The Real and the Unreal - Part VII - Ontology

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Om Gurubhyo Namah

 

 

DRAVYA (SUBSTANCE)

 

We have attempted so far to uncover the meaning of the word 'object'

by extricating it from the predication of existence that is

attributed to it, as well as by separating it from the different

modes of cognition through which it is cognised (such as conception

and perception). Now, an object that is seen or conceived as an

existing thing is a substance, for substance (dravya) is that which

is brought forth as an existing thing, wherein the prior notion of

existence is already constituted in the thing cognised. Therefore,

the question of whether a substance exists is, in Kantian language,

an analytical judgement, because a substance is that which is known

apriori as existing, and the judgement of its existence reduces to a

tautology. But it is necessary to explicate the nature of substance

in greater depth before the meaning of substance can shine.

 

Substance is revealed in the perception of an object as the existing

thing, but substance, qua substance, is never experienced by itself,

for substance is immanent as the ground in the things experienced.

What does ground here mean? Firstly, substance is the existential

core of the thing. It is this existence that is expressed as

substantiality. For we say that a horse seen in a dream is

insubstantial while the horse seen in the world is substantial. That

reality which is immanent in the perception of the latter horse is

the existentiality of substance. Secondly, substance is a unity of

existence. Substance is the unity of all sensual and non-sensual

predicates that characterise a thing. We do not, in actual

experience, perceive mere sensations as Hume presumed, but we

perceive objects as possessing sensual attributes. We do not see

complexes of colours and shapes floating about; rather we see an

apple, a table, a tree, as possessing these qualities. There is no

valid basis to argue, as some empiricists do, that sensations, or

sense data, are agglomerated into objects through association. These

empiricists may be held guilty of an 'empiricist violation' in

professing that complexes are agglomerated into an object - because

no such process of agglomeration is actually experienced. When I

perceive a tree, I have no experience of a process whereby sensations

are bundled into a unity - on the other hand the perception of the

tree is immediate. The proposition of agglomeration is based on

inductive reasoning from a premise not given in the empirical and the

empiricists that postulate it seem to violate the very premise on

which empiricism is constructed by putting forth an inference that

supersedes an empirical fact.

 

Substance, as the ground, is the unity of all the attributes, and we

may rightly say that attributes are coterminous with the substance.

Shankara affirms this nature of substance while refuting the

Vaisesikas: "But in the case under discussion, the substance itself

being known as possessed of the respective attributes in such

perceptions as, a 'white blanket', 'a red cow', 'a blue lotus', and

so on, there can be no such perception of difference between a

substance and a quality as between fire and smoke. Hence the quality

is one with the substance." (BSB II, 2.3.17). Again, Shankara refutes

the duality of substance and attributes by refuting the relationship

of inherence: "Because this leads to an infinite regress on a parity

of reasoning" for "inherence itself, which is absolutely different

from the inhering things, should be connected with the inhering

things through a separate relationship of the nature of inherence,

since the fact of similarity of absolute difference exists here as

well. And from this it follows that for those successive

relationships, other relationships of inherence have to be imagined.

In this way, the door is laid open for an infinite regress." (BSB II,

2.3.13)

 

Substance is therefore the existent, and attributes are the

descriptions of that same existent. For it cannot be that the

description of a thing becomes existentially other than the thing it

describes. It is this truth that is imbedded into the structure of

language wherein identity is predicated between the substance and

attribute by its subject-predicate form: 'An apple is red'.

 

 

SUBSTANCE AS THE GROUND OF BEING

 

When existence is predicated of a thing, it is on account of the

thing being seen as substantial i.e., as an existing thing. But that

which is seen as existing at one time may be seen as non-existing at

another time, for example, the horse seen in the dream. The

predication of existence therefore seems to have no ground to stand

on except for its manifestation as existent and non-existent. In this

respect, the ontology of presence would appear to be false as an

absolute nature of existence. Yet, substance as the existential core

is not merely a form. Substance, qua substance, is bare. It cannot be

said what substance is because the thing said of it becomes its

description, and a predicate is not the substance in its capacity as

pure substance. Substance, as abstracted from attributes, is

indiscernible. Substance is noumenal. Every manifestation has an

existential core, even the water in a mirage, because while the water

is seen to be lacking in substantiality, the form itself called by

the name `mirage' is not seen as non-existent. The horse in a dream

is seen as insubstantial, but the form itself called

the 'insubstantial form of a horse' is not seen as non-existent. The

mirage-water and the dream-horse are not like the son of a barren

woman that can never be. They are beings, all of them - the unreal

mirage-water, the unreal dream-horse, the real water, and the real

horse. All these are in the noumenal ground of Existence. The

noumenal ground is One and not many, because substance, qua

substance, is bare and indiscernible. And there cannot be difference

between indiscernible 'things' because difference is nothing but a

discernable. Therefore substance is One and indivisible. Thus, there

is nothing that is non-existent, but only Existence showing forth non-

existence as a manifest feature of its multitudinous attributions,

i.e., non-existence is a mode of Existence. In accordance with the

unfolding of experience, things may exist or may not exist, but at a

deeper level, they are all unreal as belonging merely to the chimera

of substantiality as bestowed upon them by names and forms. And yet,

at the deepest level, they are ultimately all real in accordance with

their existential core being the noumenal ground of Existence, for it

is not possible for a thing to not be. There is nothing but

Existence, even in the unreal, it being only a mode of the Real. Now

this same conclusion may be arrived at through the doctrine of

vivartavada.

 

 

VIVARTAVADA AND ONTOLOGY

 

The world is said to be unreal because it exists in the middle but

not in the beginning and the end. It is indeed not possible for non-

existence to come into existence or for existence to become non-

existence. Therefore, when things are seen to exist in the middle and

not in the beginning and end, it can mean that things are non-

existent because they were not there yesterday and will not be there

tomorrow, or it can mean that it was always there, and that its

coming into existence is merely a seeming, and that this seeming of

things coming to be is false. The latter alone is the Advaitic truth,

and the former is the falsity of superficiality that Advaita negates.

The former is not the Advaitic truth because it is what Advaita

negates, and Advaita cannot be assumed to negate an Advaitic truth!

 

What is it that is meant by creation and destruction? What indeed is

change? The most fundamental ground of logic is that a thing is

itself; a thing is identical to itself. This apparently obvious and

seemingly trivial statement yet has something to say: that a thing

cannot be other than itself. This compels us to conclude that a thing

can never be other than itself even in change.

 

It is an empirical fact that we see an object changing. But an object

changes without ceasing to be itself because otherwise it cannot be

the SAME object that changes. This seems to lead to the question:

what is an object that it is identical to itself even in displaying

various and diverse forms and attributes. An object therefore cannot

be a mere constitution of attributes, because if it were, the change

in constitution would not be seen as the same object, unless there be

a unifying unchanging principle identical to itself through the

change. That is, if the being of the object is not other than the

being of the variety of attributes that it may assume or manifest,

wherein the attributes are each identical to themselves in form, but

not separate in existence from the object, but existentially subsumed

in the object. This 'being of the object' is substance as we have

seen.

 

An object does not change. Let us take, as an example, a hypothetical

circular coin made of wax. Its shape is a circle. The shape circle

can never be another shape without ceasing to be itself. Now let us

deform the coin till it assumes a square shape. We say that the

object (coin) has changed from being circular to being square. When

the shape of the coin changed, did the shape 'round' become the

shape 'square'? That is never possible, for circle can never become

square even as square can never become circle for it is the nature of

a circle to be circle even as it is the nature of square to be

square. The circle was not destroyed even as the square was not

created. Thus, the attributes seen when the object changes,

themselves do not change. Each of the attributes that the object

displayed was not generated, but different attributes, each of which

is unchanging, was displayed in the 'change' attributed to the

object. Thus, the law of identity is not violated and yet change is

possible as the showing forth of attributes that are pre-existent in

the substantial ground. Change is the manifesting dynamism of things

that are each unchanging. It is not an ontological 'it' that

constitutes change, but the actualisation of 'its' manifest

possibilities. Which dynamism is real, and is called 'Time' (Kala).

Time is the bewitching power of Maya that drapes itself over

eternally unchanging forms. She is Mahakali, the Great Night behind

creation.

 

In truth, there is nothing born, nothing destroyed, for everything is

eternal in the infinite nature of Brahman. But let us now hear

Shankara speak, and I quote at length here because of the importance

that this commentary bears to the understanding of Advaita:

 

 

---- Quote---- (Brahadaranyaka Upanishad, Chapter I, Section II)

 

Shankara: The effect too exists before it is produced.

 

Question: How?

 

Reply: Because its manifestation points out its pre-existence.

Manifestation means coming within the range of perception. It is a

common occurrence that a thing, a jar for instance, which was hidden

by darkness or any other thing and comes within the range of

perception when the obstruction is removed by the appearance of light

or in some other way, does not preclude its previous existence.

Similarly this universe too, we can understand, existed before its

manifestation. For a jar that is non-existent is not perceived even

when the sun rises.

 

Objection: No, it must be perceived, for you deny its previous non-

existence. According to you, any effect, say a jar, is never non-

existent. So it must be perceived when the sun rises. Its previous

form, the lump of clay, is nowhere near, and obstructions like

darkness are absent' so, being existent, it cannot but appear.

 

Reply: Not so, for obstruction is of two kinds. Every effect such as

a jar has two kinds of obstruction. When it has become manifest from

its component clay, darkness and the wall etc. are the obstructions;

while before its manifestation from the clay the obstruction consists

in particles of clay remaining as some other effect such as a lump.

Therefore, the effect, the jar, although existent, is not perceived

before its manifestation, as it is hidden. The terms and

concepts 'destroyed', 'produced', 'existence' and 'non-existence'

depend on this two-fold character of manifestation and disappearance.

 

Objection: This is incorrect, since the obstruction represented by

particular forms such as the lump of the two halves of a jar are of a

different nature. To be explicit: Such obstructions to the

manifestation of a jar as darkness or the wall, we see, do not occupy

the same space as a jar, but the lump or the two halves of a jar do.

So your statement that the jar, although present in the form of the

lump or the two halves, is not perceived because it is hidden, is

wrong, for the nature of the obstruction in this case is different.

 

Reply: No, for we see that water mixed with milk occupies the same

space as the milk which conceals it.

 

Objection: But since the component parts of a jar such as its two

halves or pieces are included in the effect, the jar, they should not

prove obstructions at all.

 

Reply: Not so, for being separated from the jar they are so many

different effects, and can therefore serve as obstructions.

 

Objection: Then the effort should be directed solely to the removal

of obstructions. That is to say, is, as you say, the effect, the jar

for instance, is actually present in the state of the lump or the two

halves, and is not perceived because of an obstruction, then one who

wants the effect, the jar, should try to remove the obstruction, and

not make a jar. But as a matter of fact, nobody does so. Therefore

your statement is wrong.

 

Reply: No, for there is no hard and fast rule about it. It is not

always the case that a jar or any other effect manifests itself if

only one tries to remove the obstruction; for when a jar, for

instance, is covered with darkness etc., one tries to light a lamp.

 

Objection: That too is just for destroying the darkness. This effort

to light a lamp is also for removing the darkness, which done, the

jar is automatically perceived. Nothing is added to the jar.

 

Reply: No, for the jar is perceived as covered with light when the

lamp is lighted. Not so before lighting of the lamp. Hence this was

not simply for removing the darkness, but for covering the jar with

light, for it is since perceived as covered with light. Sometimes the

effort is directed to the removal of the obstruction, as when the

wall, for instance, is pulled down. Therefore it cannot be laid down

as a rule that one who wants the manifestation of something must

simply try to remove the obstruction. Besides, one should take such

steps as will cause the manifestation for the efficacy of the

established practice regarding it. We have already said that an

effect which is patent in the cause serves as an obstruction to the

manifestation of the other effects. So if one tries only to destroy

the previously manifested effect such as the lump or the two halves

which stand between it and the jar, one may also have such as the

potsherds or tiny pieces. These too will conceal the jar and prevent

its being perceived; so a fresh attempt will be needed. Hence the

necessary operation of the factors of an action has its utility for

one who wants the manifestation of a jar or any other thing.

Therefore the effect exists even before its manifestation.

>From our divergent notions of the past and future also we infer this.

Our notions of a jar that was and one that is yet to be cannot, like

the notion of the present jar, be entirely independent of objects.

For one who desires to have a jar not yet made sets oneself to work

for it. We do not see people strive for things which they know to be

non-existent. Another reason for the pre-existence of the effect is

the fact that the knowledge (of God) and the Yogins concerning the

past and future jar is infallible. Were the future jar non-existent,

His (and their) perception of it would prove false. Nor is this

perception a mere figure of speech. As to the reasons for inferring

the existence of the jar, we have already stated them.

 

Another reason for it is that the opposite view involves a self-

contradiction. If on seeing a potter, for instance, at work on the

production of a jar one is certain in view of the evidence that the

jar will come into existence, then it would be a contradiction in

terms to say that the jar is non-existent at the very time with which

it is said it will come into relation. For to say that the jar that

will be is non-existent, is the same thing as to say that it will not

be. It would be like saying, 'This jar does not exist.' If, however,

you say that before its manifestation the jar is non-existent,

meaning thereby that it does not exist exactly as the potter, for

instance, exists while he is at work on its production, then there is

no dispute between us.

 

Objection: Why?

 

Reply: Because the jar exists in its own future form. It should be

borne in mind that the present existence of the lump or the two

halves is not the same as that of the jar. Nor is the future

existence of the jar the same as theirs. Therefore you do not

contradict us when you say that the jar is non-existent before its

manifestation while the activity of the potter, for instance, is

going on. You will be doing this if you deny to the jar its own

future form as an effect. But you do not deny that. Nor do all things

undergoing modification have an identical form of existence in the

present or in the future.

 

Moreover, of the four kinds of negation relating to, say, a jar, we

observe that what is called mutual exclusion is other than the jar:

The negation of a jar is cloth or some other thing, not the jar

itself. But the cloth, although it is the negation of the jar, is not

a non-entity, but a positive entity. Similarly, the previous non-

existence, the non-existence due to destruction, and absolute

negation must also be other than the jar: for they are spoken of in

terms of it, as in the case of the mutual exclusion relating to it.

And these negations must also (like the cloth, for instance) be

positive entities. Hence the previous non-existence of a jar does not

mean that it does not at all exist as an entity before it comes into

being. If however, you say that the previous non-existence of a jar

means the jar itself, then to mention it as being 'of a jar' (instead

of 'the jar itself') is an incongruity. If you use it merely as a

fancy, as in the expression, 'The body of the stone roller', then the

phrase 'the previous non-existence of a jar' would only mean that it

is the imaginary non-existence that is mentioned in terms of the jar,

and not the jar itself. If, on the other hand, you say that the

negation of a jar is something other than it, we have already

answered the point. Moreover, if the jar before its manifestation be

an absolute nonentity like the proverbial horns of a hare, it cannot

be connected either with its cause or with existence (as the

logicians hold), for connection requires two positive entities.

 

Objection: It is all right with things that are inseparable.

 

Reply: No, for we cannot conceive of an inseparable connection

between an existent and a non-existent thing. Separable or

inseparable connection is possible between two positive entities

only, not between an entity and a nonentity, nor between two

nonentities. Therefore we conclude that the effect does exist before

it is manifested.

 

---- Unquote----

 

 

THE REAL AND UNREAL IN ADVAITA

 

There is nothing that is unreal. The absolutely unreal is only

the 'son of a barren woman' – a purely meaningless term. The real is

the opposite of the unreal – and hence it is all that has meaning. It

is all that is seen and conceived. This is in perfect harmony with

Sri Shankaracharya's commentary on the Brahadaranyaka Upanishad.

 

The second meaning of unreal - which arises within this overarching

reality of the All - is the mistaking of one thing for another. It

pertains to the lack of genuineness of a thing that is seen. It is

that unreality whereby what is seen is a not what is genuinely there.

We must now reassess the meaning of superimposition in the light of

these meanings.

 

The theory of adhyasa arises in the context of the second meaning of

unreality. The articulation of unreality in the Preamble is to be

seen in the light of this meaning of reality. Now, the question that

arises in the context of the 'reality of all' is: Why does one thing

get mistaken for another? Why does the snake ever get mistaken for a

rope? It is true that the rope lies concealed in the dim light of

dusk; it is also true that the coil has a likeness to a snake; yet,

why does the mind does not rest in suspension when it vaguely sees a

coil in the dim light of dusk? Why can't it contain itself in the

admission that the object is not known rather than rush to the

conclusion that it is a snake? The answer lies in the manner in which

we cognise things. We do not perceive mere attributes, but we

perceive attributes as belonging to a thing. Substance is the 'thing'

that is perceived, and the attributes are perceived as being 'of the

thing' that is perceived. Cognition never sees only attributes. The

mind and the senses both partake in the cognition and while the

senses grasp the sensible attributes, the mind grasps the thing in

which the attributes inhere. Adhyasa takes place when there is

concealment - when the attributes are seen but the thing of which

they are the attributes are not seen. Since the mind always sees

attributes as 'of a thing', it rushes out to grasp the thing without

the ascertainment of its truth and THAT IS THE SUPERIMPOSITION that

is spoken about in Advaita.

 

Vyavaharika is the state when the substratum of the world lies

concealed. The sentient Substance of the world is concealed and the

mind rushes out to grasp the insentient prakriti as the substance.

The mistaken existential core that it grasps is the falseness of jada

when in reality the existential core is the sentient Brahman. This is

the 'world' that is superimposed on Brahman, and which Advaita says

is false. Advaita does not say that superimposition is the nature of

the world, but merely points out that adhyasa is a natural feature

that characterises people in this world. It is what is to be removed

through adhyaropa apavada. The world as adhyasa is what Advaita

rejects as false. The world as ensouled by Brahman is the reality of

Advaita. The truth of Advaita is the continuum of Brahman. This whole

universe abides with Brahman as its Heart. There is no

superimposition in the continuum – Brahman is here All.

 

"He who inhabits the earth, yet is within the earth, whom the earth

does not know, whose body the earth is, and who controls the earth

from within – He is your Self, the Inner Controller, the Immortal."

(Br.Up.III.vii.3)

 

 

There is now the final question that we need to answer now: If the

entire universe is real then how can it be said that Brahman is

nirguna and formless? We shall try and attempt this topic in the next

part. Meanwhile we take leave of this long post with the words of the

Goddess in Parmenides' 'Way of Truth':

 

 

"Welcome, O youth, that comest to my abode on the car that bears

thee, tended by immortal charioteers. It is no ill chance, but right

and justice, that has sent thee forth to travel on this way. Far

indeed does it lie from the beaten track of men. Meet it is that thou

shouldst learn all things, as well the unshaken heart of well-rounded

truth, as the opinions of mortals in which is no true belief at all.

Yet none the less shalt thou learn these things also – how, passing

right through all things, one should judge the things that seem to

be." (Fr.1)

 

"Come now, and I will tell thee – and do thou hearken and carry my

word away – the only ways of enquiry that exists for thinking: the

one way, that it is and cannot not-be, is the path of Persuasion, for

it attends upon Truth; the other, that it is-not and needs must not-

be, that I tell thee is a path altogether unthinkable. For thou

couldst not know that which is-not nor utter it; for the same thing

exists for thinking and for being." (Fr.2)

 

"One way only is left to be spoken of, that it is; and on this way

are full many signs that what is is uncreated and imperishable, for

it is entire, immovable and without end. It was not in the past, nor

shall it be, since it is now, all at once, one, continuous; for what

creation wilt thou seek for it?" (Fr.8)

 

______________

 

 

With regards,

Chittaranjan