Guest guest Posted March 21, 2004 Report Share Posted March 21, 2004 Hello All, I've appended this section though previously posted to make section II more intelligible. A short speculative note on the thinking behind the preamble to the B.S.B. Superimposition has not come into the picture yet as a transcendental postulate. ******************************************************* **** I How do constraints ensure a creative solution? In poetry we artificially adopt a set of rules called prosody which give structure and by blocking the normal avenues of cliche or the first thing or the most direct thing that comes into your head, novelty is ensured. Western philosophy has taken methodic doubt to heart and we have come to imagine that unless we lay waste to all previous systems and assumptions our chances of avoiding their taint is minimal. Sankara does not do this. He takes it that there are subjects and objects. This is a non-negotiable assumption. How could it be otherwise when the Vedas which are of non-human origin exist as an object. The wisdom mediated by the sages must be included in or act as the objective guarantee of truth. When the oddness of how the object comes to be 'in' the subject strikes him (Sankara) he does not divert into the idealist stream. This apparent paradox must be resolved without, as it were, drawing everything into the subject. The question may be put in various ways: A: How is the object which is other than the subject (constraint) known when its otherness is not simply collapsed into the subject in the idealist way? B: If all knowledge is really self-knowledge then how operating under that constraint can we still know the object as it really is, objectively, as it is said? Put at its broadest - there is an object and it is known and is not reducible to my knowledge of it! The puzzle of how an object is 'in' the subject is a core issue which we first have to feel before we can even think about it. This should be the subject of another note. II How is an object in the subject? How does this 'inness' refer to an object. The term used by the medieval logicians was intentionality which is defined by the S.O.D. as ' the action of straining or directing the mind or attention towards something'. It comes by metaphor from the Latin 'intendere arcum in' which means to aim a bow and arrow at something (E.Anscombe) Plato speaks of belief (doxa) being etymylogically cognate with toxa, a bow, in the sense that it is aimed at something. In a way this 'aiming' can itself become an object. By way of analogy let us imagine Zig and Zag from the planet Zog. They watch a man making a telephone call and to them it is obvious that he is talking to a piece of moulded plastic. If you were to say 'No, he is talking to another person' they might say 'That's nonsense, we can see for ourselves that he's talking to a piece of plastic'. Of course these 'intentional objects' or 'handsets' can become fascinating in their own right as part of the realm of second intentions. Logic was said by Avicenna (Ibn Cenna) to treat of second intentions applied to first. Because the 'aiming' is usually an 'aiming-hitting' in one smooth operation, we must ask ourselves what is the structure that supports both hits and misses? I am focussing on perception here to avoid getting caught up in the many anomalies and paradoxes that intentionality generates such as imaginary objects, fictions, the false, illusions: following the general principle that hard cases make bad law and that by sorting out the central instances a general picture will emerge by which it is hoped the sports (lusus naturae) will be better understood. Advaita's treatment of intentionality is well known by the list but it is curious how close the thinking of Aristotle is. On the Soul Bk.II.12: By a 'sense' is meant what has the power of recieving into itself the sensible form of things without the matter Bk.III.4: The thinking part of the soul must therefore be, while impassible, capable of receiving the form of an object; this is, must be potentially identical in character with its object without being the object. Mind must be related to what is thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible. Bk.III.8: Let us now summarize our results about soul, and repeat that the soul is in a way all existing things; for existing things are either sensible or thinkable and knowledge is in a way what is knowable, and sensation is in a way what is sensible: in what way we must inquire. In Advaita also, mind connects in perception by being that which it perceives and it adds to the intuition of Aristotle the concept of upadhi (limiting adjunct). "Thus in cases of perception such as, "This jar," the jar etc. and the mental state in the form of those combine in the same space outside the body, and hence the Consciousness limited by both is one and the same,..."(V.P. Perception pg.15) To say that all this is itself within consciousness is to ignore the upadhi theory and can't really be a true reading of Advaita. The externality of the object in perception is maintained through the unity of being. Whether there be qualia may well be a 'my red your red herring'. Best Wishes, Michael. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted March 21, 2004 Report Share Posted March 21, 2004 Namaste Michaelji, Good analysis. I feel myself in resonance with most of what you say here. Only a few comments.... An object is the "object" or goal of the directedness of the intentionality of consciousness. While the object is subsumed in the synthetical unity of consciousness, it is in a way "independent" of the intentionality because it is (an effect that is) pre-existent in the causal substratum and is hence prior to the intending "act". In perception the mind takes the form of the object that pre-exists prior to the perceptual act and thus becomes "identical in character with its object without being the object". All (valid) perceptual intentions are second intentions (like Avicenna's logic) applied to the first underlying intention wherein "the universe has already been created", thus generating perception of "real" and not "imaginary" objects. The Greek "aporia" or the Sanskrit "viparya" is that character of intentionality whereby it miss the "actual" object resulting in an error of cognition. This entire argument still remains idealistic and solipsistic. Advaita recognises the primary intentional "act" of "creation" that underlies all individual perceptions in as much as it attributes vikshepa shakti to Ishwara alone whereby the personae of individuated beings and the world are "created". Regards, Chittaranjan advaitin, ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva@e...> wrote: > Hello All, > I've appended this section though previously > posted to make section II more intelligible. > A short speculative note on the thinking > behind the preamble to the B.S.B. Superimposition has > not come into the picture yet as a transcendental > postulate. > ******************************************************* > **** > > I > > How do constraints ensure a creative solution? In > poetry we artificially adopt a set of rules called > prosody which give structure and by blocking the > normal avenues of cliche or the first thing or the > most direct thing that comes into your head, novelty > is ensured. > > Western philosophy has taken methodic doubt to heart > and we have come to imagine that unless we lay waste > to all previous systems and assumptions our chances of > avoiding their taint is minimal. > > Sankara does not do this. He takes it that there are > subjects and objects. This is a non-negotiable > assumption. How could it be otherwise when the Vedas > which are of non-human origin exist as an object. The > wisdom mediated by the sages must be included in or > act as the objective guarantee of truth. > > When the oddness of how the object comes to be 'in' the > subject strikes him (Sankara) he does not divert into > the idealist stream. This apparent paradox must be > resolved without, as it were, drawing everything into > the subject. > > The question may be put in various ways: > A: How is the object which is other than the subject > (constraint) known when its otherness is not simply > collapsed into the subject in the idealist way? > > B: If all knowledge is really self-knowledge then how > operating under that constraint can we still know the > object as it really is, objectively, as it is said? > > Put at its broadest - there is an object and it is > known and is not reducible to my knowledge of it! The > puzzle of how an object is 'in' the subject is a core > issue which we first have to feel before we can even > think about it. This should be the subject of another > note. > > II > > How is an object in the subject? How does this > 'inness' refer to an object. The term used by the > medieval logicians was intentionality which is defined > by the S.O.D. as ' the action of straining or > directing the mind or attention towards something'. > It comes by metaphor from the Latin 'intendere arcum > in' which means to aim a bow and arrow at something > (E.Anscombe) Plato speaks of belief (doxa) being > etymylogically cognate with toxa, a bow, in the sense > that it is aimed at something. > > In a way this 'aiming' can itself become an object. By > way of analogy let us imagine Zig and Zag from the > planet Zog. They watch a man making a telephone call > and to them it is obvious that he is talking to a > piece of moulded plastic. If you were to say 'No, he > is talking to another person' they might say 'That's > nonsense, we can see for ourselves that he's talking > to a piece of plastic'. > > Of course these 'intentional objects' or 'handsets' can > become fascinating in their own right as part of the > realm of second intentions. Logic was said by > Avicenna (Ibn Cenna) to treat of second intentions > applied to first. > > Because the 'aiming' is usually an 'aiming-hitting' in > one smooth operation, we must ask ourselves what is > the structure that supports both hits and misses? I > am focussing on perception here to avoid getting > caught up in the many anomalies and paradoxes that > intentionality generates such as imaginary objects, > fictions, the false, illusions: following the general > principle that hard cases make bad law and that by > sorting out the central instances a general picture > will emerge by which it is hoped the sports (lusus > naturae) will be better understood. > > Advaita's treatment of intentionality is well known by > the list but it is curious how close the thinking of > Aristotle is. On the Soul Bk.II.12: By a 'sense' is > meant what has the power of recieving into itself the > sensible form of things without the matter > Bk.III.4: The thinking part of the soul must therefore > be, while impassible, capable of receiving the form of > an object; this is, must be potentially identical in > character with its object without being the object. > Mind must be related to what is thinkable, as sense is > to what is sensible. > Bk.III.8: Let us now summarize our results about soul, > and repeat that the soul is in a way all existing > things; for existing things are either sensible or > thinkable and knowledge is in a way what is knowable, > and sensation is in a way what is sensible: in what > way we must inquire. > > In Advaita also, mind connects in perception by being > that which it perceives and it adds to the intuition > of Aristotle the concept of upadhi (limiting adjunct). > > "Thus in cases of perception such as, "This jar," the > jar etc. and the mental state in the form of those > combine in the same space outside the body, and hence > the Consciousness limited by both is one and the > same,..."(V.P. Perception pg.15) > > To say that all this is itself within consciousness is > to ignore the upadhi theory and can't really be a true > reading of Advaita. The externality of the object in > perception is maintained through the unity of being. > Whether there be qualia may well be a 'my red your red > herring'. > > Best Wishes, Michael. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted March 21, 2004 Report Share Posted March 21, 2004 - "Chittaranjan Naik" <chittaranjan_naik > > This entire argument still remains idealistic and solipsistic. > Advaita recognises the primary intentional "act" of "creation" that > underlies all individual perceptions in as much as it attributes > vikshepa shakti to Ishwara alone whereby the personae of individuated > beings and the world are "created". > > Regards, > Chittaranjan Creation presupposes the existence of Subject, Object and the act of perception. Ignorance is the cause for the Creation(of empirical experience) itself. Tying of Ishvara with creation is a concept used in sRshTi-dRshTi-vAda, which is more of a compromise to appease the beginner. But an advaitin has to pay a heavy price while resorting to this compromise. This will necessitate some additional concepts to be introduced, which requires yet another set of new concepts, ultimately leading to a classical example of Godel's theorem. Its a selected topic for discussion this year, if I remember correctly. We will see more of this then. It is always better to confine Ishwara for prescribed meditation (upAsana). Hari Om Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted March 22, 2004 Report Share Posted March 22, 2004 Namaste Ranjeetji, > Creation presupposes the existence of Subject, Object and the act > of perception. But that would lead to a circularity because there can't be objects without creation. The egg and the chicken story... > Ignorance is the cause for the Creation (of empirical > experience) itself. Cause in the sense of material and efficient cause belongs to Ishwara alone - even in Advaita. The first section of Brahman Sutra Bhashya says this. > Tying of Ishvara with creation is a concept used in > sRshTi-dRshTi-vAda, which is more of a compromise to > appease the beginner. I don't think it is a mere compromise. > But an advaitin has to pay a heavy price while resorting to > this compromise. It is not a compromise, but a statement of the Shruti. > This will necessitate some additional concepts to be introduced, > which requires yet another set of new concepts, ultimately leading > to a classical example of Godel's theorem. No problem, if that is necessary. In fact Godel's theorem fits nicely into Advaita. > Its a selected topic for discussion this year, if I remember > correctly. We will see more of this then. Okay. > It is always better to confine Ishwara for prescribed > meditation (upAsana). I agree that Ishwara is prescribed for meditation, but I don't agree that Ishwara is merely a provisional concept for meditation. Regards, Chittaranjan Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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