The Real and the Unreal - Part IV - The Dream Analogy

[Guest guest]

Om Gurubhyo Namah

 

 

DREAM AND REALITY

 

According to Shri Shankaracharya, the world cannot be said to be

false on the basis of the dream analogy: "It has been said by those

who deny the existence of the external things that perception of

things like a pillar etc. in the waking state occur even in the

absence of external things, just as they do in a dream; for as

perceptions, they are similar. That has to be refuted. With regard to

this we say, the perceptions of the waking state cannot be classed

with those in a dream." (BSB,II,II,v,29).

 

The dream analogy presents us with an enigma. While Shankara affirms

the existence of the world in the Brahma Sutra Bhashya, his

commentary on the Gaudapada Karika seems to corroborate the view that

the world is unreal like the world of a dream. I suspect that, more

often than not, this seeming contradiction is resolved by assuming

that the bhashya speaks from a position of provisional or vyavaharika

sathya. While this thesis may not be entirely false, it would be a

deflection from the intent of the Acharya's words if we abstain from

examining the arguments provided. For, Shankara denies that the

appearance of objects can arise without there being real objects. In

order to reveal the full import of Shankara's words, we shall cite

here the three reasons given in the bhashya to show specifically that

the waking state is not like the dream state, alongwith one other

quote taken from a slightly different context, but equally applicable

to the case.

 

1. The objects of the waking state are not sublated under any

condition unlike those of the dream state.

 

"To a man arisen from sleep, the object perceived in a dream becomes

sublated, for he says, 'Falsely did I imagine myself in contact with

great men. In fact I never came in contact with great men; only my

mind became overpowered by sleep; and thus this delusion arose.' So

also in the case of magic etc., adequate sublation takes place. But a

thing seen in the waking state, a pillar for instance, is not thus

sublated under any condition." (BSB,II,II,v,29).

 

2. Dream vision is a kind of memory whereas those of the waking state

are perceptions of objects.

 

"Moreover, dream vision is a kind of memory, whereas the visions of

the waking state are forms of perception (through valid means of

knowledge). And the difference between perception and memory,

consisting in the presence or absence of objects, can be understood

by oneself, as for instance when one says: 'I remember my beloved

son, but I do not see him, though I want to see'." (BSB,II,II,v,29).

 

 

3. Objects cannot appear from mere internal impressions.

 

"And the assertion has to be refuted that even in the absence of

objects, the diversity of experience can be explained on the strength

of the variety of tendencies (or impressions). To this we say: The

tendencies cannot logically exist; for according to you, objects are

not perceived externally. It is precisely owing to the perception of

objects that a variety of (mental) tendencies corresponding to the

diverse objects can arise. But how can a variety of tendencies arise

when no object is perceived? Even if these tendencies have no

beginning (on the analogy of the seed and sprout), this infinite

regress will amount to a baseless assumption leading us nowhere like

the blind leading the blind, and it will thus cut at the roots of all

human dealings, so that your aim will remain unfulfilled. And it is

to be noted that the positive and negative instances that were

adduced by those who would deny the existence of external objects by

saying, 'All these experiences are caused by tendencies and not

objects' – those instances also stand refuted from this standpoint;

for no tendency can arise unless there be a perception of some

object. Moreover, from the admission that apprehension of objects is

possible even in the absence of past tendencies, and from the non-

apprehension that tendencies are possible in the absence of

perception of object, it follows that such positive and negative

instances (adduced by you) also prove the existence of objects.

Besides, what you call a tendency is a kind of impression (or

predisposition); and from common experience it is known that a

disposition cannot be imagined to exist unless it has some basis to

stand on, whereas you have nothing to supply this need; for nothing

can be found (by following your view) to stand as an abode for

dispositions." (BSB,II,II,v,30).

 

 

4. Objects are not unreal because they have distinguishing

characteristics.

 

"There is no distinction, as regards the nature of non-existence,

between the non-existence arising from the destruction of the seed

and the rest and the horns of a hare, both being equally

unsubstantial….. If, again, distinctive attributes be ascribed to non-

existence on the analogy of the lotus having blueness etc., then on

that very analogy of the lotus etc., non-existence will turn into

existence by the very fact of possessing distinctive qualities."

(BSB,II,II,iv,26).

 

 

Objects of the waking state are not like those of a dream. What

remains empirically valid cannot be superseded by a mere analogy. In

Shankara's words: "Moreover, one who cannot speak of the waking

experience as naturally baseless, just because that would contradict

experience, wants to speak of them as such on the strength of their

similarity with dream experiences. But anything that cannot be the

characteristic of something in its own right cannot certainly be so

because of a similarity with another. For fire, which is felt to be

warm, does not become cold because of some similarity with water. As

for the difference between dream and waking states, this has already

been shown." (BSB,II,II,v,29).

 

These are not provisional statements. They are to be resolved with

other statements in the bhashya through samanvaya, reconciliation, by

finding the higher truth in which the seeming contradictions are

resolved. I believe that the dream analogy has been used with a

certain lack of caution to 'prove' that the world is unreal. It is

true that in Advaita the world is considered unreal in a certain

sense, but it is this very meaning that is to be illuminated in the

light of the discriminative knowledge of the real and the unreal.

Until then the meaning of unreality lies hidden by darkness, as much

as does the meaning of reality.

 

 

THE INFERENCE USED IN THE KARIKA

 

The Karika does not derive the unreality of the world on the basis of

the dream analogy. The Karika bases its proof on the method of

syllogistic inference (anumama) and not on upamana (comparision). The

dream analogy appears in the syllogism as an adaharana (example) to

illustrate the vyapti (invariable concomitance) that provides the

hetu (ground or reason) for deriving the conclusion. The hetu here is

the fact of 'being perceived' – the waking world is unreal

because 'it is perceived' just as is the dream world. If we closely

examine this inference, we find that there is something the matter

with the vyapti, or the invariable concomitance, that is used in the

Karika, because, for an invariable concomitance to be valid, it must

be an apriori perceived fact. It must be remembered that in all Vedic

philosophies there is a Platonic element in the 'attainment' of

knowledge i.e., the knowledge that is to be attained is in a sense

prior to the attainment. Thus, the knowledge derived from inference

is not something new or alien, but is the application of a prior

knowledge to the particular instance of observation. For example, the

smoke, the fire, and the invariable concomitance between smoke and

fire must have been perceived apriori for the fire to be inferred

from the smoke because such inference is based on the invariable

concomitance: 'where there is fire, there is smoke'. The syllogism

only employs the prior knowledge to establish the presence of one of

the elements based on the observation of the other in the instance

where the former is hidden. If we examine the vyapti that is employed

in the Karika, it is obvious that the invariance of the relation

between 'being perceived' and 'the unreality of objects' is violated

in the waking state because objects in the waking state are perceived

to be real. Thus, the vyapti used in the syllogism to prove the

unreality of the world is NOT VALID for a person who sees the world

as real in the waking state. I think the entire argument calls for a

closer scrutiny.

 

Vyapti is an invariable concomitance between two perceived objects.

But there is a peculiarity to the vyapti used in the Karika because

the component 'being perceived' is not a perceived object. And it is

this peculiarity that provides us with a clue to the entire riddle.

If 'being perceived' is fit to be an object, then the perceiver must

abide as a witness not merely of the object of perception, but also

of the apperception of perception. Such a 'perception' is possible

only for the Self that remains as the unmoving witness - it is the

Turiya that is spoken of. Therefore, we must recognise that we are

here in the presence of an extra-normal cognition. The entire Karika

speaks from a standpoint of extra-normal perception in which the

unreality of the world is seen as a prior truth and it is thus

that 'being perceived' bears an invariable relation to 'the unreality

of what is perceived' and becomes a vyapti for the syllogism. The

validity of the syllogism is thus preserved in the Karika based on an

extra-normal vyapti as would obtain from a yogi or jnani (for it is

said that their perception is not through the sense organs). But this

does not really provide us with the meaning of 'the unreality of the

world' as seen in the extra-normal perception. For that, we turn to

the Brahma Sutra Bhashya.

 

 

IILUSION AND REALITY - THE SURFACE AND THE DEEP

 

According to Shankara, the unreality of the world, and world-

sublation, has no meaning in isolation from knowledge of the Self:

 

"Here our question is: What is meant by sublation of the universe of

manifestations? Is the world to be annihilated like the destruction

of the solidity of ghee by coming into contact with fire; or is it

that the world of name and form, created in Brahman by nescience like

many moons created in the moon by the eye disease called timara, has

to be destroyed through knowledge? Now if it be said that this

existing universe of manifestation, consisting of the body etc. on

the corporeal plane and externally of the earth etc., is to be

annihilated, that is a task impossible for any man, and hence the

instruction about its extirpation is meaningless. Moreover (even

supposing that such a thing is possible, then) the universe,

including the earth etc., having been annihilated by the first man

who got liberation, the present universe should have been devoid of

the earth etc. Again, if it be said that this universe of

manifestations superimposed on the one Brahman alone through

ignorance has to be sublated by enlightenment, then it is Brahman

Itself that has to be presented through a denial of the manifestation

superimposed by ignorance by saying, 'Brahman is one without a

second' (Ch.VI.ii.1), 'That is truth, That is the Self, That thou art

(O Svetaketu)' (Ch.VI.viii.7-16). When Brahman is taught thus,

knowledge dawns automatically, and by that knowledge ignorance is

removed. As a result of that, this whole manifestation of name and

form, superimposed by ignorance, vanishes away like things seen in a

dream. But unless Brahman is (first) taught, neither does the

knowledge of Brahman dawn nor is the universe sublated even though

the instruction, 'Know Brahman, sublate the world', be imparted a

hundred times." (BSB,III,II,v,21).

 

These words point to the subtle and perplexing nature of negation

that is involved in Advaita. The 'unreal' truly has to be a 'nothing'

if Advaita is not to devolve into a kind of duality. Yet it is not

possible to negate without having a distinctive thing to negate, and

if there is such a distinction, then that distinguished thing 'will

turn into existence by the very fact of possessing distinctive

qualities'. The answer to this riddle lies in carefully

discriminating what it is that Advaita negates. The object of

negation being both 'something' as well as 'nothing' is resolved only

if we recognise that the denial of the world is a denial of the

surface when the surface itself is seen as constituting the depth of

its true nature. When the depth is known the surface is not false,

but the falsity of taking the surface as the true nature is negated.

Thus, the object of negation is the surface, and in the ultimate

analysis, there is nothing that is negated because the surface is

ultimately subsumed in the Reality. Therefore, the sublation of the

world is nothing but the knowledge of the Self that subsumes the

world. Therein lies the meaning of world-negation. This view is

reinforced by the following words of Shankara's commentary in the

Advaita Prakarana (Chapter II of the Karika):

 

"Thus the definite conclusion arrived at by hundreds of Vedic texts

is that the reality of the Self that is a CO-EXTENSIVE WITH ALL that

exists within and without, and is birthless, is one without a second,

and there is nothing besides. It is now said that this very fact is

established by reason as well." And then follows these pregnant words

of the Karika:

 

Verse #27: "The birth of a thing that exists can reasonably be

possible only through Maya and not in reality. For one who holds that

things take birth in a real sense, there can only be the birth of

what is already born."

 

Verse #28: "There can be no birth for a non-existing object either

through Maya or in reality, for the son of a barren woman is born

neither through Maya nor in reality."

 

What is striking here – and it appears again and again in Advaita –

is the significant assertion that the 'unreality of the world is not

like the son of a barren woman' for such a thing is possible 'neither

through Maya nor in reality'. Maya can possibly only 'give birth' to

what is already existent. Again, if we read this in juxtaposition

with Shankara words that the Self is 'co-extensive with all that

exists within and without..', the meaning that emerges is surely that

the denial of the world is a denial of the surface as constituting

the true depth of its nature in which it abides in identity with its

substratum.

 

The Mandukya Upanishad says (I,2): "All this is surely Brahman. This

Self is Brahman. The Self, such as it is, is possessed of four

quarters." And commenting on this, Shankara says that "Turiya is

realised by successively merging the earlier three, starting from

Visva." How can Visva be merged with Taijasa, and Taijasa with

Prajna, and Prajna with Turiya if each is not in reality subsumed in

the next?

 

Knowing objects in truth is to know the depth of objects and not

their surface. It is the seeing into the heart of things, and the

heart of an object is its 'self'. Therefore is the suffix 'self'

attached to a thing to describe its true nature – for then we say

that it is it-self. Negation is the negation of a thing's surface

posturing as the thing it-Self. In other words, the truth of the

world is its soul, and the seemingly soulless world is a superficial

façade of its reality. It is this 'corpse' of the world, this death

as it were, that is what is negated! The SLEEP OF DEATH

characterises the three states of jagrat, swapna, and susupti,

whereas the Self is ETERNALLY AWAKE. The Self never sleeps because

its nature is Consciousness. And in that consciousness shines the

REAL LIVING WORLD!

 

 

THE CONTEXT OF ADHYASA

 

There is an objection that rises up here: If the validity of the

syllogism in the Karika is preserved based on an extra normal vyapti,

then how can it be sustained in the light of the assertion that when

the Truth is seen the entire world is Real? For there must be a

component of unreality in the perceived world if the invariable

concomitance between 'being perceived' and 'the unreality of that

which is perceived' is to be valid. In order to counter this

objection, we need to analyse what adhyasa is, for it is in the

context of adhyasa that Advaita says 'jagat is mithya' or that the

entire world is a superimposition on Brahman like the snake on the

rope. What exactly is the superimposition that is spoken about in

Advaita? A slightly different analogy than the snake-rope analogy is

here used to illustrate the superimposition.

 

Imagine that you are sitting by a lake on a perfectly calm and

pleasant day. You become aware of something floating on the water,

and as it drifts closer, you see its course brown surface barely

visible above the water and take it to be a log of wood. You go back

to my thoughts, and after a while, you hear a splash in the water.

When you turn towards the source of the sound you catch a glimpse of

a thrashing crocodile before it disappears into the water. What you

had taken to be a log was actually a crocodile!

 

What was the superimposed thing here? It was the log that was never

there. But the features that you saw of the thing – the coarse, brown

surface - were not false, but what you imputed to the features - as

that object to which it belonged - was a superimposition. And then,

when you saw that it was a crocodile, the superimposition of the log

disappeared and the truth of the crocodile, which was what it always

was, became revealed. The coarse brown attribute remained throughout,

both before and after.

 

Here the crocodile is Brahman. The log that you saw in the water is

the superimposed world. The cause of the superimposition is the

concealment of avidya regarding the true nature of what was there.

The features that you saw – the coarse brown surface - are the

features of the world. They are not false or an illusion. The

illusion is the false log that was 'seen'.

 

What is often missed out while considering the snake-rope error is

that the attribute that was responsible for the error – the coil – is

not sublated when the error is sublated. That similarity on account

of which the mistake took place persists through the error and

continues to be seen after the real thing is revealed because it is

what the real thing has as its attribute. It cannot disappear with

the disappearance of the unreal. Therefore, when the world is said to

be a superimposition on Brahman, like the snake on the rope, it calls

for a sifting of the elements involved in the error. What is it that

is 'the snake of the world' on the Reality of Brahman?

 

When something is seen, what is seen of the thing is its attributes.

The name of the thing, say 'rope', points to the core existential

which is described as this or that wherein the 'this' and 'that' are

the predicates seen as belonging to it and as being coterminous with

it because they are the descriptions of the existential itself. In

the perception of the world, the attributes discerned are not false,

but the core that is grasped of the world is grasped as a self-

subsisting thing. In other words, the existence of the world is seen

to be independent. This independence cannot be sustained in the

vision of non-dual Truth, but it is nevertheless a characteristic

seen of the world. It is this `independence' that is the falseness,

the 'snake' that is superimposed on Reality and is the 'unreality'

that no more deludes but is seen when the Truth is seen. It is the

unreality that forms a component of the extra-normal vyapti used in

the Karika.

 

The negation of the superimposition of the world on Brahman does not

negate the world in so far as the world is the attributive mode of

Brahman, but negates the world in so far as it is perceived as

independently subsisting. Therefore, the negation is truly the

negation of duality. The vision that it presents at this stage of our

enquiry is non-duality as in Vishistadvaita. To move to Advaita, we

need to examine the nature of 'bheda' or 'difference'. Difference is

the most difficult topic of all, and I believe that it is due to this

difficulty that the conception of Brahman as Nirguna becomes one of

the biggest stumbling blocks in our attempts to understand Advaita. I

am of the conviction that there is a way to sameness through

understanding the nature of difference. God willing, we shall attempt

an enquiry into the mysteries of 'difference' later on in these

discussions.

 

 

RECONCILIATION - THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

 

Before we close this section, it would be in order to look for the

reasons why the Karika takes a different perspective on the dream

than does the Brahma Sutra Bhashya. For this, I think we must see the

Karika in a historical context. The Karika was written before the

Mimamsa philosophers had pulled down the citadels of the Buddhist

fort, and there seems to be an overriding emphasis in its pages to

refute the nihilism of the Buddhists. If we go back to the tradition

of tarka-shastra, we find that one of the accepted ways of refutation

is to begin with a common tenet with the opponent – called the

siddhanta - and then proceed to demolish the conclusion of the purva-

paksha. I believe that this is the approach taken by the Karika. Such

a thesis is supported by the following words of Shankara (Karika

IV.27):

 

"The text starting with, 'In accord with the perception of its cause,

knowledge..' and ending with the previous verse, which represents the

view of the subjective-idealists among the Buddhists, is approved by

the teacher (Gaudapada) in so far as it refutes the view of those who

believe in the external world. Now he makes use of that very argument

as a ground of inference for demolishing their own points of view".

 

Again, it is significant that immediately after establishing the

illusoriness of the world in the first ten verses of the Vaitathya

Prakarana, the Karika moves on directly to a refutation of the

Buddhists:

 

Sutra #11: "If the objects cognised in both the conditions (of dream

and of waking) be illusory, who cognises all these (illusory objects)

and who again imagines them?"

 

Sutra #12: "Atman, the self-luminous, through the power of his own

Maya, imagines in himself by himself (all objects that the subject

experiences within and without). He alone is the cogniser of objects

(so created). That is the decision of Vedanta."

 

These words are obviously aimed at the nihilists. The demonstration

of the reality of Self by accepting the siddhanta of world-unreality

is a succinct and effective way of achieving the goal. As for Sri

Shankaracharya's Sariraka Bhashya, it takes the traditional approach

of leading to the Truth through a path that does not ignore tattwa-

jnana as is evident from these words: "But anything that cannot be

the characteristic of something in its own right cannot certainly be

so because of a similarity with another. For fire, which is felt to

be warm, does not become cold because of some similarity with water."

(BSB,II,II,v,29).

 

_______________

 

With regards,

Chittaranjan

[Guest guest]

Namaste Shri Ranjeetji,

 

I feel that the real difference between us lies in the way we are

approaching the question of nama-rupa. But this question will have to

wait a while because if we falsify words and forms at this stage, we

will not be able to proceed with this discusion. :-)

 

> Maybe you ended up in vishiShTadvaita because of your reluctance

> to accept unreality of the world.

 

If there is reluctance on my part to accept the truth, then that

propensity must be checked. For enquiry is not about reluctance to

accept or reject, but to go where the truth leads us. When I accept

the shruti, where does that acceptance, merely by the act of

acceptance, lead me? I may stay in that state of acceptance for an

eternity, but it doesn't really help me unless I enquire about it

through the weighments of nyaya. You see me as having reached

Vishistadvaita due to what you believe is my non-acceptance of the

falsity of nama-rupa. But I am looking for the invisible path of

Advaita and have stopped over for a while in the wonderland of

Vishistadvaita where it said that the world is the body of Brahman.

You may even say that I am in the wonderland of Dvaita if you take my

statements on the falsity of the world's independent existence as

meaning the world's dependent existence on Brahman. But if I do lose

my way from here, please help me. If you see me as having taken the

wrong road altogether, then allow me for a while this adventure

before I'm guided back to the path. :-)

 

> Chittaranjanji, is the name and form real? If you are dealing

> with the topic in your future installments, let us leave this

> question for the moment.

 

I will try to attempt this topic later - to whatever extent I

understand it. But tell me Ranjeetji, why is the cloth false when the

yarn is true? Why is the whiteness of milk false when the milk is

true?

 

 

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan

 

 

advaitin, "Ranjeet Sankar"

<thefinalsearch> wrote:

> Namaste Chittaranjanji,

>

> The 4th installment was a real treat for us all. We don't get much

of Shri

> sha~Nkara here to read! I envy the way you handle the language!!

>

> Now coming to the subject..

> I will just mention a few things which crossed my mind. Since you

are in

> planet vishiShTadvaita at the moment, the comments on adhyAsa can

wait until

> you reach advaita.

>

> First of all, the 3rd point you mentioned viz. 'Objects cannot

appear from

> mere internal impressions' is a bit inappropriate. What we are

refuting here

> is the existence of external objects. Your point presupposes the

existence

> of objects. So something like 'Mental impressions cannot arise in

the

> absence of objects' would have been more appropriate. This is just

my

> opinion. After all, this is your show :-)

>

> The 4th point viz. 'Objects are not unreal because they have

distinguishing

> characteristics' and the supporting quotes needs further attention.

The

> quote from BSB-2-2-26 is primarily concerned with the rebuttal of

the view

> that existence can come out of non-existence. Against this, Shri

sha~Nkara

> lists down some examples which we see in the empirical dealings.

The line of

> arguments followed is thus:

>

> a) Causality which is observed in the world (such as sprout coming

from the

> seed alone and curd coming out of milk alone) is possible only if

there is

> any distinction in the cause.

>

> b) Non-existence cannot have any distinctions. Shri sha~Nkara gives

the

> example of the similarity between the non-existence arising from the

> destruction of seed and that from the horn of a hare.

>

> c) Since (a) and (b) are true, existence cannot come out of non-

existence.

>

> Here, the examples are quoted from the empirical dealings to show

that

> nothing can ever come out of non-existence. In my humble opinion,

this

> cannot be used to substantiate the claim that objects have

distinguishing

> characteristics and so they are not unreal.

>

> Also, I didn't understand how the second quote, which is from BSB-2-

2-29,

> supports the 4th point. I request an explanation.

>

>

> Further you said,

> " Verse #28: There can be no birth for a non-existing object either

through

> Maya or in reality, for the son of a barren woman is born neither

through

> Maya nor in reality.

>

> What is striking here - and it appears again and again in Advaita -

is the

> significant assertion that the 'unreality of the world is not like

the son

> of a barren woman' for such a thing is possible 'neither through

Maya nor in

> reality'. "

>

>

> Chittaranjanji, if you are to say that this backs up about the

reality of

> the world (as in 'real' snakes), then I would have to object. This

verse is

> a rebuttal of the nihilist's view that everything is void, a non-

existence.

>

> Finally regarding the paradox, well I don't see any! ;-)

> In BSB, Shri sha~Nkara is saying that external objects exist. The

point is

> that perception cannot come out of nowhere. It presupposes a

substratum. In

> kArikA, Shri sha~Nkara is comparing the dream object with

the 'perceived'

> object, the unreal name and form, and not with the substratum. If

you go

> further to 2-16, 17, 18, you will see that the reality of the

substratum is

> asserted. So the two contexts are different and are not in

conflict. Maybe

> you ended up in vishiShTadvaita because of your reluctance to accept

> unreality of the world. Chittaranjanji, is the name and form real?

If you

> are dealing with the topic in your future installments, let us

leave this

> question for the moment.

>

> hara hara sha~Nkara jaya jaya sha~Nkara

>

> Hari Om

[Guest guest]

Namaste Chittaranjanji,

>we shall cite here the three reasons given in the bhashya

>to show specifically that the waking state is not like the

>dream state

 

> 1. The objects of the waking state are not sublated under any

> condition unlike those of the dream state.

 

First of all, the word 'sublate' is vague, notwithstanding previous

discussion. In this context we may suppose that it means 'shown to

be unreal' due to disappearance. Shankara seems to be saying that we

do not 'wake up' from the waking state in such a way that the shapes

and colors of the waking state disappear, as they do when we wake

from the dream. I totally agree. Even Ramana saw the people and

trees around him

 

The issue is not whether what manifests does or does not disappear.

The issue is that whatever manifests, whether in waking or dreaming

state, merely manifests, and hence is in consciousness. And Brahman

IS consciousness, so that the equation of reality with manifestation

in consciousness cannot be denied, according to the sole reality of

Brahman.

 

Regarding Shankara's denial of 'external objects', I said something

on this in a previous message, and I haven't found where you might

have addressed this issue or responded to my argument. (Admitedly, I

have been out of touch with this list due to finishing my WAVES

paper.) Anyhow I said (quoting from my paper):

 

QUOTE

However, there is a subtlety regarding the illusion of

objectivity which must be clarified. On the one hand,

the word 'object' may refer to the hypothetical material

entity distinct from consciousness to which our

perceptions supposedly refer. We may call this the 'gross

object'. But on the other hand, it is common experience

that the perceptions themselves may appear as objects.

If one contemplates one's perceptions, they too may

seem distinct and 'out there', much like a hologram.

We may call this the 'subtle object'. This distinction

neutralizes a common objection to the subjective idealistic

interpretation of Shankara. Authors such as Eliot Deutsch

quote the notorious passage II.2.28 from Shankara's Brahma

Sutra Bashya refuting the Buddhist Vijnanavadins (idealists),

where Shankara says, "There could be no non-existence (of

external entities) because external entities are actually

perceived..." Leaving aside that Shankara misunderstands

the alleged 'nihilism' of the Buddhists (both Madhyamika and

Vijnanavada), his argument in this case is invalid. By referring

directly to perception, he only confirms the truth of subjective

idealism as described here, but he does make the correct point

that the perceptions appear as though objective when we are

in the ordinary dualistic frame of mind (which he calls

vyavaharika).

END QUOTE

 

>2. Dream vision is a kind of memory whereas those of the

>waking state are perceptions of objects.

 

This is true. The dream usually consists of memories of perceptions

in the waking state. The point is that both memories of perceptions

and perceptions occur (manifest) in consciousness, and in THIS sense

they are similar.

 

>3. Objects cannot appear from mere internal impressions.

 

As Shankara says later

>It is precisely owing to the perception of objects that a

>variety of (mental) tendencies corresponding to the

>diverse objects can arise.

 

This is similar to the message I quoted above. Shankara is talking

only of 'perceptions' as the cause of tendencies. The 'perception of

objects' is the holographic illusion WITHIN consciousness to which

Shankara refers. In the vyavaharika state, those perceptions APPEAR

as though objects.

 

In other words, whatever Shankara may have been thinking, he has

provided no argument in favor of the existence of material objects a

la Newton existing totally 'outside' of consciousness. There is no

indication that he even thinks in those terms. His language always

refers back to perceptions, which are in consciousness. To him

'external' means the *appearance* of externality of the perceptions,

which are within consciousness. This is vyavaharika dualism. He is

talking from the gut level of ordinary experience, where people are

confusing their perceptions with the 'things other than me'. (This

is ordinary naive realism, which is different from the more

theoretical dualism of Newtonian and Lockean matter.) That is, it is

a purely phenomenological discussion. At the same time, there ARE

qualitative differences between the waking and dream states, and

Shankara is right to mention these.

 

Anyhow, why do we make such a fetish out of this text? As Dennis

points out, there are other equally authentic texts which use the

dream analogy in a straightforward way. And then, what of less

'authentic' texts like the Vivekachudamani? Are we going to simply

ignore them, even though they are an important part of the Advaitic

tradition, used by leading Swamis everywhere?

 

BUT THE REAL QUESTION IS THIS. Suppose you could prove that Shankara

said that objects exist 'externally' to consciousness, i.e. OTHER

than consciousness. How would you reconcile this with the definition

of Brahman as 'consciousness' and 'one without a second'? I have

raised this issue many times, and nobody ever tries to answer it.

The logic is too irrefutable.

 

Hari Om!

Benjamin

[Guest guest]

-

"Ranjeet Sankar" <thefinalsearch

<advaitin>

Monday, July 12, 2004 9:11 PM

Re: The Real and the Unreal - Part IV - The Dream

Analogy

 

 

Just a small correction here..

> First of all, the 3rd point you mentioned viz. 'Objects cannot appear from

> mere internal impressions' is a bit inappropriate. What we are refuting

here

> is the existence of external objects. Your point presupposes the existence

> of objects. So something like 'Mental impressions cannot arise in the

> absence of objects' would have been more appropriate. This is just my

> opinion. After all, this is your show :-)

>

 

 

The sentence above should have been 'What we are proving here is the

existence of external objects.' Sorry for the confusion caused, if any.

 

Hari Om

[Guest guest]

Namaste Shri Ranjeet-ji,

> The sentence above should have been 'What we are proving

> here is the existence of external objects.' Sorry for the

> confusion caused, if any.

 

It is proved here only to be wiped out by the language of vyavaharika

sathya and paramarthika sathya! It is the problem of nama-rupa in

another guise.

 

We may disagree on these matters, but I am thankful to you for

livening up the discussion. :-)

 

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan

 

 

 

advaitin, "Ranjeet Sankar"

<thefinalsearch> wrote:

>

> -

> "Ranjeet Sankar" <thefinalsearch>

> <advaitin>

> Monday, July 12, 2004 9:11 PM

> Re: The Real and the Unreal - Part IV - The

Dream

> Analogy

>

>

> Just a small correction here..

>

> > First of all, the 3rd point you mentioned viz. 'Objects cannot

appear from

> > mere internal impressions' is a bit inappropriate. What we are

refuting

> here

> > is the existence of external objects. Your point presupposes the

existence

> > of objects. So something like 'Mental impressions cannot arise in

the

> > absence of objects' would have been more appropriate. This is

just my

> > opinion. After all, this is your show :-)

> >

>

>

> The sentence above should have been 'What we are proving here is the

> existence of external objects.' Sorry for the confusion caused, if

any.

>

> Hari Om

[Guest guest]

2. Dream vision is a kind of memory whereas those of the waking state

are perceptions of objects.

 

"Moreover, dream vision is a kind of memory, whereas the visions of

the waking state are forms of perception (through valid means of

knowledge). And the difference between perception and memory,

consisting in the presence or absence of objects, can be understood

by oneself, as for instance when one says: 'I remember my beloved

son, but I do not see him, though I want to see'." (BSB,II,II,v,29)

 

praNAm Sri CN prabhuji

Hare Krishna

 

Due to official obligations I am not following this thread

completely....but, after looking your shankara quotes on dream state, I'd

like to share shankara's view point on dream state elsewhere in sUtra

bhAshya itself. This would be an interesting reading for those who believe

that dreams are only product of vAsana-s created in the waking world.

 

2-1-14 :

prasiddhaM cha idaM lOkE anvayavyatirEkakushalAnAm EdrushEna svapna

darshanEna sAdhvAgamaH sUchyatE, EdrushEna asAdhvAgamaH iti.

 

He also says *atha svapnAH purushaM krushNam, krushNadaNtaM pashyati sa

yEnam hanti* na chiramiva jIvishyadIti vidyAt*

 

Why shankara telling like this prabhuji?? if svapnA are only vAsana of

waking world, how can this svapna can indicate future happening to us in

socalled waking state?? please clarify this point.

 

Further, see ItarEya upanishad where shruti mAta telling us Atman has only

three avastha-s & all these three avasthA are mere dreams *tasya traya

AvasatAH trayaH svapnAH*, while commenting on this shruti kindly look what

shankara says :

nanu jAgaritaM prabhOdha rUpatvAt na svapnaH naivam *svapna Eva* katham??

*paramArthasvAtmaprabhOdhAbhAvAt, svapnavat asadvastu darshanAccha*

 

(I donot want to translate this in english prabhuji, I leave it to you to

look at some translation work & give your opinion on it)

 

Now you tell me prabhuji, from which view point shankara was arguing in

2-2-29 & upholding the unwarranted reality to the waking world.

 

Before passing any concluding remarks on reality of the waking world as

against dreaming world, we've to analyse our three avasthA from three

different view points.

 

01. Loukika or vyAvahArika drushti

02. shAstra drushti

03. sAkshi drushti based on our day to day experience.

 

that is what shankara did in all through his prasthAna trayi bhAshya...more

of this later ...till then

 

Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!

bhaskar

[Guest guest]

Namaste Chittaranjanji,

>The world is external without it being existentially

>independent from Brahman. The language of 'external

>world' and 'internal appearance' is an artificial divide.

>This is what I had tried to address in the second part

>(Part II -The Reality Divide).

 

Thank you for directing me to this. As you may have noticed, I had

to drop out of the discussion to finish a paper. I will now read

your Part II. As I read it, your erudition and eloquence are

remarkable. Still, I sometimes feel that there are some unnecessary

complications. I will respond to some points you make.

 

>It is not surprising therefore that contemporary cognitive science

>talks about two worlds, the world of qualia-filled consciousness, and

>the world of independently subsisting entities. In contrast to this

>duality, there is of course the duality, or plurality, that is seen

>in the observed world itself

 

Good. It seems that you are aware of the two kinds of duality: (i)

the duality of consciousness (including perception) and gross

unconscious matter utterly distinct from consciousness (a mere

theoretical construct with no justification); and (ii) the

phenomenological appearance of duality within consciousness (where

the perceptions themselves appear as objects - the 'seen' as opposed

to the 'seer'). So far, so good.

 

When you get to Berkeley, you say

>It is necessary to emphasise here that even in the conception

>of idealism, there is the notion of the independent world - a

>world that it goes about to deny. This is the schism. As long as

>this notion remains, the world has lost something of its intrinsic

>character and remains as one pole of a tensional duality that it

>has artificially constructed.

 

If this independent material world is denied, then it does not exist.

You say that there is still the 'notion'. There most certainly is.

Many people believe that this notion corresponds to something real.

But once the notion is shown to be false, to be an illusion, the

'schism' no longer remains. The mere presence of a notion in the

mind has no kind of 'existential potency', unless we actually believe

it. So it seems to me that you are getting off on a wrong track

here. Let us read further.

 

Skipping Husserl and Wittgenstein, we get to

>Why does this reality-divide not appear as a theme in Indian Philosophy?

 

It DOES appear. The Sankyan purusha and prakriti correspond to the

Cartesisan/Lockean divide of consciousness and material object. That

is why Shankara so vigorously refutes it. Unfortunately, due to

texts like the Bhagavad Gita, the Sankya is sometimes mixed up

uncritically with the nonduality of the Upanishads (e.g.

Yaynavalkya's famous talk with Maitreyi in Brihadaranyaka). From a

strict philosophical point of view, this is untenable, but the Gita

is more concerned with soteriology, so it jumps between dualistic

common sense and the Advaitic perspective of the sage.

 

>Yet, idealism did arise in later Advaita. The reality-divide may

>have been absent as a theme, but an unarticulated "parallel

>universe" lurked behind the language of the illusory world.

 

Again, the 'parallel universe' does not exist if it is denied. You

seem to think that even *supposing* this parallel world as a

hypothesis to be refuted is illegitimate. But the fact that many

people DO suppose it, and even believe it, shows that it can be at

least supposed. Your reasoning is unclear to me.

 

Skipping the part on science we get to

>The metaphysics of illusion is fraught with danger. Yet we

>must admit that "illusion" has its use. The vision of the world

>as illusion brings home the truth that the world is not

>independent of the perceiving consciousness.

 

When the idealist or Advaitin says that the world is 'illusion', he

means illusion insofar as it is conceived as other than

consciousness. The shapes and colors are not denied; they are

perceptions in consciousness, which are perfectly real insofar as

they manifest. It is the further conceptual interpretation of these

perceptions as other than consciousness ('objects') that is being

denied, whether it is the subtle objectivity of the 'phenomenological

object' or the gross objectivity of the 'material object'.

 

In brief, you seem to be raising a straw man against idealism, namely

that it is creating some shadowy world which it then denies while

still somehow believing that it exist... This line of reasoning is

confused.

 

You finish by saying

>It is time we went back to the reality that we see and experience,

>the healthy and lusty reality that is joyful and painful...

 

This IS idealism, to the extent that the only reality is conscious

experience. However, we must not then impose any kind of subtle

phenomenological objectivity within this experience, as when we take

even the perceptions to be objects - the 'seen' as opposed to the

'seer'.

 

 

Getting back to your later response to me, I said

> ... it is common experience that the perceptions themselves

> may appear as objects.

 

and you replied

>It is this that Shankara objects to. The denotation of the

>word 'perception' is not the object, but perception. The

>object is the percept, the destination of perception and

>not the perception itself.

 

Good. Then Shankara is rejecting even the subtle phenomenological

object that seems to appear *within* perception (in which case the

gross material object is utterly untenable). To say that the 'object

is the percept', is more confirmation of idealism, but then you

contradict yourself by saying that the object 'is the destination of

perception and not the perception itself'. So which is it?

>The gross material object is not separate from consciousness -

>it is a question of acknowledging the object as it presents itself

>exactly in experience and not as it presents itself when we

>contemplate it in an investigative mode

 

Right. To say that the 'gross material object is not separate from

consciousness' is pure idealism. Likewise for 'acknowledging the

object as it presents itself exactly in experience'. And yes, it is

mere abstract and erroneous theory which hypothesizes about 'external

material reality'.

 

So much that you say does sound exactly like idealism, to the extent

that the only meaningful reality is immediate experience, yet you

cling to this straw man conception of idealism as maintaining some

kind of ghostly world outside of consciousness, which it erects, and

refutes, yet all the while somehow maintaining it. This part of your

thinking seems quite unclear and untenable to me. Basically, though

it seems you accept idealism, to the extent that 'consciousness is

reality', which is nothing but a key mahavkya and fundamental

principle of Advaita.

 

Hari Om!

Benjamin

[Guest guest]

Namaste Chittaranjanji,

 

I hope I am not becoming a speed-breaker in this discussion. :-)

 

You said:

" If there is reluctance on my part to accept the truth, then that

propensity must be checked. For enquiry is not about reluctance to accept or

reject, but to go where the truth leads us. When I accept the shruti, where

does that acceptance, merely by the act of acceptance, lead me? I may stay

in that state of acceptance for an eternity, but it doesn't really help me

unless I enquire about it through the weighments of nyaya. "

 

Did Shri sha~Nkara make any attempt in his prastAnatraya bhAshyam-s to

venture into the complexities involved in explaining advaita with the help

of nyAya?

 

 

You said:

" But if I do lose my way from here, please help me. If you see me as having

taken the wrong road altogether, then allow me for a while this adventure

before I'm guided back to the path. :-) "

 

Chittaranjanji, I am not the qualified one here in this forum for such a

task. But I do feel that we can explain advaita without setting our foot in

the wonderland of vishiShTadvaita or dvaita and then taking a flight back

home through an over-dose of nyAya. However, I really would like to read

your nyAya explorations. As the bookmarker I use says, 'Don't follow

the path set by others. Explore new paths and leave a trial behind for

others to follow!' Please continue with your adventure!!

 

 

You said:

" But tell me Ranjeetji, why is the cloth false when the yarn is true? Why

is the whiteness of milk false when the milk is true? "

 

 

' yathA somyaikena mRRItpiNDena sarvaM mRRInmayaM vij~nAta{\m+}

syAdvAchArambhaNaM vikAro nAmadheyaM mRRIttiketyeva satyam || '-Ch.Up-6-1-4

 

[ O good looking one, as by knowing a lump of clay, all things made of clay

become known: All transformation has speech as its basis, and it is name

only. Clay as such is the reality. ]

 

Isn't the shruti wonderful? :-)

 

hara hara sha~Nkara jaya jaya sha~Nkara

 

Hari Om

[Guest guest]

Namaste Shri Bhaskar-ji,

 

You are interpreting the bhashya from a perspective wherein the

vyavaharika world is considered to be entirely false and where the

Truth is formless and bereft of the world. Whereas I am interpreting

the bhashya from a perspective wherein the vyavaharika world is the

Truth Itself that is seen through avidya. How do we decide which of

these two perspectives are correct?

 

The cloth is nothing but the yarn. Isn't then the world nothing but

Brahman? Let us assume for arguments sake that the cloth is false on

account of it being by name only. Now tell me, when you look at the

cloth, are you not looking at the yarn even if you should say that

the cloth is false? Are you not looking at the truth itself and

seeing falsehood in the appearance of difference that it puts forth?

Similarly, even if you deny that the entire world of difference is

false, you are still looking at Brahman only when you see the world.

Therefore, whatever is seen in vyavaharika is not simply false, but

is the Truth seen through falsity.

 

> This would be an interesting reading for those who believe

> that dreams are only product of vAsana-s created in the

> waking world. Why shankara telling like this prabhuji??

> if svapnA are only vAsana of waking world, how can this

> svapna can indicate future happening to us in socalled

> waking state?? please clarify this point.

 

I'm not sure if I have understood the question you are asking. If you

are asking about signs - prediction from dreams - then there is no

problem because that character of being a sign is given to it by the

same Brahman that has given this world the entire character of

causality.

 

> Now you tell me prabhuji, from which view point shankara was

> arguing in 2-2-29 & upholding the unwarranted reality to the

> waking world.

 

Shankara was not upholding the unwarranted reality of the waking

world. He was upholding the warranted reality of the waking world.

:-)

 

> Further, see ItarEya upanishad where shruti mAta telling us

> Atman has only three avastha-s & all these three avasthA are

> mere dreams *tasya traya

 

Yes, all three avastha-s do not have existence in independence from

the Self just like the dream world has no existence from the self,

and hence all three may all be said to be like a dream in this

respect. But the dream world is said to be unreal because it is seen

that it is impossible for it to be contained within the confines of

the body. What is it that is seen that makes the waking world

impossible?

 

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan

 

 

 

advaitin, bhaskar.yr@i... wrote:

>

> 2. Dream vision is a kind of memory whereas those of the waking

state

> are perceptions of objects.

>

> "Moreover, dream vision is a kind of memory, whereas the visions of

> the waking state are forms of perception (through valid means of

> knowledge). And the difference between perception and memory,

> consisting in the presence or absence of objects, can be understood

> by oneself, as for instance when one says: 'I remember my beloved

> son, but I do not see him, though I want to see'." (BSB,II,II,v,29)

>

> praNAm Sri CN prabhuji

> Hare Krishna

>

> Due to official obligations I am not following this thread

> completely....but, after looking your shankara quotes on dream

state, I'd

> like to share shankara's view point on dream state elsewhere in

sUtra

> bhAshya itself. This would be an interesting reading for those who

believe

> that dreams are only product of vAsana-s created in the waking

world.

>

> 2-1-14 :

> prasiddhaM cha idaM lOkE anvayavyatirEkakushalAnAm EdrushEna svapna

> darshanEna sAdhvAgamaH sUchyatE, EdrushEna asAdhvAgamaH iti.

>

> He also says *atha svapnAH purushaM krushNam, krushNadaNtaM

pashyati sa

> yEnam hanti* na chiramiva jIvishyadIti vidyAt*

>

[Guest guest]

Namaste Shri Ranjeetji,

 

> I hope I am not becoming a speed-breaker in this

> discussion. :-)

 

Not at all, Ranjeetji. It is my office work that is somewhat of a

speed-breaker at the moment.

 

> Did Shri sha~Nkara make any attempt in his prastAnatraya

> bhAshyam-s to venture into the complexities involved in

> explaining advaita with the help of nyAya?

 

No, but he did venture, using nyaya (reason), into dismantling the

complexities built by the constructions of the mind. Unfortunately,

we have equipped ourselves with so may ideas and concepts that we

subconsciously apply them to the things around us as we go about our

lives. Whether we like it or not, this is how it is. If we are to

dispossess ourselves of these complexities, one of the ways to do it

is through nyaya. That is not much different from manana. Nyaya is an

arm of the Vedas, and It is the supporting platform on which the

philosophies of Vedanta are sought to be explicated. Shruti is the

prime pramana, but nyaya is its handmaiden. I am not saying that the

way of nyaya is the only way, but it is one way. Radha, on the other

hand, reached Truth through pure Love. Shankara of course did not

need any nyaya because Shankara (Lord Shiva) is Himself the Truth.

 

> But I do feel that we can explain advaita without setting our

> foot in the wonderland of vishiShTadvaita or dvaita and then

> taking a flight back home through an over-dose of nyAya.

 

I agree, but I am personally of the belief that Vishistadvaita and

Dvaita have much to contribute in the endeavour to understand

Advaita.

 

> However, I really would like to read your nyAya explorations.

> As the bookmarker I use says, 'Don't follow the path set by

> others. Explore new paths and leave a trial behind for others

> to follow!' Please continue with your adventure!!

 

Thank you for the encouragement, Ranjeetji .

 

> [ O good looking one, as by knowing a lump of clay, all things

> made of clay become known: All transformation has speech as

> its basis, and it is name only. Clay as such is the reality. ]

>

> Isn't the shruti wonderful? :-)

 

Yes it is, but you didn't answer my question asking why the pot

should be false when the clay is true. You merely tell me that it is

by name (speech) only. If it is by name only, it is its nature to be

by name only, and what is of its own nature cannot be false.

The clay is true, and so is the pot - unless the clay-nature is

hidden when the pot is taken to be the truth. The Truth, it seems, is

hidden in the mysteries of Vak.

 

 

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan

 

 

 

advaitin, "Ranjeet Sankar"

<thefinalsearch> wrote:

> Namaste Chittaranjanji,

>

> I hope I am not becoming a speed-breaker in this discussion. :-)

>

> You said:

> " If there is reluctance on my part to accept the truth, then that

> propensity must be checked. For enquiry is not about reluctance to

accept or

> reject, but to go where the truth leads us. When I accept the

shruti, where

> does that acceptance, merely by the act of acceptance, lead me? I

may stay

> in that state of acceptance for an eternity, but it doesn't really

help me

> unless I enquire about it through the weighments of nyaya. "

>

> Did Shri sha~Nkara make any attempt in his prastAnatraya bhAshyam-s

to

> venture into the complexities involved in explaining advaita with

the help

> of nyAya?

>

>

> You said:

> " But if I do lose my way from here, please help me. If you see me

as having

> taken the wrong road altogether, then allow me for a while this

adventure

> before I'm guided back to the path. :-) "

>

> Chittaranjanji, I am not the qualified one here in this forum for

such a

> task. But I do feel that we can explain advaita without setting our

foot in

> the wonderland of vishiShTadvaita or dvaita and then taking a

flight back

> home through an over-dose of nyAya. However, I really would like to

read

> your nyAya explorations. As the bookmarker I use says, 'Don't follow

> the path set by others. Explore new paths and leave a trial behind

for

> others to follow!' Please continue with your adventure!!

>

>

> You said:

> " But tell me Ranjeetji, why is the cloth false when the yarn is

true? Why

> is the whiteness of milk false when the milk is true? "

>

>

> ' yathA somyaikena mRRItpiNDena sarvaM mRRInmayaM vij~nAta{\m+}

> syAdvAchArambhaNaM vikAro nAmadheyaM mRRIttiketyeva satyam || '-

Ch.Up-6-1-4

>

> [ O good looking one, as by knowing a lump of clay, all things made

of clay

> become known: All transformation has speech as its basis, and it is

name

> only. Clay as such is the reality. ]

>

> Isn't the shruti wonderful? :-)

>

> hara hara sha~Nkara jaya jaya sha~Nkara

>

> Hari Om