was: Ramana; now realism

[Guest guest]

On 3/15/04 01:52 am "Chittaranjan Naik" (chittaranjan_naik) wrote:

 

So are objects. I think we should leave them alone too. In the logic

of Nyaya and Mimamsa, shapes and colours are objects

 

===Good point! Just because Benjamin doesn't believe they exist apart from

consciousness doesn't mean they have escaped object-hood. For Benjamin, they

are at least objects of reference.

 

And Benjaminji is a bit of a realist about colors, the way he speaks of the

contents of a stream-of-consciousness. He asks why the contents (colors, etc.)

in *Greg's* stream aren't available to be seen by Ben. The multi-observer

criterion is a hallmark of realism. The ability of X to be seen by two

observers is realism about X. It's also realism about the observers. Even if

the observers are "streams of consciousness," then this entails realism about

streams of consciousness.

 

It seems to me that the stream-of-consciousness model, if not sublatable, is not

a fruitful avenue for investigation into This.

 

On the other hand, Consciousness -- as awareness, as Brahman -- is not the kind

of thing one can be a metaphysical or epistemological realist about. It is not

the kind of thing about which existence claims make any sense. If one must use

the "e" word at all, then consciousness is Existence itself.

 

--Greg

[Guest guest]

Namaste Gregji,

 

I agree with you that the streams of consciousness model is not a

fruitful avenue for investigation into reality. The water is too

turbid in the stream. The stream of consciousness is a magic weave. I

believe it needs a lot of unweaving to reach the source where the

weaver is weaving.

> "If one must use the "e" word at all, then consciousness

> is Existence itself".

 

Yes Gregji, it is said that Sat (existence) and Chit (consciousness)

are its essence.

 

Regards,

Chittaranjan

 

 

advaitin, Gregory Goode <goode@D...> wrote:

> On 3/15/04 01:52 am "Chittaranjan Naik" (chittaranjan_naik)

wrote:

>

> So are objects. I think we should leave them alone too. In the

logic

> of Nyaya and Mimamsa, shapes and colours are objects

>

> ===Good point! Just because Benjamin doesn't believe they exist

apart from consciousness doesn't mean they have escaped object-hood.

For Benjamin, they are at least objects of reference.

>

> And Benjaminji is a bit of a realist about colors, the way he

speaks of the contents of a stream-of-consciousness. He asks why the

contents (colors, etc.) in *Greg's* stream aren't available to be

seen by Ben. The multi-observer criterion is a hallmark of realism.

The ability of X to be seen by two observers is realism about X.

It's also realism about the observers. Even if the observers

are "streams of consciousness," then this entails realism about

streams of consciousness.

>

> It seems to me that the stream-of-consciousness model, if not

sublatable, is not a fruitful avenue for investigation into This.

>

> On the other hand, Consciousness -- as awareness, as Brahman -- is

not the kind of thing one can be a metaphysical or epistemological

realist about. It is not the kind of thing about which existence

claims make any sense. If one must use the "e" word at all, then

consciousness is Existence itself.

>

> --Greg