avidya.

 

Here, you are taking the analogy too seriously. The analogy is

illustrated to indicate that the level of reality of the world and

that of brahman are not the same. Note that moreover I used the

word "mistaken perception" with "avidya" in the brackets and I did

not use avidya itself. This does not mean that both are the same,

just as the rope is not brahman.

 

>In the snake-rope analogy, the

> real thing called snake is absent in the locus where there is

present

> this real thing called rope. Both snake and rope are real entities

>in

> the world.

 

 

Definitely. But the analogy is not meant to illustrate the reality of

both snakes and ropes.

 

>It is impossible to mistake the rope for a snake unless

> there be in this world a real snake, for nobody ever mistakes

> something to be something else that never existed.

 

 

While this is not important for the main argument, let me tell you

that I am not too sure about this.

 

>So when you say

> that the world is unreal in paramarthika sathya, where does the

> possibility of the object (i.e., world) seen in the mistake come

> from.

 

 

Since the world is absolutely unreal in paramArthika satya, the

mistaking of the world is also absolutely unreal, so that the

possibility of the object is also absolutely unreal. By the way,

the "world" here means the "world in all its aspects".

 

>The superimposition can come from avidya, but not the very

> possibility of the world that the avidya superimposes on to the

> substratum. The possibility of a thing can only come from the

>reality

> of the thing. (See Shankara Bhashya)

 

 

Conventional reality of course. Not ultimate reality.

 

> It is important to keep the locus in mind when we use an analogy.

>An

> analogy is not applicable to everything in the analogy but only to

> the locus to be explained. The analogy of the snake and the rope is

> for bringing out the error of superimposition and not for proving

>the

> unreality of snake in as much as the unreality of the particular

> instance of snake is dependent on the reality of the snake in the

> world. Unless you explain where the unreality of the world comes

from

> in your version of paramarthika sathya, your analogy of snake and

the

> rope is meaningless.

 

 

The analogy of the snake and rope is also meant to illustrate the

concept of mithyatva of falsity. Falsity is that which can be

eternally negated in its own locus, just as the snake in the rope

does not really exist in the past, present or the future. The

negation of the snake(world) is nothing but the rope(brahman). The

vyavahArika satya (snake) was, is and never will be there in brahman

(rope). And the paramArthika satya, which is synonymous with brahman

(rope), is the negation of the world(snake). The world is non-

existent in brahman just as the "snake in the rope" is non-existent.

 

 

Regards

Raghavendra