Guest guest Posted July 10, 2004 Report Share Posted July 10, 2004 Namaste Chitteranjanji, As you have given some thought to the boys/sky/pan section of the preamble there are significant ways in which it differs from the paradigm case of the rope/snake. The latter is confusion pure and simple and once you are disabused of your error you will no longer see a snake where it is not. In the other case which is a delusion, you will continue to see it even if told about it. This would be an example of the well known optical illusion. Superimposition cannot be at work here so it is a questionable extension of the principle by Shankara to claim that it is. When the non-self is superimposed on the Self he claims that the Self is not unknown either. True in one way viz. that it is shown to exist by remembrance and by the contiuity of identity. However is is not known as a separate thing which is the case with both the rope and the snake. In short it is shown but not known. I'm bound to say that there seems here to be an uncertainty about the function of analogical thinking. The sense of superimposition is what is intended to be borne by the analogy not any imputation of exact likeness. By getting involved with 'Self/non-self is not like rope/snake' and tacitly accepting this total likeness criteria for the general efficacy of analogies a muddle is created. Shankara's changing of the paradigm case from confusion to illusion shows this. Really all an analogy has to do is to show a general likeness of operation between one field and the other. In that connection 'substratum' is beginning to be talked about. That adds an extra theoretical spice to the stew in that it is a generalisation about the function of the rope for the snake to appear. O.K. but is the transferance of that to Self/non-self legitimate? Isn't that to make out that the superimposition is of exactly the same sort? This tends to transfer the thought that one is real and the other is not, in the same sense of real/unreal. Where specifically does Shankara talk about the substratum idea? Best Wishes, Michael. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 10, 2004 Report Share Posted July 10, 2004 Namaste Shri Chittaranjanji, To my remark, 'Let the superimposition be anything, known or unknown.' you replied, " You can't simply say 'let the superimposition be anything, known or unknown' for the unknown can never be a thing to be superimposed. Then the snake in the error will become "this unknown thing" and not a "snake". That is why the son of a barren woman can never be a superimposition. That is why it has to be a real thing that in the instance of error is something that in retrospect - when the error is sublated - can be an unreal thing." I will tell you why I made that remark. The point I wanted to drive home was that whether the superimposed thing is known or unknown is irrelevant to me (and Shri sha~Nkara). The analogy and the reasoning applied in the field of vedAnta should be that which would help us in the direct experience of the Self. So the reasoning used behind an analogy should always help us in moving towards the Real, and not towards the unreal. So the dielectrics involved in finding the reality or unreality of the superimposed thing is unwanted. That is also the reason why shri sha~Nkara doesn't go into explaining the various theories of errors in the preamble. The point is that there is beginningless superimposition. And the ascertainment of the Real entity is what really matters. You will see this aspect if you take any analogy given by shri sha~Nkara. He never goes into explaining the reality grade of the snake, the silver etc. All this analogies are used only to show us the basic nature of the superimposition, an unreal modification of name and form. It also points us to the reality (rope, shell etc.) in the superimposition. Going by this logic, the "son of a barren woman" should be a pointer towards the real entity involved in the superimposition, which is the substratum, and not towards the superimposed part of it. Chittaranjanji, if possible, please give references wherein 'son of a barren woman' is explained in your way. I am not well-read when it comes to texts by authors other than Shri sha~Nkara. You said: " What you have said as 'firstly' and 'secondly' should be interchanged to comply with the order in which Shankara goes about it. " True. I thought this was a more easier way to explain.:-) On the boy-sky analogy, you said: " Shankara first proves that the objection of the opponent is invalid in so far as the Self is not an unperceived thing. He says that it is the content of an internal apprehension "I". The objection has been thus invalidated. But then, why does Shankara proceed to bring in the sky as an example of an unperceived thing when the entire objection has already been invalidated. Where is the answer to this? Shankara clearly mentions that the sky is not a perceived thing. Yet the sky is a perceived thing - it is perceived through the attribute of sound. " Chittaranjanji, you are making the same mistake which some members did while reading BSB-2-2-28. Please see the original objection. The original objection was that superimposition can only take place on something in front of us, and the Self on which the non-Self is superimposed is not perceived as an object in front of us. Shri sha~Nkara first shows that this objection cannot stand against the superimposition of the non-Self on the Self. Secondly, the boy-sky analogy is brought in to show that superimposition can take place even if the object is not perceived as in front of us. The boy doesn't perceive the sky as an object in front on him. Even then, he superimposes dirt and concavity on the sky. So the ONLY point that Shri sha~Nkara wanted to convey was that superimposition can take place even if the substratum is not an object in front of us. There is no need to go a level deep into the perception of the sky through the attribute of sound and so on. You said: " It is necessary to recognise that Advaita is mystical. Atleast that is how I see it. " You got company !! Welcome to the club ;-) Chittaranjanji, I don't want to tie you to the preamble essay. You may please continue with the discussion. hara hara sha~Nkara jaya jaya sha~Nkara Hari Om Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 10, 2004 Report Share Posted July 10, 2004 Namaste Chittaranjanji, I have read somewhere in swAmi satchidAnandEndra saraswathi's "The method of vedAnta" that the claim of a 'real snake' for the snake-rope superimposition to take place is wrong. He was referring to the dream world and also to the state of a lunatic. Unfortunately, I am not able to reproduce the entire objection since I don't remember the section where it appears. I will post it if I come across the same. hara hara sha~Nkara jaya jaya sha~Nkara Hari Om - "Chittaranjan Naik" <chittaranjan_naik > Namaste Shri Dennisji, > > > > And "It is because there are real snakes in the world that a > > rope can be mistaken for a snake. We do not, for example, > > mistake a person to be the son of a barren woman." But we do > > mistake posts for ghosts, don't we and there are not any real > > ghosts (to my knowledge)? > > If all the snakes in the world are killed today, then would I be > wrong if I continue to say that snakes are real things? I would be > inclined to say that snakes are real things irrespective of whether > they are manifested in the world or not. But others may not agree > with me. Now, this is actually a question of ontology - the question > of the predication of existence to things. According to me, ghosts > exist. When you say that "we do mistake posts for ghosts" and "there > are not any real ghosts", the premise that there are no real ghosts > influences your conclusion that real things are not required for the > unreal to appear in the likeness of those things. And my premise that > ghosts exist influences my conclusion that real things are required > for them to appear as unreal in the locus of error. We cannot resolve > this matter through mere analogies; we need to first investigate the > meaning of existence. You may however accuse me of bringing in an > analogy to demostrate a thing when the analogy is itself in question, > and I accept that such an accusation would be justified at this > moment. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 10, 2004 Report Share Posted July 10, 2004 Namaste Shri Ranjeetji, Ranjeetji, all your objections are based on the fact that I am speaking words that go beyond the lines of the bhashya. I can't help it, I am trying to present my understanding. And I am likely to 'stray' even more as we go along in this series. Unfortunately, I can't agree with you when you say that there is no need to go to a level deeper than what is presented in the words of the bhashya. What does 'deeper' here mean? Doesn't it mean the depth of meaning? > The point I wanted to drive home was that whether the > superimposed thing is known or unknown is irrelevant to > me (and Shri sha~Nkara). That's appropriating Shri Shankara to your views. :-) > The analogy and the reasoning applied in the field of > vedAnta should be that which would help us in the direct > experience of the Self. So the reasoning used behind an > analogy should always help us in moving towards the Real, > and not towards the unreal. Isn't that circular reasoning - we are here discussing the real and the unreal, and you are asking us to move away from the unreal that is yet to be determined. But there is nowhere to move. We are the Self, the Real. There can never be the unreal, so how can we move away from it? :-) > Chittaranjanji, I don't want to tie you to the preamble essay. > You may please continue with the discussion. Yes, I'm thinking of posting the next part tomorrow if I can make the additions to it that I'm thinking of. Warm regards, Chittaranjan advaitin, "Ranjeet Sankar" <thefinalsearch> wrote: > Namaste Shri Chittaranjanji, > > To my remark, 'Let the superimposition be anything, known or unknown.' > you replied, > > " You can't simply say 'let the superimposition be anything, known or > unknown' for the unknown can never be a thing to be superimposed. Then the > snake in the error will become "this unknown thing" and not a "snake". That > is why the son of a barren woman can never be a superimposition. That is why > it has to be a real thing that in the instance of error is something that in > retrospect - when the error is sublated - can be an unreal thing." > > > I will tell you why I made that remark. The point I wanted to drive home was > that whether the superimposed thing is known or unknown is irrelevant to me > (and Shri sha~Nkara). The analogy and the reasoning applied in the field of > vedAnta should be that which would help us in the direct experience of the > Self. So the reasoning used behind an analogy should always help us in > moving towards the Real, and not towards the unreal. So the dielectrics > involved in finding the reality or unreality of the superimposed thing is > unwanted. That is also the reason why shri sha~Nkara doesn't go into > explaining the various theories of errors in the preamble. The point is that > there is beginningless superimposition. And the ascertainment of the Real > entity is what really matters. You will see this aspect if you take any > analogy given by shri sha~Nkara. He never goes into explaining the reality > grade of the snake, the silver etc. All this analogies are used only to show > us the basic nature of the superimposition, an unreal modification of name > and form. It also points us to the reality (rope, shell etc.) in the > superimposition. Going by this logic, the "son of a barren woman" should be > a pointer towards the real entity involved in the superimposition, which is > the substratum, and not towards the superimposed part of it. > > Chittaranjanji, if possible, please give references wherein 'son of a barren > woman' is explained in your way. I am not well-read when it comes to texts > by authors other than Shri sha~Nkara. > > > You said: > " What you have said as 'firstly' and 'secondly' should be interchanged to > comply with the order in which Shankara goes about it. " > > True. I thought this was a more easier way to explain.:-) > > > On the boy-sky analogy, you said: > " Shankara first proves that the objection of the opponent is invalid in so > far as the Self is not an unperceived thing. He says that it is the content > of an internal apprehension "I". The objection has been thus invalidated. > But then, why does Shankara proceed to bring in the sky as an example of an > unperceived thing when the entire objection has already been invalidated. > Where is the answer to this? Shankara clearly mentions that the sky is not a > perceived thing. Yet the sky is a perceived thing - it is perceived through > the attribute of sound. " > > Chittaranjanji, you are making the same mistake which some members did while > reading BSB-2-2-28. Please see the original objection. The original > objection was that superimposition can only take place on something in front > of us, and the Self on which the non-Self is superimposed is not perceived > as an object in front of us. Shri sha~Nkara first shows that this objection > cannot stand against the superimposition of the non-Self on the Self. > Secondly, the boy-sky analogy is brought in to show that superimposition can > take place even if the object is not perceived as in front of us. The boy > doesn't perceive the sky as an object in front on him. Even then, he > superimposes dirt and concavity on the sky. So the ONLY point that Shri > sha~Nkara wanted to convey was that superimposition can take place even if > the substratum is not an object in front of us. There is no need to go a > level deep into the perception of the sky through the attribute of sound and > so on. > > > You said: > " It is necessary to recognise that Advaita is mystical. Atleast that is how > I see it. " > > You got company !! Welcome to the club ;-) > > Chittaranjanji, I don't want to tie you to the preamble essay. You may > please continue with the discussion. > > hara hara sha~Nkara jaya jaya sha~Nkara > > Hari Om Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 10, 2004 Report Share Posted July 10, 2004 Namaste Shri Ranjeetji, advaitin, "Ranjeet Sankar" <thefinalsearch> wrote: > Chittaranjanji, you are making the same mistake which some > members did ..... > the boy-sky analogy is brought in to show that > superimposition can take place even if the object is not > perceived as in front of us. The boy doesn't perceive the > sky as an object in front on him. Then the boy sees no space in front of him and should hence be seeing no objects in front of him. All the objects that 'are in front of him' should come in conjunction with him. Actually, the boy shouldn't be seeing physical objects at all because physical objects are extended things and there can be no extension without space. No, your contention is not correct - the boy does perceive space, though it remains hidden; it is hidden in so far as he doesn't know how to attach words to what he sees. Regards, Chittaranjan Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 10, 2004 Report Share Posted July 10, 2004 Isa upanishad Verse 15 Covered with the golden disc is the face of truth. Uncover it, O Pusan, so that I who love truth may be able to see it. well, as we climb the steps to reach the Ladder of Truth , I hope we will be able to move away from the unreal world of 'analogies' like Rope mistaken for a snake, or a Barren woman's son to the real world of BraHman. Love and regards Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 10, 2004 Report Share Posted July 10, 2004 Namaste Chittaranjanji, Agreeing to this would be the same as saying that Shri sha~Nkara's use of analogy was wrong ! Hari Om - "Chittaranjan Naik" <chittaranjan_naik > > Then the boy sees no space in front of him and should hence be seeing > no objects in front of him. All the objects that 'are in front of > him' should come in conjunction with him. Actually, the boy shouldn't > be seeing physical objects at all because physical objects are > extended things and there can be no extension without space. > > No, your contention is not correct - the boy does perceive space, > though it remains hidden; it is hidden in so far as he doesn't know > how to attach words to what he sees. > Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 11, 2004 Report Share Posted July 11, 2004 Namaste Shri Michaelji, I am not sure if I have understood the points in your message fully, but I feel that there is a distinction made between confusion and illusion (or delusion) in such a way that there is no superimposition in the latter case (of illusion). But in so far as there is a false notion held during delusion, and there is the real nature to the thing that is referred by the name, it is still a case of superimpision - of the wrong notion superimposed on the real reference of the word. I feel that the case of illusion is being considered as one in which duality doesn't persist (in so far as one may say that there is duality in the snake-rope error). I am not sure if that is how Shankara uses it. It is true that an optical illusion continues to be seen after the delusion is gone. But then, does the notion that was there during the delusion still persist? The thing continues to be seen as a phenomenon, it is true, but not as an illusion, the name 'optical illusion' being a name derived out of the capacity for illusion that the phenomenon has. The notion that got negated when the delusion went is the superimposion. Shankara takes only the characteristic that 'one thing is mistaken as another' as the generic feature of all errors. As for the causal factors, he says that it is "an awareness, similar in nature to memory, that arises on a different basis as a result of some past experience". The subject of substratum is I think a common one - when countering the Madhyamikas, Shankara states that there can be no error or phenomena without a substratum. The substratum must also be known. This is like Meno's paradox, and is treated in the Bhashya: Opponent: Is that Brahman, again, familiar or unfamiliar? If It be familiar, It need not be deliberated on for the sake of knowledge. Again, if It be unfamiliar, It cannot be deliberated on. Shankara: Brahman exists as a well-known entity. For from the very derivation of the word Brahman, the ideas of eternality, purity, etc. become obvious, this being in accord with the root brmh. It becomes necessary to establish, when speaking about unperceived 'things' that the lack of perception does not indicate complete imcomprehendability for that would make it incapable of being deliberated upon or being mistaken. The substratum is needed as the 'this' on which the false attribution takes place. And once it is established that the unperceivable is always something that is not entirely unknown, it becomes a ground to achieve two purposes (in the boy-sky case that was cited) - first, to negate the objection itself (that the Self is unperceived), and second to lay the barrier for the objection that the unperceived, being an unknown thing, cannot be the ground of an error. Warm regards, Chittaranjan advaitin, ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva@e...> wrote: > Namaste Chitteranjanji, > > As you have given some thought to the boys/sky/pan section > of the preamble there are significant ways in which it > differs from the paradigm case of the rope/snake. The > latter is confusion pure and simple and once you are > disabused of your error you will no longer see a snake > where it is not. In the other case which is a delusion, > you will continue to see it even if told about it. This > would be an example of the well known optical illusion. > Superimposition cannot be at work here so it is a > questionable extension of the principle by Shankara to > claim that it is. When the non-self is superimposed on > the Self he claims that the Self is not unknown either. > True in one way viz. that it is shown to exist by > remembrance and by the contiuity of identity. However is > is not known as a separate thing which is the case with > both the rope and the snake. In short it is shown but > not known. > > I'm bound to say that there seems here to be an > uncertainty about the function of analogical thinking. > The sense of superimposition is what is intended to be > borne by the analogy not any imputation of exact > likeness. By getting involved with 'Self/non-self is not > like rope/snake' and tacitly accepting this total > likeness criteria for the general efficacy of analogies a > muddle is created. Shankara's changing of the paradigm > case from confusion to illusion shows this. Really all > an analogy has to do is to show a general likeness of > operation between one field and the other. > > In that connection 'substratum' is beginning to be talked > about. That adds an extra theoretical spice to the stew > in that it is a generalisation about the function of the > rope for the snake to appear. O.K. but is the > transferance of that to Self/non-self legitimate? Isn't > that to make out that the superimposition is of exactly > the same sort? This tends to transfer the thought that > one is real and the other is not, in the same sense of > real/unreal. Where specifically does Shankara talk about > the substratum idea? > Best Wishes, Michael. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 11, 2004 Report Share Posted July 11, 2004 Namaste Shri Ranjeetji, advaitin, "Ranjeet Sankar" <thefinalsearch> wrote: > > Then the boy sees no space in front of him and should > > hence be seeing no objects in front of him. All the > > objects that 'are in front of him' should come in > > conjunction with him. Actually, the boy shouldn't > > be seeing physical objects at all because physical > > objects are extended things and there can be no extension > > without space. > Agreeing to this would be the same as saying that Shri > sha~Nkara's use of analogy was wrong ! That is what the purva-paksha says. The argument I had provided (above) that space is a perceived thing is a variation of the argument that Shankara brings against the Buddhists who say that space is not perceieved (and doesn't exist). Can we then say that Shankara is contradicting himself? I don't think so, and I feel we should look for the overarching principle that reconciles the apparent contradictions. The purpose of the boy-sky anology is to demostrate that there can be superimposition between the perceived and the unperceived, but to achieve that purpose it is necessary to ensure that the foundation is strong, which I believe the Acharya does. Warm regards, Chittaranjan Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 11, 2004 Report Share Posted July 11, 2004 Namaste Adiji, advaitin, "adi_shakthi16" <adi_shakthi16> wrote: > well, as we climb the steps to reach the Ladder of Truth , > I hope we will be able to move away from the unreal world > of 'analogies' like Rope mistaken for a snake, or a Barren > woman's son to the real world of BraHman. The steps are so may snakes, the moving away from the unreal is the unreality. The Real is Living, isn't it? And isn't Love its nature? We are trapped by the dry encrustations of our minds -- ratio (reason) has run away from Eros (love). But they are not sprung from different sources. Thay are one, but they have split into two in some primordial sundering of Reality. Now the heart goes her own way, and the intellect her own way. Must we not heal this primordial wound? There is a healing that is the way of the heart, and there is a healing that is the way of the intellect. When we go the way of the intellect, we find that there are snakes and dragons on the way - these are the complications that the mind has given to this world - and it is these snakes and dragons that we must conquer. Love and warm regards, Chittaranjan Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 13, 2004 Report Share Posted July 13, 2004 I am at least a week behind in my learning process. I am going through the mails chronologically. If many of these topics have already been addressed, my apologies. I am still addressing the third part. --- Chittaranjan Naik <chittaranjan_naik wrote: CN: > The assertion of unreality ascribed to the thing – and > it may be noted that it is to a 'thing' that unreality is ascribed - > is not a statement of the absolute non-existence of the thing, but a > denial of a real thing of the world as being existent in a locus ÿ where it is in actuality not existing. KS: >From my understanding: I would be little careful in the interpretation. Note that what is denied is the superimposed ‘thing’ but not the substantive of ‘the thing’, when one is seeing ‘the thing’. So is the world – ‘when one says the world is unreal’ what is denied is not the substantive of the world but the ‘appearance of the things’- which are superimpositions on the substantive which is never seen but yet is considered as real. When an advaitin says “world is unreal’ the unreality is like the unreality of the snake - denial of reality to what is assumed to be real snake. The appearances are not denied but the apparent ‘things’ are real is denied – similarly experience of plurality of the world is not denied but the reality of the plurality is denied – that includes all swajaati, vijaati and swagata Bheda-s (all differences between objects constituting the world). Yes - no where in the adhyaasa it is said the world is unreal but also equally YES no where in the adhyaasa it is said the world is real – it is ‘styaNRita mithuniikaraNam adhyaasam” – the mixing of real and unreal resulting in unitory experience is the error-the real part is there as the substantive for the superimposition and the unreal part is like the snake part - the supper imposed ‘things’ or the pluralistic world – the jadam part. In that sense it is like a dream, which I presume is the topic of the next chapter. CN: >Thus, in the superimposition > of the non-Self on the Self, the non-Self is said to be unreal as the > Self, but it cannot, logically, be said to be absolutely non- >existent. It is important to make this distinction. KS: YES– but also if I can add – it is equally important to recognize that it cannot said to be absolutely existent either. If I can express my thoughts, I get the feeling that the criticism of Vijnaanavaadins is little unfair as it is put – the ‘ as though’ applies to even to the distinction made between ‘externality’ and ‘internality’ in the perceptions. If that distinction is also recognized as superimposition of non-self on self as distinct special coordinates and is recognized, then the self-that is on which the non-self is superimposed – can neither be external nor internal since self being all pervading self. The distinction of the internal and external arises as the product of adhyaasa or notion there is an internal and internal with respect to body (mind is included) and these special distinctions associated with objects externality from the self is also taken as real – the world out there is only world superimposed on ‘I’ – neither external nor internal since both are one puurnam only. CN: > > The last sentence is significant - the world is not unreal like the > son of a barren woman. It is important to distinguish the difference > between the unreality of the son of a barren woman and the unreality > of the snake in the rope. The world in Advaita is unreal like the > snake in the rope, and the snake in the rope is grounded on its > likeness to real snakes in the world. To say that the world is ÿ absolutely unreal is to adopt the doctrine of the Buddhists. ............ >“It also affirms the reality of the object in the world, but >accepts the unreality of the object in the locus of error in >accordance with the empirical sublating cognition that the 'the >snake is false'. It is to be noted that the falseness of the snake in >the rope does not exterminate snakes from the world! > KS: The snake example here is extended beyond its applicability. This is one of the criticism of dwaitins on adhyaasa. The example is only in terms of normal experience of superimposition to show that adhyaasa arises by mixing real and unreal – satyaaNRita mithuniikaraNam. “To say that the world is absolutely unreal is to adopt the doctrine of the Buddhists.” – yes on the same token to say the world is real also not correct. Advaita does not affirm the reality of the world either. Adhyaass is the superimposition of the ‘world’ on reality – that does not make the world real either. Just as prior ‘samskaara’ of the snake is a pre-requisite for the superimposition of a snake on ‘the rope, the real; similarly from the prior ‘samskaara’, the ‘world or non-self’ is superimposed on the self, the real – not that there is a real world that has locus of its own some where like our good old snake. Clearly snake example is pushed more than its intended application. Instead one can take another example - One can take the ghost on the post for a change to see this clearly. If I project a ghost on the distant post, it is not that there is real ghost some where with its locus, I am only projecting a false ghost (I did not say non-real) on the post. I have notion of ghosts from the horror movies! Is the ghost real – no way. Is the ghost unreal – then it becomes like son of barren woman. Since I see it, it exists. The point is just because I am projecting based on my samskaara, does not make ghost any real. Similarly the world. Looks like I have umpteen mails before I can proceed to the next lesion in the series – Not counting our beloved lady – aditiji’s mails. Hari OM! Sadananda ===== What you have is destiny and what you do with what you have is self-effort. Future destiny is post destiny modified by your present action. You are not only the prisoner of your past but master of your future. - Swami Chinmayananda Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 13, 2004 Report Share Posted July 13, 2004 Namaste Sadanandaji, I hope you are in good health. > KS: > > YES- but also if I can add - it is equally important to recognize that > it cannot said to be absolutely existent either. > > If I can express my thoughts, I get the feeling that the criticism of > Vijnaanavaadins is little unfair as it is put - the ' as though' applies > to even to the distinction made between 'externality' and 'internality' > in the perceptions. If that distinction is also recognized as > superimposition of non-self on self as distinct special coordinates and > is recognized, then the self-that is on which the non-self is > superimposed - can neither be external nor internal since self being all > pervading self. The distinction of the internal and external arises as > the product of adhyaasa or notion there is an internal and internal with > respect to body (mind is included) and these special distinctions > associated with objects externality from the self is also taken as real > - the world out there is only world superimposed on 'I' - neither > external nor internal since both are one puurnam only. I believe that we should refrain ourselves from putting all the advaitic concepts in all the places. What to think of perception when even the notion of perception is a product of avidyA? In my humble opinion, reading BSB-2-2-28 through the entire-advaita-lens is unwanted. hara hara sha~Nkara jaya jaya sha~Nkara Hari Om Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 13, 2004 Report Share Posted July 13, 2004 Namaste Shri Sadanandaji, I feel that much of what you have written in your message arises from the doctrine of sat-asat-vilakshana. It is my belief that the doctrine of sat-asat-vilakshana is not found in Sri Shankaracharya's bhashya, but is a later development in Advaita that took place in the post-Shankara period. It is true that the Acharya mentions the term 'anirvacaniya', but it is not put forth as the nature of things, but of what can be said of things. Thus, the locution is always that it CANNOT BE SAID TO BE either real or unreal, not that it is neither real or unreal. In other words, anirvacaniya relates to the category of the epistemological and not of the ontological. It arises in TRYING TO DESCRIBE the nature of the world, and is not the nature of the world itself. If we postulate sat-asat as the nature of the world, then both the object that is seen in the normal course as well as the object that is seen in the error cannot be explained because both would have the characteristic of sat-asat - the one because the world would appear sat-asat in accordance with its nature, and the other (the object of error) would not appear real during the error due to its likeness to the object's nature which is sat-asat. Moreover, if objects are sat-asat it would result in universal chaos as there can be no certainty about anything at all in this world. There is a conflation of two distincly different perceptions in the definition of the world as sat-asat - it seeks to combine the validities of two disparate perceptions seen on two different occasions into a single definition. For example, the object of error is known to be unreal on its sublation, but it was seen as real when the error was seen; hence it is sat-asat. But this sat-asat relates only to its epistemological determinations, not to the object itself. What should be the deciding criteria here? The Acharya is clear - it is the current unsublated perception that must prevail. It cannot be violated by anumana. > The snake example here is extended beyond its applicability. > This is one of the criticism of dwaitins on adhyaasa. It is also the criticism of Advaita on the Nyaya theory. I had not noticed that I was commiting the same mistake as the Nyayaikas - I was saying that the snake in the error is based on the reality of snakes 'in the world'. The last part - 'in the world' - should not have been there, and I believe that I have corrected this in a subsequent post after reading the comments of Ranjeetji and Michaelji. As for mistaking a post for a ghost, the point was raised by Michaelji, but I believe that it cannot be resolved one way or the other without actually investigating how we predicate existence to things. Ghosts after all are as real as other things, for the shruti speaks about the world of the Manes. Warm regards, Chittaranjan advaitin, kuntimaddi sadananda <kuntimaddisada> wrote: > I am at least a week behind in my learning process. I am going through > the mails chronologically. If many of these topics have already been > addressed, my apologies. > > I am still addressing the third part. > > --- Chittaranjan Naik <chittaranjan_naik> wrote: > > CN: > > The assertion of unreality ascribed to the thing – and > > it may be noted that it is to a 'thing' that unreality is ascribed - > > is not a statement of the absolute non-existence of the thing, but a > > denial of a real thing of the world as being existent in a locus > ÿ where it is in actuality not existing. > > KS: > From my understanding: > > I would be little careful in the interpretation. Note that what is > denied is the superimposed `thing' but not the substantive of `the > thing', when one is seeing `the thing'. So is the world – `when one > says the world is unreal' what is denied is not the substantive of the > world but the `appearance of the things'- which are superimpositions on > the substantive which is never seen but yet is considered as real. When > an advaitin says "world is unreal' the unreality is like the unreality > of the snake - denial of reality to what is assumed to be real snake. > The appearances are not denied but the apparent `things' are real is > denied – similarly experience of plurality of the world is not denied > but the reality of the plurality is denied – that includes all swajaati, > vijaati and swagata Bheda-s (all differences between objects > constituting the world). Yes - no where in the adhyaasa it is said the > world is unreal but also equally YES no where in the adhyaasa it is > said the world is real – it is `styaNRita mithuniikaraNam adhyaasam" – > the mixing of real and unreal resulting in unitory experience is the > error-the real part is there as the substantive for the superimposition > and the unreal part is like the snake part - the supper imposed `things' > or the pluralistic world – the jadam part. In that sense it is like a > dream, which I presume is the topic of the next chapter. > > CN: > >Thus, in the superimposition > > of the non-Self on the Self, the non-Self is said to be unreal as the > > Self, but it cannot, logically, be said to be absolutely non- > >existent. It is important to make this distinction. > > KS: > > YES– but also if I can add – it is equally important to recognize that > it cannot said to be absolutely existent either. > > If I can express my thoughts, I get the feeling that the criticism of > Vijnaanavaadins is little unfair as it is put – the ` as though' applies > to even to the distinction made between `externality' and `internality' > in the perceptions. If that distinction is also recognized as > superimposition of non-self on self as distinct special coordinates and > is recognized, then the self-that is on which the non-self is > superimposed – can neither be external nor internal since self being all > pervading self. The distinction of the internal and external arises as > the product of adhyaasa or notion there is an internal and internal with > respect to body (mind is included) and these special distinctions > associated with objects externality from the self is also taken as real > – the world out there is only world superimposed on `I' – neither > external nor internal since both are one puurnam only. > > CN: > > > > > The last sentence is significant - the world is not unreal like the > > son of a barren woman. It is important to distinguish the difference > > between the unreality of the son of a barren woman and the unreality > > of the snake in the rope. The world in Advaita is unreal like the > > snake in the rope, and the snake in the rope is grounded on its > > likeness to real snakes in the world. To say that the world is > ÿ absolutely unreal is to adopt the doctrine of the Buddhists. > > ........... > > >"It also affirms the reality of the object in the world, but > >accepts the unreality of the object in the locus of error in > >accordance with the empirical sublating cognition that the 'the >snake > is false'. It is to be noted that the falseness of the snake in >the > rope does not exterminate snakes from the world! > > > > KS: The snake example here is extended beyond its applicability. This > is one of the criticism of dwaitins on adhyaasa. The example is only in > terms of normal experience of superimposition to show that adhyaasa > arises by mixing real and unreal – satyaaNRita mithuniikaraNam. > > "To say that the world is > absolutely unreal is to adopt the doctrine of the Buddhists." – yes on > the same token to say the world is real also not correct. > > Advaita does not affirm the reality of the world either. Adhyaass is the > superimposition of the `world' on reality – that does not make the world > real either. Just as prior `samskaara' of the snake is a pre- requisite > for the superimposition of a snake on `the rope, the real; similarly > from the prior `samskaara', the `world or non-self' is superimposed on > the self, the real – not that there is a real world that has locus of > its own some where like our good old snake. Clearly snake example is > pushed more than its intended application. Instead one can take another > example - One can take the ghost on the post for a change to see this > clearly. If I project a ghost on the distant post, it is not that there > is real ghost some where with its locus, I am only projecting a false > ghost (I did not say non-real) on the post. I have notion of ghosts > from the horror movies! Is the ghost real – no way. Is the ghost unreal > – then it becomes like son of barren woman. Since I see it, it exists. > The point is just because I am projecting based on my samskaara, does > not make ghost any real. Similarly the world. > > Looks like I have umpteen mails before I can proceed to the next lesion > in the series – Not counting our beloved lady – aditiji's mails. > > Hari OM! > Sadananda > > > ===== > What you have is destiny and what you do with what you have is self- effort. Future destiny is post destiny modified by your present action. You are not only the prisoner of your past but master of your future. - Swami Chinmayananda Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 13, 2004 Report Share Posted July 13, 2004 Namaste Shri Sadanandaji, I feel that I need to provide some additional clarification on what I said about anirvacaniya being epistemological and not ontological. The character of inexplicability arises on account of the avidya through which the world is seen. The world, as seen thus, cannot be said to be real or unreal because it is seen with an admixture of the real and the superimposition of the unreal. But in the light of knowledge, the world is real only, for there is no darkness of avidya in Light. A thing may not be what it is thought to be, but it is what it is nevertheless. According to Shankara, the nature of a thing is independent of the intellect. Warm regards, Chittaranjan advaitin, "Chittaranjan Naik" <chittaranjan_naik> wrote: > Namaste Shri Sadanandaji, > > I feel that much of what you have written in your message arises from > the doctrine of sat-asat-vilakshana. It is my belief that the > doctrine of sat-asat-vilakshana is not found in Sri Shankaracharya's > bhashya, but is a later development in Advaita that took place in the > post-Shankara period. It is true that the Acharya mentions the > term 'anirvacaniya', but it is not put forth as the nature of things, > but of what can be said of things. Thus, the locution is always that > it CANNOT BE SAID TO BE either real or unreal, not that it is neither > real or unreal. In other words, anirvacaniya relates to the category > of the epistemological and not of the ontological. It arises in > TRYING TO DESCRIBE the nature of the world, and is not the nature of > the world itself. If we postulate sat-asat as the nature of the > world, then both the object that is seen in the normal course as well > as the object that is seen in the error cannot be explained because > both would have the characteristic of sat-asat - the one because the > world would appear sat-asat in accordance with its nature, and the > other (the object of error) would not appear real during the error > due to its likeness to the object's nature which is sat-asat. > Moreover, if objects are sat-asat it would result in universal chaos > as there can be no certainty about anything at all in this world. > > There is a conflation of two distincly different perceptions in the > definition of the world as sat-asat - it seeks to combine the > validities of two disparate perceptions seen on two different > occasions into a single definition. For example, the object of error > is known to be unreal on its sublation, but it was seen as real when > the error was seen; hence it is sat-asat. But this sat-asat relates > only to its epistemological determinations, not to the object itself. > What should be the deciding criteria here? The Acharya is clear - it > is the current unsublated perception that must prevail. It cannot be > violated by anumana. > > > > The snake example here is extended beyond its applicability. > > This is one of the criticism of dwaitins on adhyaasa. > > It is also the criticism of Advaita on the Nyaya theory. I had not > noticed that I was commiting the same mistake as the Nyayaikas - I > was saying that the snake in the error is based on the reality of > snakes 'in the world'. The last part - 'in the world' - should not > have been there, and I believe that I have corrected this in a > subsequent post after reading the comments of Ranjeetji and > Michaelji. As for mistaking a post for a ghost, the point was raised > by Michaelji, but I believe that it cannot be resolved one way or the > other without actually investigating how we predicate existence to > things. Ghosts after all are as real as other things, for the shruti > speaks about the world of the Manes. > > Warm regards, > Chittaranjan > Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 14, 2004 Report Share Posted July 14, 2004 Thank you Chittaranjanji for your detailed response. >It is my belief that the doctrine of sat-asat-vilakshana is not >found in Sri Shankaracharya's bhashya, but is a later >development in Advaita that took >place in the post->Shankara period. Would love to know more details of the statement if is more than your belief or understanding. H.H. Swami Satchidanadendra saraswati has done extensive research on concepts of post Shankara that differed from Shankara – Shree Stig has done extensive study of the Swamiji’s work – may be he could elaborate on this issue. >It is true that the Acharya mentions the > term 'anirvacaniya', but it is not put forth as the nature of things, >but of what can be said of things. Thus, the locution is always >that it CANNOT BE SAID TO BE either real or unreal, not that it is >neither real or unreal. In other words, anirvacaniya relates to the >category of the epistemological and not of the ontological. Very interesting distinction. Now just for my clarification – let us take an example of ring made of gold. How do you describe the ring? Following your distinction – I can say two ways - It cannot be said to be real since gold is the substantive and ring is only a name for a form of gold, and it cannot be said to be unreal since it is there with a utility and is different from another form of gold, say, bangle etc. –Now is this an epistemological issue or an ontological issue? I can equally say – it is not real since it undergoes mutation to bangle or necklace without its substantive undergoing any change (provided I define from experience that what is real (ontologically speaking) is that which does not undergo any mutation during the mutation of the ring) and it is not unreal (unlike vandhyaa putraH) since it is experienced. Can you really make distinction between these two descriptions? Are ring and gold ontologically on equal par? – from anvaya and vyatiraka point– one (ring) is the other (gold) is and one is not the other is. Obviously I have to make a distinction between the two since one is dependent and the other is independent. That which is changing and that which is changeless in the changing should be ontologically on different footing compare to the changing things. Ontologically there is clear distinction between the two – both cannot have the same degree of reality. In that sense I think ‘anirvachaniiyam’ is more than an epistemological issue. It arises from the fundamental problem of Brahman (sat-chit-ananda) being the material cause as well – as defined by the yatova imaani bhUtaani jaayante … etc. Perhaps you need to provide us the definition of what is real- since by way of vandhyaa putraH we have the definition of unreal. I was going to write on the dream part but that could wait till we have the clear definitions of the terms we are using in the discussion. I must thank you for providing a good food for thought. Hari OM! Sadananda ===== What you have is destiny and what you do with what you have is self-effort. Future destiny is post destiny modified by your present action. You are not only the prisoner of your past but master of your future. - Swami Chinmayananda Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 14, 2004 Report Share Posted July 14, 2004 Namaste Shri Sadanandaji, Thank you for your comments Sadanandaji. I was all along trying to avoid the topic of sat-asat-vilakshana in this discussion, but I suppose it was bound to come up sooner or later. With regards to some of the points raised in your post, I will have to request you to allow me some more time - until a future posting - when the topic will come up. advaitin, kuntimaddi sadananda <kuntimaddisada> wrote: > > > It is true that the Acharya mentions the term 'anirvacaniya', > > but it is not put forth as the nature of things, but of what > > can be said of things. Thus, the locution is always that > > it CANNOT BE SAID TO BE either real or unreal, not that it > > is neither real or unreal. In other words, anirvacaniya > > relates to the >category of the epistemological and not > > of the ontological. > > Very interesting distinction. Now just for my clarification – > let us take an example of ring made of gold. How do you > describe the ring? The way the question is framed, it makes the ring the substantive. So, one description is that it is round. There would of course be other decriptions of the ring depending on the particular ring in question. > Following your distinction – I can say two ways - It cannot > be said to be real since gold is the substantive and ring is > only a name for a form of gold, The qualificatory word 'only' seems to presuppose that the ring is false and only gold is real. But the following reasoning seems to me to be correct. If 'ring' is a name for a form that is not seen where it is said to be, then it is unreal because the form denoted by the name is not present in the thing. But if 'ring' is a name for a form that is present where it is said to be, then it is real because it is present there. Would I be asking too much in asking why name and form is false? I am not discarding the Advaita tenet, I am merely asking how it comes to be that name and form is false. > and it cannot be said to be unreal since it is there with an > utility and is different from another form of gold, say, > bangle etc. –Now is this an epistemological issue or an > ontological issue? The determination of the truth of what a thing is is epistemological. What the thing is is ontological. > I can equally say – it is not real since it undergoes mutation > to bangle or necklace without its substantive undergoing any > change (provided I define from experience that what is real > (ontologically speaking) is that which does not undergo any > mutation during the mutation of the ring) and it is not > unreal (unlike vandhyaa putraH) since it is experienced. > Can you really make distinction between these two descriptions? The question of change is quite a tricky one. I would say that in reality there is no change of either the substantive or the qualificatory, but the qualifications merely manifest or do not manifest. But this is the topic of a later post (Part VII), and I would like to request for time until then, otherwise this post will become too long (and besides I would like to take a natural course to the topic of change). > Are ring and gold ontologically on equal part? – from anvaya > and vyatiraka point– one (ring) is the other (gold) is and > one is not the other is. Obviously I have to make a distinction > between the two since one is dependent and the other is > independent. The ring is not existentially different from the gold. It is gold itself. The distinction 'ring' is a form of the existential 'gold'. > That which is changing and that which is changeless in the > changing should be ontologically on different footing compare > to the changing things. Ontologically there is clear distinction > between the two – both cannot have the same degree of reality. > In that sense I think `anirvachaniiyam' is more than an > epistemological issue. Ontologically (existentially) there is no difference between the two because there are no two existents here. This is an empirical fact - the ring is not seen to be existing separately from the gold. Therefore, anirvacaniya is not applicable here. As for the question of change, that too is not applicable - but of this later. > Perhaps you need to provide us the definition of what is > real- since by way of vandhyaa putraH we have the definition > of unreal. This too is part of the same post which covers change - the two topics are related. For the present, in so far as the word 'real' applies to things, there are two connotations of the word: 1. The real is what exists. An existing thing is real. 2. The real is the nature of what exists. For example, when we say that 'it is a real apple', we mean that it conforms to the nature of an apple. Warm regards, Chittaranjan Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 14, 2004 Report Share Posted July 14, 2004 No problem - I may end up discussing the next post from my understanding. Hari OM! Sadananda --- Chittaranjan Naik <chittaranjan_naik wrote: > Namaste Shri Sadanandaji, > > Thank you for your comments Sadanandaji. I was all along trying to > avoid the topic of sat-asat-vilakshana in this discussion, but I > suppose it was bound to come up sooner or later. With regards to some > of the points raised in your post, I will have to request you to > allow me some more time - until a future posting - when the topic > will come up. ===== What you have is destiny and what you do with what you have is self-effort. Future destiny is post destiny modified by your present action. You are not only the prisoner of your past but master of your future. - Swami Chinmayananda Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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