The Real and the Unreal - Part VII - Ontology

[Guest guest]

Namaste Chittaranjanji and all Advaitins,

 

The concept of substance is an extremely difficult one.

I think that ordinary usage is not much of a guide in

that it is a technical term. Aristotle handles the

term very precisely allying substance with accidents

and matter with form. Due to the influence of the

Aristotelian philosophy on early science, the concept

of matter was purely his, we are nudged into a similar

understanding when concepts which are allied and bear a

Sanskrit technical title are translated into English.

With near congruence is difficult to distinguish where

edges meet. It is tempting to bring a scissors to

neaten things up like the fool with the jigsaw puzzle.

 

The dravya has this much in common with Aristotelian

substance namely that it is broadly speaking the locus

or the substratum of qualities or attributes. It is

easy then to fall into the Lockean error that when you

take away the attributes the ultimate subject of

predication will be something without predicates or

attributes, something in other words we know not what.

 

So what you (CN) are saying "Substance is therefore the

existent, and attributes are the descriptions of that

same existent" would line up with the

Aristotelian/Sankarite position as is clear from the

latters dismissal of the Vaisesika doctrine of

inherence as relation. A similar view of inherence is

at the core of the famous disassembly of the chariot of

Milinda by Nagasena.

 

I shall be reading in Hiriyanna's Outlines of Indian

Philosophy (Motilal Banarsidas)of the various views of

the dravya and looking at the various references in

Swami Satprakashananda's Methods of Knowledge (Advaita

Ashrama), and of course attending to the discussions in

the clearing of the cyber forest known as the Advaitin

List.

 

Best Wishes, Michael.

[Guest guest]

Namaste Shri Michaelji,

 

I would believe that the difficulty with conceiving substance has

something to do with the way both philosophy and science has gone in

the post-Descartes period. The Aristotelien substance is quite in

conformance with the Nyaya substance once inherence is treated as

conjunction (this has been addressed by Shankara in the bhashya). The

word 'inhere' with its connotations of being 'in the thing itself'

almost suggests this meaning of conjunction. I am not much familiar

with the great debates that Nyaya philosophers had with Buddhist

logicians like Dignaga, but it appears that Nyaya ultimately won the

day. The 'Nyaya Manjari', a monumental work by Jayanta Bhatta

dissects the Buddhist doctrines to the minutest details before

discarding them. I could manage to get one chapter of the book in

English translation, and even of that one chapter I could read only a

part because of its difficult reading.

 

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan

 

 

advaitin, ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva@e...> wrote:

> Namaste Chittaranjanji and all Advaitins,

>

> The concept of substance is an extremely difficult one.

> I think that ordinary usage is not much of a guide in

> that it is a technical term. Aristotle handles the

> term very precisely allying substance with accidents

> and matter with form. Due to the influence of the

> Aristotelian philosophy on early science, the concept

> of matter was purely his, we are nudged into a similar

> understanding when concepts which are allied and bear a

> Sanskrit technical title are translated into English.

> With near congruence is difficult to distinguish where

> edges meet. It is tempting to bring a scissors to

> neaten things up like the fool with the jigsaw puzzle.

>

> The dravya has this much in common with Aristotelian

> substance namely that it is broadly speaking the locus

> or the substratum of qualities or attributes. It is

> easy then to fall into the Lockean error that when you

> take away the attributes the ultimate subject of

> predication will be something without predicates or

> attributes, something in other words we know not what.

>

> So what you (CN) are saying "Substance is therefore the

> existent, and attributes are the descriptions of that

> same existent" would line up with the

> Aristotelian/Sankarite position as is clear from the

> latters dismissal of the Vaisesika doctrine of

> inherence as relation. A similar view of inherence is

> at the core of the famous disassembly of the chariot of

> Milinda by Nagasena.

>

> I shall be reading in Hiriyanna's Outlines of Indian

> Philosophy (Motilal Banarsidas)of the various views of

> the dravya and looking at the various references in

> Swami Satprakashananda's Methods of Knowledge (Advaita

> Ashrama), and of course attending to the discussions in

> the clearing of the cyber forest known as the Advaitin

> List.

>

> Best Wishes, Michael.

[Guest guest]

Namaste Shri Michaelji,

 

Substance was alive in Spinoza; it was infact axiomatic in his

philosophy:

>From the Ethics, Part I, Concerning God, Definitions:

 

Def.3: By substance I mean that which is in itself and is conceived

through itself; that is, that the conception of which does not

require the conception of another thing from which it has to be

formed.

 

Def.4: By attribute I mean that which the intellect perceives of

substance as constituting its essence.

 

Def.5: By God I mean an absolutely infinite being; that is, substance

consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal

and infinite essence.

 

Spinoza approaches the Vishistadvaita conception of God somewhat.

 

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan