Advaita and adhyasa - 2

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Namaste SrI Chittaranjan-ji,

 

In continuation of our discussion, I am posting whenever I find time.

 

> Why? Why does the

> Acharya specifically state in the Bhashya that dream experience is

> not the same as waking experience even after writing a commentary

on

> the Karika? Why does the Acharya state that objects cannot be

> considered as mere appearance? If you think it is only to make a

> concession to vyavaharika "sathya", then please read the Bhashya

> again. The Acharya specifically demolishes the doctrine that

objects

> arise only from impressions within consciousness and he provides

> arguments that such impressions cannot arise without there being

> objects. If we are to interpret the Brahma Sutra Bhashya, then

these

> are questions which we need to deeply ponder over.

 

 

I think Sir, you need to be more careful while discussing with more

than one person. The position that objects are mere appearances was

taken by SrI Benjamin and not by me.

 

> It is true that in one sense Advaita says the world is illusion.

But

> it also says that the world is Brahman. There is a pivotal point in

> Sadhana when you look one way and say that the world is illusion,

and

> you look the other way and say that it is real.

 

 

This point was replied in the previous mail.

 

> I have no right to

> object to anyone who takes the path that says the world is illusion

> because it is a legitimate path of Advaita. But interpreting the

> Prasthana Traya is a different matter than describing about a path.

> It is the outlining of the Reality as envisioned in the Vedas. One

> must be careful to follow the Vedanga of Nyaya in interpreting the

> Vedas.

 

 

Are you talking of the nyAya school here? That may lead us into

problems. So, please clarify.

 

>There is a difference between the scenery that unfolds around

> a sadhaka on a particular path, and the vision of Reality that

admits

> of all the paths. The Brahma Sutras are a chart of that Reality

which

> enfolds all paths.

 

 

I did not understand what you meant by all paths here.

 

> > And the negation of the world etc. is synonymous with

> > brahman, just as the computer infront of me is also the

> > negation of a television or a cow etc.

>

>

> No, the negation of the world is not synonymous with Brahman,

> otherwise the nihilist would be a Vedantin.

 

 

How would it make the nihilist a vedAntin? The nihilist's negation is

synonymous to absolute nothing. Negation is of many kinds.

 

> You are able to negate the television because there is a real thing

> in this world called telivision. Without the reality of the

> television, you wouldn't even feel the necessity of negating it.

 

 

No problem. The computer infront of me is not a hare's horn.

 

> Dear Kalyanji, I grant you all this. :-) I would only add that

> vyavaharika "sathya" is that same paramarthika sathya as it filters

> to us through the taint of asathya. :-)

 

So, you are accepting that they are not absolutely the same.

 

 

> I worship both Shiva and Krishna. I am doing that because I feel

like

> doing that - it brings me into a more intimate Reality. I need to

do

> that because it makes my ego take its proper place in the scheme of

> Reality. I need chitta-suddhi so that the dirt of my mind doesn't

> colour the truth. You are welcome to ask me these questions, but if

> you are trying to tell me that Ishwara is a product of avidya, I

> don't agree with you. Ishwara is real. It is vyavaharika sathya

that

> says that Ishwara is unreal. :-)

 

 

If that is your personal opinion, I have no problem. But, that is not

the opinion of advaita as I know it or understand it. There would be

far too many problems to advaita, if you consider Ishwara as real.

 

 

> Please tell me where I implied that, and which are my statements

that

> made you think I did.

 

You wrote that only statements so and so are meaningful etc. Please

refer to your own first post before my first reply.

 

> But you did it in a way that contradicts statement # 3.

 

How so?

 

> > The unreality of everything(including dream and waking states) =

> > negation of everything = brahman. If brahman is limited, then

> > advaita is limited!

>

>

> 1) You are begging the question.

>

> 2) Your equation is the equation of nihilism because it is saying

> that Brahman = negation of everything = null (nihilum).

 

 

Far from that. The negation of a television can be either this

computer or "nothing". Negation is of many kinds. You are limiting

yourself to one particualr type of negation.

 

> 3) If Brahman is unlimited, one shouldn't have to negate anything

>to

> get to it, unless such negation is a negation of the limitedness

>that

> the mind conceives of in trying to grasp it.

 

 

Well, are you really contradicting me here?

 

 

> > And I did not disagree with you on that matter. But from whence

did

> > waking and dream states start having the same reality?

>

>

> If Raghavendra Kalyanji can say that both dream and waking states

>are

> unreal by ignoring statement # 3, why can't Chittaranjan Naik say

> that they are both real by holding on to statement # 3 and

resolving

> statement # 2?

 

 

It is one thing to say that I have ignored something. (By the way can

you please tell me how I ignored something?) As for your statement of

granting equal reality to dream and waking states, it does not need

any logic to be disproved. We all know and experience that dream is

not as real as waking state. That too since you hold waking state

objects to be not created by consciousness and it is already known

that the mind itself creates dream objects, it is more illogical on

your part to grant them the same level of reality. I sincerely hope

that this discussion wont turn into vitanDa.

 

> Maya is reality. I've already quoted Shri Ramana Maharshi on this.

 

With all due respect to SrI Ramana Maharshi, I cannot accept his

statement as an authority.

 

> Please note that Shri Shankaracharya says that Maya is both real

>and

> unreal.

 

The reality is also qualified by the unreality.

 

>Where is the pivotal point whereby one can turn around from

> the unreal world to the real world? Why do you hold on to only the

> unreal?

 

 

There is a very good reason why mAyA is treated as sadAsad

anirvachanIyam. It "seems" real as long as it is perceived. It "is"

unreal after it is sublated. Moreover, after sublation, it is known

that it "was" unreal even before sublation. (snake and rope) Thus,

mAyA "is" indeed unreal. It can be eternally negated.

 

> > brahman is the material cause of the world, in exactly the same

> > way as the real rope is the material cause of the snake.

> When you use the word "exactly" please make sure that you abide by

> exactness. The snake is not there is the rope, but there is in the

> world something called a snake.

 

Let there be something called a snake. But the analogy is not meant

to show the reality of snakes in the world. It is meant to show the

unreality of the snake in a rope.

 

>Now, when you say that the world is

> not there in Brahman in exactly the same way, please tell me where

> exactly the world is (in the same manner as one would say that the

> snake is in this world).

 

First, I think you must not associate this question with the analogy

of snake-rope, because the analogy has a different purpose.

 

To come to your question, I dont know where the world is, but I do

know that it is not there in brahman. For if it were really there in

brahman, then brahman would be no longer what the Sruti say brahman

is. I know you are not satisfied with the reply. You still want to

know where the world is. In that case, you can think that the world

really exists. No objection from my side, but I dont think that would

be advaita. I have one more thing to say. Advaitins are not

logicians. They are not bothered about the nature of avidya.

 

> > Take away the rope and there is no snake!

>

>

> Even if you don't take away the rope there is no snake! You are

> talking of the snake in the rope, remember?

 

Definitely, but my point was intended to illustrate how brahman in

the material cause of the world and not why the world is unreal.

>

> > That does not mean that the snake(world) in the rope(brahman)

> > has an existence.

>

>

> But it does mean that snake has an existence that is not

instantiated

> in the rope.

 

Let it be. But that is not the point of the analogy. This is the last

time I am going to repeat that.

 

> > > Also in the mistaken perception of the snake in the rope,

> > > where does the snake come from?

> >

> > The snake in the rope is neither there nor will ever be

> > there in the rope. The "snake" itself comes from

> > remembrance probably.

>

>

> Remembrance of what? If this is what Advaita is about, it has

painted

> itself into a corner. And secondly, Sir, this "probably" will not

do

> for an answer. This is the crux of the problem and you can't slip

> away by saying "probably". Have you read the Acharya's Bhashya? It

is

> clearly stated therein that the impressions of memory cannot be

there

> without objects.

 

 

I am sorry if my statement was misleading. I meant, the

superimposition which gave rise to the superimposed snake is due to

remembrance.

> > From the class called snakes.

>

>

> Great! Please tell me where the Acharya uses the concept of

>classes.

 

 

He doesn't use because he dosn't need to use. If there is no class

of "snakes" at all in the world at any point of time, then the

word "snake", as we use it will have no meaning. I presume that is

common sense.

 

> Shall we now move from the theory of classes to the domain of tarka

> shastra or nyaya shastra which the Acharya uses? A class is a set

>of

> similar entities, but that samanya by which each entity becomes

> similar in respect of which it is grouped into a class comes from

> jati. You would therefore need to take recourse to the meaning of

> samanya to arrive at the jati that makes entities into a common set

> of a class. In nyaya, a word points to both the universal and the

> particular, but in Advaita a word points to the universal only.

 

 

Thanks for all this, but I dont see how this is relevant to the point.

Btw, class is an english word. It is not that all advaitins share the

same opinion on these issues. SrI Harsha is a good example of an

exception. I dont know if the AchArya himself spent time on these

issues.

 

> Again, what a word points to is an object - it is that which is the

> object of the directedness of the word. In Advaita there is no

> difference between the meaning of a word and the object of a word.

> What all this means is that the meaning of the snake comes from the

> object snake.

 

 

Let it be. But I dont see where all this is leading to. For a class

itself has no meaning without objects to fill the class. But a

serious argument should have more purpose than to determine if the

meaning of a word comes from this or that. And by accepting the

existence of the class of snakes in this world, the acceptance of the

object snake is already implied. Probably that's the reason why

logicians are eternally in argument with everyone. The point that we

need to ponder over is this - How is all this relevant to advaita?

 

 

Regards

Raghavendra