Time and Space

[Guest guest]

Namaste Gregji and Harshaji,

 

 

Benji:

 

However, you, a professional philosopher, are using the vague word

'idealism' without any kind of definition, not even a few words.

Naughty! Naughty! :-)

 

 

Gregji (citing Garth Kemerling):

 

Idealism: Belief that only mental entities are real, so that physical

things exist only in the sense that they are perceived...

 

 

Benji:

 

I'm SO surprised to see a response! :-)

 

Well, as you might anticipate, I think you are misusing the word 'real'.

 

(1) When materialists or 'realists' say that the external world is

'real' or 'exists', they mean 'exists independently of

consciousness'. If our consciousness were to disappear, the world

would still be there. We both agree this is false.

 

(2) When a true idealist like me says that only perceptions are

'real', he does not mean it in this objective sense. (I realize that

some so-called idealists are a bit confused about this.) The

apparent 'objects' of consciousness, such as perceptions, thoughts

and feelings, are in no way to be distinguished from consciousness

itself. They only appear that way, like the objects in dreams. They

are 'real' only to the same degree and in the same way that

consciousness itself is. Upon awakening, we realize that there was

only the consciousness. Likewise for the objects of the waking

state. It is all nothing but 'consciousness'.

 

Now if you have a problem with calling consciousness 'real', then you

have a problem with the Upanishadic characterization of Brahman as

sat (being), chit (consciousness) and ananda (bliss). Brahman IS

'reality' or 'being', which is synonymous with consciousness, or

bliss for that matter. It is in this sense that I say that

consciousness and its illusory objects (e.g. perceptions) are 'real'.

They are unreal when interpreted by the mind as entities existing in

their own right, but they are real as manifestations of (or in) the

'substratum' of consciousness. (Even the word 'substratum' is a bit

deceiving, insofar as it suggests a layer 'under' the illusory

objects, and so in some sense distinct from them.)

 

Ultimately, my definition of consciousness is operational: just be

aware without thinking. That immediacy is 'consciousness', which can

include the thoughts, perceptions and feelings, though without any

conceptual interpretation as to their 'distinctness'. That

conceptual interpretation would be the 'superposition' of snake on

rope that Advaita speaks of. I do NOT mean 'real' in THAT sense.

 

I know that your experience of nonduality is like this too. The only

problem is that you persist in thinking that I am using the ambiguous

word 'real' in a sense contrary to my true intention. I know you

work in a law firm, but this twisting of my words must stop!!! :-)

 

 

Harshaji:

>The analysis of sleep states is part of the classical advaita

>vedanta methodology and not original with Sri Atmananda.

 

This is true, but Atmanada seems to particularly emphasize it.

Anyhow, I'm glad to see you read here regularly, even if you do not

post often. I sometimes wonder how many silent readers we have here.

 

Hari Om!

Benjamin

[Guest guest]

At 07:14 PM 5/28/2004 -0400, Benjamin wrote:

>Hi Greg,

>

>===Our agreement that the words "real" and "idealism" are ambiguous

>is I think quite good enough. We can cordially agree to disagree on

>lots of other stuff! We don't want none of that stuff here like "my

>idealism is more REAL than yours." "Your realism is more idealistic

>than mine."

>

>

>Real in what sense? That's the point.

 

 

Ha!

[Guest guest]

Namaste Harshaji.

 

So also is the analysis of time (past, present and future) leading to

the conclusion that there is only an 'ever-present present'

(Benji's 'eternal now'). I am sure Atmanandaji has picked it from

traditional thoughts. When enough material is available right in the

traditional and the teachings of Bh. Ramana Maharshi et al, I don't

quite understand why we are splitting hairs on inconclusive idealism.

 

(Ramji, please let this see the light. This is not spam.)

 

PraNAms.

 

Madathil Nair

___________________

 

advaitin, "Harsha"

wrote...................

>

> The analysis of sleep states is part of the classical advaita

vedanta

> methodology and not original with Sri Atmananda.

[Guest guest]

Hello Greg, Benjamin and Dennis,

In the B.S.B.II.ii.13

Shankara rebuts the Vaisesika theory of inherence

using the vicious regress argument against them. It

is a complex argument however in its essentials it is

stated by S. "If now it be said that conjunction is

different (from the thing conjoined), so that it has

to be related through another relationship, then

inherence also must need some other relationship,

since it too is different (from the things

inhering)."

 

Aristotle in Categories 7 outlined the fallacy of

treating a relation as a substance and the students

of philosophy may recall Gilbert Ryle's category

errors (Concept of Mind).

 

Bradley appears to be equivocal about relations or

perhaps it is that he is merely pointing out the

contradictions which are implicit in our normal

understanding. Perhaps others would deny his

characterisation of the latter and convict him of

that error. In a discussion of his thought in

'Methods of Metaphysics' Alan R. White writes:

 

"A similar examination aims to prove that space and

time 'have nor belong to reality' by showing that

each contradicts itself. For example; space, on the

one hand, cannot be a mere relation since, unlike a

relation, it is made up of parts which are themselves

spaces. On the other hand, it is nothing but a

relation, namely a collection or relation of spaces

which are themselves relations of spaces ad

infinitum. Again, space must be limited and yet

without a space outside it; and this is a self-

contradiction."pg.76op cit

 

Finally, I consider it whimsical that identity theft

should occur on the Advaitin list,

 

Best Wishes, Michael.

[Guest guest]

Namaste Chittaranjanji.

 

Further to my post 23406 where I wrote:

 

"I am neither qualified nor competent to delve into the shAstrAs.

However, in my meditations, I have felt that all the sensory stimuli

that we deal with have a common source where they exist together

undifferentiated without apparent boundaries. It has more to do with

light. This has resulted in a growing conviction, to put it rather

crudely, that light can be heard, tactility and sound can be seen

etc. etc. Again, we had discussed this topic during our "Light in

Enlightenment" discussion of last September. There is a medical term

for such experience - I forgot it (perhaps Sunderji who brought that

in might remember). Your hunch, therefore, that yogIs and jnAnis

have access to what we cannot understand in the shAstrAs seem very

valid."

 

I believe this link which Kenji has kindly suggested in his Maya

introduction helps:

 

http://www.kamakoti.org/hindudharma/part5/chap7.htm

 

Kindly peruse it. I believe it is Grace flowing in our earnest

endeavour to understand sound for what it really is.

 

PraNAms.

 

Madathil Nair

[Guest guest]

Hi Greg, Benjamin, Michael et al,

 

Still here, but I haven't really got anything further to say about Bradley

etc. I checked the links you gave Greg but the first (major one) appears to

have been taken away - all I get is a blank page with the URL at the top of

it. Incidentally, the book (Appearance and Reality) can be downloaded from

my site - from the page www.advaita.org.uk/western.htm though, as I said, it

is reading only for the very dedicated. The first chapter is sort of ok but

then it's downhill all the way! Looks like you may have tried it Michael and

I suspect that you would be able to follow it since your own writing is on a

par in respect of erudition, density and, I have to say it, difficulty - I'm

afraid I didn't understand your last post at all. Contrary to your possible

assumption, I do not have a PhD in philosophy (or even an 'O' Level)!

 

Best wishes,

 

Dennis

[Guest guest]

I sometimes wonder how many silent readers we have here.

 

Hari Om!

Benjamin

 

Namaste Benjamin,

 

I certainly am one of them; not because silence is golden, but because I am

confused.

 

praNAms,

Venkat-M

 

 

 

 

 

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[Guest guest]

advaitin, Benjamin <orion777ben> wrote:

>

> Actually, Chittaranjanji, I regretted my message to you

> immediately after posting it, because I stated my case too

> strongly. In my mind, I was striving for clarity, but it

> comes across looking a bit aggressive or perhaps even pompous.

> I had noticed this before and resolved to give soft edges to my

> style, while preserving clarity, but I forgot...

 

No, Benjaminji, I did not think that your message was strong or

pompous, it's just that I didn't feel like arguing the point as my

view is not much different than yours even though it may seem to be

quite the contrary when I say that the entire universe is real. It is

all a question of words. When I first came to the path of Advaita, it

was due to an intellectual-intuitive "irruption" in my life not

unlike the Berkelian "vision", but over the years it has "evolved"

into a kind of perspective wherein the world of "names and forms" is

not false, but is "something" within the One Reality of

Consciousness - there is of course nothing "else" in Consciousness,

but there is the "way of words" which is also the "way of seeming",

and this way that the world appears may be spoken of through words

knowingly as being the way of words. It seems to me that speaking

knowingly is an attainment of independence from the possessive hold

of words and that that is a vision of Self as the unchanging,

ummutable, eternal substratum the universe. I don't know if I am

making sense in saying all this....

 

Regards,

Chittaranjan

[Guest guest]

Namaste Gregji,

 

advaitin, Gregory Goode <goode@D...> wrote:

> Dear Benji and Chittaranjanji,

> But Chittaranjanji, I can't really understand what you wrote

> about Berkeley. You aren't saying that he drew a distinction

> between mind and perceiver, are you?

 

Berkeley doesn't seem to make a clear distinction between mind and

perceiver, which I think is rather problematic.

 

> Are you saying that he called objects mind? Can you point to

> any passages on that? He comes closer to calling them ideas,

> which are percieved by the mind. This is the distinction that

> Benji noted above. For Berkeley, ideas cannot exist without the

> mind.

 

Yes, I admit that Berkeley says that objects are ideas rather than

mind. But it seems to me that the difference between mind and ideas

is like the difference between matter and objects. Am I missing some

key element here?

 

Regards,

Chittaranjan

[Guest guest]

At 05:53 PM 6/1/2004 +0000, Chittaranjan Naik wrote:

>Yes, I admit that Berkeley says that objects are ideas rather than

>mind. But it seems to me that the difference between mind and ideas

>is like the difference between matter and objects. Am I missing some

>key element here?

 

===Well, nothing in Berkeley is key for Shankaracharya's advaita-vedanta! But

it might be for some folks, an antidote for the attribution of external

independent solid reality to physical objects. And then on to advaita!

 

But for Berkeley, the relationship between mind and ideas is essential. For he

put great weight on two propositions,

 

 

1. A mind can perceive nothing but an idea.

2. Nothing can be like an idea but another idea.

3. To be is to be perceived.

 

Because of (1), he argued that the mind cannot perceive physical objects.

Because of (2), he argued that ideas cannot resemble physical objects. All

things perceived are ideas. And because of (3), the only things that exist are

ideas.

 

And here's where your point about the mind/ideas comes in, together with

something Benjamin said earlier.

 

Namely, in putting all this weight on the mind and its ideas, Berkeley was

relying on a notion of *mental* substance. And this notion of mental substance

is vulnerable to the same arguments that Berkeley used against physical

substance. Not to mention idea-substance, which he never really discussed in

relation to mental substance. I have a feeling he knew all this, but wasn't

prepared to take his arguments that far, being a bishop and all...

 

Regards,

 

--Greg

[Guest guest]

Ooops, I changed that, make that three propositions!

 

At 02:30 PM 6/1/2004 -0400, Gregory Goode wrote:

>But for Berkeley, the relationship between mind and ideas is essential. For he

put great weight on two propositions,

>

>

>1. A mind can perceive nothing but an idea.

>2. Nothing can be like an idea but another idea.

>3. To be is to be perceived.