The Real and the Unreal - Part IV - The Dream Analogy

July 12, 2004

Namaste Chittaranjanji,

The 4th installment was a real treat for us all. We don't get much of Shri

sha~Nkara here to read! I envy the way you handle the language!!

Now coming to the subject..

I will just mention a few things which crossed my mind. Since you are in

planet vishiShTadvaita at the moment, the comments on adhyAsa can wait until

you reach advaita.

First of all, the 3rd point you mentioned viz. 'Objects cannot appear from

mere internal impressions' is a bit inappropriate. What we are refuting here

is the existence of external objects. Your point presupposes the existence

of objects. So something like 'Mental impressions cannot arise in the

absence of objects' would have been more appropriate. This is just my

opinion. After all, this is your show :-)

The 4th point viz. 'Objects are not unreal because they have distinguishing

characteristics' and the supporting quotes needs further attention. The

quote from BSB-2-2-26 is primarily concerned with the rebuttal of the view

that existence can come out of non-existence. Against this, Shri sha~Nkara

lists down some examples which we see in the empirical dealings. The line of

arguments followed is thus:

a) Causality which is observed in the world (such as sprout coming from the

seed alone and curd coming out of milk alone) is possible only if there is

any distinction in the cause.

b) Non-existence cannot have any distinctions. Shri sha~Nkara gives the

example of the similarity between the non-existence arising from the

destruction of seed and that from the horn of a hare.

c) Since (a) and (b) are true, existence cannot come out of non-existence.

Here, the examples are quoted from the empirical dealings to show that

nothing can ever come out of non-existence. In my humble opinion, this

cannot be used to substantiate the claim that objects have distinguishing

characteristics and so they are not unreal.

Also, I didn't understand how the second quote, which is from BSB-2-2-29,

supports the 4th point. I request an explanation.

Further you said,

" Verse #28: There can be no birth for a non-existing object either through

Maya or in reality, for the son of a barren woman is born neither through

Maya nor in reality.

What is striking here - and it appears again and again in Advaita - is the

significant assertion that the 'unreality of the world is not like the son

of a barren woman' for such a thing is possible 'neither through Maya nor in

reality'. "

Chittaranjanji, if you are to say that this backs up about the reality of

the world (as in 'real' snakes), then I would have to object. This verse is

a rebuttal of the nihilist's view that everything is void, a non-existence.

Finally regarding the paradox, well I don't see any! ;-)

In BSB, Shri sha~Nkara is saying that external objects exist. The point is

that perception cannot come out of nowhere. It presupposes a substratum. In

kArikA, Shri sha~Nkara is comparing the dream object with the 'perceived'

object, the unreal name and form, and not with the substratum. If you go

further to 2-16, 17, 18, you will see that the reality of the substratum is

asserted. So the two contexts are different and are not in conflict. Maybe

you ended up in vishiShTadvaita because of your reluctance to accept

unreality of the world. Chittaranjanji, is the name and form real? If you

are dealing with the topic in your future installments, let us leave this

question for the moment.

hara hara sha~Nkara jaya jaya sha~Nkara

Hari Om

July 13, 2004

Namaste Shri Benjamin-ji,

The world is external without it being existentially independent from

Brahman. The language of 'external world' and 'internal appearance'

is an artificial divide. This is what I had tried to address in the

second part (Part II -The Reality Divide).

You might have missed my earlier reply to the question you raise, and

I reproduce it here:

> ... it is common experience that the perceptions themselves

> may appear as objects.

It is this that Shankara objects to. The denotation of the

word 'perception' is not the object, but perception. The object is

the percept, the destination of perception and not the perception

itself. The question of whether this object is separate from

consciousness is a different question than the one that asks what the

nature of an object is. The gross material object is not separate

from consciousness - it is a question of acknowledging the object as

it presents itself exactly in experience and not as it presents

itself when we contemplate it in an investigative mode. The

contemplative mood still tries to account for the object as seen in

experience by saying that "the perceptions appear as though objective

when we are in the ordinary dualistic frame of mind" wherein the

word "as though" points to what was indeed seen which is sought to be

reduced through contemplation to something less than what was exactly

seen.

> Leaving aside that Shankara misunderstands the alleged

> 'nihilism' of the Buddhists (both Madhyamika and Vijnanavada),

> his argument in this case is invalid.

Shankara's arguments are not invalid - they do not seek to 'reduce'

the objects of experience as the Buddhists do.

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan

advaitin, Benjamin <orion777ben> wrote:

>

> Namaste Chittaranjanji,

>

> >we shall cite here the three reasons given in the bhashya

> >to show specifically that the waking state is not like the

> >dream state

>

> > 1. The objects of the waking state are not sublated under any

> > condition unlike those of the dream state.

>

> First of all, the word 'sublate' is vague, notwithstanding previous

> discussion. In this context we may suppose that it means 'shown to

> be unreal' due to disappearance. Shankara seems to be saying that

we

> do not 'wake up' from the waking state in such a way that the

shapes

> and colors of the waking state disappear, as they do when we wake

> from the dream. I totally agree. Even Ramana saw the people and

> trees around him

>

> The issue is not whether what manifests does or does not disappear.

> The issue is that whatever manifests, whether in waking or dreaming

> state, merely manifests, and hence is in consciousness. And

Brahman

> IS consciousness, so that the equation of reality with

manifestation

> in consciousness cannot be denied, according to the sole reality of

> Brahman.

>

> Regarding Shankara's denial of 'external objects', I said something

> on this in a previous message, and I haven't found where you might

> have addressed this issue or responded to my argument. (Admitedly,

I

> have been out of touch with this list due to finishing my WAVES

> paper.) Anyhow I said (quoting from my paper):

>

> QUOTE

> However, there is a subtlety regarding the illusion of

> objectivity which must be clarified. On the one hand,

> the word 'object' may refer to the hypothetical material

> entity distinct from consciousness to which our

> perceptions supposedly refer. We may call this the 'gross

> object'. But on the other hand, it is common experience

> that the perceptions themselves may appear as objects.

> If one contemplates one's perceptions, they too may

> seem distinct and 'out there', much like a hologram.

> We may call this the 'subtle object'. This distinction

> neutralizes a common objection to the subjective idealistic

> interpretation of Shankara. Authors such as Eliot Deutsch

> quote the notorious passage II.2.28 from Shankara's Brahma

> Sutra Bashya refuting the Buddhist Vijnanavadins (idealists),

> where Shankara says, "There could be no non-existence (of

> external entities) because external entities are actually

> perceived..." Leaving aside that Shankara misunderstands

> the alleged 'nihilism' of the Buddhists (both Madhyamika and

> Vijnanavada), his argument in this case is invalid. By referring

> directly to perception, he only confirms the truth of subjective

> idealism as described here, but he does make the correct point

> that the perceptions appear as though objective when we are

> in the ordinary dualistic frame of mind (which he calls

> vyavaharika).

> END QUOTE

>

> >2. Dream vision is a kind of memory whereas those of the

> >waking state are perceptions of objects.

>

> This is true. The dream usually consists of memories of

perceptions

> in the waking state. The point is that both memories of

perceptions

> and perceptions occur (manifest) in consciousness, and in THIS

sense

> they are similar.

>

> >3. Objects cannot appear from mere internal impressions.

>

> As Shankara says later

>

> >It is precisely owing to the perception of objects that a

> >variety of (mental) tendencies corresponding to the

> >diverse objects can arise.

>

> This is similar to the message I quoted above. Shankara is talking

> only of 'perceptions' as the cause of tendencies. The 'perception

of

> objects' is the holographic illusion WITHIN consciousness to which

> Shankara refers. In the vyavaharika state, those perceptions

APPEAR

> as though objects.

>

> In other words, whatever Shankara may have been thinking, he has

> provided no argument in favor of the existence of material objects

a

> la Newton existing totally 'outside' of consciousness. There is no

> indication that he even thinks in those terms. His language always

> refers back to perceptions, which are in consciousness. To him

> 'external' means the *appearance* of externality of the

perceptions,

> which are within consciousness. This is vyavaharika dualism. He

is

> talking from the gut level of ordinary experience, where people are

> confusing their perceptions with the 'things other than me'. (This

> is ordinary naive realism, which is different from the more

> theoretical dualism of Newtonian and Lockean matter.) That is, it

is

> a purely phenomenological discussion. At the same time, there ARE

> qualitative differences between the waking and dream states, and

> Shankara is right to mention these.

>

> Anyhow, why do we make such a fetish out of this text? As Dennis

> points out, there are other equally authentic texts which use the

> dream analogy in a straightforward way. And then, what of less

> 'authentic' texts like the Vivekachudamani? Are we going to simply

> ignore them, even though they are an important part of the Advaitic

> tradition, used by leading Swamis everywhere?

>

> BUT THE REAL QUESTION IS THIS. Suppose you could prove that

Shankara

> said that objects exist 'externally' to consciousness, i.e. OTHER

> than consciousness. How would you reconcile this with the

definition

> of Brahman as 'consciousness' and 'one without a second'? I have

> raised this issue many times, and nobody ever tries to answer it.

> The logic is too irrefutable.

>

> Hari Om!

> Benjamin

July 14, 2004

Namaste Shri Bhaskar-ji,

praNAms Sri CN prabhuji

CN prabhuji:

You are interpreting the bhashya from a perspective wherein the

vyavaharika world is considered to be entirely false and where the

Truth is formless and bereft of the world. Whereas I am interpreting

the bhashya from a perspective wherein the vyavaharika world is the

Truth Itself that is seen through avidya. How do we decide which of

these two perspectives are correct?

bhaskar :

For this problem shankara himself provided solution prabhuji. He says in

sUtra bhAshya, whenever there is a problem in drawing siddhAnta from shruti

vAkyas, whenever there is complication in interpreting duality statement,

we_should_consider nirguNa nirvishEsha brahman as the ultimate truth. I

hope you know where shankara says this in sUtra bhAshya. Truth is formless

(nirguNo, niranjano, nirvikalpo, nirAkhyAta, achintya, agrAhya, astUla,

anaNu etc.) is not shankara's statement, it is shruti pratipAdita siddhAnta

prabhuji. I earnestly hope there is no second opinion on this among

shankarAdvaita sampradAya followers.

CN prabhuji:

The cloth is nothing but the yarn. Isn't then the world nothing but

Brahman?

bhaskar :

>From vyAvahArika view point we can say cloth is nothing but the yarn, but

FROM pAramArthika drushti yarn is not cloth, that is what krishna says in

gIta.

CN prabhuji:

Let us assume for arguments sake that the cloth is false on

account of it being by name only. Now tell me, when you look at the

cloth, are you not looking at the yarn even if you should say that

the cloth is false? Are you not looking at the truth itself and

seeing falsehood in the appearance of difference that it puts forth?

bhaskar :

Yes prabhuji, pls. note I am not denying the validity of vyAvahArika

satyatva of jagat. From this view point I see cloth as a cloth not as a

yarn & will use it accordingly:-))

CN prabhuji:

Similarly, even if you deny that the entire world of difference is

false, you are still looking at Brahman only when you see the world.

bhaskar:

but seeing, seen, seer (jnAtru, jnAna & jnEya) triputi will not be there in

paramArtha prabhuji. Looking at the brahman as an objective reality

(pramEya) needs a subject (pramAtru) who perceive vishaya (pramEya) through

pramANa is it not?? where is this pramAtrutva when our state described as

one without second prabhuji?? Having said this, I do remember shankara says

Atman is *aham pratyaya gOchara* just to prove parama astitva (eternal

existence) of our chaitanya svarUpa but pls. note this is not to objectify

the reality.

CN prabhuji:

Therefore, whatever is seen in vyavaharika is not simply false, but is the

Truth seen through falsity.

bhaskar :

whatever seen in vyavahAra has the temporal reality & has limited time &

space frame. Hence cannot be called as ultimate reality.

CN prabhuji:

I'm not sure if I have understood the question you are asking. If you

are asking about signs - prediction from dreams - then there is no

problem because that character of being a sign is given to it by the

same Brahman that has given this world the entire character of

causality.

bhaskar:

prabhuji, pls. note that this quote was in reply to your observation that

dreams are mere product of vAsana-s from waking state. If the dreams are

mere smruti-s of waking world, if the dreams are entirely dependent on

waking state's vAsana-s, how can these predictions happen, what is the

locus of these smruti-s which are predicting the future events?? do you

agree from smruti-s (vAsana-s) of dreaming state these things going to

happen in future at waking world?? if yes, how can it be reconciled with

your statement that dreams are mere offshoot of waking world's vAsana-s??

as you said, if parabrahman is giving all these signs of predictions in

dreams, why brahman is giving *more reality* to dreaming world?? why

brahman opted dreaming state to put these things prabhuji as against hard

core reality of waking world. Please clarify this point.

CN prabhuji:

Shankara was not upholding the unwarranted reality of the waking

world. He was upholding the warranted reality of the waking world.

:-)

bhaskar :

ofcourse, vyavahArically :-)) waking world does not hold water when you are

in dream do you agree with that??

CN prabhuji:

Yes, all three avastha-s do not have existence in independence from

the Self just like the dream world has no existence from the self,

and hence all three may all be said to be like a dream in this

respect.

But the dream world is said to be unreal because it is seen

that it is impossible for it to be contained within the confines of

the body. What is it that is seen that makes the waking world

impossible?

bhaskar:

prabhuji, same is the case with the waker & his world, I'd like to see who

can see the waking world without wearing the waker's attire!! can you cite

me an example prabhuji. dont you think waker & waking world & dreamer &

dreaming world are inter dependent??

Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!

bhaskar

July 14, 2004

Benjamin wrote:

The issue is not whether what manifests does or does not disappear.

The issue is that whatever manifests, whether in waking or dreaming

state, merely manifests, and hence is in consciousness. And Brahman

IS consciousness, so that the equation of reality with manifestation

in consciousness cannot be denied, according to the sole reality of

Brahman.

Hello Benjamin,

Where ordinary folk see, hear, etc the philosopher of a

certain cast will have manifestations. That sounds dramatic, suitably vague

and theory laden. It asserts a point of view without establishing any

grounds. Here's a point for the members, for whom this might be an

attractive way of looking at perception, to consider. If there's an as though

touching must there not be a true touching. The two are linked and you can't

by philosophical fiat say 'no they're not'. If there's an up there's a down.

A rough draft of Macbeth has come to light suffering from iambic defecit.

"Is this a dagger which I see before me,

The handle towards my hand? Come let me

clutch thee.

I have thee not, and yet I see thee still.

Art thou not,

fatal vision, sensible

To feeling as to sight? or art thou but

A dagger of the mind, a false creation,

Proceeding from the heat-oppressed brain?

Dagger. Why yes old chap all daggers are daggers of the mind

as 'twere, some are more of the mind than others epistemologically speaking,

veridicality and all that. However ontologically we all daggers whatever and

thee Macbeth are ontologically unfounded.

Macbeth. Oh, that's all right then. What't for tea Mum?

Best Wishes, Michael

July 14, 2004

Namaste ombhurbhuva-ji

>A rough draft of Macbeth has come to light suffering

>from iambic defecit.

>"Is this a dagger which I see before me,

>The handle towards my hand? Come let me clutch thee.

>I have thee not, and yet I see thee still.

Yes, maya is an illusion like Macbeth's dagger.

And if we take it too seriously, we will cut ourselves, as he did.

The wound and pain too are illusions in the mind.

Realizing this, we can suffer less.

I will have a chance to practice what I preach.

I have dental surgery in a few hours.

Hope the anesthetic neutralizes the illusory pain!

Hari Om!

Benjamin

July 14, 2004

Namaste Sri Benjamin:

First, mAyA is not an illusion, but it is REAL mAyA! The advaitic

concept of mAyA is quite complex and difficult and can only be

resolved by the Brahman! Brahman alone knows the Brahman and mAyA is

an integral part of the Brahman.

The focus of advaita is not the unavoidable temporary pains

experienced by the transient body/mind. The scriptures (especially

Gita) talk about how to avoid the avoidable unnecessary sufferings!

As human beings we have learnt to cope up with the pain and look

for means to reduce them. For example, by accepting the injection

of local anesthetic (smaller pain) we avoid bigger pains during the

surgery. Those who have taken the pains to adoot the lessons of Gita

(like Gandhiji) were able to avoid pain and sufferings in dealing

with the most difficult life situations.

The implied advaitic message is simple but quite powerful. The pain

and suffereings are only associated with the body, mind and

intellect. In other words the problem is the well-

known 'identification problem.' The 'Atman' within doesn't

experience the pain because it is neither the body nor the mind or

intellect! This may explain why Lord Krishna declares that it is

neither born nor it can ever be destroyed!! The discussion of Gita

Chapter 2 verses 2.11 to 2.30 is quite relevant for all of us to

understand what is real and what is unreal.

Warmest regards,

Ram Chandran

advaitin, Benjamin <orion777ben> wrote:

>

> Yes, maya is an illusion like Macbeth's dagger.

>

> And if we take it too seriously, we will cut ourselves, as he did.

>

> The wound and pain too are illusions in the mind.

>

> Realizing this, we can suffer less.

>

> I will have a chance to practice what I preach.

> I have dental surgery in a few hours.

> Hope the anesthetic neutralizes the illusory pain!

>

> Hari Om!

> Benjamin

July 14, 2004

Namaste Shri Bhaskarji,

If vyavaharika truth and paramarthika truth are two seperate truths -

one false and the other true - then there is no way from within

the 'false truth' to speak of the 'true truth'. Hence it seems to me

that the shruti loses validity, that our reason loses validity, and

of course perception has already lost it validity.

I would agree that words fail to reach Brahman - that much is obvious

because words can't reach the very source of words. But words do not

fail to reach their natural targets. These targets are the meanings

of those words. We have to use words in accordance with their

meanings, but to say that there are two truths and that one of them

is false and the other true seems to be a usage of words where

something is amiss. But such an interpretation is not necessary

because there is a meaning that fits the shruti, the bhashya as well

as reason. That meaning, as I see it, is what I had written about in

my previous message.

Bhaskarji, all I am saying here is that the severence of truth into

two does not satisfy me. But it is obvious that you find some meaning

in it that I fail to see. And since this is the central issue of our

differences, let us agree to disagree on the matter. I do respect

your vast learning and knowledge of the shastras.

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan

advaitin, bhaskar.yr@i... wrote:

> Namaste Shri Bhaskar-ji,

>

> praNAms Sri CN prabhuji

>

> CN prabhuji:

>

> You are interpreting the bhashya from a perspective wherein the

> vyavaharika world is considered to be entirely false and where the

> Truth is formless and bereft of the world. Whereas I am interpreting

> the bhashya from a perspective wherein the vyavaharika world is the

> Truth Itself that is seen through avidya. How do we decide which of

> these two perspectives are correct?

>

> bhaskar :

>

> For this problem shankara himself provided solution prabhuji. He

says in

> sUtra bhAshya, whenever there is a problem in drawing siddhAnta

from shruti

> vAkyas, whenever there is complication in interpreting duality

statement,

> we_should_consider nirguNa nirvishEsha brahman as the ultimate

truth. I

> hope you know where shankara says this in sUtra bhAshya. Truth is

formless

> (nirguNo, niranjano, nirvikalpo, nirAkhyAta, achintya, agrAhya,

astUla,

> anaNu etc.) is not shankara's statement, it is shruti pratipAdita

siddhAnta

> prabhuji. I earnestly hope there is no second opinion on this among

> shankarAdvaita sampradAya followers.

>

> CN prabhuji:

>

> The cloth is nothing but the yarn. Isn't then the world nothing but

> Brahman?

>

> bhaskar :

>

> From vyAvahArika view point we can say cloth is nothing but the

yarn, but

> FROM pAramArthika drushti yarn is not cloth, that is what krishna

says in

> gIta.

>

> CN prabhuji:

>

> Let us assume for arguments sake that the cloth is false on

> account of it being by name only. Now tell me, when you look at the

> cloth, are you not looking at the yarn even if you should say that

> the cloth is false? Are you not looking at the truth itself and

> seeing falsehood in the appearance of difference that it puts forth?

>

> bhaskar :

>

> Yes prabhuji, pls. note I am not denying the validity of vyAvahArika

> satyatva of jagat. From this view point I see cloth as a cloth not

as a

> yarn & will use it accordingly:-))

>

> CN prabhuji:

>

> Similarly, even if you deny that the entire world of difference is

> false, you are still looking at Brahman only when you see the world.

>

> bhaskar:

>

> but seeing, seen, seer (jnAtru, jnAna & jnEya) triputi will not be

there in

> paramArtha prabhuji. Looking at the brahman as an objective reality

> (pramEya) needs a subject (pramAtru) who perceive vishaya (pramEya)

through

> pramANa is it not?? where is this pramAtrutva when our state

described as

> one without second prabhuji?? Having said this, I do remember

shankara says

> Atman is *aham pratyaya gOchara* just to prove parama astitva

(eternal

> existence) of our chaitanya svarUpa but pls. note this is not to

objectify

> the reality.

>

> CN prabhuji:

>

> Therefore, whatever is seen in vyavaharika is not simply false, but

is the

> Truth seen through falsity.

>

> bhaskar :

>

> whatever seen in vyavahAra has the temporal reality & has limited

time &

> space frame. Hence cannot be called as ultimate reality.

>

> CN prabhuji:

>

> I'm not sure if I have understood the question you are asking. If

you

> are asking about signs - prediction from dreams - then there is no

> problem because that character of being a sign is given to it by the

> same Brahman that has given this world the entire character of

> causality.

>

> bhaskar:

>

> prabhuji, pls. note that this quote was in reply to your

observation that

> dreams are mere product of vAsana-s from waking state. If the

dreams are

> mere smruti-s of waking world, if the dreams are entirely dependent

on

> waking state's vAsana-s, how can these predictions happen, what is

the

> locus of these smruti-s which are predicting the future events?? do

you

> agree from smruti-s (vAsana-s) of dreaming state these things going

to

> happen in future at waking world?? if yes, how can it be reconciled

with

> your statement that dreams are mere offshoot of waking world's

vAsana-s??

> as you said, if parabrahman is giving all these signs of

predictions in

> dreams, why brahman is giving *more reality* to dreaming world??

why

> brahman opted dreaming state to put these things prabhuji as

against hard

> core reality of waking world. Please clarify this point.

>

> CN prabhuji:

>

> Shankara was not upholding the unwarranted reality of the waking

> world. He was upholding the warranted reality of the waking world.

> :-)

>

> bhaskar :

>

> ofcourse, vyavahArically :-)) waking world does not hold water when

you are

> in dream do you agree with that??

>

> CN prabhuji:

>

> Yes, all three avastha-s do not have existence in independence from

> the Self just like the dream world has no existence from the self,

> and hence all three may all be said to be like a dream in this

> respect.

>

> But the dream world is said to be unreal because it is seen

> that it is impossible for it to be contained within the confines of

> the body. What is it that is seen that makes the waking world

> impossible?

>

> bhaskar:

>

> prabhuji, same is the case with the waker & his world, I'd like to

see who

> can see the waking world without wearing the waker's attire!! can

you cite

> me an example prabhuji. dont you think waker & waking world &

dreamer &

> dreaming world are inter dependent??

>

> Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!

>

> bhaskar

July 14, 2004

Namaste Ramji,

>First, mAyA is not an illusion, but it is REAL mAyA!

It's a REAL ILLUSION all right! :-)

Like Universal Studios... (Swamiji liked that one!)

>For example, by accepting the injection

>of local anesthetic (smaller pain) we avoid

>bigger pains during the surgery.

It's over! The injection of local anesthetic was nothing but a

pinprick, and I did not feel anything at all when the tooth was

extracted. I also did not feel anything at all in that tooth when I

got a root canal 5 years ago. The reason was because I

procrastinated so long before the root canal that the nerve was dead

by the time I did it.

Moral of the story: Procrastinate and the problem may resolve itself! :-)

>In other words the problem is the well-known 'identification problem.'

I do agree that if we can truly cease all identification with the

body, then we feel no pain. The problem is that we indulge our ego

all the time in small and large ways, which builds up a huge

reservoir of vasanas, which can't simply be turned off with the flick

of a switch. Hence the need for anesthetic...

By the way, I once knew a Zen Buddhist monk who said that the power

of mind was so great than the disciplined master could TRANSMUTE pain

to pleasure. It is because the mind BELIEVES it is the body that we

feel pain.

The AWESOME power of the mind!

Our WORST ENEMY but a NECESSARY TOOL on the path to liberation.

(I do not believe that lower animals can be liberated, and Shankara

says so too. Precious is the human birth! Let us not waste it.)

Hari Om!

Benjamin

July 14, 2004

Namaste Shri Benjaminji,

> > Why does this reality-divide not appear as a theme in

> > Indian Philosophy?

>

> It DOES appear. The Sankyan purusha and prakriti correspond

> to the Cartesisan/Lockean divide of consciousness and

> material object.

No Benjaminji, it doesn't. The Lockian primary quality is beyond

perception, whereas the prakriti of sankhya is the seen. Prakriti is

not the unseen or unseeable. The only manner in which becomes unseen

is when it is not seen. That is when the three constituents of

prakriti – sattwa, rajas, tamas - are in equilibrium.

Even in the logical school of Nyaya, and the atomic school of

Vaisesika, the world is made up of padarthas or word-objects where

the object of a word is not something that is inconceivable.

> So much that you say does sound exactly like idealism, to

> the extent that the only meaningful reality is immediate

> experience, yet you cling to this straw man conception of

> idealism as maintaining some kind of ghostly world outside

> of consciousness, which it erects, and refutes, yet all the

> while somehow maintaining it.

Your words bring to mind an old Zen saying that goes something like

this:

In the beginning a mountain is a mountain,

Then the mountain is not a mountain,

And finally a mountain is a mountain.

There is a stage of denial on the path to knowing, and this is when

the world is denied – the world 'does not remain' the world, but

becomes an idea, a mere form in consciousness. Hence idealism.

Now let us analyse idealism. A material thing does not exist. It is

only a form in consciousness in the likeness of the material thing.

Let us call this Form-I. Now if you consider this form in

consciousness which you call an idea (Form-I), then in so far as you

conceive it, it has materiality subtracted from it because that has

been denied. But what you see in the world has the character of being

material, for otherwise there would have been nothing to deny when

you saw that 'it was only a form in consciousness'. Let us call this

Form-M. It will have to be admitted that what you conceive of as a

form in consciousness (Form-I) does not conform with the actual form

presented by consciousness as the material thing (Form-M) because it

has negated the character of materiality that is present in what was

actually seen. The form that is conceived as the 'idea' in the

likeness of the material thing is not equal to what is actually seen,

but is only a mentally conceived thing, i.e., Form-I is not equal to

Form-M. When you conceive the form without negation of materiality in

acknowledgement of the form as it is actually seen in consciousness,

then it goes back to the form of the material world as you see it

because it now includes the character of materiality that it had

excluded earlier. Thus, Form-I now equals Form-M. Thus, the world

that is only 'in' consciousness 'becomes' material. Materiality is

what consciousness has bestowed on the form. The mountain, which had

become an idea, has once again become a mountain. There is no reality-

divide because even the conceived thing now coincides with the seen

material thing without leaving its home in consciousness. There is

nothing to deny – only the witness sees in knowingness that

materiality shows itself forth in Reality. That knowingness is a

state of independence from words in which the world with all its

grossest materiality flows across the screen of consciousness in an

ineffable silence.

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan

advaitin, Benjamin <orion777ben> wrote:

>

> Namaste Chittaranjanji,

>

> >The world is external without it being existentially

> >independent from Brahman. The language of 'external

> >world' and 'internal appearance' is an artificial divide.

> >This is what I had tried to address in the second part

> >(Part II -The Reality Divide).

>

> Thank you for directing me to this. As you may have noticed, I had

> to drop out of the discussion to finish a paper. I will now read

> your Part II. As I read it, your erudition and eloquence are

> remarkable. Still, I sometimes feel that there are some

unnecessary

> complications. I will respond to some points you make.

>

> >It is not surprising therefore that contemporary cognitive science

> >talks about two worlds, the world of qualia-filled consciousness,

and

> >the world of independently subsisting entities. In contrast to this

> >duality, there is of course the duality, or plurality, that is seen

> >in the observed world itself

>

> Good. It seems that you are aware of the two kinds of duality: (i)

> the duality of consciousness (including perception) and gross

> unconscious matter utterly distinct from consciousness (a mere

> theoretical construct with no justification); and (ii) the

> phenomenological appearance of duality within consciousness (where

> the perceptions themselves appear as objects - the 'seen' as

opposed

> to the 'seer'). So far, so good.

>

> When you get to Berkeley, you say

>

> >It is necessary to emphasise here that even in the conception

> >of idealism, there is the notion of the independent world - a

> >world that it goes about to deny. This is the schism. As long as

> >this notion remains, the world has lost something of its intrinsic

> >character and remains as one pole of a tensional duality that it

> >has artificially constructed.

>

> If this independent material world is denied, then it does not

exist.

> You say that there is still the 'notion'. There most certainly is.

> Many people believe that this notion corresponds to something real.

> But once the notion is shown to be false, to be an illusion, the

> 'schism' no longer remains. The mere presence of a notion in the

> mind has no kind of 'existential potency', unless we actually

believe

> it. So it seems to me that you are getting off on a wrong track

> here. Let us read further.

>

> Skipping Husserl and Wittgenstein, we get to

>

> >Why does this reality-divide not appear as a theme in Indian

Philosophy?

>

> It DOES appear. The Sankyan purusha and prakriti correspond to the

> Cartesisan/Lockean divide of consciousness and material object.

That

> is why Shankara so vigorously refutes it. Unfortunately, due to

> texts like the Bhagavad Gita, the Sankya is sometimes mixed up

> uncritically with the nonduality of the Upanishads (e.g.

> Yaynavalkya's famous talk with Maitreyi in Brihadaranyaka). From a

> strict philosophical point of view, this is untenable, but the Gita

> is more concerned with soteriology, so it jumps between dualistic

> common sense and the Advaitic perspective of the sage.

>

> >Yet, idealism did arise in later Advaita. The reality-divide may

> >have been absent as a theme, but an unarticulated "parallel

> >universe" lurked behind the language of the illusory world.

>

> Again, the 'parallel universe' does not exist if it is denied. You

> seem to think that even *supposing* this parallel world as a

> hypothesis to be refuted is illegitimate. But the fact that many

> people DO suppose it, and even believe it, shows that it can be at

> least supposed. Your reasoning is unclear to me.

>

> Skipping the part on science we get to

>

> >The metaphysics of illusion is fraught with danger. Yet we

> >must admit that "illusion" has its use. The vision of the world

> >as illusion brings home the truth that the world is not

> >independent of the perceiving consciousness.

>

> When the idealist or Advaitin says that the world is 'illusion', he

> means illusion insofar as it is conceived as other than

> consciousness. The shapes and colors are not denied; they are

> perceptions in consciousness, which are perfectly real insofar as

> they manifest. It is the further conceptual interpretation of

these

> perceptions as other than consciousness ('objects') that is being

> denied, whether it is the subtle objectivity of

the 'phenomenological

> object' or the gross objectivity of the 'material object'.

>

> In brief, you seem to be raising a straw man against idealism,

namely

> that it is creating some shadowy world which it then denies while

> still somehow believing that it exist... This line of reasoning is

> confused.

>

> You finish by saying

>

> >It is time we went back to the reality that we see and experience,

> >the healthy and lusty reality that is joyful and painful...

>

> This IS idealism, to the extent that the only reality is conscious

> experience. However, we must not then impose any kind of subtle

> phenomenological objectivity within this experience, as when we

take

> even the perceptions to be objects - the 'seen' as opposed to the

> 'seer'.

>

> Getting back to your later response to me, I said

>

> > ... it is common experience that the perceptions themselves

> > may appear as objects.

>

> and you replied

>

> >It is this that Shankara objects to. The denotation of the

> >word 'perception' is not the object, but perception. The

> >object is the percept, the destination of perception and

> >not the perception itself.

>

> Good. Then Shankara is rejecting even the subtle phenomenological

> object that seems to appear *within* perception (in which case the

> gross material object is utterly untenable). To say that

the 'object

> is the percept', is more confirmation of idealism, but then you

> contradict yourself by saying that the object 'is the destination

of

> perception and not the perception itself'. So which is it?

>

> >The gross material object is not separate from consciousness -

> >it is a question of acknowledging the object as it presents itself

> >exactly in experience and not as it presents itself when we

> >contemplate it in an investigative mode

>

> Right. To say that the 'gross material object is not separate from

> consciousness' is pure idealism. Likewise for 'acknowledging the

> object as it presents itself exactly in experience'. And yes, it

is

> mere abstract and erroneous theory which hypothesizes

about 'external

> material reality'.

>

> So much that you say does sound exactly like idealism, to the

extent

> that the only meaningful reality is immediate experience, yet you

> cling to this straw man conception of idealism as maintaining some

> kind of ghostly world outside of consciousness, which it erects,

and

> refutes, yet all the while somehow maintaining it. This part of

your

> thinking seems quite unclear and untenable to me. Basically,

though

> it seems you accept idealism, to the extent that 'consciousness is

> reality', which is nothing but a key mahavkya and fundamental

> principle of Advaita.

>

> Hari Om!

> Benjamin

July 14, 2004

Namaste Chittaranjanji

Sorry if I am sending too many messages in today. I am supposed to

be on sick leave, but I can't lie down. Need to kill time...

>No Benjaminji, it doesn't. The Lockian primary quality is beyond

>perception, whereas the prakriti of sankhya is the seen.

Hallelujah! This means that ALL of Indian Philosophy is idealistic.

The Sankya was the most dualistic of the 'respectable' schools.

(Does anybody need an explanation for 'Hallelujah'?)

>Even in the logical school of Nyaya, and the atomic school of

>Vaisesika, ...

Further confirmation. Thank you.

>Now let us analyse idealism. A material thing does not exist. It is

>only a form in consciousness in the likeness of the material thing.

>Let us call this Form-I.

So far so good. I could stop here.

>But what you see in the world has the character of being

>material, for otherwise there would have been nothing to

>deny when you saw that 'it was only a form in consciousness'.

>Let us call this Form-M.

> . . .

> Form-I is not equal to Form-M.

Hmmm. Looks like we may have found the logical 'bug' in your thinking.

The 'materiality' being denied was only a *concept*, a false idea, a

mere figment of the intellect. To deny an error is not to deny

anything real. Well, OK, maybe its meager 'reality' consists in

being 'a false thought'. The erroneous thought is real as a mere

thought, but what it purports to refer to does not exist, namely, the

'matter' external to consciousness.

So what you call 'material' is merely the false thought superposed on

the reality of consciousness, the snake on the rope. You might say

that the illusion of the snake has a certain illusory reality to the

one who is being fooled by his mind, but the point is that there is

no real snake (i.e. no real matter).

Actually, in a way you are agreeing with me. You seem to be saying

that the illusion of an external material world seems very real to

the one who believes in it. I do not deny this. This is also how I

explained Shankara's BSB II.2.28.

Really, I would say that you and Shankara are so VERY idealistic that

you give reality even to your false thoughts, provided you believe in

them. You are being honest by admitting that when overwhelmed by the

illusion of externality, it really does *seem* very real to you. The

same is true for me most of the time, but at least I am clear in my

head that it IS an illusion.

>Materiality is what consciousness has bestowed on the form.

Right. This is what I have been saying. This is the illusion.

Sorry, my dear Chittaranjanji, but I am going to have to conclude

that you really do agree with me, even if you don't realize it!

So much for that discussion! Thank you!

Hari Om!

Benjamin

July 15, 2004

Namaste Benjaminji,

advaitin, Benjamin <orion777ben> wrote:

> Hallelujah! This means that ALL of Indian Philosophy is

> idealistic. The Sankya was the most dualistic of the

> 'respectable' schools. (Does anybody need an explanation

> for 'Hallelujah'?)

Smile. :-)

> >But what you see in the world has the character of being

> >material, for otherwise there would have been nothing to

> >deny when you saw that 'it was only a form in consciousness'.

> >Let us call this Form-M.

> > . . .

> > Form-I is not equal to Form-M.

>

> Hmmm. Looks like we may have found the logical 'bug' in

> your thinking. The 'materiality' being denied was only

> a *concept*, a false idea, a mere figment of the intellect.

The so-called logical 'bug' actually points to the 'bug' of ascribing

more reality to mind and denying it altogether to material objects.

This is how idealism arises - by investing the notion of truth

into 'idea' and divesting it from 'object'. But Advaita sees the same

status for both idea and object. Out of the twenty-four categories of

Samkhya (which Advaita accepts), four of them are the internal

antahkaranas and the remaining are external categories like the sense

organs, elements, etc. The antahkaranas include the mind and

intellect. There is no gradation of reality amongst the twenty four

categories. The difference between Advaita and Samkhya lies in the

fact that in Samkhya there is the duality of purusha and prakriti

whereas in Advaita prakriti has no independent existence from

Purusha. There is also a difference between the Purusha of Advaita

and the purusha of samkhya in that the samkhya purusha is the Advaita

Purusha as seen circumscribed by the mind and body thus generating

the multiplicity of purushas that one finds in Samkhya.

If you accept that all the twenty-four categories have the same

ontological status, then there would be no preference to call objects

merely 'ideas'. Instead objects would be called objects and ideas

would be called ideas, and language would retain the natural

relationships between the words that arise in consciousness and the

forms that likewise arise in consciousness.

> Really, I would say that you and Shankara are so VERY idealistic

> that you give reality even to your false thoughts, provided you

> believe in them. You are being honest by admitting that when

> overwhelmed by the illusion of externality, it really does *seem*

> very real to you. The same is true for me most of the time, but

> at least I am clear in my head that it IS an illusion.

This one really made me smile. :-) I like your candour.

> Sorry, my dear Chittaranjanji, but I am going to have to conclude

> that you really do agree with me, even if you don't realize it!

> So much for that discussion! Thank you!

Thank you too for the interesting discussion.

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan

July 15, 2004

praNAm Sri Chittaranjan prabhuji

Hare Krishna

While agreeing to disagree with me you said something which prompted me to

say few words in reply. Here it is:

Before agreeing to disagree with you :-)) I'd like to make one point clear

to you. Prabhuji, in advaita sampradAya the usage of words like

vyAvahArika & pAramArthika satya as common as avidyA, mAyA etc. But, it

does not mean that advaita advocating the different levels of truths.

shAstra-s do teach us through this method to drive home the point of its

ultimatum *EkamEva advitIya satyatva of parabrahman* & our advaita

paramAchArya effectively adopted this method to teach shruti purport. I'm

bit surprised to see your understanding of vyAvahArika & pAramArthika as

two different levels of parallel realities...have I anywhere said

vyavahArika satya is false?? I've been repeatedly telling vyavahArika

jagat has its reality in its own realm within the permitted parameters of

time & space & pAramArthika satya is never, ever get affected by this &

will remain AS IT IS for ever.

Further you said :

If vyavaharika truth and paramarthika truth are two seperate truths -

one false and the other true - then there is no way from within

the 'false truth' to speak of the 'true truth'. Hence it seems to me

that the shruti loses validity, that our reason loses validity, and

of course perception has already lost it validity.

bhaskar :

Yes, ofcourse we have to agree this. From the *true truth* (satyastha

satya) point of view, everything loses its validity, for that matter even

shruti-s also. atra veda avEda, mAta amAta etc. asserts shruti. *true

truth* is permanent truth & false truth is temporary truth & very much

subject to modification....I am saying this from *false truth* no doubt,

but my AchArya says this & I have full faith in his words. Though I read

his bhAshya-s from *false truth* platform, I do have firm conviction that

there is a state where *false truth* does not have any validity.

CN prabhuji:

all I am saying here is that the severence of truth into two does not

satisfy me.

bhaskar :

prabhuji, kindly pardon me, whether it satisfies you or not it is

immaterial to shankara followers (sorry, no offence intended here). Since

our paramAchArya says this in bhAshya, we'd meticulously adhere to his

words. His severance of truth & different view points in shAstra jignAsa

are quite evident & I think these are effective tools for understanding of

the apparent contradictions in shruti purports. Being shankara sampradAya

followers, we should ready to sacrifice our satisfaction for the sake of

truth is it not prabhuji??

Finally I'd like to share this passage from shankara's kArikA bhAshya where

shankara makes *severance of truth* for the better understanding of our

paramArtha svarUpa. kindly see what shankara says on waking state here :

Shankara's kArikA bhAshya on 4-87 :

//quote //

" with a thing" means that it contains objective things which are real from

the stand point of avidyA. And with knowledge means that it contains the

knowledge of these things. That which is the field of all *vyavahAra*

including that of the shAstra-s, the duality consisting of the knowing

subject & the knowable objects, is called *laukika*, the ordinary life,

which is the same thing as the waking state. This is waking as described

in the vEdAnta.

//unquote//

Lastly but more importantly your reluctance in accepting division of

reality in advaita reminds me vAdAvali's dvaita bandhu-s objections on

vyAvahArika satya in advaita vEdAnta :-))

Humble praNAms once again

Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!

bhaskar

July 15, 2004

Namaste Chittaranjanji,

>If you accept that all the twenty-four categories

>have the same ontological status, then there would

>be no preference to call objects merely 'ideas'.

This may be a bit like Bertrand Russell's so-called 'neutral monism'

.... about which I know little. Just thought I'd mention it, since

you are so erudite about all philosophers, East and West.

If it means that there is just one homogeneous 'reality' that

encompasses both 'idea' and 'object', then I would still call that

'consciousness'. Because consciousness is the undeniable immediate

reality, as far as I am concerned, and if that is the only reality,

then the conclusion follows.

Are we down to hair-splitting semantics?

OK. That's my second message already. I'll try to stop. Sick leave

is over. Anyhow, your posts are highly informative. You have

clearly read a great deal. And it is admirable that you search for

the truth in both hemispheres. The West has been very arrogant, but

quite a few Indians seem to think that all wisdom originates in

India. Human nature is the same everywhere!

Hari Om!

Benjamin

July 15, 2004

Namaste Shri Bhaskarji,

I respect the fact that you have a guru, and that your convictions

are based on your belief in your guru. The guru is the ultimate

saviour.

I need to clarify what I said in my message which you seem to have

misunderstood. When I spoke of satisfaction, I was speaking of the

satisfaction arising from being convinced that one is on the right

path to truth. Ultimately, this conviction has to arise from within

oneself. The Self is the truth, and it is the stamp of truth within

the Self that provides the signs whereby one gains the satisfaction

that one is on the path to truth. How does one recognise the guru?

Where does grace come from?

> Lastly but more importantly your reluctance in accepting

> division of reality in advaita reminds me vAdAvali's dvaita

> bandhu-s objections on vyAvahArika satya in advaita vEdAnta :-))

I accept the division of vyavaharika and paramarthika as expressed in

Advaita darshana as a provisional division to indicate the fact that

when one is in samsara the truth is partially hidden by avidya. It is

a situation of looking at the truth with unseeing eyes, so to speak,

in which the truth is announcing itself but is yet not seen. The

truth is never completely hidden.

As for the objection of Dvaitins, I believe that it is quite valid in

so far as it is targeted against the belief of a vyavaharika sathya

that is a false-truth severed from the true-truth -- because then the

shruti loses validity alongwith everything else. I do not believe

that one becomes an Advaitin by refusing to see valid objections

wherever they may come from.

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan

advaitin, bhaskar.yr@i... wrote:

>

> praNAm Sri Chittaranjan prabhuji

> Hare Krishna

>

> While agreeing to disagree with me you said something which

prompted me to

> say few words in reply. Here it is:

>

> Before agreeing to disagree with you :-)) I'd like to make one

point clear

> to you. Prabhuji, in advaita sampradAya the usage of words like

> vyAvahArika & pAramArthika satya as common as avidyA, mAyA etc.

But, it

> does not mean that advaita advocating the different levels of

truths.

> shAstra-s do teach us through this method to drive home the point

of its

> ultimatum *EkamEva advitIya satyatva of parabrahman* & our advaita

> paramAchArya effectively adopted this method to teach shruti

purport. I'm

> bit surprised to see your understanding of vyAvahArika &

pAramArthika as

> two different levels of parallel realities...have I anywhere said

> vyavahArika satya is false?? I've been repeatedly telling

vyavahArika

> jagat has its reality in its own realm within the permitted

parameters of

> time & space & pAramArthika satya is never, ever get affected by

this &

> will remain AS IT IS for ever.

>

> Further you said :

>

> If vyavaharika truth and paramarthika truth are two seperate

truths -

> one false and the other true - then there is no way from within

> the 'false truth' to speak of the 'true truth'. Hence it seems to me

> that the shruti loses validity, that our reason loses validity, and

> of course perception has already lost it validity.

>

> bhaskar :

>

> Yes, ofcourse we have to agree this. From the *true truth*

(satyastha

> satya) point of view, everything loses its validity, for that

matter even

> shruti-s also. atra veda avEda, mAta amAta etc. asserts shruti.

*true

> truth* is permanent truth & false truth is temporary truth & very

much

> subject to modification....I am saying this from *false truth* no

doubt,

> but my AchArya says this & I have full faith in his words. Though

I read

> his bhAshya-s from *false truth* platform, I do have firm

conviction that

> there is a state where *false truth* does not have any validity.

>

> CN prabhuji:

>

> all I am saying here is that the severence of truth into two does

not

> satisfy me.

>

> bhaskar :

>

> prabhuji, kindly pardon me, whether it satisfies you or not it is

> immaterial to shankara followers (sorry, no offence intended

here). Since

> our paramAchArya says this in bhAshya, we'd meticulously adhere

to his

> words. His severance of truth & different view points in shAstra

jignAsa

> are quite evident & I think these are effective tools for

understanding of

> the apparent contradictions in shruti purports. Being shankara

sampradAya

> followers, we should ready to sacrifice our satisfaction for the

sake of

> truth is it not prabhuji??

>

> Finally I'd like to share this passage from shankara's kArikA

bhAshya where

> shankara makes *severance of truth* for the better understanding of

our

> paramArtha svarUpa. kindly see what shankara says on waking state

here :

>

> Shankara's kArikA bhAshya on 4-87 :

>

> //quote //

>

> " with a thing" means that it contains objective things which are

real from

> the stand point of avidyA. And with knowledge means that it

contains the

> knowledge of these things. That which is the field of all

*vyavahAra*

> including that of the shAstra-s, the duality consisting of the

knowing

> subject & the knowable objects, is called *laukika*, the ordinary

life,

> which is the same thing as the waking state. This is waking as

described

> in the vEdAnta.

>

> //unquote//

>

> Lastly but more importantly your reluctance in accepting division of

> reality in advaita reminds me vAdAvali's dvaita bandhu-s

objections on

> vyAvahArika satya in advaita vEdAnta :-))

>

> Humble praNAms once again

> Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!

> bhaskar

July 16, 2004

As for the objection of Dvaitins, I believe that it is quite valid in

so far as it is targeted against the belief of a vyavaharika sathya

that is a false-truth severed from the true-truth -- because then the

shruti loses validity alongwith everything else. I do not believe

that one becomes an Advaitin by refusing to see valid objections

wherever they may come from.

praNAm Sri Chittaranjan prabhuji

Hare Krishna

prabhuji, as you know, the sanskrit word *vyavahAra* has comprehensive

meaning it comprehends not only thought & expression but also conduct based

upon them. Whatever we do, speak, think can be called vyavahAra ( Sunder

prabhuji is it right??) To think of the snake in the rope & if we jump out

of fear is called mithyA vyavahAra, if you see the real snake as a snake &

your resultant behaviour like running out of it or holding stick to get

rid of it then it is called samyag vyavahAra or right behaviour. But from

vEdAnta perspective all our ideas, speech & conduct based upon practical

life (vyAvahArika) are really due to ignorance. So, this vyavahArika view

is same as the view of ignorance (avidyA drushti) why?? because it

distinguishes the knower & the known (pramANapramEya drushti). Shankara

says it is on the inborn tendency of the human mind to falsely superimpose

the self and the non-self (the body, the senses & the mind of the waking

state) upon which the socalled vyavahAra is based. Now you kindly tell me

prabhuji, is this drushti is false or real?? false truth called as false

from paramArtha drushti not from vyavahAra drushti itself... Now the

question is how is the waking point of view known to be the result of an

error?? the answer is already stated above, it is coz. the waking state

takes the body and the organs of senses etc. to be real without any warrant

& mixes up the real witnessing Atman & the unreal not-self. Kindly refer

my shankara's kArika bhAshya quote in yesterday's mail where AchArya in

clear tone says waking state is ajnAna janita. Whereas, as regards to

paramArtha shankara says yEkarUpENa hi avasthithO yo arthaH sa paramArthaH

( sUtra bhAshya 2-1-11). But do you think this vyavahAra of ours is

yEkarUpa avasthitha prabhuji?? No, it is not...it is changing every second

....changing from one avastha to another.... that is the reason why

vyAvahArika jagat called as false appearance from paramArtha drushti.

There is not severance here in truth...to simply put it is not there in

first place from paramArtha drushti..

Even after reading shankara bhAshya, If you say that dvaitins holding

*valid objection* as against shankara siddhanta ofnvyavahArika

satya...what should I say prabhuji ??

Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!

bhaskar

July 16, 2004

Namaste Sri Chittaranajan:

The last point that you have made here is quite important and it

distinguishes the advaitins from other Vedantic thoughts. As you

have rightly stated that as advaitins, we keep an open mind to

investigate validity of any objections raised by Vedantic and non-

Vedantic schools of thoughts. We classify such objections into one

of the two broad categories:

Objections that arose due to lack of understanding of advaita

philosophy which can be validated using direct or implicit

statements from the scriptures.

Objections that arose due to incorrect understanding of the

scriptural statements which can neither be supported nor be

refuted.

As advaitins (using the Shankara's Advaitic Philosophical framework)

we can reconcile differences between the various philosophical

thoughts. On the contrary, the other schools (dvaitins and

visistadvaitins) use a more rigid framework and consequently refuse

to accept the Truth implied through the advaitic logic.

Philosophical differences between different schools of thought can't

be decided using intellectual logic alone. Faith and intuition is

an integral part for accepting the views contrary to our

expectations. It is time to open our eyes and ears and remember the

debate that took place long time back between Sankaracharya and

Mandana Misra. The debate between these two great scholars took

place in Banaras in the presence of great intellects of that time.

The referee for their debate was Mandana Misra's wife Bharathi

(considered reincarnation of Goddess Saraswati). The debate was not

decided on the basis of the intellectual abilities of these two

great masters. Instead, the debaters were garlanded with two

identical flower garlands. These two great intellects had the

humility to bow down to faith in the miracle of whether their

respective garlands withered away or not. The debate continued for

several weeks. Sankaracharya was declared the winner by the

adjudicator, the wife of his opponent! The intellects who assembled

to witness the debate have also accepted the judgement based on

faith and intuition.

Warmest regards,

Ram Chandran

Note; In modern times, we seem to forget that the importance of

faith and intuition are integral parts of the Vedic tradition.

Interestingly, those schools (dvaitans and visistadvaitins) who

claim to follow the Bhakti path seem to ignore these fundamentals

and raise untenable objections to advaita.

advaitin, "Chittaranjan Naik"

<chittaranjan_naik> wrote:

> Namaste Shri Bhaskarji,

>

> .......... I do not believe

> that one becomes an Advaitin by refusing to see valid objections

> wherever they may come from.

>

> Warm regards,

> Chittaranjan

July 16, 2004

Namaste:

The ongoing discussions on "The Real and the Unreal" provide great

opportunity for all of us to learn and understand Shankara's advaita

philosophy on clearer terms. I want to thank Sri Chittranjan for

leading the discussions with lots of esssential related materials.

While browsing through the internet (one of my pastime!) I have come

across this interesting site with an interesting essay on "The Idea

of Creation in Sankara" very nicely written by Sri Desikan an

undergraduate student from Boston University.

Here is the site address:

http://www.hindunet.org/Moksha/a1v2i003.html

This site is maintained by the Hindu Student Council (Indian

Students who mostly live in USA). This council earlier used to run

hindu list forum under bitnet (about 10 years back) where we used to

participate discussing vedanta. Since this article is quite

relevant for the current discussion, I am reproducing it here with

appropriate acknowledgement. (The advaitin list wants thank the

Hindu Student Council for this well written article)

=============================

The Idea of Creation in Sankara by Sri Desikan

(Mr. Desikan is a senior pursuing his B.A. in Biology, Classics, and

Neuroscience at Boston University, Boston, MA)

"That [is Brahman] from which [are derived] the birth etc. of this

[universe]." (Brahmasutrabhasya, p.13) This statement initiates

Sankara's deliberation upon Brahman and the creation of this

universe. The concept of creation constitutes an essential component

of Sankara's Advaita system as it asks the following question: what

is the relationship between Brahman and the world? Or, in what sense

is Brahman the creator of this universe?

Sankara postulates two ways to view the world, which leads to the

doctrine of the two truths. From the conventional perspective, the

world appears pluralistic facilitating the formation of a

subject/object relationship between man and the Ultimate Being.

Ultimate reality states Brahman to be the only true, existent Being.

The non-dual Brahman alone Is; there is nothing real beside It.

Brahman can be described as either saguna (with attributes) or

nirguna (without attributes). Saguna Brahman is the Being with

qualities or Isvara (the personal God), with the limiting adjuncts

(the world) superimposed upon him. Nevertheless, He is omniscient

and omnipotent when viewed from the conventional point of view.

Nirguna Brahman is the Absolute Being divested of all qualities,

attributes, limiting adjuncts etc. and the realization of whom leads

to moksha (liberation).

The presence of Isvara does not assign duality to the nature of

Brahman. Isvara, Brahman with attributes, exists as the highest

possible reality for those lacking the realization of the Ultimate

Being, the ones subjected to the powers of nescience. Isvara becomes

the subject of all upasana (worship), while man is the object, when

viewed from conventional reality. Sankara often uses "Lord"

and "Brahman" interchangeably, for example, he states, "it is

reasonable to ascribe agentship to It (Brahman) by saying, "It saw""

(Brahmasutrabhasya, p.49). Brahman here is the Lord, the agent, "the

omniscient and omnipotent source from which occur the birth,

continuance and dissolution of this universe" (Brahmasutrabhasya,

p.14). Brahman is the maker and the cause of this world. Thus, it

can be stated that Isvara, viewed as the "mediating principle"

between this world and the Ultimate Brahman, is not separate from

but exists as, conventionally speaking, another side of Brahman.

The individual jiva (soul) is different from Isvara and does not

possess powers to create the universe. The Lord is, from the

standpoint of nescience, different from and greater than the

individual soul, as He is that being "free from grief and hunger,

whose will is always realized, which has to be sought by the

individual soul" (Chandogya Upanisad, trans. Olivelle, p.171). Until

realization is attained about the identity of the Atman with

Brahman, it is an error to reject the Lord as a power greater than

the individual soul. These ideas are stated explicitly by Sankara

as, "We speak of that entity as the creator of the universe which is

something greater than, that is to say, different from the embodied

being [jiva]" (Brahmasutrabhasya, p.348). This exists as such, from

the standpoint of nescience, despite the presence of ultimate

reality that upholds Atman as non-different from Brahman. Thus, from

the conventional perspective, Isvara transcends individual souls.

The omniscient and omnipotent Isvara is the material and efficient

cause of the universe (Brahmasutrabhasya, p.292). To the objection

that in experience, material causes do not possess knowledge,

Sankara replies, "the causation of the Absolute is not strictly

comparable with worldly causation. This is not a matter within the

province of inference. And because it belongs to the province of

revelation, it has to be conceived just as the revealed texts say,"

proving that reliance on scriptural texts, makes exact conformity to

experience unnecessary (Brahmasutrabhasya, p.294). Isvara, creating

without implements or instruments, transforms Himself into the

manifold effects of the world by his great powers. Sankara compares

the transformation of the Absolute to when "milk gets transformed

into curds by itself without depending on any extraneous accessory,

so it can be here as well" (Brahmasutrabhasya, p.350). Isvara

requires no outside help, as he is one who possesses all the

necessary powers perfect within himself. Thus, Isvara can be

described as a changing Brahman, combining both aspects of being and

becoming in order to produce the world. This does not imply that he

is impaired by self-expression in the many. Sankara gives the

example of a magician who is himself not affected by his creation,

thus the Lord is not affected by his maya (illusion).

Various objections are produced questioning the validity of Isvara

as the cause of the universe. The first objection pertains to the

idea of transformation and that giving rise to the "contingency of

either wholesale transformation or the violation of the texts about

partlessness" (Brahmasutrabhasya, p.353). This is the idea that

since Brahman transforms either completely, thus becoming one with

his creation, or partly, which would contradict the Upanisadic

text, "partless, actionless, peaceful, faultless, taintless" (Sv.

Upanisad, VI. 19). Sankara denies the existence of Brahman as an

object of the senses, thus making all transformations objects of

perception. Hence Brahman, in reality, does exist as an unchanged

entity. Only when viewed from the conventional perspective as

Isvara, does Brahman become subject to modification, and ultimately

the conventional view of Brahman is not real. Sankara states that

the realm of Brahman is beyond logical grasp (Brahmasutrabhasya,

p.355), thus one should not try to apply rationality to It but

instead embrace the word of the Vedas, which alone are a source to

Brahman.

Another objection raises the argument that Isvara cannot be the

cause of the world since there is a difference of nature between the

cause and the effect. A piece of gold cannot be the cause of a

vessel of clay (Brahmasutrabhasya, p.308). Likewise, Isvara, pure

and conscious, cannot be the cause of the impure and non-conscious

world. Sankara replies that unconscious objects frequently take rise

from conscious beings as shown by the fact that "man, well known as

a conscious being, originates hair, nail, etc. that are different in

nature (being insentient)" (Brahmasutrabhasya, p.312). Sankara

further states that the world and Brahman are not completely

different as both share the common characteristic of satta (being).

An objection states that if the world issues from and returns to

Isvara, then, on its return, the qualities of the world such as

materiality, compositeness, non-intelligence, limitedness, impurity,

etc. must defile Isvara. Sankara retorts by stating that when the

effects return to their causes, they lose their specific qualities

and merge into their cause, as when plates made from earth become

reabsorbed into the earth devoid of their individual features

(Brahmasutrabhasya, p.317). If, then, all distinctions are

obliterated during resorption, there will be no reasonable ground

regulating the re-emergence of creation with the usual differences.

Sankara answers by stating an analogy, "As in natural slumber and

samadhi, though there is a natural eradication of differences, still

owing to the persistence of the unreal nescience, differences occur

over again when one wakes up, similarly it can also happen here"

(Brahmasutrabhasya, p.319). The basis of the recurring return of the

world of existence lies in the works performed in former lives that

require to be accounted for. Thus the liberated, cannot be subjected

to rebirth "for [in their cases] unreal nescience stands eradicated

by full illumination" (Brahmasutrabhasya, p.319).

The final objection to consider against Isvara being the cause of

the world involves him acting unjustly and granting varying, instead

of equal, lots on his creatures. The objector states, "God has

passion and hatred like some ignoble persons, for He creates an

unjust world by making some experience happiness, some experience

extreme misery and some experience moderate happiness and sorrow.

Hence there will be a nullification of God's nature of extreme

purity, etc. that are declared in the Vedas and Smrtis"

(Brahmasutrabhasya, p.362). Sankara replies by stating that God

takes other factors (i.e. the law of karma) into consideration. He

does not act arbitrarily, but acts with reference to the good and

evil works of each creature in its earlier births. God is compared

to rain which helps paddy, barley, etc. grow, while the reasons for

the differences of paddy, barley, etc. depends, not on the rain but

on the individual potentiality of the seed (Brahmasutrabhasya,

p.363). Thus, God cannot be charged with partiality and cruelty.

This brings up the essential question of why Isvara creates: what

remains his motive for creation? God, who subsists self-satisfied,

creates without reference to any motive, out of mere lila (play,

sport) (Brahmasutrabhasya, p. 361). It is the spontaneous overflow

of God's nature, as it is man's nature to breathe in and out. The

infinite is not something that exists in itself first and then feels

a necessity to go out into the finite. Creation contains no motive;

it is spontaneous. No moral consequences attach to the creator in

his activity, so he cannot be held responsible for the subsequent

actions that arise within the fields of his creation. By viewing

creation as a cosmic game in which Isvara indulges, Sankara brings

out the ease and effortlessness with which the creation is sustained

and demonstrates the infinite might and supra-rational existence of

the Lord.

The presentation of these ideas necessitates the summoning of the

maya doctrine. Brahman presents itself as fullness of being, as self-

luminous consciousness and as sacchitananda (infinite bliss); It

alone exists. The phenomenal world of plurality does not exist in

reality, it is maya. Maya is all experience that follows from, and

constituted by the distinction between the subject and the object.

Whenever there is a transformation of the impersonal into the

personal, there exists an association with maya. Maya is often

denoted as the creative power of Isvara. Using maya, the Lord can

manifest himself into the plurality of the world. It is inherent in

Isvara, conferring to him limiting adjuncts. Maya often equates

itself with the names and forms which, in their unevolved condition,

here in Isvara, and in their developed state constitute the world.

In this sense, maya is synonymous with prakrti. The Lord, however,

remains unaffected by his own maya as the magician with his magic

(Brahmasutrabhasya, p.318). When a magician makes one thing appear

into another, one is deluded into believing his magic as real. And

just as the magician creates illusions that are not binding upon him

and that last as long as the believer remains in ignorance, so

Brahman conjures up a phenomenal world, whose importance vanishes

upon the attainment of true Knowledge.

Maya has the power of concealing and distorting reality. Not only do

we not perceive Brahman, we substitute something else in its place

as Ultimate Reality. Thus, maya is not just a negative designation

but something positive that produces an illusion. Furthermore, maya

cannot be designated as mere illusion; it exists as real until all

duality is transcended. The world, then, 'appears' to be real as

long the non-dual Brahman is not known.

The idea of avidya (ignorance) lies in close connection with the

doctrine of maya. Avidya causes adhyasa (superimposition). In

reality, there exists no creator and no world; there alone is

Brahman. Nescience, in conjunction with maya, imposes limiting

adjuncts upon the Limitless and forces the mind to perceive a

subject object relationship thus maintaining duality. Sankara uses

the analogy of the pots to illustrate nescience when he states,

"Thus the Lord conforms to the external adjuncts formed by

name and form set up by nescience in the same way that the ether

conforms to external adjuncts such as the clay pot and the

[differently shaped] coconut water vessel, etc. And within the realm

of human experience He rules over the conscious beings called

individual souls, who are in truth nothing but His own Self, but who

assume the limitations of body, mind and senses are [not real,

being] wrought of name and form which are set up by nescience. Hence

the Lordship, as well as His omniscience and omnipotence, exist only

in relation to external conditions which are [illusory because they

are] of the nature of nescience. From the standpoint of ultimate

truth, there can be no talk of any dichotomy between a Lord and His

subjects, or of qualities such as omniscience etc. in the Self. For

[from the standpoint of the highest truth] no external conditions

exist in the Self, in the true nature of which all external

cognitions stand negated through knowledge" (Brahmasutrabhasya,

II,i,14).

This paragraph explains thoroughly the ideas constituting the theory

of nescience. Thus, it can be concluded that all duality, including

creation, persists because of nescience; once ignorance is uprooted

the non-dual Brahman alone exists.

Now, the question of the relation between Brahman and the creation

of the world can be approached. For Sankara, this question has no

relevance because this admits that the world and Brahman are

distinct entities. This demands a discussion of causation and the

various levels associated with it. The first level involves the

belief in an omniscient and omnipotent creator. The mind, conceiving

the Lord (Isvara) as the material and efficient cause of this

universe, perceives a definite distinction between the creator and

his creation. The creator is different and somehow superior to this

world and to the individual souls. Thus, there exists a

subject/object relationship between the Lord and human beings.

The second level introduces the concept of satkaryavada in

conjunction to Brahman and the world. This idea postulates that an

effect pre-exists in the cause and that it is not different from its

cause. Sankara, in support of this idea, states, "for direct

perception does occur about the non-difference of the cause and

effect. It is thus: In a cloth constituted by an arrangement of

yarns, one does not perceive the cloth apart from the yarns; but the

yarns themselves, arranged as warps and woofs..."

(Brahmasutrabhasya, p.336). Satkaryavada, like the dualistic level,

pertains to the phenomenal world because it ultimately upholds

causation, an idea whose existence is derived only from the

conventional perspective. It differs and elevates itself from

duality in the sense that it states non-difference between the cause

and effect, between the creator and his creation. Satkaryavada

offers the mind, not a rejection of causality, but a rational,

defensible theory of it thus facilitating an understanding of the

Vedas, at the phenomenal level, and simultaneously maintaining the

possibility of the Infinite in which causality is altogether

transcended. Sankara defends this doctrine and yet interprets it in

such a way as to lead the mind beyond the realm of causality into

the realm of transcendence by introducing the idea of vivartavada.

Vivartavada, the theory that the effect is only an apparent

manifestation, an 'appearance' of its cause, constitutes the third

level. The creation of this world is only an apparent change, it is

not a modification of Brahman in reality. From the viewpoint of

vivartavada, there is no creation; reality is the non-dual Brahman.

The infinite Brahman can in no way create the finite world since He

is beyond all action. The relation of cause and effect has no

bearing to Brahman, since cause has only meaning in relation to the

finite modes of being. Vivartavada affirms the appearance-only

status of the effect and thus points the way to the sublation of the

world in Brahman, where all questions of creation are silenced. Once

Brahman is realized, all causality and duality is transcended. Thus,

vivartavada teaches that no causal relation can be established

between Brahman and the world and that the world as effect must be

only an appearance of Brahman.

A question now arises concerning the potential helpfulness of the

creation texts and other texts not directly pertaining to the

Ultimate Being. The purpose of the duality teachings in the texts is

to prepare the mind for the ultimate realization. The contemplation

of the Lord as the subject and creator of this universe relieves the

mind of its thoughts on the more vulgar sides of the world of

appearance, in particular crude sense enjoyment. In addition, the

texts on creation and entry of the Absolute into the phenomenal

world are part of a process that conveys to the student a notion of

his own true identity by way of false attributions and subsequent

denials of them. Sankara bestows positive qualities upon the idea of

the Lord's manifestation when he states,

"During the state of ignorance, when the individual soul is

blinded by the darkness of ignorance and cannot understand itself to

be different from the assemblage of body and organs, it derives its

transmigratory state, consisting in its becoming an agent and

experiencer, from the behest of the supreme Self who presides over

all activities and resides in all beings, and who is the witness (of

all), imparts intelligence (to all) and is the supreme Lord.

Liberation, too, results from realization that is vouchsafed by Him

out of His grace." (Brahmasutrabhasya, p.504)

By this Sankara means that even the manifestation of the world, with

the Lord as creator, should be viewed as a kind of grace; only

because of the Lord's grace is Liberation possible.

The problem of creation is a complex one, and is approachable from

various levels. The first level is a definite difference between the

all-powerful Isvara Brahman (cause) and his creation, the world

(effect). This level is a pre-requisite to understanding the other

two levels and thus is of importance to one who has not attained

realization. The second level is satkaryavada, where the effect is

supposed to pre-exist in the cause. This level is also a preparatory

step towards vivartavada, where both creation and causality are

transcended because Brahman alone is acknowledged to exist. Thus,

one cannot establish relations between disparate levels of being,

one can only trace the generation of these levels in the mind of the

subject. Any sort of identity with a previously transcended level

would mean a reversion back to that level.

July 16, 2004

Namaste Shri Bhaskarji,

We are taking a long time to agree to disagree, no?

I agree that all vyavahara is due to ignorance. This statement

however does not mean that the entire world is false like the son of

a barren woman. The Acharya says that superimpsition is the mistaking

of one thing for another. All our behaviour arises from mistaking the

non-Self for the Self. When this error is removed, there is no sense

of agency and hence there is no more any behavior or vyavahara.

> Now the question is how is the waking point of view known to

> be the result of an error?? the answer is already stated above,

> it is coz. the waking state takes the body and the organs of

> senses etc. to be real without any warrant & mixes up the real

> witnessing Atman & the unreal not-self.

I will here reproduce Shankara's words on superimposition: "It is an

awareness, similar in nature to memory, that arises on a different

basis as a result of some past experience. With regards to this, some

say that it consists in the superimposition of the attributes of one

thing on another. But others assert that wherever a superimposition

on anything occurs, there is in evidence only a confusion arising

from the absence of discrimination between them. Others say that the

superimposition of anything on any other substratum consists in

fancying some opposite attributes on that very basis. From every

point of view, however, there is no difference as regards the

appearance of one thing as something else".

The unreality of the non-Self lies in the fact that it appears

falsely as the Self.

> There is not severance here in truth...to simply put it is

> not there in first place from paramArtha drushti..

I can see that there is no severence of truth according to your view

because you are considering the world to be non-existent like 'the

son of a barren woman'. If this was true, you couldn't have seen the

world even like a dream, for the 'son of a barren woman' can be born

neither in reality nor in Maya. This is what Gaudapada says in the

Advaita Prakarana of the Karika:

"There can be no birth for a non-existing object either through Maya

or in reality, for the son of a barren woman is born neither through

Maya nor in reality."

Now observe the following statement from the Gaudapada Karika:

"The birth of a thing that exists can reasonably be possible only

through Maya and not in reality. For one who holds that things take

birth in a real sense, there can only be the birth of what is already

born."

Link this to the Brahma Sutra that says that the effect is pre-

existent in the material cause. Thus the world is not really born

because it is already pre-existent in the cause, and the

differentiation which makes it seem to come into being is false. It

is the birth through Maya of what is already existent.

> Even after reading shankara bhAshya, If you say that dvaitins

> holding *valid objection* as against shankara siddhanta

> of nvyavahArika satya...what should I say prabhuji??

I do not see that the objections of the Dvaitins are valid against

Shankara siddhanta, but I see them as being eminently valid against

your siddhanta. :-)

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan

July 16, 2004

Namaste Shri Ram Chandranji,

advaitin, "Ram Chandran" <RamChandran@a...>

wrote:

> I want to thank Sri Chittranjan for leading the discussions

> with lots of esssential related materials.

I would like to thank you too and the Advaitin list and all its

members for giving me this opportunity to discuss and clear my doubts

on Advaita Vedanta. I have learnt much from my discussions in this

list.

> While browsing through the internet (one of my pastime!) I have

> come across this interesting site with an interesting essay on

> "The Idea of Creation in Sankara" very nicely written by Sri

> Desikan an undergraduate student from Boston University.

It is indeed beautifully written. Thank you for posting it.

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan

..

July 16, 2004

--- Chittaranjan Naik <chittaranjan_naik wrote:

Cittaranajanji I appreciate if you can hold on to the next part until

we are all through with this IVth part - I am still studying it. From

the input you can see lot of people still are.

Hari OM!

Sadananda

=====

What you have is destiny and what you do with what you have is self-effort.

Future destiny is post destiny modified by your present action. You are not only

the prisoner of your past but master of your future. - Swami Chinmayananda

July 16, 2004

Namaste Benjamin,

Benjamin <orion777ben wrote:

(I do not believe that lower animals can be liberated, and Shankara

says so too. Precious is the human birth! Let us not waste it.)

Venkat - M thinks

Nor do lower animals want to be liberated because they are not under the

illusion of being bound. Also since these animals do not consider their life to

be precious, they do not waste it!!!

pranams,

Venkat - M

ALL-NEW Messenger - sooooo many all-new ways to express yourself

July 16, 2004

Namaste:

In the article, Sir Desikan sites the page number of

Brahmasutrabhasya but there is no reference to the title of the

book. The book that he refers to is;

Brahma-Sutra

Translated by Swami Gambhirananda

Published by Advaita Ashram, Kolkatta

Swami Gambhirananda's translation of Sankara Bhasya (Sankara's

commentary) is widely referenced in advaita texts.

regards,

Ram Chandran

advaitin, "Ram Chandran" <RamChandran@a...>

wrote:

>

> "That [is Brahman] from which [are derived] the birth etc. of this

> [universe]." (Brahmasutrabhasya, p.13)

July 16, 2004

Namaste Benjaminji,

advaitin, Benjamin <orion777ben> wrote:

>

> If it means that there is just one homogeneous 'reality' that

> encompasses both 'idea' and 'object', then I would still call that

> 'consciousness'.

On this we agree. :-)

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan

July 16, 2004

Namaste Shri Sadanandaji,

advaitin, kuntimaddi sadananda

<kuntimaddisada> wrote:

>

> Cittaranajanji I appreciate if you can hold on to the next

> part until we are all through with this IVth part....

Okay Sadanandaji.

Regards,

Chittaranjan

July 20, 2004

Namaste Shri Bhaskarji,

Humble praNAms Sri Chittaranjan prabhuji

Hare Krishna

CN prabhuji:

We are taking a long time to agree to disagree, no?

bhaskar:

yes prabhuji, it is coz. of your unintentional persistence to stretch it!!

CN prabhuji:

I agree that all vyavahara is due to ignorance. This statement

however does not mean that the entire world is false like the son of

a barren woman.

bhaskar:

I agree but at the same time it cannot be said that the world is brahman or

pUrNa either...this entire world of waking traces no place in dream world &

in sushupti neither waking world nor dream world but YOU are there !! is it

not??

CN prabhuji:

The Acharya says that superimpsition is the mistaking

of one thing for another. All our behaviour arises from mistaking the

non-Self for the Self. When this error is removed, there is no sense

of agency and hence there is no more any behavior or vyavahara.

bhaskar :

Right prabhuji, then could you please educate me what is self & what is

non-self according to you prabhuji. As far as I know, in your case, in

snake-rope analogy both snake & rope are real.