Dristhti-shristi and Dvaita (A case of amnesia?)

[Guest guest]

Namaste Sri Srinivas Kotekal-ji,

 

advaitin, "Srinivas Kotekal" <kots_p>

wrote:

> So for, in all his write ups, he has demonstrated excellent

> presentation of his thesis, no doubt. But, critical pramAna-s

> quotes either from Acharaya or vEda on critical key points

> are missing. All my pursuit was inquisitive about it and

> trying to understand him better.

 

 

Do you really mean this? Have you forgotten all the texts I've quoted

from Shankara's bhashyas? Have you not read them both here and in

Vadavalli? Let me refresh your memory:

 

 

QUOTE 1

-------

>From Chandogya Upanioshad bhashya (IV.ii.3):

 

"That (Existence) saw, 'I shall become many. I shall be born'."

 

Shankara: "How did That visualise? This is being answered: `Syam, I

shall become; bahu, many; Prajayeya, I shall be born excellently',

like earth taking shapes of pots etc. or ropes taking the shapes of

snakes etc. imagined by the intellect."

 

Objection: "In that case whatever is perceived is unreal, like a rope

perceived in the shape of a snake etc."

 

Shankara: "No. Since it is Existence itself that is perceived

otherwise through the duality of different forms, therefore, THERE IS

NO NON-EXISTENCE OF ANYTHING ANYWHERE. That is what we say."

 

Shankara (continuing): "As the Nyaya school, after assuming that a

thing is different from existence, says again that it has no

existence before its birth and after its destruction – it is not

assumed by us in that way, at anytime or anywhere, that any word or

any thing denoted by the word can be there differently from

Existence. But all words and all things that are spoken of with THE

IDEA OF THEIR BEING DIFFERENT FROM EXISTENCE, are Existence only,

just as in the world a rope itself is spoken of as a snake, under THE

IDEA THAT IT IS A SNAKE."

 

 

QUOTE 2

-------

>From Brahman Sutra Bhashya (II,1,17):

 

"The condition in which name and form become evolved is different

from the condition in which name and form is not so evolved. Hence

although the effect exists as non-different from the cause before

creation, still from the standpoint of this difference in conditions

the effect is declared to be non-existent before creation."

Later: "Therefore this declaration of non-existence of the effect

before creation is made from the standpoint of a difference of

conditions. Since in the world a thing is said to exist when it

manifests itself through name and form, therefore, as a concession to

common sense, the universe is said to be non-existent before being

evolved through name and form."

 

 

QUOTE 3

-------

>From Brahadaranyaka Upanishad bhashya (I,2):

 

Shankara: The effect too exists before it is produced.

 

Question: How?

 

Reply: Because its manifestation points out its pre-existence.

Manifestation means coming within the range of perception. It is a

common occurrence that a thing, a jar for instance, which was hidden

by darkness or any other thing and comes within the range of

perception when the obstruction is removed by the appearance of light

or in some other way, does not preclude its previous existence.

Similarly this universe too, we can understand, existed before its

manifestation. For a jar that is non-existent is not perceived even

when the sun rises.

 

Objection: No, it must be perceived, for you deny its previous non-

existence. According to you, any effect, say a jar, is never non-

existent. So it must be perceived when the sun rises. Its previous

form, the lump of clay, is nowhere near, and obstructions like

darkness are absent' so, being existent, it cannot but appear.

 

Reply: Not so, for obstruction is of two kinds. Every effect such as

a jar has two kinds of obstruction. When it has become manifest from

its component clay, darkness and the wall etc. are the obstructions;

while before its manifestation from the clay the obstruction consists

in particles of clay remaining as some other effect such as a lump.

Therefore, the effect, the jar, although existent, is not perceived

before its manifestation, as it is hidden. The terms and

concepts 'destroyed', 'produced', 'existence' and 'non-existence'

depend on this two-fold character of manifestation and disappearance.

 

Objection: This is incorrect, since the obstruction represented by

particular forms such as the lump of the two halves of a jar are of a

different nature. To be explicit: Such obstructions to the

manifestation of a jar as darkness or the wall, we see, do not occupy

the same space as a jar, but the lump or the two halves of a jar do.

So your statement that the jar, although present in the form of the

lump or the two halves, is not perceived because it is hidden, is

wrong, for the nature of the obstruction in this case is different.

 

Reply: No, for we see that water mixed with milk occupies the same

space as the milk which conceals it.

 

Objection: But since the component parts of a jar such as its two

halves or pieces are included in the effect, the jar, they should not

prove obstructions at all.

 

Reply: Not so, for being separated from the jar they are so many

different effects, and can therefore serve as obstructions.

 

Objection: Then the effort should be directed solely to the removal

of obstructions. That is to say, if, as you say, the effect, the jar

for instance, is actually present in the state of the lump or the two

halves, and is not perceived because of an obstruction, then one who

wants the effect, the jar, should try to remove the obstruction, and

not make a jar. But as a matter of fact, nobody does so. Therefore

your statement is wrong.

 

Reply: No, for there is no hard and fast rule about it. It is not

always the case that a jar or any other effect manifests itself if

only one tries to remove the obstruction; for when a jar, for

instance, is covered with darkness etc., one tries to light a lamp.

 

Objection: That too is just for destroying the darkness. This effort

to light a lamp is also for removing the darkness, which done, the

jar is automatically perceived. Nothing is added to the jar.

 

Reply: No, for the jar is perceived as covered with light when the

lamp is lighted. Not so before lighting of the lamp. Hence this was

not simply for removing the darkness, but for covering the jar with

light, for it is since perceived as covered with light. Sometimes the

effort is directed to the removal of the obstruction, as when the

wall, for instance, is pulled down. Therefore it cannot be laid down

as a rule that one who wants the manifestation of something must

simply try to remove the obstruction. Besides, one should take such

steps as will cause the manifestation for the efficacy of the

established practice regarding it. We have already said that an

effect which is patent in the cause serves as an obstruction to the

manifestation of the other effects. So if one tries only to destroy

the previously manifested effect such as the lump or the two halves

which stand between it and the jar, one may also have such effects as

the potsherds or tiny pieces. These too will conceal the jar and

prevent its being perceived; so a fresh attempt will be needed. Hence

the necessary operation of the factors of an action has its utility

for one who wants the manifestation of a jar or any other thing.

Therefore the effect exists even before its manifestation.

>From our divergent notions of the past and future also we infer this.

Our notions of a jar that was and one that is yet to be cannot, like

the notion of the present jar, be entirely independent of objects.

For one who desires to have a jar not yet made sets oneself to work

for it. We do not see people strive for things which they know to be

non-existent. Another reason for the pre-existence of the effect is

the fact that the knowledge (of God) and the Yogins concerning the

past and future jar is infallible. Were the future jar non-existent,

His (and their) perception of it would prove false. Nor is this

perception a mere figure of speech. As to the reasons for inferring

the existence of the jar, we have already stated them.

 

Another reason for it is that the opposite view involves a self

contradiction. If on seeing a potter, for instance, at work on the

production of a jar one is certain in view of the evidence that the

jar will come into existence, then it would be a contradiction in

terms to say that the jar is non-existent at the very time with which

it is said it will come into relation. For to say that the jar that

will be is non-existent, is the same thing as to say that it will not

be. It would be like saying, 'This jar does not exist.' If, however,

you say that before its manifestation the jar is non-existent,

meaning thereby that it does not exist exactly as the potter, for

instance, exists while he is at work on its production, then there is

no dispute between us.

 

Objection: Why?

 

Reply: Because the jar exists in its own future form. It should be

borne in mind that the present existence of the lump or the two

halves is not the same as that of the jar. Nor is the future

existence of the jar the same as theirs. Therefore you do not

contradict us when you say that the jar is non-existent before its

manifestation while the activity of the potter, for instance, is,

going on. You will be doing this if you deny to the jar its own

future form as an effect. But you do not deny that. Nor do all things

undergoing modification have an identical form of existence in the

present or in the future.

 

Moreover, of the four kinds of negation relating to, say, a jar, we

observe that what is called mutual exclusion is other than the jar:

The negation of a jar is cloth or some other thing, not the jar

itself. But the cloth, although it is the negation of the jar, is not

a non-entity, but a positive entity. Similarly, the previous non-

existence, the non-existence due to destruction, and absolute

negation must also be other than the jar: for they are spoken of in

terms of it, as in the case of the mutual exclusion relating to it.

And these negations must also (like the cloth, for instance) be

positive entities. Hence the previous non-existence of a jar does not

mean that it does not at all exist as an entity before it comes into

being. If however, you say that the previous non-existence of a jar

means the jar itself, then to mention it as being 'of a jar' (instead

of 'the jar itself') is an incongruity. If you use it merely as a

fancy, as in the expression, 'The body of the stone roller', then the

phrase 'the previous non-existence of a jar' would only mean that it

is the imaginary non-existence that is mentioned in terms of the jar,

and not the jar itself. If, on the other hand, you say that the

negation of a jar is something other than it, we have already

answered the point. Moreover, if the jar before its manifestation be

an absolute nonentity like the proverbial horns of a hare, it cannot

be connected either with its cause or with existence (as the

logicians hold), for connection requires two positive entities.

 

Objection: It is all right with things that are inseparable.

 

Reply: No, for we cannot conceive of an inseparable connection

between an existent and a non-existent thing. Separable or

inseparable connection is possible between two positive entities

only, not between an entity and a nonentity, nor between two

nonentities. Therefore we conclude that the effect does exist before

it is manifested.

 

 

I have no problem if you interpret Advaita the way you want to, but

please don't say that I have not produced quotes from the Acharya or

Upanishad to support my understanding of Advaita. It is not true.

 

Warm regards,

Chittaranjan