Advaita and adhyasa (earlier Vishishtadvaita Ontology)

[Guest guest]

Namaste Shri Kalyanji,

 

 

advaitin, "Raghavendra N Kalyan"

<kalyan7429> wrote:

> Namaste SrI Chittaranjan-ji,

 

> Please note that whatever I say to you is just my own

> understanding of the AchArya. For all that I may say, I

> might end up learning from you.(remember gArgya and

> ajAtaSatru)

 

 

We are both students Kalyanji, so let us discuss in the spirit of

students and learn on the way.

___________

> > Dear Kalyanji, you almost use the word "we" as if I am

> > excluded from being an Advaitin!

>

> I am sorry Sir if that offended you, but I meant "we all",

> though of course I have no right to speak for you or other

> members here.

 

 

No, I was not offended.

___________

> > There is another question that I have here regarding this

> > two-fold characterisation of sathya. Do you preserve

> > vyavaharika "sathya" in paramarthika sathya? What happens

> > to the asathya that characterises vyavaharika "sathya" --

> > is it preserved?

>

> No Sir. brahman and brahman alone is the ultimate satya.

 

 

When you say Brahman alone is the ultimate sathya, the question that

is to be resolved in our discussion is: What does Brahman include and

what does it not include? I am of the opinion that we should

interpret Advaita in a manner whereby the two statements (1) The

world is unreal and (2) Brahman is the world, should be reconciled,

whereas you seem to exclude the latter statement. Before one can say

that something is an illusion, it is necessary to flesh out the

meaning of illusion itself.

______________

> >In what way does Advaita include both standpoints?

>

> ajAti vAda is the paramArthik standpoint while vivarta vAda

> is the vyavahArik standpoint.

 

 

Incorrect. What is the standpoint of the Acharya in the Brahma Sutra

Bhashya? Please note that the correct term for what Adi Shankara uses

in the Brahma Sutra Bhashya is vivartavada. Vivartavada is the

doctrine that there is no creation and destruction, that all change

(as pertaining to objects) is false and apparent only. There is

nothing created because the effect is pre-existent in the cause. Your

statement that vivartavada is the standpoint of vyavaharika "sathya"

is incorrect. Vivartavada is the standpoint of paramarthika sathya -

that there is no creation, no destruction, no birth, no death.

 

Ajativada has its origin in Abhidharma Buddhism and was taken over by

Gaudapada to show how ajativada did not lead to nihilism or

momentariness because Brahman remains in all the negations as the

ground of negations. Like vivartavada, ajativada also holds that

there is no creation or destruction, but its semantic meaning

indicates the absence of essence. (Maybe someone who is coversant

with Sankrit roots can throw more light on this.) While Adi Shankara

has written a commentary on Gaudapada's Karika, it is significant

that he does not use ajativada in his Bhashya. Why? Why does the

Acharya specifically state in the Bhashya that dream experience is

not the same as waking experience even after writing a commentary on

the Karika? Why does the Acharya state that objects cannot be

considered as mere appearance? If you think it is only to make a

concession to vyavaharika "sathya", then please read the Bhashya

again. The Acharya specifically demolishes the doctrine that objects

arise only from impressions within consciousness and he provides

arguments that such impressions cannot arise without there being

objects. If we are to interpret the Brahma Sutra Bhashya, then these

are questions which we need to deeply ponder over.

 

It is true that in one sense Advaita says the world is illusion. But

it also says that the world is Brahman. There is a pivotal point in

Sadhana when you look one way and say that the world is illusion, and

you look the other way and say that it is real. I have no right to

object to anyone who takes the path that says the world is illusion

because it is a legitimate path of Advaita. But interpreting the

Prasthana Traya is a different matter than describing about a path.

It is the outlining of the Reality as envisioned in the Vedas. One

must be careful to follow the Vedanga of Nyaya in interpreting the

Vedas. There is a difference between the scenery that unfolds around

a sadhaka on a particular path, and the vision of Reality that admits

of all the paths. The Brahma Sutras are a chart of that Reality which

enfolds all paths.

_______________

> You may say that I said that brahman alone is the ultimate

> satya and I am again bringing in ajAti vAda. So are there

> not 2 satyas here? Well, the answer for that is simple.

> ajAti vAda is nothing but a negation of the phenomenal world

> in its entirety.

 

 

Noted.

_____________

> And the negation of the world etc. is synonymous with

> brahman, just as the computer infront of me is also the

> negation of a television or a cow etc.

 

 

No, the negation of the world is not synonymous with Brahman,

otherwise the nihilist would be a Vedantin.

 

You are able to negate the television because there is a real thing

in this world called telivision. Without the reality of the

television, you wouldn't even feel the necessity of negating it.

________________

> Of course there is only one satya. If we really know and

> believe that there is only one satya, then there is no

> need for scriptural study, no need for us to study our

> (our both!) AchArya's bhAshya-s etc. Are you ready to

> accept all this? Are you ready to do nothing???!!!!

> It is for people who need to come up to that level that

> the concept of vyavahArika satya is there.

> It does not mean that it is also a satya.

 

 

Dear Kalyanji, I grant you all this. :-) I would only add that

vyavaharika "sathya" is that same paramarthika sathya as it filters

to us through the taint of asathya. :-)

_________________

> Btw, do you worship Siva, ViSNu etc? If yes, why are you

> doing that? Why do you need to do that if you are already

> brahman? Why do you need chitta-suddhi when you are already

> brahman? Sorry about the mode of questioning, but my

> questions have a definite purpose and I hope you are seeing it.

 

 

I worship both Shiva and Krishna. I am doing that because I feel like

doing that - it brings me into a more intimate Reality. I need to do

that because it makes my ego take its proper place in the scheme of

Reality. I need chitta-suddhi so that the dirt of my mind doesn't

colour the truth. You are welcome to ask me these questions, but if

you are trying to tell me that Ishwara is a product of avidya, I

don't agree with you. Ishwara is real. It is vyavaharika sathya that

says that Ishwara is unreal. :-)

_________________

> I was just taking exception to your statements which would

> imply that some of AchArya's statements were not meaningful.

 

 

Please tell me where I implied that, and which are my statements that

made you think I did.

_________________

> I already wrote in my previous mail why the statement # 2

> is also necessary.

 

 

But you did it in a way that contradicts statement # 3.

_________________

> > But you are limiting Advaita to the viewpoint that both

> > the dream and the waking state are absolutely unreal!

>

> The unreality of everything(including dream and waking states) =

> negation of everything = brahman. If brahman is limited, then

> advaita is limited!

 

 

1) You are begging the question.

 

2) Your equation is the equation of nihilism because it is saying

that Brahman = negation of everything = null (nihilum).

 

3) If Brahman is unlimited, one shouldn't have to negate anything to

get to it, unless such negation is a negation of the limitedness that

the mind conceives of in trying to grasp it.

________________

> > I am saying that the world is unreal when the denotation of

> > the word "world" is a superimposition, and that the world

> > is real when the denotation of the word "world" is its true

> > substratum.

>

> And I did not disagree with you on that matter. But from whence did

> waking and dream states start having the same reality?

 

 

If Raghavendra Kalyanji can say that both dream and waking states are

unreal by ignoring statement # 3, why can't Chittaranjan Naik say

that they are both real by holding on to statement # 3 and resolving

statement # 2?

 

Maya is reality. I've already quoted Shri Ramana Maharshi on this.

Please note that Shri Shankaracharya says that Maya is both real and

unreal. Where is the pivotal point whereby one can turn around from

the unreal world to the real world? Why do you hold on to only the

unreal?

__________________

> brahman is the material cause of the world, in exactly the same

> way as the real rope is the material cause of the snake.

 

 

When you use the word "exactly" please make sure that you abide by

exactness. The snake is not there is the rope, but there is in the

world something called a snake. Now, when you say that the world is

not there in Brahman in exactly the same way, please tell me where

exactly the world is (in the same manner as one would say that the

snake is in this world).

__________________

> Take away the rope and there is no snake!

 

 

Even if you don't take away the rope there is no snake! You are

talking of the snake in the rope, remember?

__________________

> That does not mean that the snake(world) in the rope(brahman)

> has an existence.

 

 

But it does mean that snake has an existence that is not instantiated

in the rope.

__________________

> > Also in the mistaken perception of the snake in the rope,

> > where does the snake come from?

>

> The snake in the rope is neither there nor will ever be

> there in the rope. The "snake" itself comes from

> remembrance probably.

 

 

Remembrance of what? If this is what Advaita is about, it has painted

itself into a corner. And secondly, Sir, this "probably" will not do

for an answer. This is the crux of the problem and you can't slip

away by saying "probably". Have you read the Acharya's Bhashya? It is

clearly stated therein that the impressions of memory cannot be there

without objects.

__________________

> > The superimposition of the snake on the rope is due to avidya,

> > but where does the meaning of snake come from.

>

> From the class called snakes.

 

 

Great! Please tell me where the Acharya uses the concept of classes.

Shall we now move from the theory of classes to the domain of tarka

shastra or nyaya shastra which the Acharya uses? A class is a set of

similar entities, but that samanya by which each entity becomes

similar in respect of which it is grouped into a class comes from

jati. You would therefore need to take recourse to the meaning of

samanya to arrive at the jati that makes entities into a common set

of a class. In nyaya, a word points to both the universal and the

particular, but in Advaita a word points to the universal only.

Again, what a word points to is an object - it is that which is the

object of the directedness of the word. In Advaita there is no

difference between the meaning of a word and the object of a word.

What all this means is that the meaning of the snake comes from the

object snake.

_________________

> > Are you saying that all meanings come from avidya? If so,

> > does the meaning of the word "Brahman" come from avidya?

>

> The word brahman which is reserved for conventional useage itself

> comes from avidya.

 

 

Sorry, according to Advaita, words are eternal and come from Brahman.

In the para state they exist in identity with Brahman and the object

which the word denotes also lies in identity with Brahman. In the

pashyanti state they become embryonic within consciousness. In the

madhyama state they begin to separate into the form of the word and

the form of the object. In the vaikhary state the word and the object

are separated. A word is not the same as the object denoted, but the

relationship between words and objects is eternal.

_________________

> The referrent of the word "brahman" does not come from avidya,

> though the reference itself could come from it.

 

 

If the referent of the word "Brahman" does not come from avidya, then

by what means do the referents of other words come from avidya? The

nature of words do not change depending on the referents.

 

According to Advaita, a word is eternal. A word is attached to

objects. Without an object a word is not a word - it is noise or just

sound. So, we need evidence for your statements from the shashtras.

According to Advaita, words point to their objects by virtue of an

eternal relationship. You may also consult Panini and Patanjali

Mahabhashya for a re-confirmation on this point. (The philosophy of

the grammarians is also a philosophy of Advaita.)

_________________

> > Please realise that the snake in the rope is not generated by

> > avidya;

>

> The "snake" itself is not generated by mistaken perception.

> That does not mean that it is not generated by avidya.

 

 

According to the Acharya, the snake is not generated by avidya. Only

the superimposition is the result of avidya. The snake is also not a

mere appearance appearing like a snake because the appearance itself

cannot occur without a real snake that has the attributive likeness

of the mistaken snake. I would like to know the authoritative source

from which you are contradicting the things written by the Acharya in

his Bhashya. Or you may provide your own coherent justification

starting with "what does it means to say that a thing is real or

unreal".

__________________

> If it were as real as brahman, then your substratum of the

> snake, which is brahman, would be moving whenever the snake

> moves.

 

 

No, you have not understood the logic of nyaya shastra. Movement

belongs to the attributive nature and not to the substantive. Gold,

the substantive, does not move when a bangle made of gold is shaken;

gold does not change when you melt the bangle and make it into a

necklace.

__________________

> > it is only the superimposition of this thing called snake,

> > which is a real thing in the world, on to the rope, which

> > is also a real thing in the world, that is due to avidya.

>

> Here, you are taking the analogy too seriously.

 

 

The analogy has a purpose of illustrating something, and that which

it seeks to illustrate must be taken seriously, and that which it

does not seek to illustrate must also be taken seriously so as to

avoid making false conclusions from the analogy.

_________________

> The analogy is illustrated to indicate that the level of

> reality of the world and that of brahman are not the same.

 

 

The Bhashya says that the analogy is to illustrate the error of

superimposition. What this superimposition is, is the question that

we are trying to resolve here. And there are no levels of reality;

either a thing is real or it is unreal. When you speak about levels

and degrees, the degree does not belong to the substantive, but to

the intensity of the attribute in the substantive which is itself an

attribute.

________________

> Note that moreover I used the word "mistaken perception"

> with "avidya" in the brackets and I did not use avidya itself.

> This does not mean that both are the same, just as the rope

> is not brahman.

 

 

Noted.

_______________

> > In the snake-rope analogy, the real thing called snake is

> > absent in the locus where there is present this real thing

> > called rope. Both snake and rope are real entities in

> > the world.

>

> Definitely. But the analogy is not meant to illustrate the

> reality of both snakes and ropes.

 

This is begging the question. Please don't tell me the conclusion you

have reached, give me the arguments to justify your conclusions.

_______________

> > It is impossible to mistake the rope for a snake unless

> > there be in this world a real snake, for nobody ever mistakes

> > something to be something else that never existed.

>

> While this is not important for the main argument, let me tell you

> that I am not too sure about this.

 

 

This is MOST IMPORTANT as IT IS the MAIN ARGUMENT at this point in

time since the illustration of the analogy is the point of

contention. I would advise you to read the Acharya's Bhashya again

where he specifically discusses this point about the impossibility of

appearance of a thing even as an illusion unless the thing is real.

_________________

> > So when you say that the world is unreal in paramarthika

> > sathya, where does the possibility of the object (i.e., world)

> > seen in the mistake come from.

>

> Since the world is absolutely unreal in paramArthika satya, the

> mistaking of the world is also absolutely unreal, so that the

> possibility of the object is also absolutely unreal.

 

 

But this is begging the question again. Arguments please.

_________________

> By the way, the "world" here means the "world in all its aspects".

 

 

What does that mean?

__________________

> > The superimposition can come from avidya, but not the very

> > possibility of the world that the avidya superimposes on to the

> > substratum. The possibility of a thing can only come from the

> > reality of the thing. (See Shankara Bhashya)

>

> Conventional reality of course. Not ultimate reality.

 

 

No, ultimate reality, because that ultimate reality must have the

possibility to even generate what you call an illusion.

__________________

> > It is important to keep the locus in mind when we use an

> > analogy. An analogy is not applicable to everything in the

> > analogy but only to the locus to be explained. The analogy

> > of the snake and the rope is for bringing out the error of

> > superimposition and not for proving the unreality of snake

> > in as much as the unreality of the particular instance of

> > snake is dependent on the reality of the snake in the

> > world. Unless you explain where the unreality of the world

> > comes from in your version of paramarthika sathya, your

> > analogy of snake and the rope is meaningless.

>

> The analogy of the snake and rope is also meant to illustrate the

> concept of mithyatva of falsity. Falsity is that which can be

> eternally negated in its own locus, just as the snake in the rope

> does not really exist in the past, present or the future.

 

 

This I agree. But you shouldn't miss out the reality of the snake

that is an object and which object is here eternally negated in the

locus.

__________________

> The negation of the snake(world) is nothing but the

> rope(brahman). The vyavahArika satya (snake) was, is and

> never will be there in brahman (rope). And the paramArthika

> satya, which is synonymous with brahman (rope), is the

> negation of the world(snake). The world is non-existent

> in brahman just as the "snake in the rope" is non-existent.

 

 

This is begging the question again. You are merely repeating the way

in which you interpret the analogy, but are not providing any

arguments to support your interpretation. You need to reply to those

points to justify how an illusion having the appearance of a thing

may arise when such a thing is itself non-existence. An illusion of A

THING can only be an illusion by virtue of it not being THAT THING -

it necessitates that the denied thing itself be existent apriori.

_________________

 

 

Kalyanji, I will be very occupied this month, so you may have to bear

with me if I take more time to respond to your mails.

 

 

With regards,

Chittaranjan

[Guest guest]

Namaste SrI Chittaranjan-ji,

 

> Kalyanji, I will be very occupied this month, so you may have to

>bear

> with me if I take more time to respond to your mails.

 

 

Your reply was so huge that it will take some time for me to go

through it. So please expect a delay from my side too. And since I

too am quite busy, I will respond to it part by part. Thanks and

sorry for the inconvenience.

 

 

Regards

Raghavendra