The Real and the Unreal - Part V

July 27, 2004

Namaste Shri Sadanandaji,

advaitin, kuntimaddi sadananda

<kuntimaddisada> wrote:

> Just curious - Am I wrong in assuming that the bulk

> of your arguments about the reality of the world rest

> on Shankara's refutation of Buddhist arguments in

> Ch II of BS. Baashya and not so much on other bhaashya-s

> of Shankara related to principle Upanishads.

I feel I need to say a little more on the subject of why Advaita

refutes Buddhism when it is itself saying that the world is unreal.

There is an element in the argument against the Madhyamika doctrine

which suggests to us the status of the world in Advaita. Shankara

says that the unreality of the world as held by the Buddhists is not

reasonable because the world, according to their doctrine, doesn't

have a substratum. Advaita also says the world is unreal, but this

unreality is somehow justified because there is a substratum. What is

it that the substratum brings to the argument here?

In Advaita, Brahman is the substratum of the world. Therefore, all

things, in substance, are Brahman. It is Brahman that ensouls the

world. When the world is seen divested of Brahman – as seen by the

Madhaymikas – then it has no reality, for Reality has been removed

from the world. Therefore Advaita refutes the 'world of vacuity' that

the Madhyamikas speak about. Advaita takes a stand against the

Buddhists that the world is not without a substratum, and since it

has a substratum it is indeed real -- because it is in substance

Brahman, and is ensouled by Brahman.

But strangely, Advaita iself says that the world is unreal. The world

that is unreal is here actually the world as seen in vyavaharika.

This is because people in vyavaharika do not see the soul of the

world – they see only the inanimate, the shell and not the kernel.

This is 'the world' that is unreal. But when one sees into the heart

of the world, one sees Brahman as the immanent existential core of

the world, and then the world is real only.

It is significant that Shankara says (in the bhashya) that it is

Samkhya that is the doctrine closest to Advaita. If we carefully go

through the arguments against Samkhya, we find that the

differentiating line between Advaita and Samkhya lies in the

assignation of the ultimate material and efficient causes of the

universe. Once both these causes are placed in Brahman, instead of in

pradhana, Samhkya becomes the same as Advaita (in this respect).

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan

July 27, 2004

--- Chittaranjan Naik <chittaranjan_naik wrote:

> There is an element in the argument against the Madhyamika doctrine

> which suggests to us the status of the world in Advaita. Shankara

> says that the unreality of the world as held by the Buddhists is not

> reasonable because the world, according to their doctrine, doesn't

> have a substratum. Advaita also says the world is unreal, but this

> unreality is somehow justified because there is a substratum. What is

> it that the substratum brings to the argument here?

>

> In Advaita, Brahman is the substratum of the world. Therefore, all

> things, in substance, are Brahman.

Chttaranjanji - Interesting point. Taking Brahman as substratum, if the

reality of the world is the reality of the substratum, then I fully

agree with you. Brahman as substratum goes with the statement that

Brahman is the material cause for the universe. However, one cannot

perceive Brahman, since he is not an object of perception. Besides what

I perceive through senses are only attributes but not substantive.

Hence to say that what I perceive is real becomes a problem, since what

I perceive is not necessarily Brahman. Since I perceive, it is cannot

be unreal since unreal cannot be perceived. I have not yet studied your

next part related to the ontological issue.

When dvaitins (who consider adviata as prachhanna Buddhism) say world is

real, ontologically they are not referring to the substratum Brahman

since for them Brahman is not the material cause of the universe. They

rest their reality on the account of perception of the world. When

VishishTadvaitin says the world is real, their arguments are different

too.

>

> But strangely, Advaita iself says that the world is unreal. The world

> that is unreal is here actually the world as seen in vyavaharika.

> This is because people in vyavaharika do not see the soul of the

> world – they see only the inanimate, the shell and not the kernel.

> This is 'the world' that is unreal. But when one sees into the heart

> of the world, one sees Brahman as the immanent existential core of

> the world, and then the world is real only.

Yes indeed. I would say what one perceives through the senses are only

attributes and mind has to provide a locus for the attributes to

complete the cognition process to say that object with those attributes

is there that I am perceiving. Mechanics of the perception process along

with the assesment of reality becomes important in the correct

analysis of the issue involved.

> Once both these causes are placed in Brahman, instead of in

> pradhana, Samhkya becomes the same as Advaita (in this respect).

I agree with your parathetical statement, although my knowledge of

sankhya is bare minimum.

Hari OM!

Sadananda

>

> Warm regards,

> Chittaranjan

>

=====

What you have is destiny and what you do with what you have is self-effort.

Future destiny is post destiny modified by your present action. You are not only

the prisoner of your past but master of your future. - Swami Chinmayananda

July 28, 2004

Namaste Shri Sadanandaji,

I think you raise some vitally imprtant points in your post, and I

take the liberty of writing a bit freely on the topic.

advaitin, kuntimaddi sadananda

<kuntimaddisada> wrote:

> Chttaranjanji - Interesting point. Taking Brahman as substratum,

> if the reality of the world is the reality of the substratum,

> then I fully agree with you. Brahman as substratum goes with

> the statement that Brahman is the material cause for the

> universe. However, one cannot perceive Brahman, since he is

> not an object of perception. Besides what I perceive through

> senses are only attributes but not substantive. Hence to say

> that what I perceive is real becomes a problem, since what

> I perceive is not necessarily Brahman. Since I perceive, it

> is cannot be unreal since unreal cannot be perceived. I have

> not yet studied your next part related to the ontological

> issue.

> > But when one sees into the heart of the world, one sees

> > Brahman as the immanent existential core of the world,

> > and then the world is real only.

> Yes indeed. I would say what one perceives through the senses

> are only attributes and mind has to provide a locus for the

> attributes to complete the cognition process to say that

> object with those attributes is there that I am perceiving.

> Mechanics of the perception process along with the assesment

> of reality becomes important in the correct analysis of the

> issue involved.

This brings us to the topic of 'substance', or 'ousia' as it was

known to the Greeks. One does not perceive the substance as susbtance

bare. What one perceives of the substance, by the very fact of

being 'of the substance', is a predicate. Anything that is said, or

seen, or thought, about the substance is the attribute of the

substance. And, as attributes they are not existentially different

than the substance; they are the descriptions of the very substance.

Substance and its attributes cannot be separated as is clear from

Shankara's commentary. I believe this was the way substance was known

to the ancients and the early-medievals until somewhere in the middle-

ages the meaning of substance became lost in the obscurations of

analysis wherein the analysis itself seems to have abstracted

the 'substance' out of things. Today, it is Descartes that is known

as the turning point when Scholastic Philosophy gives way to Modern

Philosophy. Descartes has been hailed as a new beginning in

philosophy, and has also been decried as the philosopher responsible

for spoiling everything. I think it is a bit unfair to blame

Descartes for being merely the pivotal point of a historical

unfolding. The complete loss of meaning of substance may be detected

in the British Empiricists - Locke, Berkeley and Hume. But it is

interesting that, while the meaning of 'substance' was almost lost by

this time, Descartes had almost - but not quite - reached back to its

original meaning, and I would like to quote a passage from

Descartes' 'Meditations' to bring out this point.

Descartes:

"Take for example, this piece of wax; it has been but recently taken

from the hive; it has not yet lost its sweetness of the honey it

contained; it still retains something of the odor of the flowers from

which it has been gathered; its color, its shape, its size, are

manifest to us; it is hard, cold, ....

"But behold! While I am speaking let it be moved toward the fire.

What remains of the taste exhales, the odor evaporates, the color

changes, the shape is destroyed, its size increases, it becomes

liquid, it becomes hot and can no longer be handled, and when struck

upon emits no sound. Does the wax, not withstanding these changes,

still remain the same wax? We must admit that it does; no one doubts

that it does, no one judges otherwise. What then, was I comprehending

so distinctly in knowing the piece of wax? Certainly, it could be

nothing of all that I was aware of by way of the senses, since all

the things that came by way of taste, smell, sight, touch and

hearing, are changed, and the wax none the less remains.

"... As we find, what then alone remains is a something extended,

flexible and movable. But what is this 'flexible', this 'movable'?

What am I then imaging? That the piece of wax from being round in

shape can become square, or from being square can become triangular?

Assuradly not. For I am apprehending that it admits of an infinity of

similar shapes, and am not able to compass this infinity by way of

images. Consequently this comprehension of it cannot be the product

of the faculty of imagination.

"... I must therefore, admit that I cannot by way of images

comprehend what this wax is, and that it is by the mind alone that I

apprehend it.

"... For I now know that, properly speaking, bodies are cognized not

by the senses or by the imagination, but by understanding alone. They

are not thus cognized because seen or touched, but only in so far as

they are apprehended understandingly."

Sadanandaji, you have rightly pointed out the importance of the

mechanics of perceptions as a key factor in understanding this

subject. As per my understanding of the Advaita theory of cognition,

perception takes place by means of the mind going out alongwith the

senses to grasp the object -- what the senses grasps is the sensible

attributes while the mind grasps attributes like smallness, etc, and

the comprehension of the object taking place in the light of chit.

Unfortunately, Advaita has been interpreted in the last two centuries

through the colourations of Idealism. As pointed out by Michaelji in

an earlier post, this is probably due to the fact that this period

was the great period of Idealism in the West. The matter was made

worse I think due to a confounding of Buddhist Vijnanavada doctrines

with those of Advaita Vedanta.

> When dvaitins (who consider adviata as prachhanna Buddhism)

> say world is real, ontologically they are not referring to

> the substratum Brahman since for them Brahman is not the

> material cause of the universe. They rest their reality on

> the account of perception of the world. When VishishTadvaitin

> says the world is real, their arguments are different too.

Yes, I have gathered that in Dvaita the material cause is prakriti

which is dependent on Brahman, whereas in both Vishistadvaita and

Advaita, the existential core of the world is Brahman Itself. The

language of Advaita does often create confusion though. I believe

that when Brahman is hidden, the world seen through avidya 'becomes'

a limiting adjunct in so far as the substratum is not seen as the

substratum, and when avidya is 'removed', the same world is seen as

nothing but Brahman - as features of the non-dual Brahman. But

Advaita does not stop at this vision of the world, but goes to the

heart of attributes itself in its doctrine of word-meanings.

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan

July 28, 2004

Our beloved SHANKARA BHAGVADAPADA says in his Gita Bhashya

" avyakto paro narayana "

Narayana is beyond Maya (which is Vyakta).

can some learned member in this satsangha fully explain what this

means in the context of the present discussion.

in ever-lasting gratitude

ps yaduji, btw thank you for your explanation regarding my query....

July 28, 2004

--- Chittaranjan Naik <chittaranjan_naik wrote:

>

> Sadanandaji, you have rightly pointed out the importance of the

> mechanics of perceptions as a key factor in understanding this

> subject. As per my understanding of the Advaita theory of cognition,

> perception takes place by means of the mind going out alongwith the

> senses to grasp the object -- what the senses grasps is the sensible

> attributes while the mind grasps attributes like smallness, etc, and

> the comprehension of the object taking place in the light of chit.

> Unfortunately, Advaita has been interpreted in the last two centuries

> through the colourations of Idealism. As pointed out by Michaelji in

> an earlier post, this is probably due to the fact that this period

> was the great period of Idealism in the West. The matter was made

> worse I think due to a confounding of Buddhist Vijnanavada doctrines

> with those of Advaita Vedanta.

Chittaranjanji

Thanks for your prompt response. Yes, in the analysis of the cognition

process (Advaita also follows the prevailing tArkika's view), the mind

goes out along with the senses to grasp the object. That was the

understanding at that time, based on their understanding of the

mechanics of the perception process. Here, we are now entering into

the realm of not Vedanta or philosophy but objective sciences. So I

only examine from that perspective rather than from any western

philosophical perspectives that I have no knowledge of. I strongly

believe that philosophy has to accommodate scientific discoveries that

include the space-time concepts as well as quantum mechanical concepts

of matter. The beauty of Advaita is that not only it accommodates the

new discoveries of science without compromising the essential Advaita

nature of the truth or reality, but in fact endorses them. So my

understanding of Advaita has nothing to do modern advaitins adoptation

of western philosophical thoughts during the past two centuries. I

embarked on Advaita purely as a student of science rejecting

VishisshTaadvaita that I grew up with, since childhood.

Let us examine the perception as it occurs. This is my understanding.

When I see a pot there, what do I really see? Eyes can only see forms

and colors, as the input arrives to the senses (hence senses going out

is only metaphorical). Similarly other sense input such as sound, if it

is a singing pot, etc. Each sense input is independent of other and all

feed in the information. The information from different senses has to

be integrated by the mind to a common locus. Senses being maatra-s can

only measure the degrees and magnitudes of the attributes.

Surprisingly, in the volition process, where the integration occurs,

there is an inherent assumption involved that there cannot be attributes

without a locus. The mind perceives only the attributes and not the

substantive. Hence a locus for the attributes is provide by the mind

with an image of the object in the mind taking all the inputs from the

senses and locussing on that image. In the perception of the form, due

to the presence of two eyes with the 7-deg separation between the two,

we have stereographic projection with 3-Dimensional perspective of the

forms as well as the spatial location of the object in relation to the

perception of other surrounding objects. The cognition of the object by

the mind therefore involves the perception and volition along with

spatial relations surrounding the object. Space being too subtle, is not

perceived by the senses but inferred due to stereographic projection of

the 3-D nature of the world. Time is again inferred by the mind due to

movement of the objects in space, and the relation between the

space-time and more importantly the cognition of both space and time

through the mind become inherent process in these perceptions. (Dvaitins

bring in Saakshee for cognition of time and space beyond the senses and

mind, and frankly make a mess of the cognition process)

The cognition process is complete with the attributes measured by the

senses and mind providing a locus for the attributes with space-time

superimposed on it. " I see a pot, right there, right now"- is the

so-called perceptional knowledge. I am not seeing the object as it is

(as Dvaitins claim as yathaartham pramaanam), but always as presented by

the sense input and limited by the mind's capacity for volition and

cognition. If the mind is absent, the whole process does not

materialize. Recognition occurs by comparing the cognized object with

the images from the memory, which are based on past cognitions. Here we

enter the arena of vyakti and jaati aspects.

Here, I need to emphasize one important aspect. Complete perceptual

process, involving that there is an object out there and thus the world

out there, cannot be fully established without the mind being active.

This is unavoidable in the perception process. Does the world exists

without the mind present, is a philosophical question; but I would say

it remains as a unanswerable question, since mind is required even to

answer it, yes or no. To me this is truly an indeterminate problem and

there is no way to get around this. Hence I put this under the category

of anirvacaniiyam only, whether original Advaita concepts directly

implied anirvachaniiya khyaati in this way or not.

In the perception of the world- the mind's role being unavoidable, we

have an inherent problem in establishing the reality of the world

independent of the mind. Personally I am not concerned if there is some

parallelism to Vijnaanavaada. This becomes a problem in the science too

- the investigation of the matter independent of an observer.

Coming back to the philosophical aspect, if the Brahman is

existence-consciousness-infiniteness and thus the material cause for the

universe, there is an inherent problem of the cognition of the world,

which is inert. If what are cognized are only attributes and not

substantive which is Brahman as the above cognition process indicates,

then I have no problem in accounting the world out there. I am not

negating the world as such but negating the attributes as just

superimposition, which includes the forms and therefore names for the

forms. The substantive is myself as my mind. Is the world real, yes

from the substantive point- but from the point of names and forms as the

Upanishads declare - vaachaarambhanam vikaaro naamadheyam - It is only

transformation in names and forms - It is only apparent? Hence we have

differentiation of vyavahaara satyam and satyasya satyam. Since the

Upanishads say I am Brahman, the subject-object (dRik-dRisya)

distinctions are only the play of the mind - In the deep sleep state,

when the mind folds - so is the projection of the subject-object

relationships. Identified the world as names and forms, if the question

is asked whether the world real - no - the names and forms are only

superimpositions. But identified from the substantive part - is the

world real - yes, that is Brahman; but when I do identify the world with

Brahman, I have to also recognize that I am that Brahman and therefore

there is no separate world 'out there' since they are nothing but

Brahman that I am - so the concept of 'out-there' with space-time

continuum itself dissolves into I.

So what is real - Brahman alone is real and 'tat twam asi' is the

teaching to a Vedaantic student. Everything else is superimposition on

Brahman. If 'consciousness is Brahman' is the scriptural definition

of Brahman, inert cannot be Brahman and if one see inert (the world)

then what is seen is not real but only apparent. Mind's role in seeing

or experiencing the world therefore requires proper analysis and

understanding in view of the scriptural declaration. As I have

discussed above the current understanding of the mechanics of perception

process are not in violation of adviatic concepts. To me this is pure

Advaita to the core and nothing to do with the idealism Philosophy the

West or Vijnaana vaada of Buddhism of the East, even if there are some

agreements with their concepts. The dream analogy only endorses these

concepts, hence the importance I give to Shankara's prakarana Grantha-s

than his commentary on poursheya Brahmasuutra related to Ch.II.

Hari OM!

Sadananda

> Yes, I have gathered that in Dvaita the material cause is prakriti

> which is dependent on Brahman, whereas in both Vishistadvaita and

> Advaita, the existential core of the world is Brahman Itself. The

> language of Advaita does often create confusion though. I believe

> that when Brahman is hidden, the world seen through avidya 'becomes'

> a limiting adjunct in so far as the substratum is not seen as the

> substratum, and when avidya is 'removed', the same world is seen as

> nothing but Brahman - as features of the non-dual Brahman. But

> Advaita does not stop at this vision of the world, but goes to the

> heart of attributes itself in its doctrine of word-meanings.

The confusion actually is the use of the word in the Vedanta itself-

asat - it is used for both non-existent in the naasato vidyate bhaavo

and sometime used as in the vyavahaarika satyam as asatoma sadgamaya. I

have not seen any confusion in the Advaita - but yes in Brahmasuutra-s.

If ten daarshanika’s claim that their darshana-s which do not agree with

each other but all claim their darshana-s are in tune with B.Suutra-s,

there is an inherent problem in the suutra-s. Agreement with B.Suutra

therefore cannot form basis for the validity of a darshana. Hence I go

by the Shankara's prakarana Grantha-s which are based on Upanishads than

on his B.Sutra commentary. Adhyaasa bhaashya, of course, is the

quintessence of Advaita Vedanta and is independent of B. Suutra-s.

Hari OM!

Sadananda

>

> Warm regards,

> Chittaranjan

=====

What you have is destiny and what you do with what you have is self-effort.

Future destiny is post destiny modified by your present action. You are not only

the prisoner of your past but master of your future. - Swami Chinmayananda

July 28, 2004

Namaste Shri Sadanandaji,

I feel a bit hesitent to write this message because it may appear

provocative (due to its rather radical stand), but Sir I believe that

one must speak one's convictions, and therefore I make myself bold to

write these words.

advaitin, kuntimaddi sadananda

<kuntimaddisada> wrote:

> That was the understanding at that time, based on their

> understanding of the mechanics of the perception process.

> Here, we are now entering into the realm of not Vedanta or

> philosophy but objective sciences. So I only examine from

> that perspective rather than from any western philosophical

> perspectives that I have no knowledge of. I strongly

> believe that philosophy has to accommodate scientific

> discoveries that include the space-time concepts as well

> as quantum mechanical concepts of matter.

.........

> Let us examine the perception as it occurs. This is my

> understanding. When I see a pot there, what do I really see?

> Eyes can only see forms and colors, as the input arrives

> to the senses (hence senses going out is only metaphorical).

> Similarly other sense input such as sound, if it is a

> singing pot, etc. Each sense input is independent of other

> and all feed in the information. The information from

> different senses has to be integrated by the mind to

> a common locus.

There is adequate reason to believe that science is illogical at its

most basic foundations. Science is a set of mathematical equations

that work. Its theories and models are not the truth of what the

world is, but are analogous constructs of the mind devised to predict

phenomena and use it for constructive utilitarian purposes. All

scientific models are predictive models and nothing more. The basic

paradigm of science is to devise 'theories that work', and its

propositions, especially those of modern science, are not

linguistically sound statements (they do not abide by word-meanings)

and hence they do not speak of the world as it is in its nature, but

are, more often than not, merely symbolisms that only have a

correspondence to the dynamism of things. Meaning must embody the

propositional form, otherwise the proposition is strictly not a

proposition i.e., it is not a valid sentential form. Most

propositions of modern physics relating to the 'Theory of Relativity'

and 'Quantum Physics' are not meaningful sentential forms. With all

due respects to Einstein, space is not curved; neither is

simultaneity indeterminable. Again, space is not Euclidian 'space'

nor 'Reimannian space', these being only notions superimposed on the

visually formless space.

The case with Quantum Mechanics is similar. Electrons and quantum

orbits are 'nonsensical' propositions. The structure of the atom was

necessitated by certain observations of spectral bands, but when the

nuclear atomic structure entailed that electrons occupy quantum

orbits (in between which there are no spaces), it was time to abandon

the nuclear model and shift to the electron as a 'property' of the

atom rather than as an orbiting particle. The electron itself is a

logically meaningless conception because an electron cannot have a

form and can hence not be a particle. According to the scientific

theory, a form is seen when light rays coming from the thing is

differentiated from the light rays coming from beyond the periphery

of the thing so that the boundary stands out as its form. But is it

possible for light rays to come from an electron? The light ray is

itself nothing but electromagnetic radiation that emerges when an

electron jumps orbits or energy levels. So how can there be a SET OF

RAYS from an electron as apart from the rays that come from beyond

its periphery? How can there be those innumerable rays from an

electron so that its boundary (and form) may be defined? The theory

of the electron and the nuclear model of the atom are both illogical.

What again is the relationship between 'parts' and 'whole' in

science? How can the atomic conception of the world be sustained when

it is not explained in the first place how disparate parts give rise

to an entirely new thing viz, the whole? It is because the foundation

of science is weak in this respect that it resulted in the EPR

paradox. It was only then that Neils Bohr came up with a hypothesis

that the whole is somehow contained in the parts. But even that

hypothesis does not have a logical explanation.

Again, if we look at the theory of cognition, where do the light rays

come from? Do they come from the surface of the visible objects? But

if the scientific theory is true, then aren't the objects that we see

mere phenomena - mere representations? Are the light rays then

rightfully in the phenomenal world? But yet they can't be, because if

the scientific theory is true, they would necessarily be prior to the

activations of the mind? Are they in the noumenal world? - then how

are we able to conceive of them, let alone measure and conduct

experiments on them? And what are these experiments that we conduct

on the mere appearances of objects which are already the

presentations of the brain? When analysed, the scientific theory of

cognition leads to a logical circularity and is not sustainable (as

shown in Part VI).

I need to clarify here that I am not against science. I am only

against accommodating Vedanta to the 'discoveries' of science when

the paradigm of science itself is vulnerable to the shifting sands

of 'agreements' as reached from time to time by the scientific

community (called paradigm shifts according to Kuhn). I believe that

science, as it has evolved, is actually 'techne' or technology – it

is a set of analogous constructs to predict phenomena and utilize it

for human ends. Its greatness lies in this alone, and not in its

capacity to point to the truth of the essential nature of things. I

believe that Advaita is not in need of a 'science' that has not

examined its own foundations. I am of course deeply impressed by the

work done by the geniuses of science – those great men and women who

have contributed to the tremendous developments of classical and

modern science - but despite all that, physics is only about

provisional pragmatic models and not about the truth of things. We do

not respect truth because it is what science postulates. We respect

science because we believe it represents truth. If science fails the

test, then it is reasonable to depart from its sanctuary.

The Advaita theory that the mind and senses reach out to objects is

not merely a metaphorical statement, it is the only logical answer to

the mechanism of cognition.

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan

July 28, 2004

Namaste.

>When dvaitins (who consider adviata as prachhanna Buddhism) say

world is

>real, ontologically they are not referring to the substratum Brahman

>since for them Brahman is not the material cause of the universe.

They

>rest their reality on the account of perception of the world.

As I understood, the reality of world is not just based on perception

of the world, but on many folds such as logically and scripturally ;

Logically :

All aastika schools holds that Brahmn can be known only from Veda-s,

no exceptions. Whether that Brahmn is 'I' or not is decided only

after Veda-s are analyzed and siddhAnta-s are built. But concept

of "Brahmn" as such is from Vedas to begin with. Having said that, if

at all one were to hold that Brahmn is "real", it automatically

presupposes the source of such concept (Vedas) must also be real. Not

only that, the cognition process from which such source is grasped,

must also be real. Not to mention, the mind & senses behind such

cognition process is necessarily be real. Also, the agent behind such

cognition process (because mind & senses are jada and can't act on

themselves) must also be real. As said earlier, whether this

agent 'I' itself is Brahmn or not is something comes into picture

later.

All these different things (except 'I') involved in knowing "Brahmn

is Real" i.e "source of knowledge of Brahmn " (i.e Vedas), "cognition

process", "mind" , "senses" etc are collectively called "the world".

As I understood, in Advaita it is held that 'I' is appramEya and does

not need any sources (pramANa) to know that it is real. No doubt "I"

is real, but "I am Brahmn" (which is not so appramEya but known only

thru Vedas) can be real only if "Brahmn" part is also real. This is

because, otherwise we can not equate real 'I' with not-real 'Brahmn',

otherwise we'll be left with "I" and not "I am Brahmn".

So, logically speaking, if knowledge of "Brahmn is Real" or "I am

Brahmn" are to be real, "the world" must necessarily be real as well.

Scripturally :

Once scriptures are established as real as noted above, it is just a

matter of education to learn about what Vedas are endorsing about

reality of this world.

Just to mention few ;

- 'satyamenamanu vishve' (RV 4.17.5)

- 'vishvaM satyam.h' (RV 2.24.12).

- 'yAthAtathyato arthAn.h vyadadhAt.h (I.U. 8).

- 'mithashcha jaDa-bhedo.ayam prapaJNcho bheda-pa.nchakaH '

paramashruti.

...etc

Regards,

Srinivas.

July 29, 2004

praNAm Sri CN prabhuji

Hare Krishna

I've read your reply to Sri Sadananda prabhuji's mail on perception &

brahma yEkatva... I searched..searched a lot in your reply where you shared

your understanding on philosophical aspects discussed in detail by Sri

Sadananda prabhuji. Instead of that I've found only your profundity in

explaining science & its limitation, protons, electrons, atoms etc. etc.

which anyway I am not able to understand a bit being a commerce student

:-)). My humble request to you to make an attempt to share your thoughts

on Sri Sadananda prabhuji's following paragraphs :

//quote //