The Real and the Unreal - Part VI - Prelude to Ontology

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Om Gurubhyo Namah

 

 

THE ONTOLOGY OF PRESENCE

 

In his seminal book, the 'Critique of Pure Reason', Kant examines the

term 'existence' and concludes as follows: "If the question regarded

an object of sense merely, it would be impossible for me to confound

the conception with the existence of the thing. For the conception

merely enables me to cogitate an object as according with the general

conditions of experience; while the existence of the object permits

me to cogitate it as contained in the sphere of actual experience."

Thus Kant places the meaning of existence in the fact of aposteriori

experience rather that in the conceptual cogitation of a thing. It is

this same distinction that was formalised later by Gottleb Frege

through his symbolic framework, which later went on to become the

foundation for analytical philosophy and modern logic. Frege was

trying to counter the manner in which idealist philosophers employed

language whereby they said that objects don't exist because they are

ideas in the mind. Frege reasoned that in the realm of language we

apply the word 'existence' to objects only when these objects are

concrete facts in the world and not when they are mere ideas. He thus

made a distinction between pure thought (propositions) and the

assertion of existence (existential judgement) to what is thought

about. Accordingly, the thing that is thought about is a concept or

an abstract class, and its existence is the concept instantiated as a

fact in the world. In a sense, both Kant and Frege were reinforcing

the ontology of presence by restricting the meaning of existence to

experienced facts of the concrete world.

 

Another variant of the ontology of presence is found in the

philosophies of existentialism, which may be summarised as follows:

All things are nothing but their presence to consciousness. But the

term 'existence' does not properly belong to consciousness because

consciousness is always consciousness of something, i.e.,

consciousness is intentional. Thus, in Heideggerian terms, existence

translates into what may be called 'being-at-hand'. But

existentialism does not stop at merely positing such an

ephemeral 'existence', but goes further to state that 'existence

precedes essence'. What this means is that there no such thing as

essence can persist in an un-intentional state. Thus, the doctrine

of 'existence is prior to essence' dissolves everything into 'a

nothing' that lies behind the nature of things. The main problem with

such an hypothesis is that it cannot account for the recognition of

sameness, as such recognition needs the persistence of the notion of

things by which sameness is seen, as say when we experience: 'This is

the same tree that I saw yesterday'. If the tree has no essence, then

there is no persistence of the notion of the tree, and the next

instance of a tree that I see can have no likeness to the prior

instance of the tree. Indeed, without universals, it would be

impossible for anything to have a presence in as much as the world

would dissolve into an amorphous void. It is because of the

metaphysical need to account for sameness that scholastic

philosophers had postulated essences, for in scholastic philosophy a

thing may cease to exist but its essence remains forever. Recognition

of sameness is possible only if universals are admitted, but then

this would negate the doctrine that 'existence precedes essence'.

Unfortunately, many modern philosophers have discounted scholastic

philosophy without a deeper understanding of its metaphysics. It

would seem that there was much more light in the 'dark ages' than

most modern philosophers are willing to admit.

 

By saying that the world is unreal, Advaita seems to negate the

ontology of presence. But it is our contention that Advaita affirms

both the ontology of presence as well as the ontology of absence in

an overarching ontology of Existence. Before we move on to a deeper

examination of ontology, we must segregate the question of existence

from the other related questions that rise up in its guise to

confound us, and this necessitates making certain metaphysical

distinctions.

 

 

THE DISTINCTION OF THE TATTWAS

 

What does it mean to say that an object exists? The first thing that

is to be distinguished in this question is that there are two terms

employed in it: the 'object' and the 'existence' that is predicated

of the object. These two terms are so interleaved in everyday

language that we are wont to disqualify an object as an object unless

it is also such as to be qualified as existent – for otherwise we say

that it is a mere 'idea' or 'concept'. Thus there is already an

apriori notion of existence due to which we deny existence

to 'objects in the mind' and affirm it to 'objects in the world'. We

say that the one is insubstantial and the other is substantial. It

would seem that the word 'substance' is grounded in the idea of

existence. All these words – object, idea, concept, mind, substance –

are so inextricably linked with one another that it is easy to be

trapped in the mire of words if we do not discriminate between them

through a study of the tattwas.

 

 

WHAT IS AN OBJECT?

 

The English word 'object' comes from the Latin 'objectum' which

means 'a thing put before the mind'. The current usage – and this

includes scientific usage – is that an object is something 'concrete'

that is perceptible to the senses. The first thing that strikes one

here is the restrictive sense of the modern usage of the term. But if

we trace back to the etymology of the word, we find that the original

meaning is more encompassing – an object is the goal to which the

mind is directed. In other words, it is the object of the

directedness of the mind. Thus, in the original sense of the word,

there is no difference between an object that is thought and an

object that is perceived in so far as they are objects. Again, a

particular object when ideated and when seen are the same object, for

if they were not, it would lead to a contradiction to say that the

SAME object that is seen is thought. For then, the tree in the yard

that I think about would not be the same tree that is in the yard and

hence the object of my thought would be contrary to the object in the

yard which would make the tree in the yard that I think about not

conform to the tree in the yard and hence I would not have thought

about the tree in the yard, which is self-contradictory. Therefore

there are no two disjunct realities, one in the mind and the other in

the world. There is no difference between the object of thought and

the object of perception, in respect of them being objects, but the

difference lies in the modes of cognition, the one being a conception

and the other being a perception. The same object when it is

conceived is called a concept and when it is perceived is called a

percept.

 

The taxonomy of objects includes all that is known. It is not

restricted to sense objects only - it is whatever is perceived as

well as thought. It is an object irrespective of the predication of

existence that is given to it. That which I think about is not a

mere 'concept' whereby it loses its dignity of being an object. Joy

and sorrow, motion and rest, doubt and certitude, are also objects –

because they are objects of the mind. Modern philosophers have been

foxed by the padarthas of Nyaya, which includes in its repertoire

such entities as object of cognition, instrument of cognition,

discussion, disputation, etc. This perplexity is primarily because

they translate padartha as 'ontological category'. The words 'tattwa'

and 'padartha' have no exact English equivalent, but I believe that

the term 'logos' is as good a translation as is possible.

 

In considering an object, it is important to realise that the

relation between words and objects are not mediated through an

intermediate entity called the 'sense', but that an object is the

immediate object of the word. It is therefore called 'artha' which

means both 'meaning' as well as 'object'. The modern sense-reference

theory (due to Frege), which states that words have an intermediate

sense and that this sense points to objects in the world, is not

logically sustainable. Firstly, the sense of a word can have no

meaning unless the 'objectness' is contained in the sense, and if the

objectness is contained in the sense it would need no separate object

as a reference, for if it did, the object would have to contain

something more than the objectness and hence objectness would not

define the object, which is absurd (because objectness is the essence

of the object). The positing of the duality of sense and object is

therefore superfluous, and going by the principle of parsimony it

would obviate the need for a separate sense. Again, an

intermediate 'sense' necessitates a binding between the word and

sense, and between the sense and object, which in turn would need

four more binding relationships, and so on ad infinitum. Therefore,

the sense-reference theory is superfluous.

 

The marriage between a word and its object is sacred and mystical.

They are united together as elucidated by Shankara in the Agama-

Prakarana of Gaudapada Karika (I.1):

 

"Though the word and the thing signified are the same, still the

presentation in the text, 'This letter that is OM is all this' was

made by giving greater prominence to the word. The very same thing

that was presented through an emphasis on the word is being indicated

over again with a stress on the thing signified, so that the unity of

the name and the nameable may be comprehended."

 

 

MIND AND OBJECT

 

The mind is a sea of objects. There is no separate thing called the

mind. For it is not possible that there be a perturbation in

consciousness without there being objects as modes of that

perturbation. Yet, the word 'mind' has a sense of being internal and

as being associated with the subject. Therefore it is called an

internal tattwa – antahkarana - which apart from the objects

cogitated, is inferred as the internal instrument of cognition. This

is perhaps due to the subliminal sense of 'vrittis' in consciousness

from which all objects arise. Yet the mind itself is an object

because it can be thought of as the reference of the word 'mind'. In

other words, whatever is thought is an object, and because the mind

itself can be thought about, it too is an object. But in every

thought, the mind is inferred to be the subjective instrument of

thinking. Thus there is a dual aspect of mind – as an object and as

an inferred internal entity. It is this dual aspect of mind – as the

manifold of objects and as the internal cognising instrument – that

generates a kind of false duality. For objects that are cogitated are

not called 'objects' but 'ideas', and objects that are perceived are

distinguished from 'ideas' and called 'objects'. But there is no

duality between mind and objects. The object is the target of the

mind, and the mind as the internal instrument is the obverse side of

the target. They are the object and its vritti. They are like the

concave and the convex. And when the mind itself is thought about, it

is both an object and the internal instrument inferred as operating

in the thinking. In the pages of Western Philosophy, we find this

kind of conception about the unity of mind and body in the philosophy

of Spinoza:

>From the 'Ethics', Part II - Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind:

 

Proposition 7: The order and connection of ideas is the same as the

order and connection of things.

 

Proposition 11: That which constitutes the actual being of the human

mind is basically nothing else but the idea of an individual actually

existing thing.

 

Proposition 12: Whatever happens in the object of the idea

constituting the human mind is bound to be perceived by the human

mind i.e. the idea of that thing will necessarily be in the human

mind. That is to say, if the object of the idea constituting the

human mind is a body, nothing can happen in that body without its

being perceived by the mind.

 

Proposition 13: The object of the idea constituting the human mind is

the body - i.e. a definite mode of extension actually existing, and

nothing else.

 

Scholium to Proposition 7 (Part II): Consequently, thinking substance

and extended substance are one and the same substance, comprehended

now under this attribute, now under that. So too, a mode of extension

and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, expressed in

two ways. This truth seems to have been glimpsed by some of the

Hebrews, who hold that God, God's intellect and the things understood

by God are one and the same. For example, a circle existing in

nature, and the idea of the existing circle - which is also in God -

are one and the same thing, explicated through different attributes.

 

 

There has been much confusion in modern philosophy because of the

inability to bridge the seeming divide between mind and body leading

to problems such as 'the ghost in the machine' and the 'hard problem

of consciousness'. Much of the problem has its roots in the stimulus-

response theory of cognition, for this theory divides reality into

the 'outside world of objects' and 'the internal world of

sensations' – the world of bodies and the world of mind. We have

already seen how the reality-divide is false, but we must now treat

the subject logically.

 

 

REFUTATION OF THE STIMULUS-REPSONSE THEORY OF COGNITION

 

The stimulus-response theory of perception is one of the most

persistent dogmas in the history of human thought, and one that

continues to persist even in the pages of modern science; it is the

dogma that the human sensorium is a tabula rasa, a passive thing that

is invoked into response by the sensory signals that impinge upon it.

This is an old Epicurean doctrine, and surprisingly, it has not been

subjected to a serious examination in since its emergence on the

philosophical-scientific scene - except perhaps indirectly through

the brilliant phenomenology of Edmund Husserl who showed that we

reach objects directly without mediation. Yet Husserl did not make an

attempt to dislodge the dogmatic theory of cognition. I had, in an

earlier post titled 'Advaita and the Brain' (Msg.#20931), provided

the reasons why the stimulus-theory of cognition is illogical, and I

reproduce here below some extracts from that article with some minor

modification:

 

 

"The brain-centric model of perception postulates the brain as the

cause of perception and ideation -- as the 'intelligent' centre where

the various input signals from the environment are processed

and 'displayed' as the manifold phenomena of the world. Thus,

logically, it follows that all the things I perceive, and have ever

perceived, are only forms 'displayed' by the brain, for it is no more

possible for me to perceive anything except through the machinations

of the brain. For whatever be the entity that I may point to, or

think about, it would necessarily be part of the manifold that is

presented to me, including the thing pointed to, the act of pointing,

and the comprehending of the thing. But this leads to a logical

circularity because the brain, which is supposed to be presenting

this manifold 'from behind' phenomena, is also a perceived or ideated

thing that is part of the self-same phenomena, as are other objects

of the world. Thus, the brain that we know, in so far as it is a

perceived or ideated thing, would necessarily be a product of the

machinations of whatever 'processing mechanism' is presenting it. If

we are to avoid this circularity, the presenter of the manifold of

phenomena must lie outside the manifold. Therefore the brain is not

the transforming mechanism that we conceived it to be – it is the

output, so to say, and not the transforming mechanism that presents

the output. Thus the notion of the brain as the `central processing

mechanism' collapses. When logic forces circularity it becomes

imperative to look at the premises of the theory. Here it becomes

necessary to dispense with the stimulus-response model of the brain

altogether and say that we reach objects directly without mediation."

 

"Everything appears quite logical in this hypothesis except for one

source of discomfort. The discomfort arises from the fact that the

brain has an observed correlation to perception. That is, the manner

of perception can be modified by human intervention in the workings

of the brain - by the administration of drugs, or the injection of

certain electrical signals. Experiments conducted on the brain show

that the electro-chemical-neural mechanism of the brain has a

correspondence to the manner in which we perceive. We are therefore

presented with an enigmatic problem. On the one hand, placing the

cause of perception in the brain creates a logical conundrum and

demands that the cause of perception be placed outside phenomena. On

the other hand, there is a definite causal relationship between the

brain and our perception of the world."

 

"A valid theory of cognition must ensure that the logical circularity

deriving out the stimulus-response model is avoided while at the same

time accounting for the causal relationships that are seen to exist.

The refutation of the brain model demonstrates that there is no

transforming mechanism between the perceiver and the perceived world.

Thus there is the seer and the seen, and the seer sees the seen

intimately and directly. The seen – the world and its objects - are

empty in themselves without the ground of consciousness. That is,

objects in themselves (without the consciousness that ensouls them)

are 'nothingness'; they derive their being and meanings only by

virtue of consciousness. These `empty' objects cannot influence one

another. To assign causality to objects of the world would be as

naïve as assigning causes to the things we see on the screen when we

watch a cinema. The causes of events on the screen are not in those

events or screen-things, but in the transcending source from where

they derive their existence and meaning. Similarly, there are no

causes in the world, except by virtue of causality being bestowed

upon them by the bestowing consciousness. Thus, it would be true to

say that something in the world is a cause of another only in so far

as this is the manner of ordering of the world, and not because the

cause is something intrinsic in the object. Thus, in the physical

world, the brain is the cause of perception, not because of any

intrinsic capacity in the brain to influence or be influenced by the

world, but because the Transcending Causality that orders phenomena

manifests the brain as the seat of a certain causal-nexus within the

schema of the world. It is in this wise that the brain becomes

a 'cause' of perception – not as a real cause, but as bestowed upon

it by the Real Cause."

 

 

THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE WORLD

 

There is thus one continuum of Consciousness in which mind and body

appear as manifest features of experiential reality. This is the

world. These are the objects and these are the thoughts. And these

are the causal relationships between the things of the world. They

all exist as features of the continuum. The body as the seat of our

experience arises in this continuum, marked off from the rest of the

world as 'I am this'. The individual soul is a luminous clearing

within the world and is circumscribed by the mind and body. This is

the manner in which it is bestowed. It is He Himself that has created

the body as the abode of the soul and bestowed upon it the causal

nexus between the senses and the objects.

 

"He desired: 'May I be many, may I be born. He performed austerities.

Having performed austerities, He created all this – whatever there

is. Having created all this, He entered into it." (Tai.II.vi.1).

 

"Of all these living beings, there are only three origins: those born

from egg, those born from a living being, and those born from a

sprout. That Deity thought: 'Let Me now enter into those three

deities by means of this living Self and let Me then develop names

and forms." (Ch.VI.iii.1-2).

 

The individual soul's power of determination in the world is limited

to the particular mind and body that delimits it and their capacities

thereof. The soul can affect the world only in so far as it can act

through the body. The individual soul cannot determine the world into

being; neither can it directly affect the world except through the

body. Its determinations are limited to the capacity it is bestowed

with to bring forth objects to the presence of the mind but not to

bring forth objects to the presence of the senses. Even in a dream,

the dream-objects are not brought forth by the volition of the

individual being, but by that same bestowing Cause that operates in

the totality of the world.

 

The individual soul cannot bring forth objects to the senses. In

other words, the individual soul cannot create objects; it can only

affect the objects that it already finds around it as the furniture

of the world. The world is already endowed with objects of sense-

perception prior to the individual's determinations, and the

individual soul as a limited clearing within the body can only reach

out to them with the help of the body. The capacity of the

Transcendental Cause to project the world as a sensual manifold of

objects is its vikshepa shakti. This is the creation that is held in

place for the individual to sense and live in. For according to

Shankara, what differentiates Brahman from the individual soul is the

difference in characteristics – Brahman is He whose Will is the

ineluctable translation of ideas into actuality, and the individual

soul is he who is trapped in the mire of avidya.

 

 

ON PERCEPTION (PRATYAKSHA)

 

It is in the context of the divide between the individual soul and

the rest of the world that the theory of cognition must be seen. The

tripudi of knower, known and knowledge is a feature within the

continuum of Consciousness. How does this knower – the self within

the body – perceive the world? We have seen that it is not reasonable

to posit inconceivable 'objects-in-themselves' from which signals

arrive to the body because such a hypothesis necessarily leads to a

logical circularity. If we say that the sense of an object is somehow

carried from the object to the senses within the continuum itself,

then we should be seeing objects within the body and not out there in

space where it is actually perceived. The mind cognises it as being

out-there because the mind has reached out to the space there and

conformed with the form of the object, and the there-ness of the

object is a composite part of the cognition. It cannot be said that

the object is perceived as-if it is there, for the necessity of

bringing in the as-if-ness in the argument itself proves the

attribute of spatial location that the mind has conformed to in

perceiving the object, and when the mind has conformed to its object,

it is illogical to deny the attribute that is perceived of the

object. Moreover, the pseudo-logic of 'as-if-ness' is a self-refuting

device because it lays the ground for anything to be stated as

anything else by effacing the difference seen in perception by

ascribing it to 'as-if-ness'. Therefore, the only logically

sustainable thesis is that objects are perceived through contact

between the instruments of cognition and the object whereby the mind

and senses conform to the form of the object. This is the Advaita

theory of perception - objects are perceived by the mind along with

the senses reaching out and making contact with the object. (Swami

Satprakashananda has treated this subject admirably in his

book 'Methods of Knowledge'.) The actual comprehension of the object

takes place in the intelligent light of consciousness. Thus, in

Advaita, the human sensorium is not a tabula rasa, but comprises the

mind and senses as the active instruments of cognition. It is the

actually existing object that is perceived - just as it is - and the

object is not a 'thing-in-itself' in an inconceivable 'outside

world'. The schism between mind and body, and the schism between

primary and secondary qualities are dissolved in the metaphysics of

Advaita.

 

____________

 

 

With regards,

Chittaranjan