Spinoza and Shankara disagree

[Guest guest]

Hello Chittaranjan,

The other matter in relation to Spinoza that I would take

issue with is the notion that his core philosophy has any great affinity to

Advaita. Neither is this a matter of interpretation. He believed that the

existence of God could be proven and his favoured proof was that which is styled

'the ontological proof'.

 

Prop.XI partI: God or substance consisting of infinite attributes, each one of

which expresses eternal and infinite existence, necessarily exists.

Demonstration: If this be denied, conceive, if it be possible, that God does not

exist. Then it follows (Ax.7) that His essence does not involve existence. But

this is (prop.7) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exist. Q.E.D.

 

Now the ontological proof is not regarded as having any cogency in that you

cannot move from the conceptual to the actual, however that is beside the point

because Sankara who may be supposed to have a casting vote on what is advaitic

rejects any proof whatever of the existence of Brahman. He says in B.S.B.

II.i.27:

"So what need has one to argue that the nature of Brahman, whose power is

beyond all thought, cannot be ascertained unless it be through the Vedas? So

also it has been said by an author of a Purana, "Do not bring those things

within the range of argumentation which are beyond thought. The nature of a

thing beyond thought consists in its being other than the things within

Nature." Hence a supersensuous thing is truly known from the Vedic source

alone. (end quote)

 

Apart from that if we are as he maintains modes of existence of the one

substance does that not imply that we necessarily exist?

 

Best Regards,

Michael.

[Guest guest]

Dear Sri Michae-lji,

 

 

advaitin, ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva@e...> wrote:

>

> Hello Chittaranjan,

>

> The other matter in relation to Spinoza that I would take

> issue with is the notion that his core philosophy has any

> great affinity to Advaita. Neither is this a matter of

> interpretation. He believed that the existence of God could

> be proven and his favoured proof was that which is styled

> 'the ontological proof'.

>

> Prop.XI partI: God or substance consisting of infinite

> attributes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite

> existence, necessarily exists. Demonstration: If this be denied,

> conceive, if it be possible, that God does not exist. Then it

> follows (Ax.7) that His essence does not involve existence.

> But this is (prop.7) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily

> exist. Q.E.D.

>

> Now the ontological proof is not regarded as having any

> cogency in that you cannot move from the conceptual to the

> actual, however that is beside the point because Sankara who

> may be supposed to have a casting vote on what is advaitic

> rejects any proof whatever of the existence of Brahman. He

> says in B.S.B. II.i.27:

> "So what need has one to argue that the nature of Brahman,

> whose power is beyond all thought, cannot be ascertained

> unless it be through the Vedas? So also it has been said by

> an author of a Purana, "Do not bring those things within the

> range of argumentation which are beyond thought. The nature

> of a thing beyond thought consists in its being other than

> the things within Nature." Hence a supersensuous thing is

> truly known from the Vedic source alone. (end quote)

 

You are right, Spinoza believed that you could prove the existence of

God and in this he differed from Advaita. Spinoza's proof of God -

the one that you quote - is the first proof. He also provides a

second proof which is more in line with the previous propositions

following logically from the axioms and definitions that he lays down

at the beginning. While his proof may appear like the Ontological

Proof it differs from it due to the prior definitions of substance

and attributes. His definition of substance and attribute leads to

the necessity of God in so far as substance is already an existing

thing that is not attributed as a perceptible 'thing'. We may fault

Spinoza by saying that his proof of God is a mere tautology following

from his definitions, for they are indeed such. Thus, in the end, we

may say that Spinoza does not prove the existence of God but derives

it from definitions that already contain the presumption regarding

the existence of God (in so far as his definition of substance is

another form of the proposition). My opinion on the matter is that

Spinoza derives his insight into substance from an epiphany - the

substance that he defines is nothing but the 'ousia' or the Numinous

Ground of the Greeks. But all this does not deflect from the fact

that Spinoza does differ from Vedanta in his belief that one could

prove God merely through logic.

 

> Apart from that if we are as he maintains modes of existence of

> the one substance does that not imply that we necessarily exist?

 

Yes, it does. But like the Scholastics - and unlike the Platonists -

Spinoza differentiates essence and existence. Essence would then be a

mode of existence that does not inform of existence, and existence

would be a mode of existence that informs of existence. Note how in

Navya Nyaya, abhava is not absolute non-existence... and how it all

leads to double negations, counterpositives, and so on... Some later

Advaitins defined an existing thing as the counter-positive of the

absolute non-existence of that thing abiding in Brahman!

 

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan