The Real and the Unreal - Part I - The Razors Edge (To Dennis-ji)

[Guest guest]

Namaste Dennis-ji,

> I'm not sure that I agree with this. At the time of seeing,

> there was just seeing - no you or tree. What is happening 'now'

> is that there is thinking 'I saw a tree'. As long as it goes

> no further, there is just thinking - no you or thought. But as

> soon as you postulate a 'you' having this thought and

> an 'event' in a 'past', you have crossed over into duality

> and unreality. In reality, 'you' never saw a 'tree' and the

> memory is an illusion.

>

> Best wishes,

> Dennis

 

 

Further to what I wrote in my earlier message, there is this passage

from the BSB (II,II,5,28) which might provide the required

clarification:

 

"Again, in (such forms of awareness as) 'knowledge of a

pot', 'knowledge of a cloth', the difference is seen in the two

qualifying parts, pot and cloth, but not in the substantive part

knowledge, even as in the case of 'a white cow' and 'a black cow' we

find that whiteness and blackness alone differ, but not so the

cowhood. And the difference of the one, viz. cowhood, from the two

(whiteness, blackness) stands out clearly, as also the difference of

the two from the one. Therefore an object and its knowledge differ.

Similar should be the comprehension in the cases of the seeing of a

pot and the remembrance of a pot. Here also the substantive, viz.

seeing and remembering differ, but not so the adjectival portion,

viz. pot; this is just as in the cases of the cognition, 'the smell

of milk', and the 'taste of milk', where the substantives smell and

taste alone differ, but not so the adjectival part milk."

 

When I see a tree, the 'I' and the 'tree' are not mere products of

subsequent abstractions in thought. Experience does not take the form

of a pure stream of undifferentiated consciousness without

distinguishing characteristics. The very fact that subsequent

analysis in thought allows only a particular content to be affirmed

as the 'truth' and not anything else that the mind pleases, is

evidence that the experience is not without specific content.

 

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan