The Real and the Unreal - Part III - The Preamble

[Guest guest]

Om Gurubhyo Namah

 

 

THE TOPIC OF THE PREAMBLE

 

It is generally believed that the adhyasa-bhasha of Shankara's

preamble to the Brahma Sutra Bhashya points to the unreality of the

world. This view has gained such wide currency that it seems almost

sacrilegious to question its authenticity. Yet a careful scrutiny of

the preamble belies such a reading of its pages. The subject matter

of the preamble is the superimposition between the Self and non-Self

as enunciated in the opening words of the bhashya:

 

"It being an established fact that the object and the subject, that

are fit to be the contents of the concepts 'you' and 'we'

(respectively), and are by nature as contradictory as light and

darkness, cannot logically have any identity, it follows that their

attributes can have it still less. Accordingly, the superimposition

of the object, referable through the concept 'you', and its

attributes on the subject that is conscious by nature and is

referable through the concept 'we' (should be impossible), and

contrariwise the superimposition of the subject and its attributes on

the object should be impossible. Nevertheless, owing to an absence of

discrimination between these attributes, as also between substances,

which are absolutely disparate, there continues a natural human

behaviour based on self-identification in the form of 'I am this'

or 'This is mine'. This behaviour has for its material cause an

unreal nescience and man resorts to it by mixing up reality and

unreality as a result of superimposing the things themselves or their

attributes on each other." (BSB, Pre)

 

The preamble goes on to explain the nature of superimposition. It

says that this superimposition is of the nature of avidya and that

the ascertainment of the real entity after separating the

superimposed thing from it is vidya. It points out that all forms of

worldly and Vedic behaviour have as their ground this

superimposition, and that such superimposition is common to both

animals as well as learned people. The preamble ends with the note

that the bhashya is begun in order to eradicate the source of evil

and to facilitate the knowledge of Self. Nowhere in the preamble do

we come across the statement that the world is false. The focus of

the preamble is clearly the superimposition between the Self and non-

Self and NOT the unreality of the world.

 

 

THE NATURE OF SUPERIMPOSITION

 

What is it that is meant by superimposition? The Acharya answers: "It

is an awareness, similar in nature to memory, that arises on a

different basis as a result of some past experience. With regards to

this, some say that it consists in the superimposition of the

attributes of one thing on another. But others assert that wherever a

superimposition on anything occurs, there is in evidence only a

confusion arising from the absence of discrimination between them.

Others say that the superimposition of anything on any other

substratum consists in fancying some opposite attributes on that very

basis. From every point of view, however, there is no difference as

regards the appearance of one thing as something else". (BSB, Pre).

 

Yes, superimposition is only the appearance of one thing as another.

It is in the context of this mistaking of one thing as another that

unreality arises - as a thing being unreal in posing (or appearing)

as another thing. In other words, it is unreal because the real thing

does not exist (at that place and time) in the locus where the object

is cognised. The assertion of unreality ascribed to the thing – and

it may be noted that it is to a 'thing' that unreality is ascribed -

is not a statement of the absolute non-existence of the thing, but a

denial of a real thing of the world as being existent in a locus

where it is in actuality not existing. Thus, in the superimposition

of the non-Self on the Self, the non-Self is said to be unreal as the

Self, but it cannot, logically, be said to be absolutely non-

existent. It is important to make this distinction.

 

 

ERROR AND SUPERIMPOSITION

 

In speaking about superimposition, Shankara mentions the theories of

error held by the other schools. I believe that it would be useful,

in order to gain a proper understanding of Advaita, to examine these

theories together with Advaita's response to them.

 

ANYATHAKHYATI is the Nyaya-Vaisesika theory of error. In this theory,

the error occurs when there is an awareness of 'this', but due to

either a defect of environment or instrument of cognition, and the

similarity between the 'this' (rope) and the snake calls up the snake

existing elsewhere through an extra-normal-sense-relation. This extra-

normal-sense-relation is anyathatva, or otherwiseness, of the

erroneous cognition. Both the rope and the snake are real, but the

relation between the subject 'this' and the predicate 'that' in the

cognition 'this is that' is false. According to Advaita, this theory

is untenable because the perception of the snake (in the erroneous

cognition) should then have the characteristic that snake is there

(elsewhere, say in a forest).

 

AKHYATI is the theory of error held by Mimamsa according to which all

knowledge is valid. There is no such thing as erroneous knowledge,

for a contrary supposition will paralyse human action by raising

doubt at every stage. In an erroneous cognition, we have two

cognitions, one being of the nature of direct perception, and the

other of the nature of memory, and fail to cognise the difference

between the two. The two cognitions of 'this' and 'snake' synchronise

without an apprehension of their difference. The memory, although

essentially an apprehension of a previously apprehended object,

presents itself as bare apprehension and the element of reference to

the previous cognition is lost through some defect. Advaita rejects

this theory because memory is never without a reference to place and

time even if such a reference is vague (as carrying the vague notion

of having seen it in some place and time). (Yet I feel that

Shankara's explanation on superimposition has a remarkable kinship to

the Mimamsa theory except for the fact that here the erroneous

cognition is due to 'an awareness similar to memory' rather than due

to memory itself.)

 

SATKHYATI is the Vishistadvaita theory of error. The Vishistadvaitins

hold that all objects of cognition are real, and that it is

inconceivable that there should be cognition without a real cognitum.

According to them everything exists in everything else through the

process of quintuplication (see Sri Shankara's 'Pancikaranam' for

more details on quintuplication) and the snake is as real as the

rope. Advaitins reject this theory because it does not explain why

only a snake should be seen in the rope rather than a cow or an

elephant (as everything exists in everything else).

 

SADASATKHYATI, the Samkhya-Yoga theory of error is based on

viparyaya, or false knowledge of a thing that does not correspond to

its real form. The snake though real elsewhere is unreal when it is

comprehended in this rope. At the transcendental level all things are

real and are not contradicted in respect of their very nature. (I am

not sure if and how Advaita rejects this theory).

 

It is to be noted that in all these theories, the unreality of the

object seen in the error is parasitic upon the reality of the object

in the world. In the instance of error when the false object appears

real, that appearance of reality is grounded in the real object, for

otherwise the error itself cannot take place. Thus, in Nyaya, it is

transported to the site of error from a real snake that exists

elsewhere. In Mimamsa, it is transported from the memory of the real

snake. In Vishistadvaita, it is real even in the locus of error. In

Samkhya-Yoga, it is a viparyaya, a mixing up of the attributes that a

real snake has with the attributes of the rope. It is only in the

Buddhist theories that we come across the absolute unreality of the

objects of error. We now proceed to examine the Buddhist theories.

 

 

THEORIES BASED ON UNREALITY OF OBJECTS

 

ASATKHYATI is the error-theory of the Buddhist Madhyamikas wherein

the non-existent snake appears on the non-existent rope. Thus

according to them, both the snake and the rope are unreal. This

theory is rejected by Advaita because such universal non-existence

would be indistinguishable everywhere, and cannot cause perception of

objects with distinguishable features. Says the Acharya:

 

"There is no distinction as regards the nature of non-existence,

between the non-existence arising from the destruction of the seed

and the rest, and the horn of a hare, both being equally

unsubstantial. Had there been any distinction, only then would the

assertion of such separate causality be meaningful as, 'This sprout

comes out of the seed alone, and the curd out of the milk alone'. But

when an indistinguishable non-existence is posited as the cause, the

sprout and the rest may as well spring out of a hare's horn and the

like. This is however, contradicted by experience. If, again,

distinctive attributes be ascribed to non-existence on the analogy of

the lotus having blueness etc., then on that very analogy of the

lotus etc., non-existence will turn into existence by the very fact

of possessing distinctive qualities. Moreover, non-existence can

never be the source of anything, precisely because it is non-existent

like the hare's horn. Were existence to arise out of non-existence,

all the effects would be imbued with non-existence. But that goes

against experience, for all things are perceived to exist as entities

with their respective distinguishing features." (BSB, II,II,iv,26).

 

 

ATMAKHYATI is the Buddhist Vijnanavada theory of error. In

Vijnanavada, the object of an error is real as the content of an

inner reflection of the subject. Due to past impression, there is

simultaneous flow of external 'this' and internal snake and the two

get mixed up. This theory may be rejected because it subtracts the

attribute of 'externality' from the snake and hence the snake, which

is internal, should be seen as extremely proximate resulting in some

such cognition as 'I am a snake'. For according to the Vijnanavadins,

it is the cognition itself that appears in the likeness of the

object. To which the Acharya counters:

 

"Not that anybody cognises a perception to be a pillar, a wall, etc.,

rather all people cognise a pillar, a wall, etc., as objects of

perception. And it is for this reason that all people understand the

Buddhists as really assuming the existence of an external thing even

while they deny it by saying 'That which is the content of an

internal awareness appears as though external'. For they use the

phrase 'as though' in the clause 'as though external' just because

they too become aware of a cognition appearing externally in the same

way as is well known to all people, and yet they want to deny any

external object. Else why should they say 'as though external'? For

nobody speaks thus: 'Vishnumitra appears like the son of a barren

woman'." (BSB,II,II,v,28).

 

The last sentence is significant - the world is not unreal like the

son of a barren woman. It is important to distinguish the difference

between the unreality of the son of a barren woman and the unreality

of the snake in the rope. The world in Advaita is unreal like the

snake in the rope, and the snake in the rope is grounded on its

likeness to real snakes in the world. To say that the world is

absolutely unreal is to adopt the doctrine of the Buddhists.

 

 

CONDITIONS FOR THE OCCURRENCE OF ERROR

 

An error can take place only when there is a concealment of the true

nature of the object. This concealment may be due to a defect of the

sense organs, or it may be a defect in the environment. But apart

from the condition of concealment, we find that there are two other

necessary conditions in the theories of the Vedic darshanas without

which the possibility of error (between objects) would be precluded.

These are:

 

1. That there be a likeness between the real object and the unreal

object, for example between the coil of rope and the coil of the

snake, or the glitter of nacre and the glitter of silver. It is the

likeness of the objects combined with the defect in the environment

or sense organs that makes possible the error. It is not possible,

for example, to mistake a rope for an elephant or cow.

 

2. That the appearance of the unreal object be based on the reality

of the object itself. The object is revealed as unreal only in the

locus of the error. It is because there are real snakes in the world

that a rope can be mistaken for a snake. We do not, for example,

mistake a person to be the son of a barren woman.

 

 

Advaita does not deviate from the traditional Vedic schools in so far

as an error between objects is concerned. It considers that the

object of erroneous cognition has a likeness to a really existing

object. It also affirms the reality of the object in the world, but

accepts the unreality of the object in the locus of error in

accordance with the empirical sublating cognition that the 'the snake

is false'. It is to be noted that the falseness of the snake in the

rope does not exterminate snakes from the world!

 

 

THE SUPERIMPOSITION BETWEEN SELF AND NON-SELF IS INEXPLICABLE

 

If one goes by the conditional factors that makes an empirical error

possible, it becomes an impossibility for the non-Self to be

superimposed on the Self because, the one being sentient and the

other being insentient, there is no likeness between them. This is

exactly what the Acharya says in the preamble - that the subject and

object which "are by nature as contradictory as light and darkness,

cannot logically have any identity, it follows that their attributes

can have it still less. Accordingly, the superimposition of the

object, referable through the concept 'you', and its attributes on

the subject that is conscious by nature and is referable through the

concept 'we' (should be impossible), and contrariwise the

superimposition of the subject and its attributes on the object

should be impossible." In other words, the superimposition between

the Self and non-Self is inexplicable through empirical theories of

error. Yet, this state of affairs is a natural (naisargika)

continuation from a beginningless past. If the snake-rope or silver-

nacre analogy is used to illustrate the superimposition between the

Self and non-Self, it is merely to point out that one thing is seen

as another. And it is this common feature that the Acharya points out

after considering various theories of error: "From every point of

view, however, there is no difference as regards the appearance of

one thing as something else. And in accord with this, we find in

common experience that the nacre appears as silver, and a single moon

appears as two." (BSB,Pre).

 

 

THE DISLODGEMENT OF MEANING

 

There is in the preamble what seems to be an almost passing reference

to the possibility of superimposition between what is perceived and

what is not perceived.

 

Question: "How, again, can there be any superimposition of any object

or its attributes on the Self that is opposed to the non-Self and is

never an object (of the senses and mind)? For everybody superimposes

something else on what is perceived by him in front; and you assert

that the Self is opposed to the non-Self and is not referable by the

concept 'you'."

 

Vedantin: "The Self is not absolutely beyond comprehension, because

it is apprehended as the content of the concept 'I'; and because the

Self, opposed to the non-Self, is well known in the world as an

immediately perceived (self-revealing) entity. Nor is there any rule

that something has to be superimposed on something else that is

directly perceived through the senses; for boys superimpose the ideas

of surface and dirt on space (sky) that is not an object of sense-

perception."

 

There is something subtle hidden in these lines. Why is it that it is

only boys that are susceptible to this type of error? In the case of

errors between objects, say the snake in the rope, the person subject

to the error knows the meanings of both the snake and the rope,

whereas in this case - what is it that the boy knows as the sky? An

adult who knows what 'sky' means – as that which is expansive and

pervasive through and through objects – can never superimpose ideas

such as concavity and dirt onto the sky. It is only boys (children),

who see the 'bowl' spread out above and take this bowl to be

the 'sky', that ascribe concavity to the sky. In the case of the

snake-rope error, one may say that two meanings, both of which are

known, are confused one with another in the locus of the error, but

not so in the case of the 'sky' that boys see when they attribute

concavity to the it; they do not know the meaning of sky. There is a

primal dislodgement of meaning here. And the superimposition of the

non-Self on Self, being a superimposition of the perceived on the

unperceived, is of this nature, for that is what the Acharya says.

There is no reason that can be assigned as to why such a primal

dislodgment of meaning should at all be there in Reality. It is

inexplicable, anirvacaniya.

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

What emerges from this examination is that the unreal is more

perplexing than what it at first seems. What is unreal is also

somehow the real. One of the great deliberations in the history of

mankind on the topic of the 'unreal' is to be found in the Thaetetus

and Sophist of Plato. These dialogues are inconclusive, but they are

masterpieces of dialectical philosophy. I believe that the same kind

of dialectical tension is found in the Sariraka Bhashya of

Shankaracharya. To read the bhashya with the singular notion that the

world is unreal would be a sad derailment of Advaita, for it would

denude Advaita of the element of mysticism that lies in its core.

 

_______________

 

With regards,

Chittaranjan

[Guest guest]

--- Chittaranjan Naik <chittaranjan_naik wrote:

 

Chittaranjanji - I donot know about others, but I have not graduated

from the first part yet and I request you to slow down to give us some

time to digest the second and third parts.

Hari OM!

Sadananda

 

=====

What you have is destiny and what you do with what you have is self-effort.

Future destiny is post destiny modified by your present action. You are not only

the prisoner of your past but master of your future. - Swami Chinmayananda

[Guest guest]

Namaste Shri Sadanandaji,

 

I'm not taken in by your words Sir - you don't need to graduate from

anywhere! You are the teacher, and I have learnt a lot from you. Just

yesterday I read your notes on adhyasa in the files section and

realised that I had missed out an entire aspect of superimposition. I

had to add the section on "Dislodgement of Meaning" to Part III after

a lot of contemplation which came about as a result of studying of

your notes. I am deeply indebted to you.

 

As for the pace of postings, I felt that I had to come to Shankara

Advaita as quickly as possible.... for in Part II I was discussing

more about concepts from Western Philosophy. Now that I have, I will

slow down.

 

Thanks and warm regards,

Chittaranjan

 

 

advaitin, kuntimaddi sadananda

<kuntimaddisada> wrote:

 

> Chittaranjanji - I donot know about others, but I have not

> graduated from the first part yet and I request you to slow

> down to give us some time to digest the second and third

> parts.

> Hari OM!

> Sadananda

[Guest guest]

Namaste Chittaranjanji,

 

That was a masterpiece and I really cannot wait too much to read the parts that

are still to come. It clarified my understanding of quite a few concepts. Just a

few questions:

 

What is Advaita's own theory of error? Is it anirvachaniya? To me Anyathakhyati

does not seem to be different from advaita's conception of error. Am I missing

something here? Probably for the same reason, to me advaita's objection to

anyathakhyati does not seem very convincing. If I have seen a cup in my office

and superimpose it on a tumbler that I see later in my house, why is it

necessary that along with this superimposition, I should also superimpose my

office on my house?

 

The theory of 'Dislodgement of meaning' was a new one to me though I have read

the adhyasa bhashya quite a few times. And to think that it was all the time

sitting in the files section waiting to be read-------. Sadaji, please come in

to clarify our confusions as and when you feel appropriate.

 

Many thanks and pranams,

Venkat - M

 

 

Chittaranjan Naik <chittaranjan_naik wrote:

Om Gurubhyo Namah

 

 

THE TOPIC OF THE PREAMBLE

 

It is generally believed that the adhyasa-bhasha of Shankara's

preamble to the Brahma Sutra Bhashya points to the unreality of the

world. This view has gained such wide currency that it seems almost

sacrilegious to question its authenticity.

 

 

ALL-NEW Messenger - sooooo many all-new ways to express yourself

 

 

[Guest guest]

praNAms Sri Sridhar prabhuji

Hare Krishna

 

You said :

The definition of 'Real' , I understand, is 'that which does not

change in the three periods of time'.

 

bhaskar :

 

Yes prabhuji you are absolutely right. The definition given to the term

*reality* in shAstric terminology is something different from our normal

usage. The *reality of the world* at a given point of time has been

accepted by advaita sampradAyavida-s ONLY from the transactional view point

(vyAvahArika satya), the socalled *reality of the world* falls in this

category. But from the shAstra drushti what they say to the *reality* is,

it must be trikAla abhAditam (that which does not undergo any modification

at any point of time). shruti says it is sAkshi chEtah & kEvalo nirguNascha

& sarva bhutAntarAtma (vide shwetAshwatara Up.). This sAkshi is unchanged

& mere witness to all the three avastha-s. In these avastha-s, waker has

his/her own world in waking time & space, dreamer has his/her own world in

dreaming time & space & in deep sleep state both these worlds will get

vanished ( prapanchOpashamanaM) since the projecting mind itself

conspicuous by its absence in this state. So, we can easily say through

our day to day experience that *there is a possibility where the world is

not there but we are in our true satchitAnanda svarUpa!!!.

 

With the kind permission of Sri prof. VK prabhuji, I'd like to share his

mail on *reality of the universe* which he had written on11th of December

2002 under the subject heading *question on mAyA*. Here it is :

 

//quote//

 

Namaste.

The following question has been raised by Sri Venkat Ramanan.

"In advaita, is Maya considered real or imaginary. I mean if everything

except for the self is unreal, then is Maya also considered unreal ?"

 

I am pretty sure the same question must have been raised earlier in the

list and must have been answered. But I did not make the search. As the

question is any way very important, I venture to give my answer now.

 

Let me first attempt to state the questioner's viewpoint. Unless mAyA is

already present, neither concealment nor projection can take place. Is

mAyA then coeval with brahman? Do they exist side by side? Does this not

contradict the non-dual status of brahman? Where does mAyA operate? What

is its base of operation? These questions raise very profound issues.

The base of activity of mAyA cannot be brahman because the latter is

Absolute Luminosity and there is no place in it for ignorance or darkness.

Nor can the jIva be the base of operations of mAyA. For jIva itself cannot

come into existence until mAyA has operated. There seems to be an

irresoluble logical difficulty here.

 

But the difficulty will vanish once we realize that we are here making an

implicit assumption that is not valid. We are actually assuming the prior

reality of time and space before the appearance of mAyA. Otherwise we

could not have asked the question: Where does mAyA operate? When does it

come into existence? These questions are valid only if you have a frame of

reference in time and space independent of mAyA. But time and space, says

Sankara, are themselves creations of mAyA. (cf. 'mAyA-kalpita-desha-kAla-

kalanAt' in his dakshiNAmUrti-stotra, sloka no.4). In fact, this is also

the answer to the physicist's question: When did time originate? Time did

not originate in a timeless frame because we would then be begging the

question. The very fact that we are conscious of the passage of time is a

consequence of mAyA. So questions such as, 'Where does mAyA operate?'

and 'When did it start operating?' are not properly posed. Time and space

cannot claim prior existence. It is therefore wrong to ask whether mAyA is

prior to jIva or later than jIva. Ultimate Reality is beyond space and

time. In the words of Swami Vivekananda, time, space and causation are

like the glass through which the Absolute is seen. In the Absolute itself,

there is neither space, nor time nor causation.

As in the field of modern physics, so in the field of vedanta, time and

space are modes incidental to sense perception and should not be applied

to what is trans-empirical. jIva and mAyA are both given a priori in our

experience and we have to take them as such. They are anAdi

(beginningless). The only relevant question that you can ask about them is

about their nature and final destiny. Examination will show that mAyA is

neither real nor unreal. 'I am ignorant' is a common expression, within

anybody's experience. Hence mAyA is not completely unreal. But it

disappears with the onset of knowledge. So it is not real either. Thus it

is different from both the real and the unreal. In Sanskrit it is

therefore called 'sad-asad-vilakshaNa', meaning that it is different from

both the real and the unreal. And for the same reason it is said to

be 'anirvacanIya', meaning, that which is undecidable or that which

cannot be defined one way or the other. It is in this sense we say that

the world of perception, the common world of experience, cannot be

rejected out of hand as totally false, like the hare's horn or the lotus

in the sky; nor can it be taken to be totally real because it suffers

contradiction at a higher level of experience. It is real in the empirical

sense and unreal in the absolute sense.

This is also the case with a dream. For the dreamer, the dream is real.

The acceptance of the reality of the dream to the dreamer is the king-pin

of Sankara's explanation of advaita. He bases many of his arguments on

this phenomenal reality of the dream. This reality, called 'vyAvahArika-

satyaM' is in between the total unreality - 'asat' ? of the barren

mother, and the total reality ? 'sat' - of brahman. The dream and

similarly the perceptible universe is neither 'sat' nor 'asat'. It

is 'mithyA'. The meaning of the word 'mithyA' is not falsehood but

comparative unreality. It is not total non-existence like hare's horn but

it is midway between the absolute truth of brahman and the absolute

falsehood of hare's horn.

There are actually different analogies to explain the peculiar

relationship between brahman and the universe. The analogy that Sankara

very often uses is the relationless relationship of the rope that is

mistaken for the snake, because of poor lighting. The rope appears as a

snake no doubt, but actually there is no snake there, ever. Even when it

appeared to be there, it was not there. But the one who saw it did really

get scared on 'seeing' the snake and only when help came in the form of

better lighting did the person realize that what 'was there' all the

time was only a rope. The second analogy that is used in the literature

is the appearance of water in a mirage. And the third one is that of the

dreamer and his dream. Each of these three analogies has its own

limitation in explaining the relationship between brahman which is

invisible and the universe which is visible. Brahman is the rope; the

visible universe is the snake. What appears as the universe is not really

the universe. When spiritual illumination takes place we will know that

what was there all the time was only brahman. Similarly in the example of

the mirage and water, the water appearance is only an illusion. What is

there in reality is only sand, no water. The dream of course is totally a

mental aberration, fully subjective and it vanishes the moment the person

wakes up.

The three analogies are not however just three analogies in place of one.

There is a gradation, says Ramana Maharishi. First it may be questioned,

with reference to the analogy of the rope and the snake that when the

lighting situation improves the appearance of the snake is no more there,

whereas, in the case of brahman versus universe, even after learning that

brahman is the substratum of truth, and the universe is only a

superimposition like the snake on the rope, we still continue to see the

universe; it has not disappeared! For this the Maharishi wants you to go

to the analogy of the mirage. Once you understand it is the mirage and no

watershed, the appearance of water is no more there. But now there is

another objection. 'Even after knowing that there is only brahman and the

universe is only an appearance, one gets certain wants fulfilled from this

appearance of a universe: one gets one's hunger satisfied, thirst quenched

and so on. But the water in the mirage does not quench one's thirst; so to

that extent the analogy is inappropriate'. The analogy of the dream meets

this objection, says the Maharishi. The dreamer has his thirst quenched in

the dream. The thirst itself is a dream thirst and it is quenched by

drinking (dream) water in the dream; so also the wants that one feels in

this universe like hunger and thirst are also quenched by corresponding

objects in this universe. Thus in this sense the analogy of the dream is

reasonably perfect. Maybe that is why Sankara uses the analogy of the

dream so emphatically to describe the reality or unreality of the

universe.

In advaita the concept of reality is always comparative. Relative to

materials things made out of the materials are unreal. In other words if a

bucket is made out of plastic, the bucket is unreal relative to the

plastic. It is the cause that is 'more real' than the effect. The cause of

the world versus the world itself gives us a comparison about their

relative reality. When we say that the universe is unreal, we mean that IT

IS UNREAL AS THE UNIVERSE, BUT IT IS SURELY REAL AS BRAHMAN, ITS CAUSE. In

order to explain this relative unreality the theory of superimposition is

meticulously worked out by Sankara. While the snake is superimposed on the

rope, the rope undergoes no aberration or modification in the process. It

is the same rope all the time. What appears to you is only in your mind.

The visible universe is just a perishable (kShara) superimposition on

brahman. Brahman does not undergo any change in the process. All the time

brahman remains as brahman, the imperishable (akShara) substratum. This is

where the nirguNa (attributeless) character of brahman is effectively

applied by Sankara to his explanation of this mysterious relationship.

This phenomenon of brahman not being visible but something else, the

universe, being visible, is exactly what the term 'mAyA' means. It does

two things. It hides brahman from you. Simultaneously it projects the

universe to you. The declaration that this is what is happening comes

forth from the Lord Himself in Gita IX ? 5, 6. 'Everything that is

perceptible is pervaded and permeated by Me, who is unmanifested. All the

beings are established in Me but not I in them; they are not in Me either,

this is my divine yoga.'. He remains unmanifested while what is visible is

basically a permeation by him. While he remains unchanged, and

imperceptible, the universe is what is perceptible. Everything visible is

supported by Him as the only substratum, whereas He Himself is not

supported by anything. He is His own support. The snake appears on the

rope, the rope does not undergo any change, but the snake is supported by

the rope, (meaning, without the rope there is no snake). But in reality

the snake was never there and so it is also true to say that the snake is

not in the rope. To the question: Where is the snake?, the answer is: it

is in the rope. To the question, Is the snake there?, the answer is, there

is no snake, the snake was never in the rope. It is in this strain that

the Lord gives out, almost in the same breath, what appears to be two

contradictory statements. Everything is in Me; and nothing is in Me. This

is the cosmic mystery of the existence of the Universe. It is and is not ?

sad-asad-vilakshaNa, mAyA!

 

praNAms to all seekers of spirituality.

profvk

 

//unquote//

 

 

Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!

bhaskar

[Guest guest]

Namaste Shri Ranjeetji,

 

Welcome back, I've been missing you for a long time.

 

Ranjeetji, the direction that I am taking here is to uncover the

meaning of the term 'unreal' as it is used in Advaita. Therefore, I

am a bit wary of getting into arguments involving the term, because

it is quite possible that we may not know what the nuance of this

word is as it is used in Advaita. I would ask for more patience from

you so that I can get through the next few parts of my essays;

because I have tried to cover in the next three posts what I think

may be of relevance to the topic. In Part III, I was focussing on one

nuance of the word 'unreal' which is that it is the 'posing' of one

thing as another. I believe that the preamble does not go beyond

this.

 

Now, a few comments on what you said....

 

 

advaitin, "Ranjeet Sankar"

<thefinalsearch> wrote:

 

> However, you move on and ascribe reality to the superimposed

> thing existing somewhere else. In other words, you say that

> the superimposed snake is real in some other place and time.

 

Actually, I don't say this; that is the Nyaya theory. I am only

saying that snakes are real in the world. And I say that it is

impossible to take the rope for a snake unless there are real snakes

in this world. If we try to answer the question whether any of us

have ever mistaken a rope for a camenonella, or whether we can

possibly mistake a rope for a camenonella, I believe we will say 'no'

because there is no such thing as camenella. Again, I can't mistake

someone to be the son of a barren woman. It is necessary that there

should be something real for us to mistake something else as that

thing - otherwise the very notion of its reality in the instance of

error cannot arise. But unlike Nyaya, Advaita does not say that this

real thing is elsewhere; it merely states that it should be real.

Nyaya says that the snake has to be elsewhere because the

word 'existence' in Nyaya is confined to the manifest world, whereas

Advaita uses the word 'existence' in a broader sense.

 

> Also, to say that the world is unreal doesn't make the advaitin

> a Buddhist. For an advaitin is always concerned about a real

> locus wherein the superimposition occurs, a real locus which

> is not affected by the latter.

 

This is something that goes to the core of Advaita. I believe that

the Advaitin must first know the Real Locus before he can speak about

It. Otherwise he would be denying something without knowing the basis

of the denial, because the entire ground of the denial in Advaita is

nothing but knowing the Locus. Knowing the Locus is itself the

sublation that Advaita speaks of. There is no separate denial in

Advaita. If you agree to wait until I post the next part, it would be

very nice because I have taken up this topic there.

 

> In my humble opinion, there is no need for an analysis of the

> boy-sky analogy, superimposition of the perceived on the

> unperceived.

 

I will place this comment alogwith these other words that you write:

> The conditions for the occurrence of superimposition that you

> had mentioned are true, but only to superimpositions occurring

> in the empirical world. The basis of all empirical experience

> is itself superimposition. We cannot prove in any way that

> these conditions applicable for the superimpositions in the

> empirical world would be the same as that for the very

> superimposition based on which all empirical experience

> proceeds.

 

I believe that that is why the boy-sky analogy is useful - to

understand the nature of the more primal superimposition of the non-

Self on the Self. The superimposition between objects in the world is

not like the superimposition between an unpercieved thing and a

perceived object, and this is the only example in the preamble that

directs itself to this type of error.

 

> Shri sha~Nkara clearly answers the objection by saying that

> "it is apprehended as the content of the concept 'I'".

 

Shankara brings in this argument because something that is totally

unknown, or concealed, cannot become the locus of an error. This

statement is therefore necessary before moving on to the example of

the boy-sky because it establishes one of the necessary conditions

for an error to take place. And thanks for pionting this out because

it is another condition for error that I had missed out in my post. :-

)

 

> But isn't there some relation between the superimposition

> explained in the preamble and the world?

 

Of course there is, but I think we should try and bring out the

meaning of this superimposition. I believe that the meaning is

subtle, and that we should proceed with patience.

 

> For shri sha~Nkara says,

> "Thus occurs this superimposition that has neither beginning

> nor end but flows on eternally, THAT APPEARS AS THE MANIFESTED

> UNIVERSE AND ITS APPREHENSION, that conjures up agentship and

> enjoyship, and that is perceived by all person."

 

Isn't it the very meaning of the term "unreal" that is in question

here? So, let us first unravel the meaning of the the term 'unreal,

and then say "the world is unreal". So far, from whatever the Acharya

has said in the preamble, the unreal is the superimposition of one

thing on another.

 

> So how do we explain this? If superimposition is false, then the

> appearance of manifested world is false. If manifested world is

> taken as real, then superimposition would be real, agreeing on

> which we will end up in contradicting the entire bhAshyam-s.

 

If what is superimposed is false, it is false as one thing appearing

as another. I would say at this stage that that is all that it means.

Why should we go further and arrive at conclusions that the bhashyam

will be contradicted when we are still to bring light to the meanings

of the terms 'real and 'unreal'?

 

> The view is absurd even if we resort to the 'locus' explanation.

> The world is superimposed on Brahman. Going by your locus theory,

 

As I have explained, I don't have a locus theory.

 

> Finally you concluded, "To read the bhashya with the singular

> notion that the world is unreal would be a sad derailment of

> Advaita, for it would denude Advaita of the element of

> mysticism that lies in its core."

>

> Well, if you take the snake-rope analogy and ask me whether the

> snake is real, I would definitely say 'NO'. But if you ask me

> whether IT is real, I would say YES. This is advaita.

 

 

We end on a happy note of agreement. :-)

 

 

Regards,

Chittaranjan

[Guest guest]

Well, if you take the snake-rope analogy and ask me whether the snake is

real, I would definitely say 'NO'. But if you ask me whether IT is real, I

would say YES. This is advaita.

 

praNAm Sri Ranjeet shankara prabhuji

Hare Krishna

 

Very well said prabhuji. The reality of the world/object simply revolving

around *snakeness* of the rope, but shankara says the snake is mere

objective false appearance (mAyA) due to antahkaraNa dOsha (avidyA). Such

is the experience of the common man, who says it is the nacre that looks

like silver, the one moon appears as though she had an alter ego!!

 

Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!

bhaskar

[Guest guest]

Namaste Shri Venkatramanji,

 

Thank you for your kind words Venkatji. The Advaita theory of error

as it developed in the post-Shankara period is called

anirvacaniyakhyati. I have not mentioned this theory in my message as

I was trying to focus here on Shankara Bhashya. I feel that there is

a lot of debate brought in by the Bhamati and Vivarana schools which

it would be better to steer clear from so that this discussion may be

kept as simple as possible. But it is still getting somewhat

complicated. :-)

 

> To me Anyathakhyati does not seem to be different from

> advaita's conception of error. Am I missing something here?

> Probably for the same reason, to me advaita's objection to

> anyathakhyati does not seem very convincing. If I have seen

> a cup in my office and superimpose it on a tumbler that I

> see later in my house, why is it necessary that along with

> this superimposition, I should also superimpose my office

> on my house?

 

The difference between anyathakhyati and the Advaita position is I

think quite subtle. In tarka-shastra, the meanings have to be very

exact, and when Nyaya says that the snake that is seen in the error

is a real snake transported from elsewhere, then that elsewhere-ness

must be seen in the error because Nyaya has defined the thing seen in

the error as a snake-that-is-elsewhere. That is Advaita's objection

to the theory.

 

> The theory of 'Dislodgement of meaning' was a new one to me

> though I have read the adhyasa bhashya quite a few times. And

> to think that it was all the time sitting in the files section

> waiting to be read-------. Sadaji, please come in to clarify

> our confusions as and when you feel appropriate.

 

Here I need to clarify what I said earlier because I don't want to

put Shri Sadanandaji in an embarassing position. Though what I wrote

was triggered by reading Sadanandaji's notes, it is actually what I

understood from the bhashya, and any shortcoming in understanding is

due to my own limitation. Ranjeetji has already objected to it. Let

me explain why I came to this conclusion.

 

After Shankaracharya considers the various theories of error, which

are all of the nature of errors between two objects, he takes up the

final objection that the non-Self cannot be superimposed on something

that is not perceived. The Acharya first says that the Self is not

completely beyond apprehension (as this is one condition for an error

to take place), and then takes up the example of boys superimposing

concavity and dirt on the unperceived sky. The sky is here considered

to be unperceived in respect of ocular perception and because it is

normally considered by people to be unperceived. Now if you consider

this nature of error, the first thing that is noticed is that it is a

different category of error than the error between that occurs

between two perceived objects. What is it that we can say are the

differences in features between these two categories of error?

 

If we consider a word, its meaning, and the object that the word

refers to, then in the snake rope error, there is no discord between

the word and its meaning, but the object that is present does not

conform to the meaning that is seen. The meaning that is seen is the

snake which is not present. In the snake rope error, the relationship

between the word and its meaning is preserved, but the relationship

between the meaning and the real object that is in front is broken.

In the example of boys superimposing concavity on the sky, the

situation is different. The boy does not see the meaning of the

word 'sky' as it truly is, because if he did, then he could not

superimpose concavity on to it, because, after knowing space as

something that pervades objects, it is not possible to understand

that it is concave. Here the relationship between the word and the

meaning is itself broken. This phenomenon is not explicable from any

angle except that it is lack of knowledge ie., avidya. If you read

the Acharya's next sentence, it states that the superimposition of

the non-Self on the Self is of this nature, and that it is called

avidya. It then goes on to say that this is of the nature whereby

people think "I am injured", "I am old", etc., (I am in office now,

and don't have the bhashya in front of me, so please excuse me if I

am not exact in respect of the examples the bhashya gives). Here

again there is a dislodgement of meaning, because being "injured",

being "old" etc., are not attributes of the Self, but are attributes

of the mind and body. There is a dislodgement of meaning between the

word "Self" and its meaning. All this seems to fit in with the idea

that the bhashya is here speaking of dislodgements of meaning. That

is why I included it in my post. If I am mistaken, I may be

forgiven.... and of course corrected by the respected members of the

group (and of course by providing the reasons).

 

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to express what I had meant.

 

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan

 

 

 

advaitin, S Venkatraman <svenkat52> wrote:

> Namaste Chittaranjanji,

>

> That was a masterpiece and I really cannot wait too much to read

the parts that are still to come. It clarified my understanding of

quite a few concepts. Just a few questions:

>

> What is Advaita's own theory of error? Is it anirvachaniya? To me

Anyathakhyati does not seem to be different from advaita's conception

of error. Am I missing something here? Probably for the same reason,

to me advaita's objection to anyathakhyati does not seem very

convincing. If I have seen a cup in my office and superimpose it on a

tumbler that I see later in my house, why is it necessary that along

with this superimposition, I should also superimpose my office on my

house?

>

> The theory of 'Dislodgement of meaning' was a new one to me though

I have read the adhyasa bhashya quite a few times. And to think that

it was all the time sitting in the files section waiting to be read---

----. Sadaji, please come in to clarify our confusions as and when

you feel appropriate.

>

> Many thanks and pranams,

> Venkat - M

>

[Guest guest]

Namaste Bhaskarji,

 

The unreal is that which is changing and has a beginning and an end.

That which is non-existent in the beginning and the in the end is non-

existent in the middle to be sure. This is of course true. But we

also need to enquire into the nature of change. When we dive deeper

into its meaning, two aspects of the world arises - one as the pre-

existent in the cause, and the other as a chimerical appearance. If

you ask me whether that which changes is false, I will not deny that

it is false in so far as it appears to be changing. But the question

of change has to be asked prior to this - what is it that is called

change? I am parking this question for the present as the topic comes

to the stage in Part VII.

 

Pranams,

Chittaranjan

[Guest guest]

Hi Chittaranjan,

 

I'm bound to agree with comments to the effect that: a) wonderful

presentation but b) really hard going for anyone not having a degree in

philosophy!

 

However, so far I seem to be coming down on the side of Ranjeet in his

querying of your interpretation of Shankara. I don't know that I find your

(?) suggestion that he says <something is unreal not because it absolutely

does not exist but only because we are mistakenly superimposing it at this

time and place> to be convincing. You say that: "The world in Advaita is

unreal like the snake in the rope, and the snake in the rope is grounded on

its likeness to real snakes in the world." And "It is because there are real

snakes in the world that a rope can be mistaken for a snake. We do not, for

example, mistake a person to be the son of a barren woman." But we do

mistake posts for ghosts, don't we and there are not any real ghosts (to my

knowledge)? I think there is a great danger in taking metaphors beyond the

scope of their intended utility.

 

Also, I feel that it is not reasonable to conclude that Shankara did not

believe X because he does not specifically state X in a particular writing.

He may not specifically state that the world is unreal in the BSB but does

he not effectively do this in his commentary on the Gaudapada karika? You

say that Advaita "... affirms the reality of the object in the world" but

Shankara specifically states in his comment on II.3. of the karika: "As the

objects that are perceived in dream are illusory so also are the objects

perceived in the waking state". Further, commenting on II.6, as Ranjeet

observed: "The objects perceived to exist in the waking state are unreal for

this reason also, that they do not really exist either at the beginning or

at the end." And in II. 9-10: "Objects, internal and external, are creations

of the mind (whether they be in the dream or in the waking state)." Finally,

on II.15: "Hence it is established that the objects perceived in the waking

state are as much imagination of the mind as those seen in the dream."

 

This seems pretty definite to me.

 

Best wishes,

 

Dennis