The Real and the Unreal - Part VIII - Advaita

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Om Gurubhyo Namah

 

 

AT THE GATES OF MYSTERY

 

"Turiya is not that which is conscious of the inner world, not that

which is conscious of the outer world, not that which is conscious of

both, not that which is a mass of consciousness. It is not simple

consciousness nor is It unconsciousness. It is unperceived,

unrelated, incomprehensible, uninferable, unthinkable, and

indescribable. The essence of the Consciousness manifesting as the

self, It is the cessation of all phenomena. It is all peace, all

bliss, and non-dual. This is what is to be known as the fourth

(Turiya). This is Atman, and this has to be realised." (Ma.Up.7)

 

The problem of difference is the final frontier of philosophy. In

confronting it, we are at the limits of logic, which is the same as

the limits of language, for the word 'logic' is derived from the

word 'logos'. When it is said that difference is false on account of

it being by name only, it is surely because logos cannot point deeper

than itself to the subterranean waters from which it springs forth as

the lush fountain of Reality. And yet, names and forms are not other

than Reality itself, for they are of the same living waters. In

contemplating the nature of logos, we are verily knocking on the

doors of mystery – for beyond lies Sacred Space.

 

 

THE PROBLEM OF DIFFERENCE

 

It is said that Brahman is the material cause of the universe just as

the yarn is the material cause of the cloth. It is said furthermore

that as yarn alone it is true, and as the cloth, being only a name

for a peculiar condition of the cause, it is false. But the mere fact

that the cloth is only a name for a peculiar condition (vishesha) of

the causal substratum (yarn) does not seem to be an adequate reason

for its falsity because if the cloth is only a name for the vishesha

of the substratum, then such is its very nature - to be thus by name -

and it does not behove us to deny a things own nature. For, a thing

is what it is by its own nature.

 

The cloth exists in the yarn. Then how indeed does the cloth become

false when the yarn is true, for if the yarn is true, the cloth as a

condition of the yarn cannot be untrue. I feel that this question

should not be dismissed under the mere assertion that whatever

pertains to names and forms is false because such an assertion,

merely on the strength of the assertion, would amount to a dogma. For

it would be a complete surrendering of Advaita to the void of

nihilism to say that the world is absolutely negated – because such a

thesis makes the comprehending intellect converge to Brahman as the

limit of nothingness rather than expand the intellect unto its

dissolution in the expansive Heart that sees Brahman as beyond all

limits. That is the identity of the Heart (self) with Brahman.

 

Difference is bewildering. It is seen, and yet it is not logically

sustainable, whether it be the difference of the effect in the

material cause, or it be the distinctiveness of attributes in

substance. For if difference were true, it would need a relation to

bind the distinctively different 'things' into the identity that is

seen. But such a relation is not sustainable, because, like the

relation of inherence, it would lead to an infinite regress. Neither

can identity-cum-difference be asserted because that would prevent

the identity from being seen, for the difference being real, it would

persist and prevent the perception that 'the cloth is nothing but

yarn' from taking place. The Acharya has thus refuted the doctrine of

identity-cum-difference in his debate with Bhatta Bhaskara.

 

But there is one unique conception of 'difference' which says that it

is 'the difference that can be spoken about'. Now, we may rightly

ask: Does this difference belong to the thing itself, or does it

arise in speaking about it? If it is the former, then one will have

to admit a duality between substance and attributes and this would

lead to the position of the Nyayaikas necessitating a relation for

binding them together, and like in the case of inherence, that would

lead to an infinite regress. Therefore difference cannot belong to

the thing itself. If it is the latter, then it would mean that

difference does not belong to the innate nature of the thing, but has

its origin in the speaker's ignorance in so far as he speaks about a

thing attributing to it what does not belong to it. Therefore,

difference is not justifiable. It has been said by some others that

attributes have some kind of 'own' existence because it is possible

for us to think of them separately from the substance. But this

argument is not valid, for the mental cogitation of an attribute is

not the same as the perception of an existing thing with attributes –

the objects of cognition in the two cognitions are not the same. In

spite of this, if it is said that the attributes in a substance have

some kind of 'own' existence even when the substance is cognised,

then that would make the description of a thing not itself i.e., the

description would be another existent and not the description of the

first existent. And this would make it impossible for anything to be

ever described, for any description that is predicated of a thing

would be an attribute which would have its 'own' existence, and these

attributes in turn cannot be said to be what they are because that

would need their attribution which would manifest other 'own'

existences, and so on ad infinitum. Therefore, difference is false.

 

Difference is false, yet it is seen. Therefore difference is an

admixture of truth and falsity - and indeed it is not possible to

speak of the true nature of that which partakes of falsity. It is

therefore called 'anirvacaniya'. The confusion between 'sameness'

and 'difference' is the primordial confusion that was brewed in the

cauldron of creation, nay even earlier than creation, in the

incomprehensible dimness of a beginningless past.

 

Difference is not logical. Yet the heart does not accept what the

intellect determines – because difference IS SEEN. We must now

approach difference from another direction.

 

 

WORDS AND DENOTATION

 

According to Advaita, a word does not point to the particular; it

points only to the universal. The thesis that words point to

particulars (or individuals) is not logical because it would then be

impossible to recognise two individuals as belonging to a species for

there would be nothing to bind them into a commonality. Therefore, a

word necessarily points to the universal. And it is thus that an

object is the same object, and is referable by the same name even

when it 'changes'. Alice is the same Alice when she is young and when

she is old because of the same Alicehood. While discussing the

eternality of words, Shankara says:

 

"And words are connected with the general characteristics (i.e.,

genus) and not with the individuals, for the individuals are

infinite, and it is impossible to comprehend the relation of a word

(with all of them). Thus, even though the individuals are born, the

distinctive general characteristics remain constant, so that this

creates no difficulty with the eternality of the words cow, etc."

(BSB, I,III,8.27).

 

The Nyayayikas and the Grammarians, as also other schools of Vedanta,

hold that words point to both the universal and the particular.

Advaita refutes this by saying that if this were the case, then it

would occasion a new name every time a different attribute is seen,

as the combination © of universal and particular (U+P) would then

have changed and it would be a new combination requiring a new name.

Thus an infinite number of names would need to be applied to the

object, for no two instances of the object ever show the same

particular attributes; there is always a difference in an object as

its shows itself in the field of experience. Thus it is not

reasonable to posit that words point to the combination of universals

and particulars. But there is an old Nyaya objection to the Advaitic

theory, and we must consider this in so far as this objection seems

to invoke an important element related to ontology. Gautama, the

founder of Nyaya, says this about the Advaita doctrine of words

pointing to universals: "This is not right because the manifestation

of a universal depends on individuality and configuration"

(NS,II,2.67). Vatsayana, the commentator, expands on this

objection: "There can be no apprehension of a universal by itself

unless the individuality and configuration have been apprehended.

Hence the universal cannot be regarded as constituting the denotation

of a word."

 

The Advaita response to this objection would be that there is no

difference between the samanya and vishesa, because if they were

different and disparate, then a vishesha could never belong to a

species, because the samanya could never come into conjunction with

the vishesha. And the theory that the relation of inherence binds the

two has already been discounted on the ground that it leads to an

infinite regress. Again, if the truth were to be found in

individuality, the shruti would not have proscribed the senses, and

recommended a turning away from the objects of sense, for it would be

a contradiction to say that we should find truth by turning away from

where it lies. And the shruti definitely aims to lead one away from

the senses:

 

"Svayambhuh, the great Lord, injured the outgoing senses. Therefore,

one sees the outer things and not the inner Self. A rare

discriminating man, turns his eye away and sees the indwelling Self."

(Ka.Up. II,i,1)

 

"When a man, renouncing all thoughts, is not attached to sense-

objects and actions, then he is said to have attained to Yoga."

(Bh.G. VI,4).

 

And we find the same theme in Plato: "Philosophy takes over the soul

in this condition and by gentle persuasion tries to set it free. She

points out that observation by means of the eyes and ears and all the

other senses is entirely deceptive, and she urges the soul to refrain

from using them unless it is necessary to do so, and encourages it to

collect and concentrate itself by itself, trusting nothing but its

own independent judgement upon objects considered in themselves, and

attributing no truth to anything which it views indirectly as being

subject to variation, because such objects are sensible and visible

but what the soul itself sees is intelligible and invisible."

(Phaedo).

 

Thus, according to the shruti, the truth is revealed when we withdraw

from the world of sense objects. And it cannot be said here that the

shruti is not talking about the truth of the world, for the aim of

the shruti is to lead to that Truth by knowing which All this is

known. So, the question is, how can all this be known by turning away

from all this? In other words, how is it that by knowing the Self

everything comes to be known? We have seen how Advaita holds the

world to be co-extensive with the Self, and yet the preamble to the

bhashya begins by pointing out the disparity between the subject and

object "which are by nature as contradictory as light and darkness"

and thus "cannot logically have any identity".

 

Where does the day meet the night?

 

 

SAMANYA AND VISHESHA

 

"What is night to all beings, therein the self-controlled one is

awake. Where all beings are awake, that is the night of the sage who

sees." (Bh.G. II,69)

 

Words denote only universals, but what is a universal? Universals

cannot be other than these objects themselves for otherwise words

cannot point to objects. Yet in some sense they are not objects,

because if they were, there would be no need for something called

universals. But universals necessarily exist, because without

universals there cannot be recognition, and it follows that in the

ultimate analysis there cannot be anything discernable without

universals. For the distinguishing characteristic by which anything

or any attribute of a thing is cognised as 'this' cannot take place

unless the 'thisness' can be denoted i.e., recognised.

 

A universal cannot be thought, because the very act of thinking

particularises the universal, and a universal is not a particular.

Therefore, the cognition of a universal brings forth a contradiction

in so far as cognition particularises the object to which it is

directed. It is the failure to see the nature of universals as the

unthinkable, and that thinking is always particularised, that has

caused much befuddlement in modern philosophy. Yet, the universal is

cognised in the object because otherwise the object cannot be

cognised as 'this', the object. And this brings us to the mystical

nature of Vak.

 

A universal, in its capacity as universal, has no form – it is not

spatio-temporal - and yet it is the very essence of form for without

it there can be no form. For without 'cowness', there can be no cow.

And it cannot be that there are some unspecified things called

particulars into which universals enter or 'participate', for there

can be nothing except amorphousness without universals; for what is

it that can be described as the particular without any feature (for

feature would need the universals of the feature) or form? Universals

therefore do not participate in things; they are the things

themselves and the term 'participate' is to be understood as a

metaphorical use of the word.

 

The Brhdaranyaka Upanishad, Chapter I, Section VI, starts with the

following words: "This universe indeed consists of three things:

name, form and action. Of those names, speech is the Uktha (source),

for all names spring from it. It is their Saman, for it is common to

all names. It is their Brahman (Self), for it sustains all names."

(Br.Up. I, VI,1)

 

And commenting on it, Shankara mentions about universals and

particulars in the context of names: "For all names, the

differentiations such as Yajnadatta and Devadatta springs from it,

this generality of names, like particles of salt from the salt rock.

And an effect is not separate from its cause. Also particulars are

included in the general. How does the relation of general and

particulars apply here? It, sound in general, is their Saman, so

called because of sameness. For it is common to all names, which are

its own particular forms. Another reason is that the particular

names, being derived from it, are not different from it. And we see

that something that is derived from another is not different from it,

as a jar, for instance, is not different from clay."

 

A universal is that which makes a thing what it is. And it is not

possible for the particular to be more than the universal because

that would mean that the universal is not that which makes a thing a

thing (as there would be something more than the universal needed to

make it the thing). Thus there is no difference between the universal

and the particular in so far as the capacity of a universal to be a

particular is concerned. That is, the particular is nothing more than

the universal. But if we look at it the other way round – a

particular is not the universal itself because the particular, say a

particular cow, can be absent in another instance where the universal

is seen i.e., in another cow. Thus, universals are present wherever

there is a particular, but the particular need not be present

wherever there is the universal. But a particular is wholly nothing

but a universal. Thus what emerges here is that particulars, in being

nothing but universals, and not containing them, are nothing but a

partial vision of the universal. The universal is the complete

infinitude of attributes of the thing, of say 'cow', and it pervades

all particulars; thus, the particular is nothing but that same

universal showing forth as particular instances in its

manifestations. And a universal is so capable of manifesting

simultaneously in all the instances of its particulars because the

universal has no form and is not spatio-temporal. Words denote

universals. Therefore, the world of forms that is denoted by names is

the sameness of universals – not contained by form and limitations.

It is formless, so to speak, and is the infinite repository of all

the forms that it characterises. The universal is the formless whole

of all its particulars, the very knowledge of things, as it were, in

the omniscience of Brahman. The formless Brahman therefore contains

the infinitude of all that was, is, and will be. It is, in its

immutable formlessness, the alpha and the omega, complete, purnam,

perfect, uncontained and infinite. It is the intelligence that

carries infinite universals in Its ineffable formlessness and

undisturbed sameness. It is Akshara, the immutable.

 

"O Gargi, the knowers of Brahman say this Immutable is That. It is

neither gross nor minute, neither short nor long, neither red nor

oiliness, neither shadow nor darkness, neither air nor ether,

unattached, neither savour nor odour, without eyes or ears, without

the vocal organ or mind, without the vital force or mouth, not a

measure, and without interior or exterior. It does not eat anything,

nor is It eaten by anybody."

 

And yet, Brahman is all this too.

 

"He is the sun dwelling in the bright heavens. He is the air dwelling

in the mid-region. He is the fire dwelling on earth. He is the guest

dwelling in the house. He dwells in men, in the gods, in truth, in

the sky. He is born in the water, on earth, in the sacrifice, on the

mountains. He is the True and the Great." (Ka.Up.II.ii.2).

 

"What indeed is here, is there; what is there, is here likewise. He

who sees as though there is difference here, goes from death to

death. By the mind alone is Brahman to be realised; then one does not

see in It any multiplicity whatsoever. He goes from death to death

who sees multiplicity in It. This, verily, is That." (Ka.Up.II.i.10-

11).

 

 

AVACCHEDAVADA

 

The world of sense is the world of 'concrete' particulars. It is the

world of the limitedness of the unlimited in the sphere of actuality,

the limited vision of the Great Being. This is avacchedavada, the

doctrine of the falseness of the seeming limitedness of the

unlimited. What is seen is the limited, the particular, and this

limitedness is false as being the true thing, for the thing is the

universal that is unlimited by particularisation. Therefore, the

negation that the entire world is false is a negation of the limited

as the true form of the unlimited – it is abhasavada - and yet, in a

perfectly logical manner, there is nothing excluded from Reality in

the negation. Reality is full. It is purnam. Does not the Acharya say

this in the bhashya on the Mandukya Upanishad?

 

Mandukya Upanishad (I,1): "This letter that is Om is all this. Of

this a clear exposition is: All that is past, present, and future is

verily Om. And whatever is beyond the three periods of time is also

verily Om."

 

Shankara explains: "The very same thing that was presented through an

emphasis on the word is being indicated over again with a stress on

the thing signified, so that the unity of the name and the nameable

may be comprehended. For otherwise, the nameable having been grasped

as dependent on the name, the doubt may crop up that the identity of

the nameable with the name is to be taken in a secondary sense. And

the necessity of understanding their identity arises from the fact

that (once the identity is established), one can by a single effort

eliminate both the name and the nameable to realise Brahman that is

different from both."

 

Now how is Brahman different than both? Shankara explains in the

commentary to the next verse:

 

Mandukya Upanishad (I,2): "All this is surely Brahman. This Self is

Brahman. The Self, such as it is, is possessed of four quarters."

 

Shankara's commentary: "In the text, 'This Self is Brahman', this

very Self that will be presented as divided into four parts is being

pointed out as one's innermost Self by the gesture of hand. Sah ayam

atma, that Self that is such, that is signified by Om and exists as

the higher and lower Brahman, is catuspat, possessed of four

quarters, like a coin (karsapana), but not like a cow, As the fourth

(Turiya) is realised by successively merging the earlier three,

starting from Visva, the word pada (in the case of Visva, Taijasa,

Prajna) is derived in the instrumental sense of that by which

something is attained, whereas in the case of Turiya the word pada is

derived in the objective sense of that which is achieved".

 

It is significant that Visva, Taijasa and Prajna are successively

merged into Turiya. Thus the elimination of both name and form that

is different than Brahman, is the limitedness of the names and forms

of the world of sense, and what is attained is the unlimited world in

which all the three starting with Visva gain identity. And it is this

meaning that is sought to be explained by saying "possessed of four

quarters like a coin, but not like a cow." Swami Ghambirananda

explains beautifully in the footnote: "The word pada may mean either

foot or quarter. The second meaning applies here. A karsapana is

divisible into sixteen smaller units. Four of these form a quarter.

The smaller units lose their individuality in the bigger ones, as it

were. So Visva merges in Taijasa, Taijasa in Prajna, and Prajna in

Turiya."

 

Brahman being different from both name and form is Its transcendence

from them. The word 'transcend' does not mean a spatial or temporal

separation, but a distinction of the subsuming principle from that

which it subsumes. There is nothing that is not there in the Great

Formless Being. There is nothing negated here, not a blade of grass,

not a speck of light nor a mite in the moonbeam, not a thought nor

even the dark abyss of the great void. What is experienced as nirguna

Brahman is also gunapoorna.

 

"As a lump of salt dropped into water becomes dissolved in water and

cannot be taken out again, but wherever we taste it tastes salt, even

so, my dear, this great, endless, Infinite Reality is Pure

Intelligence alone. This self comes out as a separate entity from

these elements and with their destruction the separateness is also

destroyed. After attaining oneness it has no more consciousness. This

is what I say, my dear. So said Yajnavalkya." (Br.Up.II.iv.12)

 

"Then Maitreyi said: `Just here you have bewildered me, venerable

Sir, by saying that after attaining (oneness) the self has no more

consciousness'. Yajnavalkya replied: Certainly I am not saying

anything bewildering, my dear, this is enough for knowledge, O

Maitreyi'." (Br.Up.II.iv.13)

 

"Because when there is duality, as it were, then one smells another,

one sees another, one hears another, one speaks to another, one

thinks of another, one knows another. But when to the knower of

Brahman everything has become the Self, then what should one smell

and through what, what should one see and through what, what should

one hear and through what, what should one speak and through what,

what should one think and through what, what should one know and

through what? Through what indeed should one know That owing to which

all this is known – through what, O Maitreyi, should one know the

knower?" (Br.Up.III.iv.14).

 

 

 

THE MYSTICAL REALITY

 

The nature of Reality is mystical. The magic of words plays upon the

screen of non-duality and hold us enrapt to the siren songs of

plurality. A word is essentially one with Brahman. That is para vak.

It springs from Its living waters into the formless embryo – the

pashyanti – the causal seed that is ready to sprout into manifest

form. In its middling state - madhyama – it presents the forms in

ideality before it springs into the luxuriance of the created world

as vaikhari.

 

These are the four stages of Vak – para, pashyanti, madhyama and

vaikhari. The mystery is that there is no difference in what it

points to in all these stages, because if there were a difference,

the word would not point to the same object in all its stages. We may

give a name to this paradoxical nature of words and feel satisfied

that we have found the truth, but the moment we attempt to determine

its truth, it negates itself in the very determination. Difference

arises through Vak, and yet there is no difference in its forms. Its

difference is the mystery of its own 'difference', as it were, and

the world springs into being in the womb of this great mystery. It is

the heart of the mystical - the inexplicable power of the Lord to

make many out of One while still remaining immutably One. That is His

Maya. It needs the eye of a mystic to see the One in All and the All

in One. It is the sahaja samadhi spoken of in Vedanta.

 

________________

 

 

With regards,

Chittaranjan