Idealism and realism

[Guest guest]

Namaste Anandaji, Michaelji, Gregji,

 

While being in agreement essentially with Anandaji's words, I am here

venturing to provide some further thoughts on the question of what an

object is.

 

advaitin, Ananda Wood <awood@v...> wrote:

> I'd agree that idealism can only be stated by de-constructing a

> preconceived world that has already been conceived as constructed

> from objects. But does this mean that the preconception is correct

> and that the constructed world is truly pre-existent?

 

There are two intertwined and inter-related questions here - one

related to the conception of the object, and the other related to the

existence of the object. The first enquires: "What is an object?" and

the second enquires: "Does the object exist?"

 

Now some words on what an object is. An object that is deconstructed

is not the object that the question "What is an object?" asked about.

For now, after the deconstruction has taken place, the object that

was questioned has been reified by the process of answering the

question. The object that returns from idealistic deconstruction is a

mere idea or impression - an "object" with a certain vacuuity in

itself - whilst the object that was questioned has now been hidden

and masked by the deconstructing act of intellect. Such is the matrix

of maya whereby the object that stands as an object to the questioner

is always self-referencing to the mental mode of the questioner

himself. Therefore, if the object must be known - the pure unsullied

object that is the object denoted by the word - then the mental mode

must be free of the unrest and perturbation of questioning and

answering when it perceives the object. And this brings us to the

paradox involved in the questioning.

 

We already know objects when we perceive them - otherwise we can't

ask about them, for we can't ask about what we don't know. Yet,

somehow, we don't know them - and therefore we ask questions about

them. We know and yet we know not! This is essentially the same age-

old paradox that Meno confronts Socrates with. It is also the

question that the purva-paksha confronts Shankara with in the Brahma

Sutra Bhashya. This being the situation, what is the way to get to

the true nature of objects? Science looks for answers outside –

because it believes that knowledge is extraneously acquired - and it

builds a predictive formalism that does not touch upon the essential

nature of the object at all. But true philosophy looks within, and

seeks to dispossess the already extraneous colourings that the mind

has given to objects. The stamp of an object's truth as an object is

its remaining true to its word or name. Thus, a material object is

matter; but that does not mean that it is independent of

consciousness. What an object is, must return us back to itself - and

must include its materiality in so far as the cognition of its

materiality is constituted in the cognition - through a cleansing of

the cognising instruments.

 

There is in this regard the way of Astanga Yoga. An object is the

obverse side of its corresponding vritti. It is in the purity of the

vritti that the object can be known. It can be known after one has

crossed the stage of pranayama which, I believe, corresponds to the

stage of recognition that the world has consciousness or Life as it

substratum. When the mind has learnt to withdraw from objects through

pratyahara, and has then learnt to go out again in a pure stream of

dharana to take on the form of the object, then it is that the object

is known. Such pure knowledge of objects is also called the knowledge

of padharthas (logos or word-objects). It is what Nyaya Darshana is

about. It is the knowledge of the ancient, unborn and eternal logos.

 

As regards the second question - relating to the existence of

objects - I shall here abstain from indulging upon that topic in

order to maintain my peace of mind. :-)

 

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan

[Guest guest]

Michael wrote: "As someone persuaded of the validity of realism I see

idealism as something that can only be stated on the basis of a

pre-existent world which is then de-constructed."

 

I'd agree that idealism can only be stated by de-constructing a

preconceived world that has already been conceived as constructed from

objects. But does this mean that the preconception is correct and that

the constructed world is truly pre-existent? In fact, precisely what

idealism does is to question whether and how this preconceived world

is real.

 

Namaste Anandaji,

I'm quite happy with honest disagreement on the basis of stated

positions. What

I wrote was 'pre-existent' which is different from 'pre-conceived'. A

preconception is

obviously not a direct and immediate intuition which would be the touchstone of

what is called

realism. Your analysis then of the notion of pre-conception does not address

my point at all

and I fear that you are expending great ingenuity in refuting a point that

wasn't made by me.

 

It is an idiosyncratic view that by starting out with realism, or error in your

opinion, you

can end up with truth or idealism.

 

You say: "And what's thereby shown is that the preconception is mistaken. Or,

in

other words, the objective world as preconceived is unreal. This is

not to deny any true existence or true reality, but only to question

our materialistic preconceptions of it. Thus, through such

questioning, idealism leads eventually to a more profound realism that

is quite independent of both world and mind. For, when matter is

completely removed from mind, what remains is just pure consciousness,

where there is no duality between knower and known.

 

Sankara is very insistent on coherence in his critique of the positions of

others. He

certainly would have held that there was a fundamental difference between

idealism and his

thought, which I have argued for, is a type of ontological realism. If you

think one merges

into the other i.e. realism into idealism then you ought to proffer some

arguments or in some

way show that Sankara follows that line.

 

Best Wishes, Michael.