The Real and the Unreal - Part III - The Preamble

[Guest guest]

advaitin, "Chittaranjan Naik"

<chittaranjan_naik> wrote:

Namaste Chittaranji and all

The definition of 'Real' , I understand, is 'that which does not

change in the three periods of time'.

Thus something that is very concrete, right in front of us as the

world, could still be unreal in terms of such a definition.

I hope I have not missed something from your earlier presentations.

It will be useful to introduce the technical definition of 'Real'.

To take a small detour, as I am keen on direct practical application,

the unreality of the world seen in the waking state is likened to a

dream, and on 'waking up' from this dreamy waking state there is the

promise that all the experiences and perceptions of life will be seen

for what they are though they seem very real when one is in that state.

Many namaskarams to all

Sridhar

>

> CONCLUSION

>

> What emerges from this examination is that the unreal is more

> perplexing than what it at first seems. What is unreal is also

> somehow the real. One of the great deliberations in the history of

> mankind on the topic of the 'unreal' is to be found in the Thaetetus

> and Sophist of Plato. These dialogues are inconclusive, but they are

> masterpieces of dialectical philosophy. I believe that the same kind

> of dialectical tension is found in the Sariraka Bhashya of

> Shankaracharya. To read the bhashya with the singular notion that the

> world is unreal would be a sad derailment of Advaita, for it would

> denude Advaita of the element of mysticism that lies in its core.

>

> _______________

>

> With regards,

> Chittaranjan

[Guest guest]

Namaste Shri Chittaranjanji,

 

First of all, congrats on starting a rather complex, but interesting topic

for discussion. Please accept my praNAm-s. I am not very much learned in

advaita in the traditional manner when compared to the various stalwards in

this forum. Nevertheless, I would like to express my views on your post on

the B.S.B.Preamble. To be frank with you, the preamble to B.S.B is one which

I read over and over again. Every time I read it, I draw new inspiration

from it. I don't know why! Thanks to you, I read it once again yesterday.

:-) All the quotes in this mail are from B.S.B preamble.

 

You rightly said that the various analogies like snake-rope, silver-nacre

etc. are used to illustrate superimposition. i.e to point out that one thing

is seen as another. This view is very correct. It shows that the

superimposed thing, the snake in the analogy, does not exist in the locus,

the rope at that given place and time. However, you move on and ascribe

reality to the superimposed thing existing somewhere else. In other words,

you say that the superimposed snake is real in some other place and time. By

doing so, you are going beyond the limits of the analogy. There is no need

to prove that the snake, which is absent at the instant of superimposition,

is real at some other place and time. The real purpose of the analogy is to

show that the rope is real and the superimposed snake is unreal. Why should

we concern ourselves about a snake at a different place and time? That in

fact is out of the boundary of the analogy under discussion. What we are

concerned about is whether the 'thing' in front of us is a rope or a snake.

We are only concerned with the ascertainment of the reality in the

superimposition.

 

Shri sha~Nkara says thus,

"This superimposition, that is of this nature, is considered by the learned

to be avidyA. And the ascertainment of the nature of the real entity by

separating the superimposed thing from it is called vidyA. "

 

Talks about the reality of the superimposed snake in another locus at

another place and time are unwanted.

 

Also, to say that the world is unreal doesn't make the advaitin a Buddhist.

For an advaitin is always concerned about a real locus wherein the

superimposition occurs, a real locus which is not affected by the latter.

 

For shri sha~Nkara says, "This being so, whenever there is a superimposition

of one thing on another, the locus is not affected in any way either by the

merits or the demerits of the thing superimposed."

 

This is where the 'horns of a hare' and the 'son of a barren woman' comes

in.

 

You said:

"The last sentence is significant - the world is not unreal like the son of

a barren woman. It is important to distinguish the difference between the

unreality of the son of a barren woman and the unreality of the snake in the

rope. The world in Advaita is unreal like the

snake in the rope, and the snake in the rope is grounded on its likeness to

real snakes in the world. To say that the world is absolutely unreal is to

adopt the doctrine of the Buddhists."

 

The difference between the analogies is not like what you had mentioned.

There is a real locus, a rope, in the snake-rope analogy. But in the

son-barren woman case, no such real locus exists. The world is not like

that, without a locus. It has the Self as the locus. This is the gist of

shri sha~Nkara's objection against the Buddhist views. Your reasoning that

the difference between the two cases is due to the reality of the snake

existing elsewhere in the world is a wrong one.

 

You said,

"There is something subtle hidden in these lines. Why is it that it is only

boys that are susceptible to this type of error? In the case of errors

between objects, say the snake in the rope, the person subject to the error

knows the meanings of both the snake and the rope, whereas in this case -

what is it that the boy knows as the sky? An adult who knows what 'sky'

means - as that which is expansive and pervasive through and through

objects - can never superimpose ideas such as concavity and dirt onto the

sky. It is only boys (children), who see the 'bowl' spread out above and

take this bowl to be the 'sky', that ascribe concavity to the sky. In the

case of the snake-rope error, one may say that two meanings, both of which

are known, are confused one with another in the locus of the error, but not

so in the case of the 'sky' that boys see when they attribute concavity to

the it; they do not know the meaning of sky. There is a primal dislodgement

of meaning here. And the superimposition of the non-Self on Self, being a

superimposition of the perceived on the unperceived, is of this nature, for

that is what the Acharya says.

There is no reason that can be assigned as to why such a primal dislodgment

of meaning should at all be there in Reality. It is inexplicable,

anirvacaniya."

 

In my humble opinion, there is no need for an analysis of the boy-sky

analogy, superimposition of the perceived on the unperceived. That is not

the essence of the passage. Shri sha~Nkara clearly answers the objection by

saying that "it is apprehended as the content of the concept 'I' ". The rest

of the passage that gives out the boy-sky analogy is only to show that the

objection itself is wrong! So your concluding remarks, 'And the

superimposition of the non-Self on Self, being a superimposition of the

perceived on the unperceived, is of this nature..' is subjected to revision.

 

You said,

"The focus of the preamble is clearly the superimposition between the Self

and non-

Self and NOT the unreality of the world."

 

But isn't there some relation between the superimposition explained in the

preamble and the world?

 

For shri sha~Nkara says,

"Thus occurs this superimposition that has neither beginning nor end but

flows on eternally, THAT APPEARS AS THE MANIFESTED UNIVERSE AND ITS

APPREHENSION, that conjures up agentship and enjoyship, and that is

perceived by all person."

 

So how do we explain this? If superimposition is false, then the appearance

of manifested world is false. If manifested world is taken as real, then

superimposition would be real, agreeing on which we will end up in

contradicting the entire bhAshyam-s.

 

The view is absurd even if we resort to the 'locus' explanation. The world

is superimposed on Brahman. Going by your locus theory, the superimposed

world would then be real in some other locus. Then, does that world really

exist in that other locus? If it is so, then it is not a superimposition on

Brahman. And so 'that world' would be a separate real entity other than

Brahman!

 

The conditions for the occurrence of superimposition that you had mentioned

are true, but only to superimpositions occurring in the empirical world. The

basis of all empirical experience is itself superimposition. We cannot prove

in any way that these conditions applicable for the superimpositions in the

empirical world would be the same as that for the very superimposition based

on which all empirical experience proceeds. In fact, this superimposition as

beginningless (uncaused) is taught by shri sha~Nkara!

 

Finally you concluded,

"To read the bhashya with the singular notion that the world is unreal would

be a sad derailment of Advaita, for it would denude Advaita of the element

of mysticism that lies in its core."

 

Well, if you take the snake-rope analogy and ask me whether the snake is

real, I would definitely say 'NO'. But if you ask me whether IT is real, I

would say YES. This is advaita.

 

hara hara sha~Nkara jaya jaya sha~Nkara

 

Hari Om

 

-

"Chittaranjan Naik" <chittaranjan_naik

 

Om Gurubhyo Namah

 

 

THE TOPIC OF THE PREAMBLE

 

It is generally believed that the adhyasa-bhasha of Shankara's

preamble to the Brahma Sutra Bhashya points to the unreality of the

world. This view has gained such wide currency that it seems almost

sacrilegious to question its authenticity. Yet a careful scrutiny of

the preamble belies such a reading of its pages. The subject matter

of the preamble is the superimposition between the Self and non-Self

as enunciated in the opening words of the bhashya:

[Guest guest]

Like Chitteranjan and Vekataraman and indeed the

majority of members I am very interested in the various

theories of superimposition, how they operate and the

questions that arise such as, how is error possible and

the ancilliary question, Is error possible and so

forth. All very clearly set out by Chitteranjan.

 

However it seems to me that in the Preamble Sankara is

more interested in using superimposition as an analogy

rather than working out the intricicies of its

operation. Look at his language: 'with regard to this

some say,.....But others assert....Others say. His

summary of the whole lot comes down to..."From every

point of view, however, there is no difference as

regards the appearance of one thing as something else.

And in accord with this, we find in common experience

that the nacre appears as silver, and a single moon as

two."

 

Now when we consider his close analysis of pradhana,

satkaryavada etc., it is clear that his use of

superimposition is as an analogy pure and simple. Too

close analysis may verge on treating it as a homology

as though there were a corrospondence of structure.

Sankara adverts to this in Upadesasahasri XVIII. paras

32/33/34/43 Here the vedantin's position is that the

intellect etc. are not conscious but only appear so in

a similar manner to that of the heated iron ball where

fire appears to have taken a shape - "When it is

accepted that the non-conscious intellect appears to be

conscious its modifications also appear to be so like

sparks of red-hot iron". para 83 Chap.18

 

An objection is made on the basis of the iron ball

analogy. Does not the pervasion of the intellect by

the Self represent an action as in the case of the iron

ball. Reply: Para 86: "That black iron appears to be

red is only an example (to illustrate the fact that the

non-conscious intellect appears to be conscious). *An

illustration and its subject can nowhere be absolutely

similar in all respects*"

 

So what we have here in my view is the common

phenomenon of confusion being used analogically to give

a sense of how perception, which ought to be

impossible, comes about. He is not using confusion to

explain confusion - stay out of that loop. Nor is he

saying that perception is confusion (homlogical view) -

it is a superimposition like the superimposition in

confusion.

 

Best Wishes, Michael.

[Guest guest]

ombhurbhuva wrote:

 

Namaste Michael,

 

Please help me out with the quotation marks. Is there a difference

between "with regard to ..." and "From every point of view?" I'm really

not being picky; I just want to make certain that I'm not starting out

with any more disadvantages than I already have.

 

Thanks, Bob

 

 

<snip>

Look at his language: 'with regard to this

> some say,.....But others assert....Others say. His

> summary of the whole lot comes down to..."From every

> point of view, however, there is no difference as

> regards the appearance of one thing as something else.

> And in accord with this, we find in common experience

> that the nacre appears as silver, and a single moon as

> two."

 

<snip>

[Guest guest]

advaitin, "Dennis Waite" <dwaite@a...> wrote:

> Hi Chittaranjan,

> Also, I feel that it is not reasonable to conclude that Shankara did not

> believe X because he does not specifically state X in a particular writing.

> He may not specifically state that the world is unreal in the BSB but does

> he not effectively do this in his commentary on the Gaudapada karika? You

> say that Advaita "... affirms the reality of the object in the world" but

> Shankara specifically states in his comment on II.3. of the karika: "As the

> objects that are perceived in dream are illusory so also are the objects

> perceived in the waking state". Further, ...

 

 

Sorry, I dropped out of this discussion to write my

WAVES paper. If this is in reference to the infamous

BSB II.2.28, I said the following in my paper, for what

it is worth...

 

However, there is a subtlety regarding the illusion of

objectivity which must be clarified. On the one hand,

the word 'object' may refer to the hypothetical material

entity distinct from consciousness to which our

perceptions supposedly refer. We may call this the 'gross

object'. But on the other hand, it is common experience

that the perceptions themselves may appear as objects.

If one contemplates one's perceptions, they too may

seem distinct and 'out there', much like a hologram.

We may call this the 'subtle object'. This distinction

neutralizes a common objection to the subjective idealistic

interpretation of Shankara. Authors such as Eliot Deutsch

quote the notorious passage II.2.28 from Shankara's Brahma

Sutra Bashya refuting the Buddhist Vijnanavadins (idealists),

where Shankara says, "There could be no non-existence (of

external entities) because external entities are actually

perceived..." Leaving aside that Shankara misunderstands

the alleged 'nihilism' of the Buddhists (both Madhyamika and

Vijnanavada), his argument in this case is invalid. By referring

directly to perception, he only confirms the truth of subjective

idealism as described here, but he does make the correct point

that the perceptions appear as though objective when we are

in the ordinary dualistic frame of mind (which he calls

vyavaharika).

 

Hari Om!

Benjamin

[Guest guest]

advaitin, ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva@e...> wrote:

> He is not using confusion to explain confusion - stay

> out of that loop. Nor is he saying that perception is

> confusion (homlogical view) - it is a superimposition

> like the superimposition in confusion.

 

 

I am confused! :-)

 

Benjamin

[Guest guest]

-

"Benjamin" <orion777ben

 

Leaving aside that Shankara misunderstands

> the alleged 'nihilism' of the Buddhists (both Madhyamika and

> Vijnanavada), his argument in this case is invalid.

 

 

Ouch !!

 

Benjaminji, please read BSB-2-2-28 once again. :-)

 

Hari Om

[Guest guest]

Namaste Shri Benjaminji,

> ... it is common experience that the perceptions themselves

> may appear as objects.

 

It is this that Shankara objects to. The denotation of the

word 'perception' is not the object, but perception. The object is

the percept, the destination of perception and not the perception

itself. The question of whether this object is separate from

consciousness is a different question than the one that asks what the

nature of an object is. The gross material object is not separate

from consciousness - it is a question of acknowledging the object as

it presents itself exactly in experience and not as it presents

itself when we contemplate it in an investigative mode. The

contemplative mood still tries to account for the object as seen in

experience by saying that "the perceptions appear as though objective

when we are in the ordinary dualistic frame of mind" wherein the

word "as though" points to what was indeed seen which is sought to be

reduced through contemplation to something less than what was exactly

seen.

> Leaving aside that Shankara misunderstands the alleged

> 'nihilism' of the Buddhists (both Madhyamika and Vijnanavada),

> his argument in this case is invalid.

 

Shankara's arguments are not invalid - they do not seek to 'reduce'

the objects of experience as the Buddhists do.

 

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan

 

 

advaitin, "Benjamin" <orion777ben> wrote:

>

> Sorry, I dropped out of this discussion to write my

> WAVES paper. If this is in reference to the infamous

> BSB II.2.28, I said the following in my paper, for what

> it is worth...

>

> However, there is a subtlety regarding the illusion of

> objectivity which must be clarified. On the one hand,

> the word 'object' may refer to the hypothetical material

> entity distinct from consciousness to which our

> perceptions supposedly refer. We may call this the 'gross

> object'. But on the other hand, it is common experience

> that the perceptions themselves may appear as objects.

> If one contemplates one's perceptions, they too may

> seem distinct and 'out there', much like a hologram.

> We may call this the 'subtle object'. This distinction

> neutralizes a common objection to the subjective idealistic

> interpretation of Shankara. Authors such as Eliot Deutsch

> quote the notorious passage II.2.28 from Shankara's Brahma

> Sutra Bashya refuting the Buddhist Vijnanavadins (idealists),

> where Shankara says, "There could be no non-existence (of

> external entities) because external entities are actually

> perceived..." Leaving aside that Shankara misunderstands

> the alleged 'nihilism' of the Buddhists (both Madhyamika and

> Vijnanavada), his argument in this case is invalid. By referring

> directly to perception, he only confirms the truth of subjective

> idealism as described here, but he does make the correct point

> that the perceptions appear as though objective when we are

> in the ordinary dualistic frame of mind (which he calls

> vyavaharika).

>

> Hari Om!

> Benjamin

[Guest guest]

Humble praNAms Sri Chittaranjan prabhuji,

Hare Krishna

 

CN prabhuji:

 

The unreal is that which is changing and has a beginning and an end.

That which is non-existent in the beginning and the in the end is non-

existent in the middle to be sure. This is of course true. But we

also need to enquire into the nature of change. When we dive deeper

into its meaning, two aspects of the world arises - one as the pre-

existent in the cause,

 

bhaskar :

 

prabhuji, I think we've discussed this particular point during our

pUrNamidam discussion. The pre-existent effect in cause i.e. bIja rUpa,

avyAkruta, avyakta rUpa of mAya in brahman is false attribution on

nirvishEsha, nirvikalpa parabrahman. The causal potentiality or mAyA or

pre-existent effect in the cause in

avyAkruta rUpa is avidyAtmika (of the nature of avidyA). This is what

shankara clearly says in sUtra bhAshya. (AtmabhUte iva avdiyAkalpita nAma

rUpe etc.). Here in this sUtra commentary, it is clearly said that this

pre existent of effect (kArya) in the cause (kAraNa) is nothing but

invention of avidyA. pre-existent of effect in bIja rUpa (seed form) comes

into picture only & only if you accept the reality of upAdAna kAraNa of

nAma rUpAtmaka jagat.

 

 

 

CN prabhuji:

 

and the other as a chimerical appearance. If you ask me whether that which

changes is false, I will not deny that it is false in so far as it appears

to be changing. But the question of change has to be asked prior to this -

what is it that is called

change? I am parking this question for the present as the topic comes

to the stage in Part VII.

 

bhaskar :

 

Kindly do address this question with appropriate quotes from shankara, so

that we can also learn shankara siddhAnta through *his bhAshya-s*. I am

very eager to know that unchanging thing (pre-existent thing) which is

subsequently causing modification in nAmarUpAtmaka jagat.

 

Humble praNAms

Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!

bhaskar

[Guest guest]

Namaste Shri Bhaskarji,

 

 

advaitin, bhaskar.yr@i... wrote:

>

>

> Kindly do address this question with appropriate quotes from

> shankara, so that we can also learn shankara siddhAnta through

> *his bhAshya-s*. I am very eager to know that unchanging

> thing (pre-existent thing) which is subsequently causing

> modification in nAmarUpAtmaka jagat.

 

 

I will certainly address this topic, but there is a mystery in

the "modifications" of namarupatmaka jagat that I will not be able to

dissolve because it is THE mystery of EXISTENCE.

 

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan

[Guest guest]

Namaste Chittaranjanji,

 

Thanks for your warm welcome.

 

As you said, I won't go much deep into the 'unreal' aspect now. Anyway, we

have this feast for a whole month! I will try to unravel the use of 'son of

a barren woman' as used in the original quote you provided, BSB-2-2-28. This

topic was put under the microscope many a times before in this forum by some

of our members. Some members even concluded that Shri sha~Nkara didn't

understand what he was objecting to! I hope this attempt won't add any more

numbers to that camp. ;-)

 

Shri sha~Nkara brings in 'viShNumitra appears like the son of a barren

woman' in BSB-2-2-28 while objecting to the buddhist vij~nAnavAdin's view.

So we should first see what the vij~nAnavAdin's view is.

 

sha~NkarabhAshyam:

" Yes, you do speak like that, since you have no curb to your mouth; but you

do not speak logically, FOR SOMETHING OTHER THAN THE PERCEPTION HAS TO BE

ADMITTED PERFORCE, just because it is perceived. Not that anybody cognizes a

perception to be a pillar, a wall, etc., rather all people cognize a pillar,

a wall, etc., as objects of perception. "

 

The view of the vij~nAnavAdin is that no external objects exist. Everything

that we percieve is just a perception. There is no real object at all.

Unfortunately, some think that this is the view of the advaitin-s also! But

Shri sha~Nkara maintains that a real object should necessarily be in front

of us for perception to take place. He argues that if at all anything is

perceived, there should be a 'something' which exists in front of us for

that perception to take place. It is not that perception will come out of

nowhere. All people cognize a rope as a rope, or a snake, wedge in the

groud, stream of water, etc., and this perception presupposes the existence

of a 'something'. We never cognize a perception to be a rope, rather we

cognize a rope as a perception, whether as a rope or as something else.

 

Now Shri sha~Nkara sets the stage for the entry of the son_of_a_barren_woman

example.

 

sha~NkarabhAshyam:

" And it is for this reason that all people understand those others as

really assuming the existence of an external thing even while they deny it

by saying, 'That which is the content of an internal awareness appears as

though external'. For they use the phrase 'as though' in the clause 'As

though external' just because they too become aware of a cognition appearing

externally in the same way as is well known to all people, and yet they want

to deny any external object. "

 

Here, the vij~nAnavAdin's view is that the pillar, even though an internal

awareness, exists 'as though' external. Shri sha~Nkara argues that the usage

of the words 'as though external' proves that they also are aware of an

external world of objects. Now Shri sha~Nkara brings in 'son of a barren

woman' to show that the vij~nAnavAdin's usage of words contradicts his view

itself.

 

sha~NkarabhAshyam:

" Else why should they say, 'as though external'? For nobody speaks thus:

'viShNumitra appears like the son of a barren woman'! "

 

Now, it is logical to say 'viShNumitra appears like devadatta' only if

devadatta is an existing person. But it is not so if 'devadatta' is replaced

by 'son of a barren woman' because 'son of a barren woman' is a non-entity.

So if someone say that 'A' appears like 'B', it is obvious that 'B' exists.

Similarly, when the vij~nAnavAdin say 'as though external', it is very clear

that his words give room to the existance of a world of external objects.

This is how the 'son of a barren woman' example is used by Shri sha~Nkara in

BSB-2-2-28. He doesn't use it to explain the superimposition in advaita. He

uses it only to show that the vij~nAnavAdin's view is contradicted by his

own words.

 

Now this doesn't mean that 'son of a barren woman' cannot be used to explain

superimposition in advaita. Both of us say, 'The world is not unreal like

the son of a barren woman or the horns of a hare'. But both of us see it in

a different way. I see it as explaining the existence of a substratum, a

locus for the superimposition to take place. The son of a barren woman or

the horns of a hare are purely non-existing things. They don't have a

material cause. Whereas the superimposition of the world is different. It

has a substratum,a locus, a material cause and that is brahman. So the

superimposition of the world is more like a snake seen as a rope. It has a

substratum, a real rope as the locus.

 

However, you use the 'son of a barren woman' example to show that there are

real snakes in this world. This, I believe is a wrong usage of the analogy.

Let the superimposition be anything, known or unknown. The only point is

that there should be a real substratum for the superimposition to take

place. I leave this topic here for other members in this forum to comment.

 

 

You said:

" I believe that that is why the boy-sky analogy is useful - to understand

the nature of the more primal superimposition of the non-Self on the Self.

The superimposition between objects in the world is not like the

superimposition between an unpercieved thing and a perceived object, and

this is the only example in the preamble that directs itself to this type of

error. "

>From the above, I understand you as follows.

a) The superimposition between objects in the world is not like the

superimposition of the non-Self on the Self.

b) The latter is a case of superimposition between a perceived and an

unpercieved object.

 

I will comment on this after I quote your further statements.

 

I had expressed my view as below:

" Shri sha~Nkara clearly answers the objection by saying that it is

apprehended as the content of the concept 'I'. "

 

To this you replied:

" Shankara brings in this argument because something that is totally

unknown, or concealed, cannot become the locus of an error. This statement

is therefore necessary before moving on to the example of the boy-sky

because it establishes one of the necessary conditions for an error to take

place. And thanks for pionting this out because it is another condition for

error that I had missed out in my post. :-) "

 

Chittaranjanji, I didn't understand you properly here. The objection raised

against Shri sha~Nkara was that one of the necessary condition for

superimposition to take place is the availability of the object as an object

of sense-perception and that the Self onto which the non-Self is

superimposed is not such an object of sense-perception. If you see the way

Shri sha~Nkara refutes this objection, it is clear He not only proves that

the objection is itself invalid, but also shows that it doesn't stand

against His view.

 

First of all, there is no rule that superimposition will only take place on

an object of perception. To prove this, He brings in the boy-sky example. I

have gone through your detailed posting to Shri Venkat on the boy-sky

example. So explaining the example here would be redundant! By showing that

an unperceived thing such as the sky is subjected to superimposition by the

boys, Shri sha~Nkara proves that the necessary condition for superimposition

as put forth by the objector is in fact illogical.

 

Secondly, Shri sha~Nkara maintains that the superimposition of the non-Self

on the Self is not a superimposition of this kind. The Self is in fact

apprehended as the content of the concept 'I' and is well known in the world

as an immediately perceived entity. So even if the objection is admitted for

the sake of argument, it doesn't stand against the superimposition of the

non-Self on the Self as explained by Shri sha~Nkara. I hope I am clear.

 

Chittaranjanji, there are several other points worth examining in your post.

But I desist from the attempt since I believe you will be explaining them in

more detail in your future posts. And moreover I have a slight problem with

availability of time in my office now. I am going on leave to India next

month. So many things have to be taken care of on the official front before

I leave. hmmmm... Time time time when will we ever be free? :-)

 

hara hara sha~Nkara jaya jaya sha~Nkara

 

Hari OM

[Guest guest]

Namaste Shri Ranjeetji,

 

I am in perfect agreement with you as far as the invalidity of the

Buddhist doctrines is concerned. However, there is a slight

disagreement in respect of some other points which I'll try to

clarify here.

 

advaitin, "Ranjeet Sankar"

<thefinalsearch> wrote:

> This is how the 'son of a barren woman' example is used by

> Shri sha~Nkara in BSB-2-2-28. He doesn't use it to explain

> the superimposition in advaita. He uses it only to show that

> the vij~nAnavAdin's view is contradicted by his own words.

 

Agreed.

 

> Now this doesn't mean that 'son of a barren woman' cannot be

> used to explain superimposition in advaita. Both of us say,

> 'The world is not unreal like the son of a barren woman or the

> horns of a hare'. But both of us see it in a different way.

 

No, I also see it the way you do.

 

> I see it as explaining the existence of a substratum, a locus

> for the superimposition to take place. The son of a barren woman

> or the horns of a hare are purely non-existing things. They don't

> have a material cause. Whereas the superimposition of the world

> is different. It has a substratum, a locus, a material cause and

> that is brahman. So the superimposition of the world is more like

> a snake seen as a rope. It has a substratum, a real rope as the

> locus.

 

I agree with all this, but I don't limit the analogy to only this.

Another interesting thing here is that this very substratum is the

condition that the object must be atleast partially seen for an error

to take place. The rope - the substratum - must be discerned as

atleast 'this' for it to be mistaken as a snake. The nacre must be

seen as some 'this' for it to be mistaken for silver. Likewise, the

Self must be apprehended for it to be mistaken as the non-Self. This

is the condition I was talking about in the boy-sky analogy.

> However, you use the 'son of a barren woman' example to show that

> there are real snakes in this world. This, I believe is a wrong

> usage of the analogy. Let the superimposition be anything, known

> or unknown.

 

You can't simply say 'let the superimposition be anything, known or

unknown' for the unknown can never be a thing to be superimposed.

Then the snake in the error will become "this unknown thing" and not

a "snake". That is why the son of a barren woman can never be a

superimposition. That is why it has to be a real thing that in the

instance of error is something that in retrospect - when the error is

sublated - can be an unreal thing.

 

In respect of the boy-sky analogy, you write:

> Chittaranjanji, I didn't understand you properly here. The

> objection raised against Shri sha~Nkara was that one of the

> necessary condition for superimposition to take place is the

> availability of the object as an object of sense-perception

> and that the Self onto which the non-Self is superimposed is

> not such an object of sense-perception. If you see the way

> Shri sha~Nkara refutes this objection, it is clear He not

> only proves that the objection is itself invalid, but also

> shows that it doesn't stand against His view.

>

> First of all, there is no rule that superimposition will only

> take place on an object of perception. To prove this, He brings

> in the boy-sky example. I have gone through your detailed posting

> to Shri Venkat on the boy-sky example. So explaining the example

> here would be redundant! By showing that an unperceived thing

> such as the sky is subjected to superimposition by the

> boys, Shri sha~Nkara proves that the necessary condition for

> superimposition as put forth by the objector is in fact

> illogical.

> Secondly, Shri sha~Nkara maintains that the superimposition of

> the non-Self on the Self is not a superimposition of this kind.

> The Self is in fact apprehended as the content of the concept

> 'I' and is well known in the world as an immediately perceived

> entity. So even if the objection is admitted for the sake of

> argument, it doesn't stand against the superimposition of the

> non-Self on the Self as explained by Shri sha~Nkara. I hope I

> am clear.

 

What you have said as 'firstly' and 'secondly' should be interchanged

to comply with the order in which Shankara goes about it. Shankara

first proves that the objection of the opponent is invalid in so far

as the Self is not an unperceived thing. He says that it is the

content of an internal apprehension "I". The objection has been thus

invalidated. But then, why does Shankara proceed to bring in the sky

as an example of an unperceived thing when the entire objection has

already been invalidated. Where is the answer to this? Shankara

clearly mentions that the sky is not a perceived thing. Yet the sky

is a perceived thing - it is perceived through the attribute of

sound. The unpercived is also apprehended, otherwise we will never

ever know of its existence. There is here the perennial mystery of

the known being unknown and the unknown being known - a paradox in

the field of experience that can't be avoided. Brahman is

incomprehensible, but that same Brahman is one-fourth known and three-

fourth unknown. It is necessary to recognise that Advaita is

mystical. Atleast that is how I see it. And it is this very thing

that makes both the concealment and the partial apprehension of the

substratum as a necessary condition for an error to take place. Also,

this makes it clear why "there is no rule that superimposition will

only take place on an object of perception" for the unperceived is

paradoxically also perceived. Hence it is all clear - once the

mystery is admitted. And the mystery is not of my making, it is in

Shankara's own words that says that the Self which is 'neti, neti' is

not entirely beyond apprehension.

 

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan

[Guest guest]

Namaste Shri Dennisji,

> I'm bound to agree with comments to the effect that:

> a) wonderful presentation but b) really hard going for

> anyone not having a degree in philosophy!

 

Thank you for your kind words Sir. If having a degree in philosophy

is a qualification for this discussion, then I will be the first one

to be disqualified. :-)

 

> Also, I feel that it is not reasonable to conclude that

> Shankara did not believe X because he does not specifically

> state X in a particular writing. He may not specifically

> state that the world is unreal in the BSB but does

> he not effectively do this in his commentary on the

> Gaudapada karika?

 

I agree with you. I think some clarification is necessary here on

what I wrote in Part III. The Brahma Sutra Bhashya DOES speak about

the unreality of the world. As regards the Karika, we will definitely

address the question of unreality as it appears there later on. The

entire scope of my previous post (Part III) was only the PREAMBLE to

the BSB. There is a view held by many people that the preamble

introduces the idea that the world is unreal. The purva-paksha has

certainly picked on this idea and attacked Shankara Advaita saying

that this is an assumption that is instilled right before going into

the bhashya, and that this premise colours the entire interpretation

of the bhashya. The purpose of my essay (Part III) was to show that

there is no such premise in the preamble. Unreality, in so far as it

arises in the context of the preamble, is only the mistaking of one

thing for another, and not that any of the two things involved in the

error are absolutely non-existent. The only objection that can

possibly arise to this theses is from the passage that Ranjeetji had

quoted wherein it is indicated that the entire manifested universe

arises from superimposition. But if one goes by the meaning of

superimposition that arises out of the preamble, it only means that

Brahman is mistaken to be the world, and that the world is unreal

only in the locus of this mistake and is not absolutely unreal. But

this brings in the doubt as to how the world can be real considering

that there can possibly be no other locus than Brahman. But I believe

such a doubt arises only because by the term 'locus' we understand

something that is located in space and time. But the locus of

superimposition here is not something that is spatio-temporal, but is

the very roots of meaning. The meanings of both the terms 'real'

and 'unreal' arise from meaning-conferments in the Self, and the

meanings confered are the loci.

 

> And "It is because there are real snakes in the world that a

> rope can be mistaken for a snake. We do not, for example,

> mistake a person to be the son of a barren woman." But we do

> mistake posts for ghosts, don't we and there are not any real

> ghosts (to my knowledge)?

 

If all the snakes in the world are killed today, then would I be

wrong if I continue to say that snakes are real things? I would be

inclined to say that snakes are real things irrespective of whether

they are manifested in the world or not. But others may not agree

with me. Now, this is actually a question of ontology - the question

of the predication of existence to things. According to me, ghosts

exist. When you say that "we do mistake posts for ghosts" and "there

are not any real ghosts", the premise that there are no real ghosts

influences your conclusion that real things are not required for the

unreal to appear in the likeness of those things. And my premise that

ghosts exist influences my conclusion that real things are required

for them to appear as unreal in the locus of error. We cannot resolve

this matter through mere analogies; we need to first investigate the

meaning of existence. You may however accuse me of bringing in an

analogy to demostrate a thing when the analogy is itself in question,

and I accept that such an accusation would be justified at this

moment.

 

While on this topic, I would also like to make a correction to what I

said earlier and which appears in your quote from my messsage: "The

world in Advaita is unreal like the snake in the rope, and the snake

in the rope is grounded on its likeness to real snakes in the world."

I believe that the qualification 'in the world' makes the position

tends to the Nyaya theory. I should have said 'likeness to real

snakes' and stopped at that without saying 'in the world' because

else-whereness is not an Advaitic doctrine.

 

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan

[Guest guest]

advaitin, "Chittaranjan Naik"

<chittaranjan_naik> wrote:

 

<snip>

>He may not specifically

> > state that the world is unreal in the BSB but does

> > he not effectively do this in his commentary on the

> > Gaudapada karika? ...

>

> The Brahma Sutra Bhashya DOES speak about

> the unreality of the world. As regards the Karika, we will definitely

> address the question of unreality as it appears there later on. <snip>

 

Namaste Sri Chittaranjan,

 

I had assumed that the Brahma Sutras were not in my collection until I

looked at the Vedanta Sutras and discovered that it's the same thing.

I did a search through the archives, and I couldn't find mention of

this dual/title work.

 

Maybe there are other "clueless" readers who will find this

information useful. I have a lot to learn.

 

Regards,

 

Bob Freedman

[Guest guest]

Namaste Shri Freedmanji,

 

 

advaitin, "serph1938" <rlfreed@p...> wrote:

> advaitin, "Chittaranjan Naik"

>

> Namaste Sri Chittaranjan,

>

> I had assumed that the Brahma Sutras were not in my

> collection until I looked at the Vedanta Sutras and

> discovered that it's the same thing. I did a search

> through the archives, and I couldn't find mention of

> this dual/title work.

>

> Maybe there are other "clueless" readers who will find

> this information useful. I have a lot to learn.

 

 

The forward to Swami Gambhirananda's translation furnishes us with

this additional information: "The third of the canonical texts is the

Brahma Sutra which is regarded as Nyaya-prasthana, because it sets

forth the teachings of Vedanta in a logical order. This work is known

by other names also: Vedanta-sutra, since it is the aphoristic text

on Vedanta; Sariraka-sutra, since it is concerned with the nature and

destiny of the embodied soul; Bhikshu-sutra, since those who are most

competent to study it are the sannyasins; Uttara-mimamsa-sutra, since

it is an enquiry into the final sections of the Veda."

 

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan